Old work on 35.6

The sixth article asks whether sorrow is to be avoided more than pleasure shunned. The principle here is that the desire for good is essentially stronger than the avoidance of evil, for several reasons - that pleasure can be perfect, whereas some sorrow is always “suitable in some way” (a very insightful principle, which is based on at least two causes - the goodness of perceiving something to be bad that is actually bad, and the reflexive judgment of the appetite upon itself which can follow). Aquinas applies a parallel from nature - we see that the “movement” of things becoming “more intense” as they approach their goal.
Accidentally however sorrow can be shunned more inasmuch as love is more keenly felt through sorrow. (But this would also be presupposing that a consciousness of self and self-love prevails - see my reflection on mantellatablog)
Love, which persists throughout sorrow, is simultaneously a cause of pleasure. Inasmuch as the love is the more keenly felt when there is an accompanying sorrow (as pleasure taken in such a love will be the greater and more intense by juxtaposition with the sorrow which hinders it) one strives all the harder to rid oneself of the clinging sorrow. This is a considerable modification, a per accidens counter movement, a thrust against hindrances, in the intense progress towards love’s object or terminus (or at least the clinging to the love itself inasmuch as that incidentally is the best way of ultimately realizing one’s end) through the active intermediary of loving one’s love and the object thereof together, which force causes one to repel the object of one‘s sorrow that much more vehemently.
Secondly, sorrow may be shunned more than pleasure sought on the part of the kind of good which is at stake in the sorrow and what is at stake in the pleasure. If the good to which sorrow is accidentally attached is greater than that which is concerned in the pleasure, then the sorrow will be stronger motivation in the first case than love of that particular pleasure would be in the second case. (For instance etc. - given below)
Finally, sorrow does not hinder only one pleasure but every pleasure. Here all the combined powers of pleasure do not suffice to cloud out or outweigh the experience of sorrow, rather, sorrow makes its presence felt in every kind of pleasure. Signals t(maybe there is some sort of exception - ecstasy, love, whatever?) (Shows that the appetite is not “rational” in the sense that it can measure pleasures out over sorrows, but the logic of the appetite itself is that when it is not satisfied, it is not satisfied - because it is one, when something appears as wrong to it, it becomes impossible to enjoy fully - this does not mean there is no room for therapy, but rather therapy can happen as to extent of sorrow and kind of sorrow, but still the fundamental picture is that the appetite wants a happy ending.)

Got to linger here, because this forms the basis of much of our experience - explains our actions…..
Psychologically, this is very telling. We are always fundamentally oriented, attracted, given disposition towards and movement towards what enters our appetitive horizons as “good”. And yet, when we face serious obstructions towards the gaining or enjoyment of much-loved goods, the tendency of being oriented towards our beloved objects can be accordingly deflected to fit the twists and turns of our daily fates - according to which there are restrictions or denials of access to yearned-for goods. Inasmuch as a much-loved or more primary good is hindered, the attraction towards lesser kinds of goods will fade as the attention and intention of the soul becomes focused on trying to rid itself of what hinders its enjoyment of the more valuable good. The example Aquinas gives is that of eating while subject to bodily blows - our love for the well-being of our body takes precedence in such a case over the secondary pleasure of eating. This will be important to keep in mind when faced with persons who do not seem to take much pleasure in minor things - they might be oriented towards a dearer good which in reality or in perception is threatened for them, and to be preoccupied with the removal of obstacles to such a good (which would already be moving towards the irascible - but the “shunning“ of sorrow is about the irascible, if not angry, at least determined - but anger is the metaphor for determination).
(SYSTEMATIZE AS HE DOES - apprehension - felt more keenly (reflexive) - cause - greater good (priorities) - effect - one sorrow hinders all pleasure (unity of appetite).
Also response to 2nd objection helpful insofar as it shows that on the INTERIOR side tends to good more, but insofar as senses required (and here it seems to be applying to interior things, so much as the thing derives the character of “object” and “external” does one strive to shake it off. What would this mean for effective remedies of sorrow? Keep focused on the good rather than on the evil - “keeping one’s head”.?)