I think I am confused by the use of the word "actions" in passions. It would be so easy to say "passions are what are opposed to action of their ratio." Passion as precluding, reducing action. But then he says "those actions which (man) has in common with other animals."
But I have to make the split between action and passion before I can re-complexify them. I tried "engagement" at an earlier point as the thing that identifies what I can't bother to name and distinguish and re-unite. Other sources in Aquinas:
Prima pars 110.2
Article 2. Whether corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel?
Objection 1. It would seem that corporeal matter obeys the mere will of an angel. For the power of an angel excels the power of the soul. But corporeal matter obeys a conception of the soul; for the body of man is changed by a conception of the soul as regards heat and cold, and sometimes even as regards health and sickness. Therefore much more is corporeal matter changed by a conception of an angel.
Objection 2. Further, whatever can be done by an inferior power, can be done by a superior power. Now the power of an angel is superior to corporeal power. But a body by its power is able to transform corporeal matter; as appears when fire begets fire. Therefore much more efficaciously can an angel by his power transform corporeal matter.
Objection 3. Further, all corporeal nature is under angelic administration, as appears above (Article 1), and thus it appears that bodies are as instruments to the angels, for an instrument is essentially a mover moved. Now in effects there is something that is due to the power of their principal agents, and which cannot be due to the power of the instrument; and this it is that takes the principal place in the effect. For example, digestion is due to the force of natural heat, which is the instrument of the nutritive soul: but that living flesh is thus generated is due to the power of the soul. Again the cutting of the wood is from the saw; but that it assumes the length the form of a bed is from the design of the [joiner's] art. Therefore the substantial form which takes the principal place in the corporeal effects, is due to the angelic power. Therefore matter obeys the angels in receiving its form.
On the contrary, Augustine says "It is not to be thought, that this visible matter obeys these rebel angels; for it obeys God alone."
I answer that, The Platonists [Phaedo. xlix: Tim. (Did.) vol. ii, p. 218 asserted that the forms which are in matter are caused by immaterial forms, because they said that the material forms are participations of immaterial forms. Avicenna followed them in this opinion to some extent, for he said that all forms which are in matter proceed from the concept of the "intellect"; and that corporeal agents only dispose [matter] for the forms. They seem to have been deceived on this point, through supposing a form to be something made "per se," so that it would be the effect of a formal principle. But, as the Philosopher proves (Metaph. vii, Did. vi, 8), what is made, properly speaking, is the "composite": for this properly speaking, is, as it were, what subsists. Whereas the form is called a being, not as that which is, but as that by which something is; and consequently neither is a form, properly speaking, made; for that is made which is; since to be is nothing but the way to existence.
Now it is manifest that what is made is like to the maker, forasmuch as every agent makes its like. So whatever makes natural things, has a likeness to the composite; either because it is composite itself, as when fire begets fire, or because the whole "composite" as to both matter and form is within its power; and this belongs to God alone. Therefore every informing of matter is either immediately from God, or from some corporeal agent; but not immediately from an angel.
Reply to Objection 1. Our soul is united to the body as the form; and so it is not surprising for the body to be formally changed by the soul's concept; especially as the movement of the sensitive appetite, which is accompanied with a certain bodily change, is subject to the command of reason. An angel, however, has not the same connection with natural bodies; and hence the argument does not hold.
Reply to Objection 2. Whatever an inferior power can do, that a superior power can do, not in the same way, but in a more excellent way; for example, the intellect knows sensible things in a more excellent way than sense knows them. So an angel can change corporeal matter in a more excellent way than can corporeal agents, that is by moving the corporeal agents themselves, as being the superior cause.
Reply to Objection 3. There is nothing to prevent some natural effect taking place by angelic power, for which the power of corporeal agents would not suffice. This, however, is not to obey an angel's will (as neither does matter obey the mere will of a cook, when by regulating the fire according to the prescription of his art he produces a dish that the fire could not have produced by itself); since to reduce matter to the act of the substantial form does not exceed the power of a corporeal agent; for it is natural for like to make like.
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Okay so there you have the "concept" of the soul changing the body to which the soul belongs. What would really be passionate, then? Passion is not per se bodily change; it is accompanied by bodily change. Sense knowledge is not of the senses but through the senses. And "passion" in the human sense is not of the body but of the soul - "passion of the body" is precisely that. What is the perception? It is still a kind of perception - appetite perceives... but it is not the same kind of perception of intellect, because Aquinas distinguishes "an order to things as to their ratio or intention (i forget which - probably ratio) and "an order to things in themselves -res ipsas. But both have to do with perception. One gives an evaluation of the thing according to its ratio. The other evaluates the "thing" in its "substance" - in its whole being which the intellect is not capable of containing wholly. The intellect (or at least OUR intellect) is always missing something because it goes in moments/ it is abstract/ or if it has an intuition in the sense that it "sees" the whole, it is unable to communicate it in that way, because it proceeds in parts. Thomas talks about "knowledge being better as to the things of this world" and "love being closer to God". What does he mean by the "things of this world"? Because it seems not all "beings" can be known more wholly than than they can be loved - any person, for example. And yet there is something much more knowable about persons than there would be about God becuase they are more limited and so this would still be true to say this of God only in the sense that this is truest and surest with respect to God and partially speaking with respect to created persons. Where would intellect and appetite be the same thing? I fear I am out of my league a while ago already.
