Continuing Sorrow in Particular

IS THE BODY HARMED BY SORROW MORE THAN BY THE OTHER EMOTIONS?

The first objection points out that sorrow (tristitia) has a “spiritual existence” - esse spirituale - in the soul. Reverse movement from 35.1 obj.1 which notes that dolor has a bodily existence. Now this is an interesting principle "those things that have spiritual being only do not cause a corporeal transmutatio. (The relation between matter and form is interesting even more now that I have the notions of intensio et remissio - and participation of a subject in "his" form). He gives an example: "as is clear from the intentions intentionibus of colors which are in the air from which no body is colored. Therefore sadness does not cause some bodily harm. (What? intentions of colors in the air? Lightwaves? I don't have enough science but I didn't htink Aquinas would either. come back later)
2. If something causes bodily harm, this is only insofar as it has in conjunction with a corporeal transmutation. But corporeal transmuation is found in all the passions of the soul, as was said. Therefore sorrow does not harm the body more than any other passions of the soul.
3. Aristotle says that anger and desire cause madness (faciunt quibusdam insanias) which seems to be the greatest harm, since reason is the most excellent of man's possessions. Despair also seems to be more harmful than sorrow, since it is the cause of sorrow. Therefore, etc.

Wow. These are really powerful things. I guess the "spiritual existence" of tristitia is the way I understood it through many periods of my life. I understood it as a kind of wisdom. Or rather more importantly here, I understood sorrow as something that was disconnected in a way with my capacities for action - sorrow would not be harmful - but rather a useful check. Something cognitive that infused my activities with prudence. This would indeed be a useful sorrow - but there was already a kind of pleasure in acting well and in the rewards which a careful or kind way of life brought. And sorrow becomes increasingly more harmful - the way a defect is little in the beginning but increases with time - thus I could hold it as something quite good while it had not yet taken over, in which case it is good because it means I undertake the study that it is somehting bad in itself. And I am glad that I took it to the extreme because I would rather know it and be healthier than I would be if I never got really sick at all. And this is a bit of a dangerous posture becuase it is entirely contingent (so far as we are concerned)whether a better good comes out of it or not.
Back to conceptual level. Sorrow as having a spiritual existence - this would not be much of the passion for Aquinas. And yet it would be - there is a connection - it is becuase a more intellectual sorrow would be counterbalanced and integrated into a schema of realization of goods it doesn't really have the character of sorrow but rather of "carefulness" and those other things. I was a little Stoic at a lot of times in my life. A lot of people are.
But this does not necessarily mean that they are virtuous with their passions - it MAY mean that they have not been destabilized to the extent that passion became a problem. How the destabilization happens is irrelevant here - the passibility of the patient has something to do with it but also there is something in the object which I refuse to get away from. And Aquinas, too - in that it would be more evil not to be sorrowful (even though sorrow is something bad in itself) where sorrow is called for.
The second one also seems eminently rational. And this serves to really clarify sorrow as a special passion. The third as well - particularly the point about despair. It is hard for me, sometimes I think, to see the distinction between despair and sorrow. "Despair" is still irascible, however. One kind of "sorrow" would be a completed despair, I'm guessing here.

The sed contra is threefold - Proverbs: A rejoicing heart makes a blooming life; a sorrowful spirit dries up the bones. Again Proverbs - "As moth to clothing, or worm to wood, so does sorrow harm the heart of man (eating up connotation)." Eccl. "Sorrow hastens death."
Wow. Sober.

Respondeo. (FIRST SOMETHING TO NOTE - "CORPUS" is what is talked about here. Before, the anima was the concern, in 22 and 35 - and how the body could possibly affect the soul - now it is the corpus and what the passio animae can possibly do to the corpus - very interesting switcheroo)

Sorrow harms the body more than all the other passions of the soul. The reason is because sorrow is repugnant to human life in respect to its species of movement, and not only to the measure or quantity, as with the other passions of the soul.
(The other passions are all in sync with the life-movement and perfectly compatible with it - think of Nietzsche and his will to live and thus spake zarathustra - it is about overcoming sadness - preferring wrath to sadness at every step. Why he had issues with Christianity, I would imagine - and yet he couldn't get away from his sadness - clear by the example of the moment he went mad - yet still - he had the profound intuition).

Now human life consists in a certain movmeent, which is diffused from the heart to the other members; which motion comes naturally to human nature according to a determinate measure. So here what is at issue is the moderata and temperata CHARACTER OF THE BODY - PHYSIOLOGICAL natural movements as to what constitutes 'health' - having to do with a certain "determinate measure" - a tempered biological order of dynamics - of blood, when it comes down to it - the "heart"? Well, ti would also be important to know what "the heart" means for Aquinas and medievals - it seemed in a way to be the seat of passion - he talks somewhere about hte lungs existing for the heart - it holds a pretty high place - I think Fr. Dewan mentioned something about this in his paper).
If therefore this motion procedes outside the proper (debitam) measure, it will be repugnant to human life according to its measure of quantity, but not according to the likeness of its species. But if the process of this motion is impeded, it will be repugnant to life according to its species.
Life motion itself is impeded.
It is to be attended for al the passions of the soul, that the bodily transmutation, which is in its materiality, is conformed and proportaionted to the motion of the appetitie, which is formal, as in all kinds of matter proportionate to form.
Therefore the passions of the soul which import a motion of the appetite to pursuing something not repugnant to the vital motion of its species, but they can oppose it according to quanitty, as love, joy, desire, and things of this sort. And therefore it is according to its species that it supports the nature of the body (juvant naturam corporis), but because of the excess can harm.
Now the passions which import the movement of the appetite with flight or withdrawal (retractione) are as opposing the vital motion not according to quantity only, but also according to the species of motion, and therefore harm simply; as fear and despair, and before all else sorrow, which weighs down the soul from PRESENT EVIL, whose impression (impressio) is stronger than that of future evil.

Wow. I don't imagine he could put it forward more clearly - I really understand it now - the images really help. And I don't even think he means "images" here - although he mentions sorrow as something "spiritual" in the first objection, he is talking about the "physics" of the body and the motio of the body. "VITAL MOTION" - mentions elsewhere as expansion or pursuit.

ad1 - "because the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual motion of the soul naturally is the cause of a bodily transmutation. Nor is there a simile concerning spiritual intentions, which do not naturally have an order of moving some bodies, which are not born (quae non sunt nata) to move from the soul.
2. The other passions have a corporeal transmutation conformed according to the species of the vital motion, but the contrary of sadness (NOT SURE)
3. It takes lighter causes to impede the use of reason than to damage/destroy (corrumpatur) life, since we see many illnesses taking hte use of reason, but not yet sealing off (adimunt) life. And nevertheless fear and anger bring great (maxime) corporal harm from their intermingling with sorrow, because of the absence of that which is desired.
Wow again.
Now sorrow (tristitia) itself can withdraw the reason, as is clear from those who fall into melancholy or mania because of pain (dolorem).

Wow. Sorrow is really bad.

Moving on.