Very First Official Attempts!

This is going to be long.


Passion in General:
Before analyzing kinds of sorrow as they appear in Aquinas, it will be necessary to situate ourselves within his anthropology of passion and action. Aquinas develops passions in a unique way that bears traces of his Aristotelian heritage and which provides an interesting reflection on other stories of passion, such as the Stoic one.

At the beginning of the Prima Secundae of the Summa Theologica, Thomas Aquinas proclaims his intent to treat of man who “is said to be made in the image of God, according to which image is signified “intellectual” and free will and power through oneself (…) according to which he is the principle of his works, as having free will and power over his works.” Thomas distinguishes between “acts” and the “principles” of said acts (can passion be a principle of action? This is a fundamental question - and it is quite clear in Aquinas - for passion mitigates sin and also in a way mitigates virtue - depending on its relation to rationality - whether it precedes it or accompanies - deliberately vague - he has follows - it) - the actions being rather complex (he talks about voluntary and passions) and the principles being
Passions first appear as “actions” in the prologue to Question 6. It may seem rather puzzling to have “passions” appear as something active in the first place, albeit an “action” that is not, initially speaking, in virtue of man’s special rational nature, but something shared with other animals.

Because it is necessary to come to beatitude through acts, it is consequently necessary to consider human acts, so that we may know by which acts beatitude is reached, or the way of beatitude is impeded. But because operations and acts are about singulars, therefore every operative knowledge is perfected by considering particulars. Therefore because a moral consideration is of human (mine) acts, it is indeed handed over first to the universal; but secondly, to the particular. Concerning a universal consideration of human acts, certainly the first thing that happens to be considered is human acts; secondly, their principles. Now human acts are indeed those which are properly human, but certainly there are ones common between men and other animals. And because beatitude is properly a human good, those acts which are properly human hold themselves closer (propinquius) to beatitude than those which man shares in common with other animals. Therefore we will first consider those acts which are properly human; secondly, those acts which humans have in common with other animals, which are called passions of the soul.
What is interesting here as that passions are seen as something that participate in the way to beatitude. He avows that the “properly human acts” are closer to beatitude but does not thereby deny that passions which men “shares in common with other animals” are not included in beatitude. Note also the slight difference in language at the beginning when he makes a distinction between knowing by which acts beatitude is reached of by which acts the way of beatitude is impeded. By means of this we see a subtle spacing between acts by which beatitude might be reached and by which the “way of beatitude” “might be impeded”. The use of the ablative indicates usage here - and the subjunctive indicates possibility - thus we see that Aquinas here does not immediately constitute beatitude as an action (he treats of this question in q. 3 articles one and two in which he distinguishes happiness on two counts - on its object and cause and on its essence - which would be an action) but rather speaks in terms of all actions here insofar as they conduce to or “impede the way to” beatitude.
Aquinas provides a context for the order of his questions which is not necessarily the only possible one. Indeed, in view of his anthropological postures one might build up a similar story in which passions are first treated (?)
DONE. Only thing to note with Voluntariety is that there’s imperfect voluntaries which has to do with - “perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationships of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end.”
However, for our methodology, we propose to analyze passion “purely” - in a conceptual sense, to suck in the dynamics as Aquinas conceives them. It will be difficult to define a clear path between passion and action and even more difficult to keep unentangled voluntariety and passion, but we propose for our analysis to first to distinctly label “passion” insofar as we can and later on to complexify it as Aquinas does almost at the level of every article. For the structure of our path we will follow Aquinas’ relentless narrowing of the meaning of “passion” in question 22.
The first article asks whether any passion might be found in the soul. The objections to the proposition lies in the formal nobility of the soul - passion belongs to matter, the soul has no matter, is thus not easily changed, and, unlike things which are subject to passion, does not deteriorate in its nature - I.e., it is not prone to corruptio. In answering the question, Aquinas delineates three degrees of what it means to have a “passion“.
The first possibility of “passion” is to receive something in general. Now the example which Aquinas provides for this general sense is one that seems to partake more of the notion of “perfection” as he notes - in the case of the air “receiving” light. The underlying metaphysics of this process is that something which has potential to be or to behave differently than it does of itself, in other words, whose possibilities of being are not contained and sustained wholly by its own permanent actuality (I.e., every finite thing) “undergoes” or “receives” “something” for a particular perfection of its way of being. Passion, as such, is thus not immediately or per se something that detracts or twists a being from itself, but can actually be the means or the flip-side of its actualization, just as light can be seen as a perfection of air or of a space - adding to it in a sense, the power to make the objects contained in it visible.
