Most Recent Pseudo-First-Chapter

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ANTHROPOLOGICAL METAPHYSICS MAP
Before we begin a history of sorrow in Thomas Aquinas it would be conducive to our study to consider his overall anthropology, particularly within the context that he provides in the Summa Theologiae, our primary source.
THIS IS AWKWARD - got to reconfigure order.



Aquinas’ anthropology is one that is located in a metaphysical hierarchy of possible beings - this double-ended “hierarchy” provides at least two conceptual horizons with which to trace a complex structure of the nature and capacities of the human person, i.e., a foundation in which we can locate human freedom as the principle and referent of moral actions. The functions of the human being, for example, is one that takes place as from a multi-dimensioned principle. (footnote: To make this evident, we observe that, as the Philosopher says (De Coelo ii, 12), the lowest order of things cannot acquire perfect goodness, but they acquire a certain imperfect goodness, by few movements; and those which belong to a higher order acquire perfect goodness by many movements; and those yet higher acquire perfect goodness by few movements; and the highest perfection is found in those things which acquire perfect goodness without any movement whatever.
Thus he is least of all disposed of health, who can only acquire imperfect health by means of a few remedies; better disposed is he who can acquire perfect health by means of many remedies; and better still, he who can by few remedies; best of all is he who has perfect health without any remedies. We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude. Yet he is in the last degree, according to his nature, of those to whom beatitude is possible; therefore the human soul requires many and various operations and powers. But to angels a smaller variety of powers is sufficient. In God there is no power or action beyond His own Essence.There is yet another reason why the human soul abounds in a variety of powers--because it is on the confines of spiritual and corporeal creatures; and therefore the powers of both meet together in the soul.1.77.2 - The example of “health” is a very telling one in this context, particularly if one is concerned with a medicina/therapia of the passions (find history for these). (Stil not quite relevant - conjectural). But shows a conceptual map between “spiritual” creatures and “corporeal” creatures as a means to situate man. (it’d be nice to find a source).
Once we get to this conception of man - we also come to an engagement with the purpose of man - the aims - the functions - what he does and can do and whence receive fulfilment. What is interesting here is the way - form - inclined for good (READ OLD PAPAERS FROM DEWAN!) exists in good and Thomas distinguishes different modes of “end”. Inclinatio. Inclinatio here - would it be possible that intensio means something different?
80.1
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.
Reply to Objection 1. Appetite is found in things which have knowledge, above the common manner in which it is found in all things, as we have said above. Therefore it is necessary to assign to the soul a particular power.
Thomas makes use also of the Aristotelian notion of telos but telos is according to mode for him and the mode of telos might also be telos itself, if human goal is activity.
The telos of man is to be an arche, in other words.
(prob. Wrong - good intuition - bad assumption. Exceeds the notion of telos so much that Aquinas seems to prefer to use intensio - problem - he probably does use “aim” in voluntary section.)
There are two prologues in the Summa Theologiae that are convenient for our purposes. The first begins the section on man “as the image of God” in the Prima Secundae.
Since, as the Damscene says, man said to be made to the image of God, according to which image is meant intellect and freedom of judgment and power through oneself, after having spoken of the exemplar, namely of God, and of those things which proceeded from the divine power according to his will; it remains that we should consider his image, that is the human being, according as he too is the principle of his works, as having freedom of judgment and power over his works.
There is a threefold intelligibility of the human being here. The preceding part of the Summa has dealt with God - his existence, perfections, among which are intellect and will, and the works proceeding from him freely. (The architecture of the summa is given X where X). In assuming a proportion between God, his intelligence and productions, and man’s intelligence, “free judgment” and productions, Thomas is giving an image of man which is oriented towards ethics, towards action, as the principle from which actions flow. “Freedom of judgment” is an interesting phrase, so is “power through oneself”. One of the questions that occurs in “power through oneself” is what constitutes oneself and how one’s power is realized in oneself. Thomas proceeds to characterize the specially human activity, I.e. which makes him distinguished among other animals, namely, that of V. V. is something that becomes explicit in a later article.
