Relevant Pieces from O'Rourke

"From chapter 4 - Aquinas: being, non-being, and the good" start p. 85)

"To Aristotle's well-known prhase, 'the Good is what all things desire', Aquinas adds valuable insight and elaboration. He begins with a remark which is important for the entire treatment, namely, that 'the good' is a notion which is ultimate or primary in itself. It is interesting that even within this context Aquinas allowed this as a reason whyt he Platonists could hold that the good is prior to being; he states summarily, however, that they are more properly convertible. Goodness, along with being, is one of those fundamental characteristics which cannot be analysed in to concepts anterior to itself. It cannot be reduced to elements which are simpler or more ultimate however, it becomes manifest through the things which derive from it, as a cause is revealed by its effects. Since the effect proper to the good is that it moves the appetite or will, this is how it may be desribed. The good is thus defined as that which all things desire. (In ethicorum, 1, 1, 9: considerandum est, quod bonum numeratur inter prima: adeo quod secundum Platonicos, bonum est prius ente. Sed secundum rei veritatem bonum cum ente convertitur. Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt, bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt.

Desirability, however, is a consequence or result of goodness. To describe the good as that to which all things tend, Aquinas notes, is to indicate by means of a characteristic the presence of goodness rather than disclose its essence or ground. Aquinas' definition indicates what we may term the 'phenomenological' content of goodness - its (86)
manifestation to the desiring subject - but does not pentrate tot hat which fundamentally constitutes it as such. In Plotinus' phrase: 'The good must be desired; but it is not good because it is desirable, it is desirable because it is good.' (enneads, vi, 7, 25). It is thus necessary to go beyond the ratio boni which allows us to recgonize goodness, to the natura boni, its ontological ground (cit - joseph de finance - connaissance de l'etre pp 161-2) (sounds kinda weird to me). In question 5 of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas gives suhc a foundation to goodnes by indicating its identity with being, more exactly with being conceived as actuality.

(points out that they differ according to their ratio - goodness signifies somethings relation to the will and denotes being as desirable - adds the charactr of appetitbility)

"Seeking the ground of perfection as such, Aquinas in turn states that anything is perfect only in so far as it is in act (ST 1, 5, 1 "Intantum est perfectum unumquodque inquantum est actu"),(...)
That which is in potency is lacking perfection (same question ad 1)

Another cite - p. 89
"To undersatnd why God is named as good, it should be considered that the Platonists, not distingusiheing matter from privation, placed it in the order of non-being, as Aristotle states in Physics I (i, ix, 192a). Now the causality of being extends only to the things which are (entia). Thus according to the Platonists, the causality of being did not extend to prime matter, to which, on the contrary, the causality of hte good extends. A sign of this is that prime matter most of all seeks the good. It is indeed proper to an effect to turn through desire towards its cause. Thus the Good is a more univesral and supreme cause than Being, since its causality extneds to more things. (III, 226. See In de Causis, IV, 101 - causa autem prima est latior, quia extendit etiam ad non-entia. In de causeis, lect. IV, prop XXI, 724b: Materia non participat ens, sed tamen participat bono."

p. 90
According to the Platonist viewpoint, the more general something is, the more they posited it as separate - as something prior, participated by posterior things, and therefore as cause of the posterior. In the order of those things which are affirmed most generally they placed the one and the good, which are more general even than being, since the good or the one is predicated of that of which being is not predicated, namely prime matter which Plato classed with non-being, not distinguishing between matter and privation, as is stated in Physics I; yet he attributed unity and goodness to matter, insofar as it is ordained to form. The good is spoken not only of hte end, but of htat which is ordered towards end. (25 - In de causis - iv, 98. Secundum positiones platonicas... quanto aliquid est communius, etc.)