At the second sally, however, Aquinas discerns what he calls the proper meaning of passion - that is, denoting that something is taken from the subject as well as something being received by the subject. He provides a two-fold and reversed example - the case of health being received and sickness taken, and the case of sickness being received and health taken. It is interesting that he did not discern this in the case of the air being lit up - as one might think that the air which has received light has also “lost” darkness. But what is important here is the two-sidedness of one apparent action or passion - the taking and receiving. Without even bringing in a mention of the actor of the passion, that is, focusing solely on the sufferer as centre, he distinguishes a double-sided change, which, he says, constitutes the proper sense of passion. Perhaps it is this double change that promotes corruption - the impact of something losing what it had before.
It is this double-sided conception of passion which is more proper because it implies a drawing toward the agent and a movement from something that is within oneself. (I wonder how rare this is - whether passion is usually focused on from the point of view of the actor, which takes place in heroic epics, or from the point of the helpless actee - in which case depicted as something helpless. Aquinas undertakes to highlight the situation of the passionate subject which is drawn from something in oneself (whether that thing be really suitable or unsuitable for itself) and toward something (which likewise may be suitable or may be unsuitable). This dual movement sets the stage for his “metaphysics” of human passions.
The third meaning of passion is basically the more intensified version of the second “proper” sort of passion, when the subject receives something unsuitable and loses something suited to himself. This is more passionate because passion has the character of originating from something “outside” oneself, I.e. something “acting” upon oneself in a certain sense - and the more a thing is drawn from what is suited to it the more it can be seen to be affected by the power of something else.
Returning to the original question whether the soul can be affected by passion, Aquinas notes that it is certainly affected in the first way - as in “feeling ? And understanding” being ‘ a kind of’ passion (De Anima I. 5) But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation -
But he concludes that passion per se is only in the soul accidentally - that is, as the composite of the soul and body together are affected. He distinguishes degree here as well - if the change is for the worse, it is more of a passion.
So we see that passion is present in the soul as it is in composition with the body, although one kind of “passion” is in respect of the soul alone.
The second article addresses the question whether passion is something more cognitive (apprehensive -sic) or appetitive. Thomas decides in favor of appetitive because it is through the “appetitive power that the soul has an order to things in themselves,” and passion involves being drawn by some thing, whereas the object of the intellect is not something in itself, but only a thing as it exists within a mind - that is, by its intention. What is interesting in this section is the active status that is given to passion - we see in objection 2 that the appetitive part is considered to be more active than the apprehensive or cognitive part, because (as we see in the response) it is more a principle of exterior action. Although Thomas assigns as the reason the part that it is more active because it is more passive - it is the power that actually relates to things in themselves. This is interesting because in a way, it assigns almost what one is tempted to call an “inferior” status to the intellect, which is concerned with things not as they are in themselves, but according to their form, their ratio, or their intention. (Tempted, indeed! the superiority of the intellect is clear in the first part - inherent nobility - taking in the forms of things, etc. and so far as it is related to things, it would be related to things more through their ratios - 'penetrates interiors' - this cognitive way of 'entering' is spoken about in 'love' and also spoken about in the Bible in the twofold use of 'to know someone' - here 'things in themselves must be understood as something good - and the only thing we have when intellectual access is inadequate) (Ftnt - Whether apprehension is superior to appetition is actually considered by Aquinas in a certain context - I.e. with respect to God - find. It is a complex question because of the nature of the high degree of intellectual knowledge which causes Aquinas to conclude that knowledge of natural things surpasses appetite for them, but the power of the human intellect is unceasingly surpassed by the nature of God as an intellectual object, in which case “being drawn as it were by love to God” is superior to a knowledge of him). (But the fact that we have one case where passion is superior to action - as it were - where “being drawn” trumps “plumbing the depths” - (simply because the depths cannot be plumbed by us - or even by God in that sense - when he talks about God - it is not about “containing” but about “nothing being hid” - the fact that this case is open means that in relation to God.. Perhaps with regards to things also that we would do for the love of God by extension - as Aquinas says - loving things in God)………..
Another interesting point that is developed in article 2 is the explicit opening of the bodily dimension (or essence) of passion as set forth by Aquinas. Objection 3 refers to it “Passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation.” (The argument is that sensitive apprehension requires a bodily transmutation as well as sensitive appetition). This objection requires Aquinas to negotiate more explicitly what sort of bodily changes occur in passion - as opposed to an apprehensive change which is “accidental” , such as an eye becoming “dissolved” through gazing intently at a bright object, the bodily change is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite - it is the “natural change of the organ”. The single example given is the material definition of anger as “a kindling of blood around the heart”.
With this sketch of the materiality of passion, we can return to the question of “corruption” as it exists in Aquinas. Can passions be harmful to the body? To inquire into this, it would be useful to look at the best passion - the one that is said to perfect the lover (supposing that the object is really suitable). On the one hand we find that love perfects, on the other hand, because of the intensity of the change, it might incidentally corrupt. (Is this only in really intense occasions? Or always?