Inclinatio et intensio - The tension towards beatitude.
My things with inclinatio would be that I oppose an “objective” Maritainian emphasis with the subjective inclinatio. Intensio seems to be more existential - although he talks about it in general metaphysical categories, such as the intensio of being that is “approaching” its first principle (22.3) and the intensio of a defect. (ftnt about intensio of defect as I noted in my blog). (Stretch, extension, spasm, tautness, aim - last. Look at a history of this word outside of my dictionary). Passions that have to do with this - have the character of defect - has to do with “approaching” or “recessing” from its summum - paper from Dewan where he talks about Cajetan and something’s “best” would be helpful here. This kind of language - that of degrees, of increase and withdrawal, help to understand I would contend Aquinas’ pictorial metaphors of what happens in sorrow (pursuit - flight - etc) - would my thesis then be that passion is a flight / reduction from form? No, because what makes it beautiful is that while there is room for that interpretation - that passions also belong to the perfection of man - thus there are two parts of this essay - the metaphysical sketch - and the account which Aquinas gives of passion from a more “existential” perspective which is concerned with the per accidens - where we live and where we find redemption (could again refer to part about belonging to perfection to reach by many movements).
My reasons for opposing an objective cast is that passions would precisely constitute a new kind of subjectivity (owe this idea to Maxime - see how to phrase it and cite it). To look at man wholly in terms of “end” without seeing what constitutes the tensions towards that end as well as away from it the various dimensions of himself that he faces in being towards (an?- questioned not precisely because singular but more because something unencapsulable - at least in this casual or initial reference) end which would constitute the “real” field of ethics which is about man insofar as he is voluntary and concerns by extension the involuntary and the “imperfect” voluntary. In this respect I have decided to initiate our path with Aquinas’ metaphysical map of the human being as a prelude and a guide to the immersion into the being-impassioned of the human being which Aquinas illuminates.
Let us begin, however, with where Aquinas begins.

Passions first appear as “actions” in the prologue to Question 6. It may seem rather puzzling to have “passions” appear as something active in the first place, albeit an “action” that is not, initially speaking, in virtue of man’s special rational nature, but something shared with other animals.Because it is necessary to come to beatitude through acts, it is consequently necessary to consider human acts, so that we may know by which acts beatitude is reached, or the way of beatitude is impeded. But because operations and acts are about singulars, therefore every operative knowledge is perfected by considering particulars. Therefore because a moral consideration is of human (mine) acts, it is indeed handed over first to the universal; but secondly, to the particular. Concerning a universal consideration of human acts, certainly the first thing that happens to be considered is human acts; secondly, their principles. Now human acts are indeed those which are properly human, but certainly there are ones common between men and other animals. And because beatitude is properly a human good, those acts which are properly human hold themselves closer (propinquius) to beatitude than those which man shares in common with other animals. Therefore we will first consider those acts which are properly human; secondly, those acts which humans have in common with other animals, which are called passions of the soul.(THESE NEXT TWO PARAGRAPHS - SIMILAR CONSTRUCTION IN “FIRST CHAPTER - PASSIONS - second version - I think the other one is later but this one seems simpler and clearer - check to make sure - FURTHERMORE, LEFT OUT ARISTOTLE PART, WHICH, HOWEVER, MIGHT BE VERY IMPRESSIVE AS A FOOTNOTE OR SERIES THEREOF). What is interesting here as that passions are seen as something that participate in the way to beatitude. He avows that the “properly human acts” are closer to beatitude but does not thereby deny that passions which men “shares in common with other animals” are not included in beatitude. Note also the slight difference in language at the beginning when he makes a distinction between knowing by which acts beatitude is reached of by which acts the way of beatitude is impeded. By means of this we see a subtle spacing between acts by which beatitude might be reached and by which the “way of beatitude” “might be impeded”. The use of the ablative indicates usage here - and the subjunctive indicates possibility - thus we see that Aquinas here does not immediately identify beatitude as an action (he treats of this question in q. 3 articles one and two in which he distinguishes happiness on two counts - on its object and cause and on its essence - which would be an action) but rather speaks in terms of all actions here insofar as they conduce to or “impede the way to” beatitude.Aquinas provides a context for the order of his questions which is not necessarily the only possible one. Indeed, in view of his anthropological postures one might build up a similar story in which passions are first treated (?)DONE. Only thing to note with Voluntariety is that there’s