Remedies for Sorrow

REMEDIES FOR SORROW AND PAIN (now that it is clear they are "crying out" for remedies!)

1. Does all pleasure remedy?
It seems that not every pleasure mitigates pain or sorrow. For delight does not mitigate sorrow, only insofar as it is contrary to it (Medicines are made by the contrary, as it is said.) But not every delight is contrary to every sorrow, as was said above. Therefore not every delihgt mtigates every sorrow. (True enough - it's not fixing "the" problem which is at the concern of it).
2. What causes sadness (trist) doesn't mitigate sadness - but the 'bad man is said because he took delight"
3. Augustine's example of fleeing his native land so as not to see hte places which he used to share with his friend.
Sd contra - Aristotle - "Sorrow is driven out by pleasure: either by a contrary pleasure, or any other as long as it is intense (si sit fortis)."
Delight as we have seen is a certain rest of ht eappetite in an appropriate/congenial (convenienti) good; but sadness is from that which is repugnant to the appetite. Now just as dlieght holds itself to sadness in the appetitive motions, so it holds itself among bodies as rest to fatigue, which happens from some unnatural transmutation; for and sadness itself is a certain fatigue, or imports a sickness (aegritudinem) of the appetive power.
So therefore a certain rest of the body brings a remedy against whatever fatigue coming from whatever unnatural cause; so does any delight bring a remedy to mitigate any sadness coming from whatever.
1. might not be contrary according to species but according to genus it is - and "on the part of the disposition of the subject (WHICH IS REALLY AT ISSUE) any sorrow can be mitigated through any pleasure.
2. The delights of bad men are not caused by sorrow concerning the present - but at a later point, inasmuch as they repent of having taken pleasure in bad things. One can maneuver out of this sadness through contrary pleasures (Huic tristitate subvenitur per contrarias delectationes) - So does he mean here that specifically contrary delights are what help one out of the sorrow of repentance? Because somebody repenting of taking pleasure in "bad things" will not necessarily be comforted with a cupcake.
3. When two things are causes inclining to contrary movements, each one impedes the other, and so that one finally conquers which is stronger and of greater duration. Now when someone is saddened about those things which he used to be in the habit of enjoying with a friend who is dead or absent, two causes leading toward contary effects are found. For the rethinking of the death or absence of the friend inclines to pain (dolorem); but the present good inclines to delight. Whence each one of these diminishes the other.
Nice.
But nevertheless because the present sense moves more strongly than memory of the past, and love of self remains longer than love of another; therefore finally dleight expels sadness.
Wherefore Augustine says a little later that "his pain (dolor) ceded to earlier kinds of pleasure."

OKAY - so principles at work here - the PRESENT is what is stronger, and what relates to ONESELF is stronger (or at least more long-lived, if not stronger) than what relates to another. There can be a kind of wobbling of contrary inclinations, but the "stronger and longer" wins out. This is why sorrow sometimes does win out - when there is no hope - look at so many people at Auschwitsch (sp?) there have been books which studied why no one ever sought to rebel - why only a couple of guys with guns could "herd" and control people many, many times their number - sought to explore that and the people who escaped. But there are many, many factors there - I don't even know the circumstances. And there are still many resilient people who survived these "camps".

But the more conceptual principle is that pleasure in general (any pleasure) gives that "rest" to the appetite that it needs to reconnoiter itself, no matter what its source of pain.

ARTICLE 2
Weeping?
1. The effect doesn't diminish the cause. 2. Laughter is also an effect of something, rejoicing - but it doesn't diminish rejoicing. 3. In weeping our evil is represented to us. But the imagination of the saddening thing increases sadness, as the imagination of the delightful thing increases joy.
But Augustine says that whe he wept over his friends death "in sighs and tears alone" did he find "a little relief".

Two reasons:
1. Hurtful things hurt more when closed/pent up inside, because the intention (intentio) of the soul is greatly increased concerning ipsum (either the harmful thing, or the soul); but when it is diffused toward exterior things, then the soul's intention is in a way scattered towards exterior things, and so the pain (dolor) is dimnished. And thus, when men are in sadnesses, they manifest their sadness more extierorly by weeping or sighing, or even by words, their sorrow is mitigated.
Secondly, because operation is always congenial to a man according to the disposition which he is in, and so is pleasurable. Now weeping and sighing are certain operations which are congenial to the saddened or pained one. And therefore these are delightful to them. Since therefore every delight gives some relief to sadness or pain, as was said, it follows that through mourning (planctum) and sighing sadness is mitigated.

- TWOFOLD - "dispersing" the intention of the soul which is wrapped up in hurtfulthing/itself (can't tell - they say the hurtful thing). But here also words are sufficient as well as weeping and sighing.
b. OPERATION according as it is fitting. Here's where training and therapy might come in - weeping and sadness are some kind of operation - and it is hard to think of crying as an operation, because it is something that happens when I am thinking about something else - I usually find out that I am crying when my face is wet. I'm a more watery as opposed to more loud crier and I tear up for happy things as well as sad things or even things that I didn't know I felt strongly about or enormously excited or disturbed about - its just kind of my body trying to say, "Oh, I'm here with you, too!" and I guess we all get that.
But, sometimes crying can be an operation. When you are REALLY REALLY low and it's something that is yours -that is you saying "I am more than this - this is me objecting." I guess I think of crying as an operation in an irascible sense. No, this is still not quite what he means. Crying is doing something and me doing something that is consonant with my intention or rather "disposition" as he says - meaning "as I am disposed now". Or in other words, "this is my operation." There we go.