This is an interesting question - what precisely are the dynamics or mechanics of passion in relation to the human body/composite? Passions use up energy - they are also “more the principle of exterior action” - we can say that they provide “energy”, “impetus” for external actions, we are aware of “adrenolyn” “libido” and many other things. But with passion comes also exhaustion. And people have finite amounts of energy. Passion perfects and removes from one - even if it is suitable, there is always something that is in a way consuming one - like a candle, when it burns or acts it also disappears.
THIRD POINT - the tension or straining. Objection 1 makes the point that the “first” in a genus seems to be the cause of the others, and because passion in the apprehensive power precedes passion in the appetitive power it would seem to have more passion. The answer which is more complex involves an explanation in remarkably dynamic terms - speaking of the straining (intensio) of something which increases inasmuch as it approaches to one first principle (need a metaphysics of gradated being here and gradated being that has the capacity of tensing towards or falling short of its perfection - some things richer than others). Things that are closer to the supreme first principle have less potentiality because they are already in act. Those things which recede from perfection (not just lack - dynamic) have more of the notion of passion. The intensity of the tensions is also interesting - inasmuch as something approaches to perfection, its perfection becomes more intense, inasmuch as it regresses from perfection, the defect is more intense - it seems odd to call a defect “intense“ because the direction of things is toward the good and failing is not so much something that is vehement but something that would be due to a lack of vehemence - but in this context it makes sense because it would thus at the same time more prone to passion because it has less actuality whether its actuality is merely potential or it does not have that capacity at all). Thus it would be that the prior powers - for us, the apprehensive power - of the soul there would be less passion because they are prior in actuality.
This, however, leaves the question open as to the objects of passion. (?) Question 3 asks whether passion is more in the intellectual part or the sensitive part.
(LEFT OUT THE FIRST - would be important because it incorporates passion for divine things with love of divine things which itself needn’t be passionate - but the point would be the first one - he mentions in conjunction - the answer is interesting - preceding consideration of love for divine things before he talks about “suffering“ them in an intellectual way which doesn‘t require the body. Thomas has interest in keeping these things distinct because perhaps it is easy to mistake “feeling“ for “love“ but without some kind of information about the other feeling perhaps may close in upon itself and become a reflexive exercise which in turn will fade out as it is discovered that there is no real object).
Would it not be the case that it is more intellectual - because the intellectual part would have a much more formidable object - I.e. the good taken universally? In other words, what would stir me up more - this chocolate-chip cookie or the prospect of a providence encouraging all things to their ends? (This is not what he means - a 'universal' good - he means that 'good' has the aspect of universal which is clear in the prima pars somewhere).In addition, surely we understand joy and love as belonging to an intellectual plane as well as to the more homely one. I can love qualities in my husband that I perceive, but not in my senses, as well as for his overall physical attractions - (indeed, for most of us it would seem difficult to conceive one kind of love completely separately from the other). But the point is that love certainly happens at an intellectual plane. The response serves to drive home the point that passion is about proprie the transmutatio corporalis. Contemplating my husband as a seat of political virtues, for example, does not of itself require that my heart beats faster with admiration - although this may happen and most likely does happen - depending on whether the person is at that moment more fused or more distant within her bodily being. But the point is that passion per se would not be intellectual admiration per se - it is essentially about the kindling, the sweating, the cooling, the shivering, the hastening, the retreating, the trembling, the titillation, the depression, the relaxation.
(forgot to mention the possibility of the recipient which is where I was going at first).
His answer for 3 is also important - love and joy as they appear in God. The significance of this is that if the angels and God may be called “passionate” by a certain “usurpation” of speech, that there is some kind of likeness (similitudinem operum) in actions - which seemingly is best described by us in terms of passions. “Simple act of the will with a likeness of effect, absque passions. You see Augustine in his analysis ascribes something negative to passion - affection infirm tam which could theoretically connote a metaphysical state or moral weakness (knowing Augustine it must be the latter) whereas Aquinas simply detaches passion from the deic and angelic equation without any further reflection upon our situation.
Aquinas has now delimited passion to something that is both crude (if the body is to be considered crude) while dynamically complex even in its first formulation in article 1. The intellect can have a kind of passion, but not the kind which we are concerned with. The senses can also have a kind of passion, but in an incidental sense that does not concern us. Passion, as discussed in this part of the treatise, is something that is undergone with the occurrence of a bodily change - involving a twofold alteration in the subject - a reception based on a drawing towards that which influences it, and a loss of something that the subject had or was (whether appropriately or inappropriately).