Aquinas attributs the Platonist identification of matter with non-being to Plato's failure to distinguish netween matter and privation (see also ST1, 5, 2 ad 1 and In DN, IV, ii, 295). The concept of privation is indispensable for an understanding of hte material world. Plato had already made the distinction between matter and form, thereby correcting, as Aquinas notes, (IV, ii. 295) the ivew of the nacients that matter was the sole princple of movmenet in the corporeal world. He failed, however, to discover the third princple of material being which is necessary to explain the process of becoming, namely, steresis, i.e., the privation of form. Aristotle's concept of privation allows matter to be viewed as potency towards form arather than as simple non-being. Matter never exists without form; form is the co-principle together with which it alone receives existence. Yet, informed by a specific determination, it is not of necessity restricted for once and forever to that particular form. Determined by a single form it excludes nad is deprived of all others; these are, however, not totally beyond the bounds of oits xistence: they are not excluded to the very limits of absolute non-being but reside to a greater or lesser degree within its potential resources.

p. 91
Thus for aristotle too, matter is also associated with privation, but is not identical with privation.
(...)
quote form tomas
'Because everything which is caused turns through desire twoards its cause, prime mater desires the Good; since desire is but the disposition of a being towards the actualisation of what it is deprived of (prviatio et ordo ipsius ad actum') - (IV, ii. 296 - in causis - or maybe its dio?)

92 - Tom writes FORMA est quoddam divinum et optimum et appetibile. (..) Form is good becuase it is the perfection of potency, and therefore desirable since each thing desires its perfection (In Physic. i. 7).
Later he remarks that natural desire is nothing other than the disposition of beings towards their end in accordance with their nature.
p. 93 ftnt 36
citation concerning de veritate 3, 5, ad 1 - matter and a debile esse. don't know if this is relevant at all.

p. 95 cmmntry on dvn names - opening prgh ch. 5 - aquinas - "quia bonum quodammodo ad plura se extendit, ut platonici dixerunt" - and he adds 'For that also which does not exist in act, but is being in potency, b/c it is ordained towards the good (96) has, from this very fact, the nature of goodness; but it participates in the causality of being only when it becomes actual being (V, i, 616 see also VII, i, 697: Bonum autem, sec. quod prius dictum est, quantum ad causalitatem est prius quam ens, quia bonum etiam ad non entia suam causalitatem extendit.
(...)
"the name of the Good... extens both to things which exist as well ast o things which do not exist, in so far as non-beings have something of hte good acc. as they are in potency to being.' (V, i, 610). Her - "the name Goodness epxresses the complete and univesral providence of God, whereas 'Being' denotes only a determinate effect.' - v, i, 613.
p. 96
Talking about the angels.
"Aquinas claims to discern in Dio. the view that goodness is foud in creatures in wo ways, namely 'according to an actual participation of the good or through a disposition towards the good.' This, suggest, Aquinas, is in acc. with Dio's fundmanetal principle that the Good also extends to what is not actually in being. (V, i, 616 - bonum se extendit etiam ad non-ens actu). Angels thus more perfectly ordered to goodness thru a certain 'appropinquatio' towards it.

p. 97
"Esse igitur actu boni rationem constituit... naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus est perfectio eius. (SCG, I, 37) "esse enim actu in unoquoque est bonum ipsius (SCG 1, 38).

WAIT A MINUTE - it IS APPROPRIATE to be workign with the "one" and the "good" - Aquinas does not ask wehther the "desire for being" or "craving for being" is a cuase of sorrow - nor of joy - it comes in as the good - check if there is a corresponding presence of "unity" in the pleasure

Another citation - p. 98
"Since the essecne of good consists in this, that someting be perfective of another in the manner of an end, everything which has hte character of an end also has the nature of goodness. Now two things belong to the nature of end;: it must be sought or desired by things which have not yet attained the end, and loved by the things which share the end, as something whihc is lovable. For it is essentially the same to tend towards an end and in some way to repose in it (just as it is by one and the same nature that a stone moves towards the centre and rests there) Now these two properties (tendency and rest) are foudn to belong to the very act of being (ipsum esse). For those things which do not yet participate in the act of being tend towards it by a certain natural appetite. In this way matter tends to form, according to hte PHilosopher in Physics I. But all things which already have existence, however, naturally love that existence and preserve it with all their power... The act of existing itself has the nature of a good. Thus, just as it is impossible that there be any being which does not have existence, so too it is necessary that every being be good from the very fact that it has existence, although in certain beings many aspects of goodness are added over and above the act of being whereby they subsist. (DE VERITATE - 21, 2)

