Prima Pars - question 75
Article 5.
Whether the soul is composed of matter and form?
Objection 1. It would seem that the soul is composed of matter and form. For potentiality is opposed to actuality. Now, whatsoever things are in actuality participate of the First Act, which is God; by participation of Whom, all things are good, are beings, and are living things, as is clear from the teaching of Dionysius (Div. Nom. v). Therefore whatsoever things are in potentiality participate of the first potentiality. But the first potentiality is primary matter. Therefore, since the human soul is, after a manner, in potentiality; which appears from the fact that sometimes a man is potentially understanding; it seems that the human soul must participate of primary matter, as part of itself.
Objection 2. Further, wherever the properties of matter are found, there matter is. But the properties of matter are found in the soul--namely, to be a subject, and to be changed, for it is a subject to science, and virtue; and it changes from ignorance to knowledge and from vice to virtue. Therefore matter is in the soul.
Objection 3. Further, things which have no matter, have no cause of their existence, as the Philosopher says Metaph. viii (Did. vii, 6). But the soul has a cause of its existence, since it is created by God. Therefore the soul has matter.
Objection 4. Further, what has no matter, and is a form only, is a pure act, and is infinite. But this belongs to God alone. Therefore the soul has matter.
On the contrary, Augustine (Gen. ad lit. vii, 7,8,9) proves that the soul was made neither of corporeal matter, nor of spiritual matter.
I answer that, The soul has no matter. We may consider this question in two ways.
First, from the notion of a soul in general; for it belongs to the notion of a soul to be the form of a body. Now, either it is a form by virtue of itself, in its entirety, or by virtue of some part of itself. If by virtue of itself in its entirety, then it is impossible that any part of it should be matter, if by matter we understand something purely potential: for a form, as such, is an act; and that which is purely potentiality cannot be part of an act, since potentiality is repugnant to actuality as being opposite thereto. If, however, it be a form by virtue of a part of itself, then we call that part the soul: and that matter, which it actualizes first, we call the "primary animate."
Secondly, we may proceed from the specific notion of the human soul inasmuch as it is intellectual. For it is clear that whatever is received into something is received according to the condition of the recipient. Now a thing is known in as far as its form is in the knower. But the intellectual soul knows a thing in its nature absolutely: for instance, it knows a stone absolutely as a stone; and therefore the form of a stone absolutely, as to its proper formal idea, is in the intellectual soul. Therefore the intellectual soul itself is an absolute form, and not something composed of matter and form. For if the intellectual soul were composed of matter and form, the forms of things would be received into it as individuals, and so it would only know the individual: just as it happens with the sensitive powers which receive forms in a corporeal organ; since matter is the principle by which forms are individualized. (I guess my little reflection earlier on about "persons" being things which we approach better by knowledge than love can mean that I think persons are angels - but really we are a species - although there is a reason I want to make something "unknowable" - why I object to universalizing people - it is a laudable reason, but if it is not true, then I am missing something and furthermore it will mean other bad things - it's amazing I still look at "concepts" in light of "goodness, badness" or even "beauty" sometimes. I guess it's a hangover from trying to break across many different frameworks - which I tried to make possible by positing reality as something kind of noumenal, and then taking as my primary concern moral matters - partly also because I was passionate and thought it "fitting" becuase of my concern for myself and for others - I don't know which was the cause of which. Maybe a discouragement with wisdom, maybe a solidarity with what I thought was the spirit of the age. But "truth" now. Do things have their own truth? We confuse our truths with the truths of other things. In a way, we do make our own truths about ourselves - we have a "persona" which is our role - and not necessarily a false role - we have histories and choices and actions that become concreteized and were sourced in my own individual human freedom dealing with my own circumstances. The outcries against "moral relativism" I remembered from my youth I thought as something ridiculous - I have yet to meet a moral relativist - whether on paper or in reality - mores of themselves are relative - have you done the etymology of the word? But what you mean by moral relativism - the fact that people have no "standards" or no goods that they will identify in any concrete "morally charged" situation? that is almost impossible for a human being to be what that means. By "clear principle for action" standards mean nothing - virtue is not in the ideal but in the mean of the concrete - its concerned with actions and principles of action which comes from habits rooted in concrete choices and which meets new challenges by habit as much as by "principles" - it is habit that is the "interpreter" of principles, so to speak. For instance, something like "if you have two shirts give your neighbour one" does not mean that everybody ought only to have one shirt, there is an analogical meaning that might be a literal one in extreme events - i.e. where shirts are not plentiful enough. But I justified myself also by a part in De Veritate that I remembered about truth being in the mind, about Kant - I guess it was a way of trying to cope with gaining particular knowledge and the criticism of metaphysics after being trained in a more metaphysical tradition. Again, being led by passions. If I was calmer I would not see the need to throw myself so violently into new things - even new intellectual things. I saw it as something good - I didn't provide for myself, however but really tried to be a clean slate - I took the critical approach as sincerely as Descartes purported to. The point of this was that I'm pretty sure that one could generalize the human being for Aquinas although not from a moral perspective - but that I can sit and think "us" - even "us" is already a generalization, although perhaps a more existential or attached generalization than "human beings" - the generalization is what is key to the intellectual thing -t he "existential" part would be incidental. Thinking "abstractly" is not necessarily less material than thining non-abstractly - because after a certain point abstract thinking might begin to be counter-productive perhaps? Just throwing out hypotheses. Do passions aid or impede thought? Of themselves, pleasures and pains do detract - it is the intentione thing. Okay - now I'm getting somewhere. The existentialist cry or the war against metaphysics is not so much - or at least would not be justified - in decrying abstract thought - as decrying neglect or contempt of the real world, and there is an accidental possibility that somebody who thinks he is getting really good with metaphysics may be actually horrible when it comes to reconnecting the world with his clear conceptions. I know very good metaphysicians. I knew a young metaphysician who turned me off of metaphysics - but I mistakenly thought it was the "metaphysics" instead of the "youth". This is where Aristotle is right about hte young being led astray by their passions. But the moralist might make the same objection to SOME metaphysicians "that they are led astray by their principles" for principles serve a passionate function for some such that they cannot see the individual. So... Anyway - Aristotle's metaphysics is NOT all that pretentious and dogmatic - people can use it dogmatically when metaphysics is something to be enjoyed in itself or employed purely as a heuristic device for the particular - something to get it going - it does not pretend to know everything and it can be seen to be just as much at the service of the particular as more than one particular is the basis for metaphysical reflections. I don't see what Kant or other people would have to object to it. Anyway I have a feeling that I am saying stuff without knowing again and I thus curtail, add my reservations - and go on to learn instaed of gab)
It follows, therefore, that the intellectual soul, and every intellectual substance which has knowledge of forms absolutely, is exempt from composition of matter and form.