It’s possible I don’t even have to deal with irascible, or at least not here - because I am concerned with a concupiscible passion. Maybe I can refer to this later. Fourth article very helpful. It distinguishes three moments in a passion - and it is also more complex in that we have brought in the possibility of a mover repelling as well as drawing which happened I’m not sure where (or if this is a useful point). Three moments in drawing - giving it a kind of connaturality (disposition?) to itself, secondly, gives movement towards it, third, to rest. He does not discuss a contrary case with an undesired object because the natural movement of a thing is towards something that is suitable to it - and giving something repugnance is not the same as giving movement away from it - the repugnance would come more from within the subject - the unsuitability of the object, which is something relational to the apprehensive capacity or the nature of its subject, is what gives an inclination away from it. Unsuitability enough? lackingness - there is not much intelligibility. But there is at the same time if you have to figure out how to avoid it. No, there isn’t. Because we talk about end. There is not much of a conceptual framework of “not end” - we work in terms of the good. Which is why sorrow can really throw us off of ourselves after a while. And we succumb and adjust or succumb and don’t adjust, which perhaps is not succumbing. Either way - whether cognitive or real dissonance - the subject is suffering. Is there an objective measurement of sorrow? Not really. Talks about voice and movements - but the opposites can mean the same thing. At any rate, this movement towards the good.
I think I might leave the morality of the passions until later - in the reconstructions. We will start with sorrow as a most passionate passion - explain this somewhere. Working from the non-moral passions before we rebuild something, sort of after the manner of Aquinas. Furthermore, the order of the passions among each other will be something that will be elucidated in analyzing sorrow.
We now have enough elements to begin our treatment of sorrow.
SORROW IN GENERAL
We start with question 35 which initiates the discussion on “pain” or “sorrow”. What will be interesting to note about the question in general is the two terms, “dolore” and “tristitia”. Aquinas assigns an explicit meaning to each - and yet, throughout the questions sometimes uses them interchangeably - it would be interesting to see in which contexts.
The first objection faces the question of dolor which has been translated as “pain”. There are reminiscent traces of the first question on whether there is passion in the soul - “dolor” seems to belong more to the body than to the soul. There are echoes of article (apprehens) as he cites Augustine that bodily pain is the sense resisting a stronger body - which emphasizes the apprehended-ness of pain. The third objection suggests a much more general passion than even that of the animal nature - I.e. the “natural” appetite - citing Augustine, Aquinas says that if there were no good in our nature, we should not feel pain over its loss. This is an interesting approach - what precisely would constitute pain at the level of natural appetite? Augustine’s quotation is only good for a reflective animal - not for animal passions in general - it presupposes a general comprehension of what would be good for one and an alertness as to when good is missing - something that Aquinas would grant only in a partial sense to animals. No, not necessarily. Augustine speaks of if our nature was not good. Not intellectual approach. Having some good enables us to “feel” good that is lost - pain. Interesting - this is something purely passionate. “there would be no pain of good lost as punishment.” And yet there would be some kind of evaluative process going on - an ability to compare what was with what is that enables us to “have pain”. Maybe not quite general in the intellectual sense, but in the estimative sense which Aquinas assigns as an animal power (to other animals as well as humans).
Aquinas provides an answer with stating that there is a twofold element required for pain (dolorem) - conjunctio et perceptio. Simple conjunction with something else that is not “good” or “bad” in connection with oneself causes neither pain nor pleasure. (Interesting point) At this level we could place analyses of what goes into making something “bad” or “good” to a subject. It is the ratio of something bad that causes pain - does this ratio consist in itself, in relation to the subject, or in relation to the subject’s perception? There can be a disconnect at any one of these levels. It seems that ratio of “badness” or “goodness” would be in its “objective” relation to the particular subject - swallowing a rock, for example, is good for a bird’s digestion but bad for a child’s digestion - this seems to be the “objective” part because the second element deals with the subject’s perception.
What matters here is that something cannot cause pain without the subject’s perception of his conjunction with something bad. This is essentially important - it essentially states that a reflexive element is required for pain. A person who is anesthetized - while his body may be undergoing something “evil” - such as getting his kidneys removed by a quack doctor, has no physical pain, and if no understanding of the fact, no interior pain either. This radically focuses the notion of “passion” and also raises another interesting reflection - could there be passion when the subject is so overwhelmed by passion as to become dulled in his perception of it? And if not, what would be the name that we give to the passion beyond the limits of passion? And what role would it play in our analysis of sorrow, which - as Aquinas notes, is the most passionate of passions and thus in a sense, closest to the bottom limits of passion.
If we force “passion” as a concept to implode, thus finding the regulative nature of its concept (for pure passion does not exist), we will perhaps be in a better position to navigate the fields of passion as they are actually lived which partake of these elements to a much lesser degree, and the active vision of passion, where the subject is in some way making his claim or exerting his activity or being actualized by passion, will be visible in much higher relief: these are the places where, when it is necessary, we must appeal for rehabilitation, or if rehabilitation is not necessary, these are the places where we can give credit and encouragement. Again, in that very action oriented sentence, we must remember that sorrow will be the “most passionate of passions” and we mean to explore its worst scenarios.
