Is the intellectual principle properly united to such a body?

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima ii, 1), that "the soul is the act of a physical organic body having life potentially."
I answer that, Since the form is not for the matter, but rather the matter for the form, we must gather from the form the reason why the matter is such as it is; and not conversely. (remember this!) Now the intellectual soul, as we have seen above (Question 55, Article 2) in the order of nature, holds the lowest place among intellectual substances; inasmuch as it is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth, as the angels are; but has to gather knowledge from individual things by way of the senses, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii). But nature never fails in necessary things: therefore the intellectual soul had to be endowed not only with the power of understanding, but also with the power of feeling. Now the action of the senses is not performed without a corporeal instrument. Therefore it behooved the intellectual soul to be united to a body fitted to be a convenient organ of sense.
Now all the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like, of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries, and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness; because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v). Therefore the body to which the intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals, man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe "those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind," as stated in De Anima ii, 9.

Other questions:

Is the intellectual principle united to the body as its form?
Is the intellectual principle multiplied numerically according to the number of bodies or is there one intelligence for all men?
In the body, the form of which is an intellectual principle, is there some other soul?
In the body is there any other substantial form?
What are the qualities required in the body of which the intellectual principle is the form?
Is it united to such a body by means of another body?
By means of an accident?
Is the soul wholly in each part of the body?