Anger

Good to know about - because in arguing about whether sorrow is the most harmful, anger and fear are put forward as suggestions but anger and fear are only as bad as sorrow makes them.

But the irascible will have to be dealt with, if not systematically, at least in considerable presence - the enduring aspect. And also the pleasure aspect as appears in this article:
I-IIae - q. 48.
Article 1. Whether anger causes pleasure?
Objection 1. It would seem that anger does not cause pleasure. Because sorrow excludes pleasure. But anger is never without sorrow, since, as stated in Ethic. vii, 6, "everyone that acts from anger, acts with pain." Therefore anger does not cause pleasure.
Objection 2. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that "vengeance makes anger to cease, because it substitutes pleasure for pain": whence we may gather that the angry man derives pleasure from vengeance, and that vengeance quells his anger. Therefore on the advent of pleasure, anger departs: and consequently anger is not an effect united with pleasure.
Objection 3. Further, no effect hinders its cause, since it is conformed to its cause. But pleasure hinders anger as stated in Rhet. ii, 3. Therefore pleasure is not an effect of anger.
On the contrary, The Philosopher (Ethic. iv, 5) quotes the saying that anger is "Sweet to the soul as honey to the taste" (Iliad, xviii, 109 [trl. Pope]).
I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 14), pleasures, chiefly sensible and bodily pleasures, are remedies against sorrow: and therefore the greater the sorrow or anxiety, the more sensible are we to the pleasure which heals it, as is evident in the case of thirst which increases the pleasure of drink. Now it is clear from what has been said (47, A1,3), that the movement of anger arises from a wrong done that causes sorrow, for which sorrow vengeance is sought as a remedy. Consequently as soon as vengeance is present, pleasure ensues, and so much the greater according as the sorrow was greater. Therefore if vengeance be really present, perfect pleasure ensues, entirely excluding sorrow, so that the movement of anger ceases. But before vengeance is really present, it becomes present to the angry man in two ways: in one way, by hope; because none is angry except he hopes for vengeance, as stated above (Question 46, Article 1); in another way, by thinking of it continually, for to everyone that desires a thing it is pleasant to dwell on the thought of what he desires; wherefore the imaginings of dreams are pleasant. Accordingly an angry man takes pleasure in thinking much about vengeance. This pleasure, however, is not perfect, so as to banish sorrow and consequently anger.
Reply to Objection 1. The angry man does not grieve and rejoice at the same thing; he grieves for the wrong done, while he takes pleasure in the thought and hope of vengeance. Consequently sorrow is to anger as its beginning; while pleasure is the effect or terminus of anger.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument holds in regard to pleasure caused by the real presence of vengeance, which banishes anger altogether.
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure that precedes hinders sorrow from ensuing, and consequently is a hindrance to anger. But pleasure felt in taking vengeance follows from anger.

THE other four articles are VERY IMPORTANT - the effects of anger - hindering reason, causing "heat"- heat is very important to me after looking at de motu cordis - also as causing taciturnity incidentally.
but the second one is also very itneresting particularly the asnwers to the objections as well where anger (2) is compared to fire.

"Fear" and "anger" are given the most weight of the irascible passions in terms of their enumeration of subjects - these are also the ones that have the "presence" of sorrow the most perhaps (as seen from "is sorrow the most harmful?")

FEAR - VERY interesting - from 44.1
On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 23) that "fear is a power according to systole," i.e. contraction.
I answer that, As stated above (Question 28, Article 5), in the passions of the soul, the formal element is the movement of the appetitive power, while the bodily transmutation is the material element. Both of these are mutually proportionate; and consequently the bodily transmutation assumes a resemblance to and the very nature of the appetitive movement. Now, as to the appetitive movement of the soul, fear implies a certain contraction: the reason of which is that fear arises from the imagination of some threatening evil which is difficult to repel, as stated above (Question 41, Article 2). But that a thing be difficult to repel is due to lack of power, as stated above (Question 43, Article 2): and the weaker a power is, the fewer the things to which it extends. Wherefore from the very imagination that causes fear there ensues a certain contraction in the appetite. Thus we observe in one who is dying that nature withdraws inwardly, on account of the lack of power:(..)

Reply to Objection 1. As the Philosopher says (De Problem. xxvii, 3), although in those who fear, the vital spirits recede from outer to the inner parts of the body, yet the movement of vital spirits is not the same in those who are angry and those who are afraid. For in those who are angry, by reason of the heat and subtlety of the vital spirits, which result from the craving for vengeance, the inward movement has an upward direction: wherefore the vital spirits and heat concentrate around the heart: the result being that an angry man is quick and brave in attacking. But in those who are afraid, on account of the condensation caused by cold, the vital spirits have a downward movement; the said cold being due to the imagined lack of power. Consequently the heat and vital spirits abandon the heart instead of concentrating around it: the result being that a man who is afraid is not quick to attack, but is more inclined to run away.
COLD AND HEAT - VERY IMPORTANT... did you know there was a recent study that when people felt lonely they estimated the room temperature to be lower than it was???
http://www.medicinenet.com/script/main/art.asp?articlekey=92729

and went for warming foods.

ARTICLE 3 - whether fear makes one tremble?
On the contrary, Cicero says (De Quaest. Tusc. iv, 8) that "fear is followed by trembling, pallor and chattering of the teeth."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), in fear there takes place a certain contraction from the outward to the inner parts of the body, the result being that the outer parts become cold; and for this reason trembling is occasioned in these parts, being caused by a lack of power in controlling the members: which lack of power is due to the want of heat, which is the instrument whereby the soul moves those members, as stated in De Anima ii, 4.

THISI S ALL ABOUT THE BODY. HEAT. HEAT is verrrry interesting.....
I wonder why temperature is less of a consideration in sorrow.

art.4
I answer that, Man's exterior actions are caused by the soul as first mover, but by the bodily members as instruments. Now action may be hindered both by defect of the instrument, and by defect of the principal mover. On the part of the bodily instruments, fear, considered in itself, is always apt to hinder exterior action, on account of the outward members being deprived, through fear, of their heat. But on the part of the soul, if the fear be moderate, without much disturbance of the reason, it conduces to working well, in so far as it causes a certain solicitude, and makes a man take counsel and work with greater attention. If, however, fear increases so much as to disturb the reason, it hinders action even on the part of the soul. But of such a fear the Apostle does not speak.

So fear and anger seem in a way to be more physical - in sorrow there is a tendency to regard it as something more spiritual - while there is the question of "pain" and "sorrow" which he says are the same or different and uses them both same and differently, there is a difficulty with the spirituality of it in translating it to the outward members - and there are sorrows closer to t he appetitive power and further from.

Laziness is not a sorrow for work as i thought - it is a fear of toil in work- according to the last answer to hte objection here. That would perhaps make more sense - a fear of unsuccessful toil and further self-dislike. but this wouldn't quite be laziness - it would be a paralyzation for other reasons. Laziness is just a fear of toil - not a fear of no consequences - that would be more like acedia.