Thomas then distinguishes two ways of apprehending something - in a sensitive/sensible way or in an intellectual way. The natural appetite is not something that follows the apprehension of the one in whom it exists but in another (I.e. the author of nature - prima, 6:1 ad 2 and 103, 1 and 3).
Thomas points out that every movement of the sensitive appetite is a passion - particularly those that tend to defect. Whence dolor, as it is in the sensitive appetitie, is most properly (progressive) called a passion of the soul, just as corporeal afflictions are properly called the passions of the body. SO THIS WOULD BE THE DISTINCTION THAT I AM MAKING. We are concerned with the passions of the soul, the composite - not the passions of the body. Whence Augustine names pain a special affliction.
The answers to the objections clarify this point - the first - the principle that the body cannot suffer unless the soul suffers. (This would indicate the strength and the limits of the composite - the soul is the place where suffering would take place - and even if the body suffers, the soul does not necessarily feel pain). Would the implications of this be that one need not suffer if one’s soul has the power of tranquillity? We will leave aside for the moment this question which opens a number of others, including the question of what would enable one not to suffer anymore (which, in a way, is frequently considered the project of philosophy - to “attain blessedness” - Spinoza? Definitely Stoics in a way - some - apathia). Perhaps we shall find out there are no absolute theoretical stipulations on a therapy of sorrow. (Job is my mental backup - but - Aquinas… is there room for that in him? I.e. justification in suffering? Everything would be completely relative to the person - his capacities, history, stage in development, experiences, etc. chiefly bodily weakness, I would imagine - and yet not only that - because an elderly person may be much weaker and deteriorated than a young, healthy person and yet you see that youths are much more existential than elderly. Aquinas talks about the “paassibility” of the patient - which is shortest for now to say that only God can really judge - although too short for philosophy. Conceptual answer - there are these divisions.
PROBLEMS. It is about passion - and yet - IF it was ONLY conjunction, it WOULD NOT BE - it is about an order of “things as they are in themselves” BUT… The order TO things as they are in themselves IS THROUGH perception. So we don’t really have access to things as they are in themselves - BUT - we have access to the influence they have on us - THAT they influence us might be in a way beyond our power at the time - but how this influence is evaluated, treated, and perhaps even interpreted and thus in a way freely claimed or at least engaged with or deflected by the subject, in which case passion would be converted or at least simultaneous with and the occasion of and even identical with the action of the patient/agent. But is the Stoic dream possible always and everywhere? Frankly, no. Aquinas asks this, whether perfection may be possible in this life and basically concludes that it takes place more in the reason than in actual “success” - but “failure“ is a relative term in relation to a perfection that is mostly a regulative idea for dynamic creatures at least in what Aquians would call our condition or even beyond that - in terms of our “wayfaring” position. There are incremental perfections - this is what it means to learn. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.
The second objection is making the same point basically - by affirming that we do not suffer in our senses, but by means of our senses - having sensitive skin and a nervous system, for example, makes it possible for me (the composite which is self-reflexive on the part of the soul) to be pained when I step on a nail.
Maybe I should clarify the “relationship” between body and soul… but no - I’ll never get anywhere - give a footnote.
The third is interesting - indicates a relation between the natural appetite and the sensitive appetite - which is so intertwined, that even though the natural appetite is not grasped by the subject, the subject suffers in the sensitive appetite when it “senses” a natural good is lost. This is interesting because it makes passion possible
“Pain at the loss of good shows the goodness of nature; not because pain is an act of the natural appetite, but because nature seeks something as good, which when it senses a removal, it follows that the passion of pain happens in the sensitive appetite.” This brings up an interesting question - what about the apprehensive status here? The perceptio? What about passion that does not distinctly apprehend what of its good is lost? “Sensing” something is “lost” - would it be the same thing as “apprehending” something “evil”? This last answer to the objection tends to slightly weaken the perceptio part - well - no - sensing something is perception - but it makes the perceptio not necessarily something quite distinct.
Aquinas’ strong emphasis on the twofold basis of passion - conjunctio with something (good or) evil and perception of this conjunction creates an interesting framework. It would perhaps mean on the one hand that the more passible agent is capable of suffering more, even if the object causing its suffering is not so great - on the other hand, rooting passion firmly in perception would mean that somebody with a very distinct perception, let’s say at the sensitive and intellectual level to start with, would be more powerful in that sense, but also with a greater capacity for suffering because of a greater capacity for perception. What complicates the matter is that intellectual sorrow is something a little bit different - it is more about the “displeased” as Aquians calls it later - and there is to be supposed a number of pleasures that go with intellectual activity - but on the other hand - in a “perfect” human being - passions flow from the higher to the lower - although it is to be presumed that both passions of joy and passions of sorrow, beause consequent and in a sense mediated through the intellect would thereby be already non-excessive and thus not passionate in the “bad” sense - the “most proper” sense of defect. But it takes a long time to become virtuous. The problem is that the apprehensive may increase before the appetitive catches up - “emotional immaturity” is a new catchword. The passions cannot simply be expected to sit, wait, and then follow meekly behind the intellect once the intellect is “emended”. It is much more complicated than that.
