Making "intensio" acceptable

If "intensio" is a way that I can make a transition from "form and being" to "passio" without getting caught in something so general as actuality and potentiality and change, then it should be fine.... especially as it ensures the connection of everything that goes in between - but I don't think that passio as a particular kind of intensio can be neglected to be explained. Because "intensio" can refer to "perfectio" as well as "passio" and I have already noted the (only very, very subtle) difference from Aristotle and Aquinas in that regard - Aquinas is more ready to insert "perfection" in the category of "passio" although giving it a very broad sense of the word, than Aristotle while Aristotle bumps up against perfection as a kind of passion and finds it odd.

So what would "passion" bring to the notion of "intensio", then? Something is received, and something is taken away. I had already noted that I thought it was odd that something wasn't ALWAYS perceived to be taken away, or perceived to be taken away at ALL, but now come to think of it, in Shapiro's article on the intension and remission of forms, Burley documented that the main arguments of the Middle Ages was regarding whether intensio consisted of addition, or of addition and subtraction from the contrary quality. And Aquinas incorporates both! One he calls more properly a passion!

Respondeo dicendum quod pati dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter, secundum quod omne recipere est pati, etiam si nihil abiiciatur a re, sicut si dicatur aerem pati, quando illuminatur. Hoc autem magis proprie est perfici, quam pati. Alio modo dicitur pati proprie, quando aliquid recipitur cum alterius abiectione. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Quandoque enim abiicitur id quod non est conveniens rei, sicut cum corpus animalis sanatur, dicitur pati, quia recipit sanitatem, aegritudine abiecta. Alio modo, quando e converso contingit, sicut aegrotare dicitur pati, quia recipitur infirmitas, sanitate abiecta. Et hic est propriissimus modus passionis. Nam pati dicitur ex eo quod aliquid trahitur ad agentem, quod autem recedit ab eo quod est sibi conveniens, maxime videtur ad aliud trahi. Et similiter in I de Generat. dicitur quod, quando ex ignobiliori generatur nobilius, est generatio simpliciter, et corruptio secundum quid, e converso autem quando ex nobiliori ignobilius generatur. Et his tribus modis contingit esse in anima passionem. Nam secundum receptionem tantum dicitur quod sentire et intelligere est quoddam pati. Passio autem cum abiectione non est nisi secundum transmutationem corporalem, unde passio proprie dicta non potest competere animae nisi per accidens, inquantum scilicet compositum patitur. Sed et in hoc est diversitas, nam quando huiusmodi transmutatio fit in deterius, magis proprie habet rationem passionis, quam quando fit in melius. Unde tristitia magis proprie est passio quam laetitia.

I just realized that I never really looked at the Latin of this before - but had relied on the English. "recipere" and "abiiciatur" - received and 'cast aside' 'taken out" - more violent than the "subtrahatur" which I had instinctively imagined it to be.
But the example which he gives of the passion - of health being given and sickness taken away - is much more complex than the "heat" which Shapiro uses - so the accidental form is not necessarily a single one which I was afraid it was, but can actually refer to a complex disposition - and I should remember this becuase "musician" which is used as an example of an accidental form is by no means simple or purely quantifiable.
And the most proper mode of passion when something is received and something taken, one being harmful and one not being harmful.

So in this case "intensio" would be a form of "change" that is not too "prior" a notion, but is already one that has the closer characteristics that I want to make a coherent account of passion without rewriting the Metaphysics and the De Anima first. If I'm the first scholar to make a big deal of intensio as specifically within Aquinas, so be it - if I can make plausible connections, they won't hold it against me.

YESSSSS! MY FIRST BREAKTHROUGH!!!!!! thank you God!

And I don't even need a platonist aquinas to figure this out! all I need is a bit of research on "intensio" - that article will help me to do that - and to make a coherent argument that this is what Aquinas was thinking in terms of when he wrote it in this way, and to use it accordingly in the wide and rich connotation which I wanted from it.

But I still should get Dewan's text on form in Aquinas... honing my things on "good" and "unity" (relevant because figuring heavily in the "causes" of sorrow) in Aquinas. I can probably do it from my own exegesis. But I'm afraid I won't have enough bibliography - and I have a proabably good idea that a master's thesis ought to be really scholarly. I should work with Aquinas myself first, and then get the others, so I don't panic at the last minute with my head full of outside stuff - sometimes it helps to get the ball rolling but in this situation I'd better fill up with my own gas first. Actually I wish that I had much more access to much more texts than I do. But anyway, start somewhere!