Footnotes

# See R. Stachowski’s The Mathematical Soul, p. 47 - "the problem of intensio and remissio formarum" was as it were a challenge to the traditional doctrine of the invariability of form which was phrased in the often quoted following passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics - (1044a 9-10) "And as a number does not admit of more and less, neither does substance, in the sense of form, but if any substance does, it is only the substance which involves matter." In other words, form qua form does not have gradation (does not admit of the more and less) and so intensio et remissio can only relate to accidental forms, or qualifications.”
ALSO CITE THE ONE I COUlnd’t get to - about being a popular medieval category for moral theology, etc. Also “note sur intensio et remissio“)
# One of the discussions that have come down to us concerning intension and remission was chronicled by Walter Burley, an English philosopher well-known in his time (1275-1344) who narrowly missed being a contemporary of Aquinas (1225-1274), chronicled the prominent 13th century debate on intensio and remissio. “One group, proponents of what we shall call the "addition" theory, insisted that qualitative augmentation comes about through the addition of new, real and distinct, specifically similar qualitative parts, which join the pre-existent parts to form a qualitative degree of determinate intensity. The second group, adherents of what we shall refer to as the "admixture" theory, argued that qualitative intension is to be regarded as a function of the degree of "freedom from admixture" with its contrary, enjoyed by any one member of a contrary qualitative pair.” H. Shapiro, Walter Burley and the Intension and Remission of Forms, Speculum 34, 1959, p. 413. According to Shapiro, Burley incised the debate with a fundamental correction: “Burley knifes at once to the core of this attempt to explain intension and remission, and in his very first objection neatly exposes the refractory nature of its most fundamental assumption. As this first analysis shows, the addition theory is rooted in an elementary confusion: for its supporters tacitly assume for entities clearly categorizable as qualities, characteristics which are properly predicable only of quantities.”
# Need to put explanation and citations for various modes of being - making a superior comment to the fact that I should expect the reader to know these already - a smooth way of neglecting explanation. It’s easy anyway. And the only folks reading this will know.
# For a treatment of “participation” in Aquinas, see R.A. Te Velde’s Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas.
# This is interesting in the context of the debate took place in the 13th century, according to Burley (vide footnote XXX).
# Respondeo dicendum quod augmentum, sicut et alia ad quantitatem pertinentia, a quantitatibus corporalibus ad res spirituales intelligibiles transfertur; propter connaturalitatem intellectus nostri ad res corporeas, quae sub imaginatione cadunt. (I-II, 52.1)
# (Aquinas recounts Aristotle’s famous saying about number)
# Illa (forma) vero quae recipiunt speciem ex aliquo ad quod ordinantur, possunt secundum seipsa diversificari in plus vel in minus, et nihilominus sunt eadem specie, propter unitatem eius ad quod ordinantur, ex quo recipiunt speciem. English New advent translation: But those things which receive their species from something to which they are related, can be diversified, in respect of themselves, according to more or less: and nonetheless they remain in the same species, on account of the oneness of that to which they are related, and from which they receive their species. For example, movement is in itself more intense or more remiss: and yet it remains in the same species, on account of the oneness of the term by which it is specified.
# (HERE can put in Albert-the-Great thing, whether passion is a quality or.. a passion? as a footnote, citing my 2ndary reading, and then show how passions are present both as passions and under the possibility of 'passible qualities' as well - cf. 50.1.ad3)
# “Appetite” will be the determining source of many “intensios” - insofar as one’s desires can propel one toward this or that form of action, relation, etc. However intensio remains the more primary category because it denotes an intrinsic principle towards form without the additional intelligibility of being in accordance with a thing’s appetite/desire as considered to be determined by its nature. A further indication of this is that there can be an intensio of defect in Aquinas’ terminology.
# footnote: A rock may participate in heat or recede from the formal quality of “being heated” without any perfection or detriment to its essential character - which is sit close to the earth and implies a certain quantity - if it lost a minimum quantity and was smashed to smithereens it would lose its nature of “rock” and become something else - “sand” for example.