'Nor is this prevented by the fact that all things have existence, since whatever has being desires its continuance, and what has beng actually in one way only has it potentially in another... and thus what does not have being in act desires to be actually." (DV 22 1 ad 4)

Omnibus delectabile est esse (DV 22 1 ad 7)

'Every action and movmenet are seen to be ordered in some way toward being (esse), either that it (99) may be preserved in teh species or in the individual, or that it may be newly acquired. Now, the act of being is itself good, and so all things desire to be. Therefore, every action and movement are for the sake of the good.'_ (SCG 3, 3, 1881).

99
'The more that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to act, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. THis is why anuy natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end.' (DV 22, 1, ad 3)

One thing I will have to do is find a real appropriate timeline of Aquinas' works. What I think I 'll end up doing is focusing only on the Summa for my text - staying within Aquinas' pedagogy there - assuming that his thought did not develop from one section to the other - I think the Summa is sufficient in itself for my undertaking. I don't want to make a 'system' of Aquinas -or everything else I read about him I can find the inchoate or more rounded and aged and more friendly presentations in the Summa.

p. 100 - question whether being or good is primary - (ST - 1, 5, 2; also DV 21, 2)

p. 100
"Being is divided by act and potency. Now, act as such is good, for something is perfect acc. as it is in act. Potency too is a good thing, for potency tends towards act, as is clear in every change; potency is proportionate to act and belongs in the same genus wiht act; privation does not belong to it, except accidnetally. So eerything which exists, whatever its mode of existence, is good inasmuch as it is a being. (SCG, 3, 7 1917)

DV 21, 2 - causal priority of goodness.
p. 101
"goodness, on the other hand, while it is not predicated of things hwic do not exist, extends its causality to them inasmuch as through desire they fall under its influnece." Cites DV 21, 2 ad 2.
Aquinas thus concedes that things which do not exist in acutality may participate through desire in the nature of the good. (De Malo 1, 2) (Here acc. to o'rourke Aquinas seems to agree with Platonists that the good has an amplissimam extension than being.

"Every subject, thus, inasmuch as it is in potency with respect to any perfection whatsoever, even prime matter, form the fact that it is in potency, has the nature of goodness. And since the Platonists did not dist. between matte rand privatio, but classed matter together with non-being, the y state dthat the good extends more widely than being (quod bonum ad plura se extendit quam ens). Dio. seems to have followed this way of htinking in his book On the Divine names when he ranked the good as pripor to being. A nd although matter is to be distinguished from privation and is non-being by accidnet only, this view, nevertheless, is to some extent true, since prime matter is only potnetially being and through form acquires being as such; but it has potency thru itself alone; and since potency belongs to the nature of hte good, it follows that goodness belongs ot it per se. (DM 1, 2)

p.102
For 'being' si said absolutely, whereas 'good' also involves a relation (bonum autem etiam in oridne consistit) for something is said to be good not only b/c it is an end or has achieved its end, but just as it is ordered towards an end (ordinatum in finem) which wit has not yet attained, by this very relation itself it is called good. Matter, therefore, cannot simply be called being as such, because it is potential being and is predicated in relation to acutal existence (ordo ad esse); it can, however, b/c of this relation, be called good without qualificatio. It appears thus that the good is, in a way, of wisder schope than being. FOr this reason, Dio in ch. 4 (div nam) states that the 'good extends to existing things nad non exiting things'. For even the non-existent, i.e. matter understood as privation, desires a good, since nothing desires the god except that which is good. (SCG 3, 20, 2013; CF SCG 3, 7, 1917)

Orourke notes what appears to be a 'literal reversal' of this - . "Just as prime atter is being potentially and not actually, so it is potentially perfect and not actually, and good potentially and not actually)DV 21, 2, ad 3.

O rourke wonders a this denial of 'unqualified goodness of matter' b/c it happens immeidately after a response (ad 2) where Aquinas grants a greater univesrity to goodness through causality if not by predication (she suggests looking at who he is responding to).

