Problem of agent being nobler than patient

I remember I was struggling with this earlier with De Anima asking whether the seeing is not more noble than the apple which is seen, for example, and concerned about the nobility of the the agent seeming to be less than that of the "patient":

And therefore in order to cause the intellectual operation according to Aristotle, the impression caused by the sensible does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for "the agent is more noble than the patient," as he says (De Gener. i, 5). Not, indeed, in the sense that the intellectual operation is effected in us by the mere impression of some superior beings, as Plato held; but that the higher and more noble agent which he calls the active intellect, of which we have spoken above (79, 3,4) causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction.

So going back to the "seeing" - could there be a proportion - a kind of "active intellect" in sensation? Do we see the apple, or do we see our image of the apple, in which case the agent would be itself in a way, our seeing our seeing. And we do see our seeing. In which case the middle agent between the apple and our seeing what we call "apple" would be acting upon what it takes from light waves and objects. I don't know if I am confused or way off track. But I have a feeling that all of this wil seem way out in left field tomorrow morning.