imperfect voluntariness which has to do with - “perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationships of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end.”For our methodology, we propose to analyze passion first “purely” - to their conceptual limit - as a regulative concept. It will be difficult to define a clear path between passion and action and even more difficult to keep unentangled voluntariety and passion, but we propose for our analysis to first to distinctly label “passion” insofar as we can and later on to complexify it as Aquinas does almost at the level of every article. For the structure of our path we will follow Aquinas’ relentless narrowing of the meaning of “passion” in question 22.The first article asks whether any passion might be found in the soul. The objections to the proposition lies in the formal nobility of the soul - passion belongs to matter, the soul has no matter, is thus not easily changed, and, unlike things which are subject to passion, does not deteriorate in its nature - I.e., it is not prone to corruptio. In answering the question, Aquinas delineates three degrees of what it means to have a “passion“.The first possibility of “passion” is to receive something in general. Now the example which Aquinas provides for this general sense is one that seems to partake more of the notion of “perfection” as he notes - in the case of the air “receiving” light. The underlying metaphysics of this process is that something which has potential to be or to behave differently than it does of itself, in other words, whose possibilities of being are not contained and sustained wholly by its own permanent actuality (I.e., every finite thing) “undergoes” or “receives” “something” for a particular perfection of its way of being. (Check with part about perfection being achieved by movements - and explain the connection - still good to find his words in commentaries, etc). Passion, as such, is thus not immediately or per se something that detracts or twists a being from itself, but can actually be the means or the flip-side of its actualization, just as light can be seen as a perfection of air or of a space - adding to it in a sense, the power to make the objects contained in it visible.At the second sally, however, Aquinas discerns what he calls the proper meaning of passion - that is, denoting that something is taken from the subject as well as something being received by the subject. He provides a two-fold and reversed example - the case of health being received and sickness taken, and the case of sickness being received and health taken. It is interesting that he did not discern this in the case of the air being lit up - as one might think that the air which has received light has also “lost” darkness. But what is important here is the two-sidedness of one apparent action or passion - the taking and receiving. Without even bringing in a mention of the actor of the passion, that is, focusing solely on the sufferer as centre, he distinguishes a double-sided change, which, he says, constitutes the proper sense of passion. It is because change is double-sided that the notion “corruption” makes any sense within a change - something is lost as well as something gained - whether the status of the “loss” is purely a matter of words, or whether in a change that is not purely for the better, there is perhaps a destabilization which is harmful (NEED TO RESEARCH ON WHY PASSIO WOULD BE THE CAUSE OF CORRUPTIO IN EITHER MEDIEVALS OR ARISTOTLE - WHEREVER SOURCED).
It is this double-sided conception of passion which is more proper because it implies a drawing toward the agent and a movement from something that is within oneself. (I wonder how rare this is - whether passion is usually focused on from the point of view of the actor, which takes place in heroic epics, or from the point of the helpless actee - in which case depicted as something helpless. Aquinas undertakes to highlight the situation of the passionate subject which is drawn from something in oneself (whether that thing be really suitable or unsuitable for itself) and toward something (which likewise may be suitable or may be unsuitable). This dual movement sets the stage for his “metaphysics” of human passions.The third meaning of passion is basically the more intensified version of the second “proper” sort of passion, when the subject receives something unsuitable and loses something suited to himself. This is more passionate because passion has the character of originating from something “outside” oneself, I.e. something “acting” upon oneself in a certain sense - and the more a thing is drawn from what is suited to it the more it can be seen to be affected by the power of something else.Returning to the original question whether the soul can be affected by passion, Aquinas notes that it is certainly affected in the first way - as in “feeling ? And understanding” being ‘ a kind of’ passion (De Anima I. 5) But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation - (CAN RELATE THIS BACK TO THE MATHEMATICAL SOUL) But he concludes that passion per se is only in the soul accidentally - that is, as the composite of the soul and body together are affected. He distinguishes degree here as well - if the change is for the worse, it is more of a passion.So we see that passion is present in the soul as it is in composition with the body, although one kind of “passion” is in respect of the soul alone. (Here the quotation from the “mathematical soul” would be helpful).
