Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus aliquos necesse est pervenire, oportet consequenter de humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus actibus perveniatur ad beatitudinem, vel impediatur beatitudinis via. Sed quia operationes et actus circa singularia sunt, ideo omnis operativa scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur. Moralis igitur consideratio quia est humanorum actuum, primo quidem tradenda est in universali secundo vero, in particulari. Circa universalem autem considerationem humanorum actuum, primo quidem considerandum occurrit de ipsis actibus humanis; secundo, de principiis eorum. Humanorum autem actuum quidam sunt hominis proprii; quidam autem sunt homini et aliis animalibus communes. Et quia beatitudo est proprium hominis bonum, propinquius se habent ad beatitudinem actus qui sunt proprie humani, quam actus qui sunt homini aliisque animalibus communes. Primo ergo considerandum est de actibus qui sunt proprii hominis; secundo, de actibus qui sunt homini aliisque animalibus communes, qui dicuntur animae passiones. Circa primum duo consideranda occurrunt, primo, de conditione humanorum actuum; secundo, de distinctione eorum. Cum autem actus humani proprie dicantur qui sunt voluntarii, eo quod voluntas est rationalis appetitus, qui est proprius hominis; oportet considerare de actibus inquantum sunt voluntarii. Primo ergo considerandum est de voluntario et involuntario in communi; secundo, de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quasi ab ipsa voluntate eliciti, ut immediate ipsius voluntatis existentes; tertio, de actibus qui sunt voluntarii quasi a voluntate imperati, qui sunt ipsius voluntatis mediantibus aliis potentiis. Et quia actus voluntarii habent quasdam circumstantias, secundum quas diiudicantur, primo considerandum est de voluntario et involuntario; et consequenter de circumstantiis ipsorum actuum in quibus voluntarium et involuntarium invenitur. Circa primum quaeruntur octo. Primo, utrum in humanis actibus inveniatur voluntarium. Secundo, utrum inveniatur in animalibus brutis. Tertio, utrum voluntarium esse possit absque omni actu. Quarto, utrum violentia voluntati possit inferri. Quinto, utrum violentia causet involuntarium. Sexto, utrum metus causet involuntarium. Septimo, utrum concupiscentia involuntarium causet. Octavo, utrum ignorantia.
Because it is necessary to come to beatitude through acts, it is consequently necessary to consider human acts, so that we may know by which acts beatitude is reached, or the way of beatitude is impeded. But because operations and acts are about singulars, therefore every operative knowledge is perfected by considering the particular. Therefore because a moral consideration is of human acts, it is indeed handed over first to the universal; but secondly, to the particular. Concerning a universal consideration of human acts, certainly the first thing that occurs for consideration is human acts; secondly, their principles. Now human acts are indeed those which are properly human, but certainly there are ones common between men and other animals. And because beatitude is properly a human good, those acts which are properly human hold themselves closer (propinquius) to beatitude than those which man shares in common with other animals. Therefore we will first consider those acts which are properly human; secondly, those acts which humans have in common with other animals, which are called passions of the soul. Concerning the first there are to things occuring to consideration - first, the condition of human acts, second, their distinction. Now since human acts are properly so called because they are of the will, the same will being the rational appetite, which is proper to the human being; it is necessary to consider acts inasmuch as they are voluntary. Therefore the first to be considered is the voluntary and involuntary in general; secondly, those acts which are voluntary as though elicited from the will, as existing immediately from that will; third, those acts which are voluntary as though commanded by the will, which are of the will through the mediation of other powers. And because voluntary acts have certain circumstances; according to which they are adujicated, we will first consider the voluntary and involuntary, and consequently the circumstances of those acts in which the voluntary and involuntary are found. Concerning the first eight things are to be sought. First, whether voluntariness is found in human acts. Second, whether it is found in brute animals. Thirdly, whether voluntariety can be without any act. Fourthly, whether violence of the will can be undergone. Fifthly, whether violence causes involuntariety. Sixthly, whether fear/anxiety/dread causes involuntariety. Seventh, whether concupiscence causes involuntariety. Eighth, whether ignorance.
Question 6 art. 2
asks whether anything voluntary in irrational animals.
The sed contra "both children and irrational animals participate in the voluntaty - arist - also cit. by damasc and nyssa.
Speaks of perfect and imperfect knowledge - perfect knowledge consists in not only apprehending hte thing which is the end, but also in knowing it under the aspect of end, and the relationship of the means to that end. And such knowledge belongs to none but the ratoinal nature. But imperfect knowledge of the end consists in mere apprehension of hte end, wihtout knowingi t under the aspect of end, or the relationship of an act to the end. Such knowledge of hte end is exercised by irrational animals.
Distinguishes to perfect voluntary and imperfect voluntary which is within the competenc eo fanimals - apprehends the end - doesn't deliberate - and moved to the end at once.
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