The passions are not to be completely separated, but deferentially integrated particularly when they are strong for one - and at every step remedied rather than punished or stifled - if they are simply ignored they cannot be recalled “later” in an orderly fashion - to expect they will harmoniously follow is similar to a conceptual framework in Aquinas but not because they are involved at every step of the way. Moreover. Passions as intermediate voluntariety. Love of God stronger than X. Nope. It is a progress, a story, if you like, of the “heart” and the “flesh” together. (My heart and my flesh have rejoiced in the living God - the flesh rejoices also because it plays an actual role in redemption).
The second question deals with the distinction between sorrow and pain. In view of the determination of the “seat” of pain being “in the soul” distinct from sensation itself in the last article, it is odd that the first objection distinguishes pain as belonging “to the body”. This characterization would place pain in the body; sorrow in the soul. The second suggests that sorrow extends through time in a way that pain does not - sorrow can regard evils that are past or future. Finally - pain is said to follow the sense of touch - sorrow can follow any of the senses.
The sed contra on the other hand, suggests they are the same on the basis of St. Pauls’ words.
The answer itself distinguishes the basis of the pain - whether it results from exterior apprehension or interior apprehension. THIS is most interesting. Would it mean, then, that I can have pain from something that I see as well as something that I touch. Sorrow is a species of pain - would it thereby be something that is even more reflexive? Certainly something more intellectual - one might say - but then Thomas distinguishes at one point “whether of the imagination or of the intellect”. WHat is the imagination for Aquinas? It is closely connected with intellectual activity - for we think with images - most helpfully. BUT how closely is it connected with sensitive knowledge? I forget how it acts for each capacity. Because the imagination at the service of the intellect is different. But even animals I presume can have nightmares.
1. Aug. talking according to use of vocabulary. 2. The exterior sense does not perceive (something) unless as present (Hence the associations with time - which is not the essential distinction but an accidental one).
Third is also very interesting. The third objection states that sensible objects are painful not only because exceed the proportion of the sensitive power but also because “contrary to nature” - I.e. somebody who is in a fire is getting hurt - it will result in a bodily affliction. This is an interesting interlude: Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10.
Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy.
What comes in through the other senses - hearing, seeing, etc. would be an object of sorrow rather than pain. Pain is restricted to a passion of the soul that happens by means of the sense of touch.
The third article : Is sorrow (or pain) really contrary to pleasure? The first objection suggests that sorrow causes joy, but not in a psychoanalytic sense, citing “Blessed are those who weep”. The second cites Augustine “weeping is a bitter thing, but it can nevertheless be pleasant sometimes.” While sorrow can cause pleasure, pleasure can also cause sorrow - for example “wicked men” being sorry for the (wicked) things they took pleasure in (as “repenting” of those things). Sed Contra talks about consension and dissension in Augustine as defining joy (laetitia) and sorrow (tristitia). The reply notes that passions and motions are distinguished on the basis of their object and sorrow and joy are thus fundamentally differentiated. However, the response to the first recognizes the instrumentality of sorrow for joy - either to “seek more vehemently” one’s desired object or on the other hand, sorrow may be better sustained with the hope of gaining one’s desire. The second reply considers that pain may cause pleasure insofar as it is something wonderful - like in the theatre - or that “facit percipere amorem eius” - makes one to percieve his love the more. This perhaps would be an interesting reflection for psychoanalytic paths. We love pain insofar as it makes us “perceive” - both the res amatum and the amare “itself“. The third takes a rather different approach - “will” and “reason” are reflected upon their acts, inasmuch as the act of the will and the reason are considered under the aspect of good or evil. And thus also can sadness be a cause of delight - if it is considered to be something good. Sadness as a cause for reflective delight - a cause of moral approbation in oneself.
The next article asks whether every sorrow is contrary to every pleasure. He distinguishes something being contrary - by special difference (secundum formam speciei) or simply by being in variant fields (secundum formam generis). Things are distinguished on the basis of their own form or in relation to something external - as is the case with passions and changes (motus) which are characterized by their termini or from their objects.
