FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF PASSION as seen through "sorrow" treatise

WAIT - working with general passions first.
22.1
reception/reception with loss (intensio et remissio)
art. 2 - more appetitive than apprehensive
art. 3 - sensitive more than intellectual
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23. 1 - conc. and irasc.
23.2 - not of "good and bad" but "simple and hard"
23.3 - anger has no contrary
23.4 - some passions spec. different but not contrary - 3fold form given to passionate subject - connaturality, movement, rest.
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24.1 - can be moral good and evil - insofar as subject/somehow partaking in reason
24.2 - passions not evil of themselves - cites apparent dif. betw. Stoics and Peripatetics - claims to be a matter of "words"
24.3 - influence upon morality - both for the bad and for the good - can decrease goodness, mitigate or increase badness, but also pertains to "perfection" of man with regard to their being subject to reason.
24.4 - passions can't be "good" or "bad" in their "natural genus" and yet, of their "moral genus" specific passions - considered as subject to reason and will - and some are good/bad of their species depending on their object - e.g. another's good, another's evil, one's good, one's evil - (he uses "envy" and "shame" here which is interesting because he used "mercy" and "modesty" in the sed contra - the good versions and the bad versions : )
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25.1 - Conc. precedes irasc because regards good absolutely (interesting in light of discussions about the superiority of irascible passions - prefigured in obj. 1 - the 'difficult good' being more excellent - reply is that the object of the conc. good is not contrary to the arduous good)
25.2 - Love the chief of the conc. passions? Here I found it necessary to include a whole excerpt:
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (11, 3, ad 3).
25.3 talks about IRASCIBLE - order of intention (without mentioned explicitly) and execution (specifically) - in which anger is last. Also important:
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
25.4 the four chief passions: (ones that will be dealing with the most and as such would require the most correction/honing/therapy inasmuch as this would be necessary depending on their nature)
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
SORROW
art. 1
conjunctio +perceptio conjunctionis
art. 2
interior/exterior apprehension
art. 3/4 - relations/contrarieties w/ pleasure
art. 5 - relations w/ contemplation
art. 6 - whether to be evaded more than pleasures pursued
art. 7 - interior pain greater than outward
art. 8 - only four species - on basis of "something additional"
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36.1 - caused by presence of evil more than loss of good - from the pov of appetite - the 1st
36.2 - desire cause of sorrow
3 - craving for unity
4 - irresistible power (keeping a thing from pursuing its inclination) - the IMPEDIMENT shows that it is irresistible (question for therapy is that what part is it irresistible to and how to strengthen that part?)
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37.1 - deprives/modifies power to learn - or even to remember
2 - "burdens" the soul
3 - weakens all activity except accidentally the kind that would remove sorrow
4 - most harmful of all the passions - other passions derive their harmfulness from being associated with sorrow.
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remedies
38.1 - EVERY pleasure
2 - weeping
3 - friends' sympathy (provides and is skeptical of one theory analogous to lifting or distributing burden) more confident about "percipere amorem" for himself.
4 - contemplation of truth (can soothe and even utterly overpower by its redundancy - martyr walking on coals better off than Augustine with his toothache)
5 - Sleep and baths (restoring natural mvmt) (direct approach) - also indirect approach - this disposition is furthermore itself a cause of pleasure (ad 1)
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Damn, can't believe I forgot about the last section!
q. 39
Is all sorrow evil? - yes, but on supposition, it might good "on supposition" and what is good "on some supposition" can be considered as good - note the wary approach - and yet the outcome that yes, it must be good. (also bring in convenient - as it seems to the appetite that one should mourn something that should be mourned).
Can sorrow be a virtuous good? (if it can be good, it can be a virtuous good).
Can it be a useful good? - useful as it induces us to avoid not only evil, but occasions of evil. (also see other articles from ohter questions where it can accidentally improve some kinds of activity and also that in some cases sorrow for something may cause it to be shunned - no this doesn't fall under the 'useful' really but the negative defensive)
Is bodily pain the greatest evil? - can't be as bad as not knowing that evil is evil. Also if the evil isn't evil but good, it would be worse not to be connected to the good.