# (I wonder how plausible an argument I could make of this using intensio/intentio “of the soul” as Aquinas does - I still have to fill in this gap.)
# HERE I should probably put the commentary on form-perfection - all that stuff.
# It belongs to the perfection of human being to have his natural end within himself in the mode of understanding it (FIND SOURCE) and furthermore to “move” the other powers (including the sensitive appetite) in respect of the more universal agency of the intellectual appetite, vide 1.82.4: “A thing is said to move as an agent, as what alters moves what is altered, and what impels moves what is impelled. In this way the will moves the intellect and all the powers of the soul, as Anselm says (Eadmer, De Similitudinibus). The reason is, because wherever we have order among a number of active powers, that power which regards the universal end moves the powers which regard particular ends. (…) Therefore the will as agent moves all the powers of the soul to their respective acts.”
# (ftnt - “Species” is a technical word in Aquinas that can cover, in modern terms, “form”, “image” etc - RESEARCH LATIN DICTIONARY - RESEARCH ALSO AQUINAS AND PPL ON SPEC. IN AQUINAS)
# Cf. 1.80.2 - “I answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive. “
# Can give a ftnt on the structure of the Summa - acutally just cite Aquinas’ general outline as he says it.
# citation for 84 or thereabouts and free judgment as a particular kind of appetite distinct even frm the will - “Freedom of judgment” is an interesting phrase, so is “power through oneself”. One of the questions that occurs in “power through oneself” is what constitutes oneself and how one’s power is realized in oneself.
# A note concerning gender: Aquinas, according to Latin usage, uses nouns and pronouns that are masculine in derivation but generic in usage (homo, ipse, etc). It seems that these masculine origins are an accident in Latin (for which “homo” is masculine in form, but “persona” is feminine). I am aware that a normative use of masculine forms can unfortunately connote, in English, a conception of “subject” as “primarily male”. However, when mirroring the linguistic content of Latin, in which gender does not lie too heavily upon a noun or pronoun, it seems legitimate to use masculine pronouns as applying to both “female” and “male” subjects. We propose to consider and to use the masculine form as a purely arbitrary designation referring to feminine and masculine subjects, which is consistent for the sake of convenience in writing.
# Footnote explaining what voluntariety consists of - somewhere in q. 6
# (FTNT EXPLAINING HOW HE FOLLOWS THIS ORDER) - Actually, probably NOT necessary.
# This is in keeping with I.77.2, where Aquinas notes that it belongs to the perfection of the human being to reach his perfection by “multiple powers”.
# ( - (NEED TO RESEARCH ON WHY PASSIO WOULD BE THE CAUSE OF CORRUPTIO IN EITHER MEDIEVALS OR ARISTOTLE - WHEREVER SOURCED). - - - FOOTNOTE ON MEDIEVALS AND CORRUPTION FOLLOWING PASSION - it would be interesting if I found a metaphysical cause or at least simile/correspondent to this in light of the tensions involved) which passion implies (here I don’t think it is just a “metaphysical” sense of corruption - of one formal perfection to another, but of something undergoing a detioriation in its substantial existence and unity - ACTUALLY - YES!!!! HERE I CAN PUT SOMETHING ABOUT THE “DISSOLUTION” THAT HAPPENS IN EXTREME PASSIONS )… ALSO these old notes: !With this sketch of the materiality of passion, we can return to the question of “corruption” as it exists in Aquinas. Can passions be harmful to the body? To inquire into this, it would be useful to look at the best passion - the one that is said to perfect the lover (supposing that the object is really suitable). On the one hand we find that love perfects, on the other hand, because of the intensity of the change, it might incidentally corrupt. (Is this only in really intense occasions? Or always?)This is an interesting question - what precisely are the dynamics or mechanics of passion in relation to the human body/composite? Passions use up energy - they are also “more the principle of exterior action” - we can say that they provide “energy”, “impetus” for external actions, we are aware of “adrenolyn” “libido” and many other things. But with passion comes also exhaustion. And people have finite amounts of energy. Passion perfects and removes from one - even if it is suitable, there is always something that is in a way consuming one - like a candle, when it burns or acts it also disappears.