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Prima Pars q. 75.1
I answer that, To seek the nature of the soul, we must premise that the soul is defined as the first principle of life of those things which live: for we call living things "animate," [i.e. having a soul], and those things which have no life, "inanimate." Now life is shown principally by two actions, knowledge and movement. The philosophers of old, not being able to rise above their imagination, supposed that the principle of these actions was something corporeal: for they asserted that only bodies were real things; and that what is not corporeal is nothing: hence they maintained that the soul is something corporeal. This opinion can be proved to be false in many ways; but we shall make use of only one proof, based on universal and certain principles, which shows clearly that the soul is not a body.
It is manifest that not every principle of vital action is a soul, for then the eye would be a soul, as it is a principle of vision; and the same might be applied to the other instruments of the soul: but it is the "first" principle of life, which we call the soul. Now, though a body may be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, as the heart is a principle of life in an animal, yet nothing corporeal can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as such; since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing or even a principle of life, as "such" a body. Now that it is actually such a body, it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; thus heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body, but an act of a body.
There is a danger with assuming something is obvious just because you have memory of the words. This is not as obvious a question as it seems - that the soul is not a body. The implications of a spiritual source of life may not be all that clear to us. Of course what would "spiritual substance" or "formal being" be I have very little clue - in fact, no clue at all - I think of it as "not-matter". But if I laboriously recall my old Aristotelian training - form is th eprincple of actuality, of esse. A kind of potentiality is possible to form and certainly to formal composite - not sure if that's right. Form is the principle of stability, of actuality. Of nature - it sets the stage for the possibilities internal to itself. "What a thing was to be" is its form. Matter is "stuff" wihthout which some kinds of forms are not. Matter is conducted by form and can restrict or weigh down form - as we have seen - it does make it possible for some kind of forms to be - aely forms of bodies. but in terms of possibilities, it does restrict, slow down, impede form of itself because matter is not as "light" as form, to put it in an imagistic way - to put it better, matter is "amorphous" to be tautological in a way - it is open to all kinds of possibilities within its own possibities of being. And our particular kind of form is to be the rational form of a body, and so because of what we are we work "with" matter, change, potency, learning. We are a humble level, so to speak. We assume possession of ourselves through a simultaneous process of bodily maturation and intellectual growth and social stimulation. But in this developmental thing, because of our high level of potentiality, because of our "slowness" from the point of view of formal capacity (although absolutely our canniness is something wonderful in itself - compare the progress of the human sciences to the 'progress' of other animals - even more intelligent animals who are closer to us). But why talk about matter? Because passions happen with a bodily change? Because passions are what happens in the sensitive soul but extends itself through the body? What would the "imperfect movement' be? Would it be a movement of the sensitive soul that does not infuse itself all over the body? Or would it be imperfect from the part of not proceeding "up" and "out" as it were? Or are there two possibilities? There must be two possibilities, because I know people who have psychosomatic symptoms - tics, throat closing up, sweaty or clammy palms - I have these symptoms in situations of intense pressure, but "intense pressure" is a matter of perception. For me it has been in the past giving presentations (although I hope I am getting better - and I know how subjective it is because I am pretty good with student conferences but as soon as I think I am getting "marked" I lose all confidence, or playing the organ or singing when there are large amounts of people or particularly special occasions) but I know many people whom even simple social situations cause them distress. I was not born a shy person - rather a content, quiet, and docile one - it would never have even occurred to me to be shy for the first half of my life. And I remember now what it was like to be shy or afraid in my teens but how I oriented myself out of it by directing myself towards people instead of wondering what they might think or by realizing that we all have our own person and that it would be irrational to think that one is remarkable or strange or objectionable and this stopped the physiological manifestations and left me free to be myself. So this is an example I can think of. But I have wandered. Okay - the centre being the soul - and two possibilities I'll grant you - the possibility of proceeding up to a conscious habit - the possibility of proceeding down to a completed passion - which can become a helpless rather than a rationally-confirmed habit. If somebody took this to the level of thought and actually said, "Yes, I am certain that people are out to judge me unfavourably," then this would be a "vicious" or untruthful habit - a chosen posture. But I think many people, while they may have habits that look like vicious ones and are harmful for the havoc they wreak by being untruthful, that they do not have the tools to judge them for what they are but leave the rational part rather open.
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