"Desire does not diminish with sorrow"?

I said something to that effect in my table of contents. And I reasoned to it thus - one is sad because one does not have what one wants. Right? I am more sad as I want something more and there is "impediment" to it - and an "impediment" that does not belong to irascible but to patience - that won't be cleared by my effort but actually requires some sufferance - even time. Now suffering about something that you know will come in time is also to be mitigated by hope, conviction, and also pleasure in the present - you might call it "patience" - a good-humoured disposition for the interim. But patience depends upon hope and pleasure if it is not to become involuntary suffering.

But as I said - I reasoned that sorrow is proportionate to desire. Which is why I was able to canonize it so readily. I was sadder than other people because I thought I knew what I wanted more - or I didn't know what I wanted but I wanted it very badly. And I reasoned that my enthusiasm for the infinite had to do with my capacity for depression.

But sorrow to Aquinas does not have to do perceptually with a lack, but with a presence. Hold on. First let's see what he says about desire being a cause of sorrow:


I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above (Article 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (Article 1) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Question 32, Article 6); hence it is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (30, 2, ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow.
("the second principle of the appetite is hatred, which is the first inclination of hte appetite towards the avoidance of evil. So hatred is closer in sorrow than in love - has more of hte nature of sorrow - even though a love may be stronger in itself and cause suffering - there is something connatural about love that preserves one's unity)

Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have. (So desire here is understood in the "future" sense - I was taking it before in the generic sense of "love" but love is something different - desire is something added to the notion of love that has to do with separation/absence)


Now the desire to get rid of what is bothering one would be something but this would be more irascible - sorrow is about the withdrawal of power - the being-weighed-down. On the other hand, there must be something of desire in sorrow insofar as as one wants to remove the evil which is present. But what is most prominent in sorrow is hatred - there is a 'present evil" and one's relationship to it. Hence why it is contrary to life's movement - there is an opposition to oneself there that saps one's energy.