# (FTNT ON EXAMPLE - ALSO ON ARISTOTLE AND THE DIFFERENCE BTW AQU AND ARIST IN THIS RESPECT)
# (FTNT ON HOW THIS IS INTERESTING IN LIGHT OF THE DISCUSSIONS ON “INTENSIO” AS CHRONICLED BY BURLEY - perhaps why he would consider it meaningful to distinguish “reception“ from “reception with loss“ - or maybe the distinction is that “perfection“ constitutes a kind of activity?but “air“ wouldn‘t do that - Is “air“ receding from darkness, though? - one is a quality….)
# (HERE COULD CROSS-REFERENCE medieval approaches to passions in general - corporeality, cross-referencing with physiologizing tendencies of the ancients with regard to the humours and the special role which the heart plays - citing de motu cordis and citing that many examples will be present - and also I could comment how appropriate these are - whether as metaphors or constitutive desriptions - for understanding the subjective experience - e.g. ’boiling of the blood’ - get better translation) OR MAYBE PUT THIS IN MAIN TEXT - the imagistic value of these as “metaphors”/“descriptions”
# Refer to ftnt recalling intensio (right now it’s the one right above)
# FTNT ON HOW THIS WOULD BE MORE SMART THAN OTHER VERSIONS WHICH HIGHLIGHT THE PASSIVITY OF THE ACTEE OR THE ACTIVITY OF THE OUTSIDE
# ('The more that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to act, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. THis is why any natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end.' (DV 22, 1, ad 3 - cited in o'rourke)
# [34529] Iª-IIae q. 22 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod e contrario se habet in his quae pertinent ad perfectionem, et in his quae pertinent ad defectum. Nam in his quae ad perfectionem pertinent, attenditur intensio per accessum ad unum primum principium, cui quanto est aliquid propinquius, tanto est magis intensum lucidi attenditur per accessum ad aliquid summe lucidum, cui quanto aliquid magis appropinquat, tanto est magis lucidum.Sed in his quae ad defectum pertinent, attenditur intensio non per accessum ad aliquod summum, sed per recessum a perfecto, quia in hoc ratio privationis et defectus consistit. Et ideo quanto minus recedit a primo, tanto est minus intensum, et propter hoc, in principio semper invenitur parvus defectus, qui postea procedendo magis multiplicatur. Passio autem ad defectum pertinet, quia est alicuius secundum quod est in potentia. Unde in his quae appropinquant primo perfecto, scilicet Deo, invenitur parum de ratione potentiae et passionis, in aliis autem consequenter, plus. Et sic etiam in priori vi animae, scilicet apprehensiva, invenitur minus de ratione passionis. (GIVE MY TRANSLATION)
# Ftnt to De Veritate - somewhere in the first or second question - near beginning.
# (CITATION - 82.4 explain the similarities of procedure, with the “motiva“ and “activa“ principle - whatv - of the passions )
# This is not to contradict that the intellect is not simply or per se superior, which Aquinas brings out when he considers the question whether the intellect or the will is the superior power (and the will is united to a higher power than passion - got t sort these things out). By the intellect, the human being can take in the forms of things themselves, which is better than any other relationship - Aquinas uses the metaphor of “penetrating interiors” (somewhere in q. 14 or 19 -whichever concerns gods knowledge). FIX UP WITH REAL REFLECTIONS ON THE VALUE OF COGNITION AND BY A COMPARISON TO SHOW HOW GOOD APPETITIVENESS IS IN ITSELF. - ALSO NEED TO CROSS - reference with section on charity/love WHEREVER it is that talks about “drawn as it were passively“ - OOOOH in reference to 82.5)
# (find a source in which to cite this)
# Note on the “likened” here - see footnote 6 - check to make sure this footnote doesn’t change - in the meantime - here is the description I’m looking for….Aquinas does not conceive that spiritual / intelligible things actually partake of movement and rest and similar corporeal modes of being in the exactly the same mode as these words convey for us, but that these imagistic ways of speaking are familiar to our intellect, which is more “at home” with corporeal things, is at home with these similes - c.f. I-II 52.1