The second article addresses the question whether passion is something more cognitive (apprehensive -sic) or appetitive. Thomas decides in favor of appetitive because it is through the “appetitive power that the soul has an order to things in themselves,” and passion involves being drawn by some thing, whereas the object of the intellect is not something in itself, but only a thing as it exists within a mind - that is, by its intention. What is interesting in this section is the active status that is given to passion - we see in objection 2 that the appetitive part is considered to be more active than the apprehensive or cognitive part, because (as we see in the response) it is more a principle of exterior action. Although Thomas assigns as the reason the part that it is more active because it is more passive - it is the power that actually relates to things in themselves. This is interesting because in a way, it assigns almost what one is tempted to call an “inferior” status to the intellect, which is concerned with things not as they are in themselves, but according to their form, their ratio, or their intention. (Tempted, indeed! the superiority of the intellect is clear in the first part - inherent nobility - taking in the forms of things, etc. and so far as it is related to things, it would be related to things more through their ratios - 'penetrates interiors' - this cognitive way of 'entering' is spoken about in 'love' and also spoken about in the Bible in the twofold use of 'to know someone' - here 'things in themselves must be understood as something good - and the only thing we have when intellectual access is inadequate) - FIX UP WITH REAL REFLECTIONS ON THE VALUE OF COGNITION AND BY A COMPARISON TO SHOW HOW GOOD APPETITIVENESS IS IN ITSELF.
(Ftnt - Whether apprehension is superior to appetition is actually considered by Aquinas in a certain context - I.e. with respect to God - find. It is a complex question because of the nature of the high degree of intellectual knowledge which causes Aquinas to conclude that knowledge of natural things surpasses appetite for them, but the power of the human intellect is unceasingly surpassed by the nature of God as an intellectual object, in which case “being drawn as it were by love to God” is superior to a knowledge of him). (But the fact that we have one case where passion is superior to action - as it were - where “being drawn” trumps “plumbing the depths” - (simply because the depths cannot be plumbed by us - or even by God in that sense - when he talks about God - it is not about “containing” but about “nothing being hid” - the fact that this case is open means that in relation to God.. Perhaps with regards to things also that we would do for the love of God by extension - as Aquinas says - loving things in God)………..Another interesting point that is developed in article 2 is the explicit opening of the bodily dimension (or essence) of passion as set forth by Aquinas. (What I could note is that he could give a metaphysical or mathematical account of this but prefers to go for experiential - although that was probably the more humanized nature of his science. But “kindling of the blood around the heart” shows an appreciation for the subjective experience of what it feels like - this is one thing that medieval/ancient medicine had - the explanations sure felt close to home - don‘t think this is very academic - HERE COULD RESEARCH ON MEDIEVAL MEDICINE AND HOW IT WOULD RELATE FOR WHAT I SENSE IS A VERY GOOD APPRECIATION OF THE SUBJECTIVE BODILY EXPERIENCE OF PASSION: ) Objection 3 refers to it “Passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation.” (The argument is that sensitive apprehension requires a bodily transmutation as well as sensitive appetition). This objection requires Aquinas to negotiate more explicitly what sort of bodily changes occur in passion - as opposed to an apprehensive change which is “accidental” , such as an eye becoming “dissolved” through gazing intently at a bright object, the bodily change is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite - it is the “natural change of the organ”. The single example given is the material definition of anger as “a kindling of blood around the heart”.With this sketch of the materiality of passion, we can return to the question of “corruption” as it exists in Aquinas. Can passions be harmful to the body? To inquire into this, it would be useful