Some species fall under contrary general fields without being opposite to each other specifically - Aquinas gives the example of intemperance and justice, which are opposed in that one belongs to vice and the other to virtue, but there is no real juxtaposition or contrariety between them because they do not concern the same kind ofobject. However, in the case where the species depends on a something external, contrary movements might be actually harmonious or have a mutual “affinity” - insofar as “approaching to light” is not opposed to “drawing out of darkness” (He does not say it is the SAME because it is not logically necessary that it be the same, but that it has an “affinity” ‘relation of convenience and similitude’ - harmoniousness)
He then distinguishes the genera of sorrow and pleasure (delectatio) in light of their effected movements - pleasure “pertains” to pursuit and sorrow to flight - a similar proportion to affirmation and negation in the intellect. But as we have noted in respect of their objects “contrary” movements may not actually be contrary. Thus we see that pleasure does not necessarily preclude every kind of sorrow, but that some sorrows might actually be “convenient” with some pleasures in respect of their corresponding loves.
However, sorrow is not necessarily so convenient from a different point of view. The answer to the second objection notes that while any pleasure whatsoever acts as a remedy (medicina) against any sadness, any sadness whatsoever hinders (est impeditiva) any pleasure. While joy and sorrow can be compatible as to their external objects, it remains that from the point of view of their movement they are different. Sorrow is a kind of “flight“ (se habet ut fugiens) whereas pleausure is a kind of rest (appetitus se habet ut acceptans id quod habet). In view of the destabilization that sorrow incurs, it can affect any pleasure; in view of the embracing and expansive nature of pleasure, it serves to reunify the self which has been subject to the ravages which sorrow can inflict (Cf. ad 3.- “confortatur” and “molestatur”).
Thus we see the delicate balancing relationship that can take place between pleasure and sorrow. Any sorrow has the capacity for blighting any pleasure - any pleasure has the capacity to mitigate any sorrow. This may be seen as an equilibrium that is more or less maintained throughout the general run of life, but what of these dynamics’ implications when a sorrow becomes so heavy as to overpower pleasures’ capacity for mitigating it? We will examine this question further on.
Aquinas next asks whether the pleasure of contemplation can have a contrary sorrow. “Contemplation” seems to be put forward in this context as the most stable, secure and blessed of the pleasures. It is not subject to time, such as social pleasures or pleasures of food or sex or music or the bath or other kinds (except accidentally, insofar as one’s body tires) - it is internal, constant, and most satisfying (we speak here of contemplation “generally”). PROBABLY WILL DELETE… I think the point would be that consolation would be the “one” pleasure that is stable. He distinguishes contemplation. I’ll continue this part later.
REST: NEED TO DO AT SOME POINT - just seem too obvious right now
Art. 6 - Sorrow shunned more than pleasure to be sought?
Art. 7 - Exterior pain greater than interior? (no - relevant perhaps in my discussion earlier).
Art. 8 - Only four species of sorrow… THIS will be important.
Then causes, etc.
CAUSES OF SORROW - QUESTION 36 - Back to “metaphysics” of the appetite.
The loss of a good, or the occurrence of the evil? Seems to be a dumb question if one thinks in terms of evil as a privation - it would always be in terms of a loss. However, this is where Aquinas bows to the perceptive mode of the appetite. “In apprehension, privation has the notion of some kind of being, whence it is called a being of reason. And so evil, since it is a privation, has itself through the mode of contrary. “has status of contrary”?
But with the appetitive movement - because it has to do with some kind of flight or recess/retreat, it regards a conjoined evil. Since an object is the cause of a passion, it is more proper to say that a conjoined evil rather than a lost good is the cause. SOMETHING is there to be overcome according to the lights of the sad person.

IS DESIRE (They’re Wrong, it’s not desire - its concupiscence - are they different?) A CAUSE OF PAIN? What is VERY interesting here is Augustine’s “with stealthy entry of ignorance of things to be done and desire of harmful things, X error and pain came too.”
Ignorance of things to be done… how does this come? And how does deisre of harmful things come in - through ignorance or because of it - through ignorance one desires things that are not appropriate for one? Concomitant with it? Then HE says but ignorance is a cause of error, therefore concupiscence is a cause of pain.
VERY interesting - desire here in a future context - love is the greatest source of pleasure - question 32.6 (FIND) - THIS WOULD BE INTERESTING IN LIGHT OF STUPID THINGS I WAS SAYING ABOUT CONTEMPLATION.
Augustine in the wide sense of love as extending to longing or desire that he clals it the “cause of all sorrow”.
Aquinas enunciates the principle that desire - as something that is looked-for can be the cause of sorrow - sorrow over the delay or complete disappearance of the good we desire. But it cannot be the cause of all sorrow, because we are sorrier over the loss of good we are already enjoying, than we are over goods for which we have simply entertained desires. (not unless foretastes of them).
(Also he notes in ad 2 that future objects are “present in a way” by hoping - or that the obstacle to the future is clear here and now which causes sorrow.
INTERESTING - for him he mentions grieving in this life over the delay (CHECK or over one’s sins) ‘by which he also merits eternal life’. Also notes (3) that desire gives pleasure as long as there is hope for it- but it gives pain when hope is lost. (INTERESTING TOO - instead of dying, it turns to sorrow and so lives).