ST, 1, 5, 3, ad 3
"Dicendum quod materia pirma, sicut non est ens nisi in potentia, ita nec bonum nisi in potentia.

she notes the textual 'of interest' bit that he makes this claim immediately before claiming support from platonism against he objection that not everything in existnece is good, since prime matter as such is not desirable but oly desires - here aqu. - b/c of prime matter's predisposition to the good it 'partkaes something of the good'. She notes there is of course no confloict or contradiction - and I know that.

Notes from her words " ultimately groudned in teh actuality of being, the god as such always has reference to end."
"Aquinas simpoly understands Dionysian non-being as signifying potential being; ens is equivalent to the eixtential perfeciton present formaly and actually in beings, whereas bonum is the final end and total perfection of all things; it comprehends both actual and potential being. Fran thinks this is "inded a refined rearrangmenet and prfound trasnformation of the dionysian universe acc. to a new ontological hierarchy in which Being is transcendent."
(end of p. 103)

p. 104
"Secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter.) ST, 1, 5, 1 ad 1) her trans - "to exist w/out qualification is to achieve an initial actuality; to be good w/out qualificaiton is to achieve complete actuality"

her again bot 104
"the Good is prior from the point of view of causality, b/c finality takes precednece in the order of causes. (aqu. explaining why god best named as good in dion, b/c/ 1st and universally = good - nature of cause - III, 227: Id autem quod habet rationem causae, primo et universaliter est bonum." (p. 105) (same section - more quotes. "bonum habet ratinemen finis; fins autem, primo, habet rationmen causae. and again: Agens agit siubi simile, non inquantum est ens quocumque modo, set inquantum est perfectum. Perfectum enim, ut dic. in IV meteorologicorum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Perfectum autem habet rationem boni.")
her
"in attribut. primaycy to the Good as final cause, Aqu. in no way jeopardises his own position. In agreeing w/ dion that from a causal pov. the notion of gdns is prior to that of being, aq. need not abandon his own view of God as transcendnet Being for a divine transc. beyond being. As Et. Gilson remarks, St THomas merely places the thought of dion within the context where it is fuly true, namely that of finality. Reinterpreted from this perspective it reinforces indeed Aqu' theory of God as the plenitude of being.
106
Quote from Gilson - "precisely b/c it is essentially desirbl, gdns is a final cause. Not only this, but it is both prime and ultmt in the order of prpsvns. Even bng is only b/c it is for the sake of smthgn which is its fnl cause, its end. In the ordr of cslty, then, gdns comes first and it is in this sense that Pltnsm rcvs from Tom Aq. all the crdit to which it is entitled." (teh elements of christn phlsphy p. 169)

cit 74 - De potent. 7, 2, ad 10 - Finis autem licet sit primum in intentione, est tamem postremum in operatione, et est effectus aliarum causarum.

now p. 107
ftnt - "sicut autem influere causae efficietnis est agere, ita influere casuae finalis est appeti et desiderari." (DV 22, 2.)
ftnt - "Finis est prior in causando quam aliqua aliarum causarum. (DV 21, 3 ad 3)

Finis etiam non est causa illius quod est efficiens, sed est causa ut efficiens sit efficens... unde finis est causa causalitatis efficientis, quia facit efficiens esse efficiens. (De principiis naturae, iv, 356)

also cites 1, 5, 4 at bot.

p. 108
"Dic. quod vita et scientia et alia huiusmodi sic appetutnur ut sunt in actu, unde in omnibus appetitiur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est appetibile nihil ens, et per conseuqens nihil est bonum nisi ens. (ST 1, 5, 2, ad 4)

ST, 1, 5, 2 ad 3 "Illud igitur quod per se est appetibile est esse."

ST. 1, 5, 2 ad 2 - respective causalities of being nad good.

DV 21.1 ad 4 more in the same line of hte causality of goodness and a thing pursuing its end acc. to its total being actually really important but I am geting rather wearied.

She concludes good is more universal not in teh extent of its predication in which it agrees w/ being but in the manner of its causlaity - cites "In I sent., 8, 1, 3, ad 2)
i am not inclined to disagree with her but only to be cautious of conclusionary remarks part. as she ends w/ the sentences.