to look at the best passion - the one that is said to perfect the lover (supposing that the object is really suitable). On the one hand we find that love perfects, on the other hand, because of the intensity of the change, it might incidentally corrupt. (Is this only in really intense occasions? Or always?)This is an interesting question - what precisely are the dynamics or mechanics of passion in relation to the human body/composite? Passions use up energy - they are also “more the principle of exterior action” - we can say that they provide “energy”, “impetus” for external actions, we are aware of “adrenolyn” “libido” and many other things. But with passion comes also exhaustion. And people have finite amounts of energy. Passion perfects and removes from one - even if it is suitable, there is always something that is in a way consuming one - like a candle, when it burns or acts it also disappears.THIRD POINT - the tension or straining - CONSEQUENCES OF THIS METAPHYSICS FOR SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF PASSION. Objection 1 makes the point that the “first” in a genus seems to be the cause of the others, and because passion in the apprehensive power precedes passion in the appetitive power it would seem to have more passion. The answer which is more complex involves an explanation in remarkably dynamic terms - speaking of the straining (intensio) of something which increases inasmuch as it approaches to one first principle (need a metaphysics of gradated being here and gradated being that has the capacity of tensing towards or falling short of its perfection - some things richer than others). Things that are closer to the supreme first principle have less potentiality because they are already in act. Those things which recede from perfection (not just lack - dynamic) have more of the notion of passion. The intensity of the tensions is also interesting - inasmuch as something approaches to perfection, its perfection becomes more intense, inasmuch as it regresses from perfection, the defect is more intense - it seems odd to call a defect “intense“ because the direction of things is toward the good and failing is not so much something that is vehement but something that would be due to a lack of vehemence - but in this context it makes sense because it would thus at the same time more prone to passion because it has less actuality whether its actuality is merely potential or it does not have that capacity at all). Thus it would be that the prior powers - for us, the apprehensive power - of the soul there would be less passion because they are prior in actuality.This, however, leaves the question open as to the objects of passion. (?) Question 3 asks whether passion is more in the intellectual part or the sensitive part. Actually, no, it gives a hint - in saying that the prior powers of the soul have less passion one could assume one is more likely to find them in all the lower parts….
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WHAT IS ACTUALLY OF INTEREST - BRIDGE FROM THE METAPHYSICAL TO THE VALUABLE, THE USEFUL, THE EXISTENTIAL

Goodness, Mediocrity, and “Badness” of the Passions
E) “Goodness and badness” of the passions - Metaphysical, Useful, and Moral Aspects
A) metaphysical - “perfectio” - power extending to more things, delight extending to more dimensions of subject
B) moral bonitas (mine) - I.e. details of what ends up in the above
1. As intermediate/subsidiary/instrumental: life of the passions as the mediation - between immediacy and the conscious and habituated life of virtue which is sourced in the rational principle - half-successive, half-simultaneous role depending on one’s view of the human being or perhaps depending on which human being. Not sure which I lean more heavily towards at this point - depends on what “passion“ means in each context. So I guess I am talking about passion which reason is LESS cooperative with. - sana? Disposative?
A) “balancing” - Spinoza “outweighing one Affection by something under the aspect of a stronger affection). Aquinas - (moderate) sorrow as mitigating (excessive) pleasure to enable capacity for action; pleasure as remedying sorrow (and so on for others like hope and zeal which checks and urges)
C) - Passion as point of access to that which exceeds our knowative capacity. (“approaches to God more by love, as it were drawn passively“). Does he mean love or intellectual appetite here?