Desire for unity? Objections - Aristotle - ‘repletion’ and ‘separation’ as causes of pleasure and pain seems to have to do with food (?) but there are others! 2) then no separation would be pleasurable (but unwelcome things!) 3) can look at it as “desire to be seprated from evil” as much as “desire to be united with the good”.
REFERENCE TO THE PLATONISTS - the goodness of a thing consists in a certain unity - as it has so many things united in itselves it constitutes its perfection - whence the Platonists posited “oneness” to be a principle like good. Everything therefore naturally desires unity just as goodness. 1) Not every unity I - e.g. excessive. 2) separation can cause pleasure when removes something inimical OR when conjoined by some union e.g. of one sense with its object. 3) insofar as they deprive one of one’s proper unity.
4 IRRESISTIBLE POWER?
Interesting, because would any irresistible power - even for the good? But then it would not have the ratio of ’irresistible’ but rather of ‘yay!’ irresistible means there is some kind of resistance going on - resisting good makes sense for inexperienced children who want the good of autonomy without seeing the relation it has to virtue and other things - who develop the one thing before embracing the others- the dialectical progression ya might say. But some things are more apparently good than others - simply.
Something that is evil to something is contrary to its inclination therefore “obviously” what brings this about is stronger than it. (thus the kind of helpless or involuntary aspect in whatever is suffering - no capacity to pursue its own inclination - this as the definition of power - not that of ruling others unless its making it possible also for others to pursue their own inclination - interesting the history of “inclination” from Aquinas to Kant).
Brings up also here the possibility of what had been so counter-inclinational changes the subject so that it is hten in harmony with the thing’s inclination - corruption is possible (I wonder if corruption would laos be possible for the “good” and yet the will cannot be forced in Aquinas, I think, though perhaps enticed to be itself… but this is not related because we’re supposing some kind of unity here - but if it is minor inclinations and if it is the will bringing oneself into continual contact/training, it would be free at the same time - because it has been desired although not fully unified.). CORRUPTION. If there is no longer sadness, the passion would seem to be complete. If it would not resist, but ceded in consenting, pain would not follow, but pleasure. STill questionable - because if it were really bad would the thing still have enough unity? It would be a different unity - one that would enable it to rest in these circumstances - corrupted. When is the perception wrong and the conquering right? Freedom is about luring - alluring the will - through tastes of the good - what is that in the song of songs about girls running after?
THE EFFECTS OF PAIN OR SORROW - QUESTION 37
This is per se or about the useful sorrow. (Careful)
1) does pain (dolor) take away one’s ability to learn? Compare with the question on contemplation. (I said stupid things about contempation - also about passive thing).
One of the objections was that interior sorrow is worse and yet we have seen that someone can learn in sorrow. Cites Augustine’s toothache. The answer is that all the powers fo the soul are rooted in its one, single essence. Thus if its energies are vigorously directed into the activity of one power, they must be withdrawn from the activity of any other ofr the soul being one, its energies can be directed towards one thing only.
2fold reason - “dolor sensibilis maxime trahit ad se intentionem animae” because naturally the whole intention tends toard repelling the contrary. Everything is sort of put on hold when the body is in distress. Also a lot of energy for studying “magna intentione”. Intense pain prevents any learning - but it differs according to the love which a man has for learning or considering - so much does it retain his soul’s intention, to be not wholly borne over to pain.
Answer to second objection - pleasure and pain can both impede thought - but pain draws the intention more than pleasure - when moderate pain can help by taking away excessive pleasure (but per se it impedes and can totally prevent).
What would be excessive pleasure to study? It requires work.
The reason that pain causes more harm than sorrow in this respect is that it involves a greater physiological change. “contemplation needs ‘omnimodam quietem’.
2. DOES SORROW WEIGH DOWN
We saw this already in anxiety - which is so weighed down as to prevent the flight. Here it “aggravat animum, in quantum impedit ipsum ne fruatur eo quod vult.” The other one impedes so that there might not be flight. If it’s not so strong as to banish hope, then one retains strength to repulse hurtful thing. However - if evil so strong superexcrescat vis mali intantumut spem evasionis excludat” then it will simply impede the interior movement of the soul by anguish.”
Before he was talking about exterior movement, limbs, voice - was it in the context of “sign”? Voice - above all other things - signifies interior concept. Here the iessential consideration f the interior movement.
And when the exterior movement of the body is also impeded, then what remains - a man "stupid" "in himself".
Exterior could also not yet be impeded - but it can eventually.
By being weighed down this contraction happens - “not able to progredi ad exteriora libere”
Do sorrow or pain weaken all one’s activities?
2 ways - the activity is a source of sorrow - certainly. If the sorrow is a cause of action - the activity is augmented “augeatur")
IS THE BODY HARMED BY SORROW MORE THAN BY THE OTHER EMOTIONS?