But there's a reason the first one comes first - because of the problems I had getting around to calling crying an action. At first it is something that does dissipate - there is something very physical and physically therapeutic about crying - it is about getting things out - literally and physically, you're getting out water, at least, and I'm sure on the hormonal level things are happening.

Anyway.
Ad 1 is tres interessant - The habitude of cause to affect is opposite to the habitude of the saddening thing to the saddened one; for every effect goes along with its cause (est conveniens) and consequently is delightful to itself; for the saddening one is contrary to the saddened.
Thus the effect of sadness has a greater contrary habitude to the saddened one, than the saddening thing itself to him. And thus, sadness is mitigated through the effect of sadness, by reason of the aforesaid contrariety.
THIS IS MOST INTERESTING (and empowering in a way) - the EFFECT OF SADNESS is more contrary to the CAUSE of sadness - nothing is so harmful to us than our own sadness. The fact that it is so close is a cause of self-vulnerability but also chance for great freedom (with therapy).

2. The habitude of effect to cause is similar to the habittude between the delighting to the delighted, because in both cases congeniality/convenience/symmetry (convenientia) is found. Now every like increases like. Therefore laguhter and other effects of gladness increase gladness, unless more strongly per accidens, propter excessum.

This says a lot about the human being htat I should include in a general account of passion - that bodily "effects" increase good passions (unless excessive).

3. The image of the saddening thing, insamsuch as it concerns the saddening thing, naturally works to increase sadness; but from this that man imagines that he does something which is appropriate to him according to such a state, a certain delight surges (consurget).
I love his language! The English here is rather tame.
And from the same reason if laughter steals from a man in a state in a situation which it seems mournful to him, he has pain (dolet) over this, inasmuch as he did something inappropriate, as Cicero says.

I never noticed this point in Aquinas but I insisted upon it myself. So there is nothing new in this latter part. Except for the "laughter" stealing over - I don't often laugh in situations which make me really sad, because if I can find it laughable, I change my mind and am no longer sad about it, or the memory of laughing about it makes it possible for me not to become too sad about it later if the memory recurs. There's the opposite inclinations again there.

In terms of specific kinds of sorrow - someone who can laugh is not too far gone - someone with acedia - physical or moral - can't really laugh, except perhaps an embittered one. And I would think the envious person, too. And the merciful person, at least concerning those for whom he has compassion. The anxious person is probably the only one with laughable sorrows - while unstable as to joy, s/he is also unstable as to sorrow - the sorrow is just as liable to be broken up and dispersed as to overtake the person when the situation changes or the relationship to it changes. But this is also a mild form of anxiety I am considering.

Anyway - keep that for later. I'm not sure what I'm talking about.


WHETHER PAIN AND SORROW ARE MITIGATED THROUGH THE COMPASSION OF FRIENDS
Note which I didn't before "mitigentur" = softened, lightened, alleviated, soothed, civilized - many degrees possible in this word - same root as "meek". Can mean just barely soothed, just enough for the appetite to reconnoiter - or can even mean "tamed".

1. Seems that the pain (dolor) of a con-suffering (compatientis) friend does not mitigate sadness (tristitia). For contraries are the effect of contary things. But as Augustine says, when many people rejoice together, the joy of each one in particular is enriched; because they become aroused themselves, and are inflamed by each other. Therefore equally when many are sad together, there will be greater sorrow.
2. Friendship requires that love be repaid by love (augustine) but the "condolent" friend phas pain over the the pain of his pained friend. Therefore the pain of the condolent friend is the cause of the first pained friend concerning his own evil, causing further giref. And so, by duplication of pain, sadness seems to increase.
Every evil of a friend is saddening, jsut as one's own proper evil, ofr a firend is naothe rself. But pain is a kind of evil. Therefore th e pian of a condolent friend icnreass sadness of the friend whom he condoles with.
August - we are comforted.
It is natural for a friend condoling in sadness to be consolatory.
Aristotle suggested two reasons
- the first, since sorrow pertaines to weighing one down, has the notion of a burden, which the aggravated one exerts himself to alleviate (conatur alleviari). When anyone sees someone else to be saddened by his sorrow, it seems to him as though by a certain imagination that others bear his burden with him, as attempting to it, to alleve the weight, and therefore he bears a lighter burden of sadness, just as it happens in carrying physical weights.

The second reason is better (why did he put it secondly then? doesn't seem to take as much stock in the first - maybe because of the strong presence of the imagination whereas this one is closer to relations of the appetite itself) - from that thhis friends are saddened "percipit se ab eis amari; quod est delectabile."
He sees them to love himself, which is pleasurable. This is very importnat - from having others love oneself, it is pleasurable, but it is also closer to re-unifying oneself, if others love oneself, one can love oneself, but it is taking pleasure in them loving oneself - it is directed in gratitude towards them and directed by way of their example toward love of himself which also enables him to move out of sadness - indeed, would be the BEST REMEDY in the sense of applying it to THE MOST SPECIAL SOURCE of sadness which is the reflexivity.
But Aquinas seemed to have left this unexplored and I wonder why he didn't put it first or last. And why contemplation of the truth comes after and why sleeping and baths after that. There seems at first to be no rational order to this. But I'm sure Aquinas was concerned with his order - so he must have had some basis - although perhaps sadness is an area where there is the fairest possibility of not having to have an order - because sadness is about the per accidnes where we often live, by the way.

Anyway more about that later.

CONTEMPLATION OF TRUTH. In a moment.