II) “Moral“ goodness (“as subject to the reason and will”)A) Discussion on what constitutes voluntary activity - “perfect knowledge of the end consists in not only apprehending the thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationships of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the rational nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of the end, without knowing it under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end.”Implications of means, ends, and “imperfect voluntariety” of the passions (by which animals and children are “voluntary”) and passions as infused with “perfect” voluntariety- as “subject to reason and will” - “consequent” as opposed to “antecedent” passion.
“The Bad” in passionsA) Causes of sin (here meaning lack of health, no voluntariety yet) outside the will - ignorance, weakness, contingency, surprise, etc. (Implications for "voluntary sin" - how excessive passion, which can be itself a "sin", is also a mitigation for sin and how this is possible. C) “Medicina, therapy”. “health” view - need to be nursed before rationally infused. (HERE CAN THINK ABOUT NUSSBAUM, STOICS, EVERYONE, SPINOZA - see how Aquinas might compare with them.
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EXISTENTIAL CONCLUSIONS -
Bridge from the metaphysical to the existential. What does this mean as it is experienced? Well, it will come out more with sorrow. For now the word we will use to describe the action that belongs to both the actor and the patient will be “engagement”. After having named it, we will come to the experience of it in the sorrowful context.
3 “moments” of passion - being-given connaturality, being-given movement, rest. Passion and perfection - affinities and incompatibilities.B) Passion in the more descriptive sense that Thomas describes in the first article of 22. - METAPHYSICAL ASPECTC) Transmutatio corporalis - sine qua non of passion properly speaking - PHYSIOLOGICAL ASPECT
- Aristotle’s point - what makes the soul to be united to this kind of body.
- Aquinas - cognition - sensation - soul of the composite suffers through composite.
- different kinds of “through” - maybe the trinity?
D) Conjunctio ET perceptio in joy and sorrow - EXISTENTIAList ASPECT AND COGNITIVE ASPECTS TOGETHER
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SEGWAY -
“SORROW: THE MOST PASSIONATE OF THE PASSIONS”
A. Sorrow in General1. Sorrow as Appetitive Perception: Conjunctio et perceptio conjunctionis - - I) Implications of “loss” with “gain” - where “gain” is primary and where “loss” is primary in the perception of the appetite. The role of “unity” and its “ravage” or “disruption”. Presence of “presence” (Why would I put this here instead of at joy and sorrow analysis? Because presence instead of perception would be more at stake in sorrow than in joy. The power of the other would be more apparent - oneself becomes less visible - perception also is very strong - there is a reflexivity, but an increasingly divided one. Kind of like that thing where the blood curdles up and dries up in the veins - loses unifying force.
I) Dolor et TristitiaA) Distinct and interactive kinds of perception (exterior, interior AND imagination and intellect)
A) PSYCHOLOGICAL, PSYCHOANALYTIC ASPECTS
B) COGNITIVE - VIRTUOUS PERSON’S SORROW (and what makes me say that and whether it is justifiable)B) Qualities of Sorrow as Appetitive Perception (RESOURCING IN THE GOOD - its reason for existing)I) “affinity” and “convenience” with certain joys, lovesII) Useful consequences: fuga, repellendum, resistans, expellere
3. Sorrow as Passion: Fuga, Aggravatio, Constrictio, (CONTRARY MOVEMENT - INNER LACK OF INTELLIGIBILITY EXCEPT OF “THE OTHER” - PHYSICAL, ETC)A) per se impeditive to activityI) per accidens motivation (“love felt more keenly“; “activity aimed at expelling the cause of sorrow would be increased (augeatur)“) paradoxically can be the occasion of assuming rational and voluntary command.B) “Repugnant to vital movement” - Oppression run amuck. When the object of sorrow is perceived to exceed one’s power or when hope of succor is lost.
(TWO LITMUSES - LOSING OF REASON, LOSING OF EXTERIOR ACTIVITY - WHY THE TWO POLES?)1. "Depriving of reason" - melancholia and madness.2. From anxietas to acedia.
Ending with sorrow’s “dissolving” character (if this is correct).