Reply to Objection 1. The First Act is the universal principle of all acts; because It is infinite, virtually "precontaining all things," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Wherefore things participate of It not as a part of themselves, but by diffusion of Its processions. Now as potentiality is receptive of act, it must be proportionate to act. But the acts received which proceed from the First Infinite Act, and are participations thereof, are diverse, so that there cannot be one potentiality which receives all acts, as there is one act, from which all participated acts are derived; for then the receptive potentiality would equal the active potentiality of the First Act. Now the receptive potentiality in the intellectual soul is other than the receptive potentiality of first matter, as appears from the diversity of the things received by each. For primary matter receives individual forms; whereas the intelligence receives absolute forms. Hence the existence of such a potentiality in the intellectual soul does not prove that the soul is composed of matter and form.
What that earlier winding commentary was simply trying to dispel unfamiliarity at this proof. "Receiving absolute forms" - can we know in that way? Individual vs. absolute forms. I don't think there is much to inquire here - some things are more understandable by economy than by attempts - not because they are empty of themselves but because my relationship to it is rather empty. But individual forms - that of this particular one. The forms that find themselves into my dreams. The intelligence receiving "absoltue" forms - ratios - why as well as what. Why I got confused earlier is that I placed a kind of primacy on the res ipsas - giving a step-up to passions as it were - "Well, it must be better to be related ad res ipsas than to res intellectum!" But no. Because to know something is to "penetrate to its very interior" - to be closer than any passionate proximity would permit. It does not make passion impossible - indeed it is impossible to make passion impossible for us unless we're dead - and if you get rid of passions you're only likely to get rid of the happy ones - because it's our nature and we can't be happy unless its a package deal. But there's a lot of intermediate things that makes this not so simple. Knowing a thing - knowing its interiors so that nothing is hidden - this creates the possibility of abetter love. If a free being always has newness - it means there is more to know and more to love but there is also something of the "chasing" that would happen because the infinity happens more on the changes than on the substance - it's more because of the limits of time than the wondrous fulness of content - and we do wonder at people and we do take pleasure in texts and speaking because we are made the same way and thus can really teach or remind or inspire. But this is where knowledge is great. And one does not have to leave "others" behind or show no mercy or at least the effects of empathy.
Reply to Objection 2. To be a subject and to be changed belong to matter by reason of its being in potentiality. As, therefore, the potentiality of the intelligence is one thing and the potentiality of primary matter another, so in each is there a different reason of subjection and change. For the intelligence is subject to knowledge, and is changed from ignorance to knowledge, by reason of its being in potentiality with regard to the intelligible species.
Reply to Objection 3. The form causes matter to be, and so does the agent; wherefore the agent causes matter to be, so far as it actualizes it by transmuting it to the act of a form. A subsistent form, however, does not owe its existence to some formal principle, nor has it a cause transmuting it from potentiality to act. So after the words quoted above, the Philosopher concludes, that in things composed of matter and form "there is no other cause but that which moves from potentiality to act; while whatsoever things have no matter are simply beings at once." [The Leonine edition has, "simpliciter sunt quod vere entia aliquid." The Parma edition of St. Thomas's Commentary on Aristotle has, "statim per se unum quiddam est . . . et ens quiddam."]
Reply to Objection 4. Everything participated is compared to the participator as its act. But whatever created form be supposed to subsist "per se," must have existence by participation; for "even life," or anything of that sort, "is a participator of existence," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Now participated existence is limited by the capacity of the participator; so that God alone, Who is His own existence, is pure act and infinite. But in intellectual substances there is composition of actuality and potentiality, not, indeed, of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. Wherefore some say that they are composed of that "whereby they are" and that "which they are"; for existence itself is that by which a thing is.
No comments:
Post a Comment