http://www.cla.purdue.edu/english/theory/psychoanalysis/kristevaabject.html
http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/engl/theory/psychoanalysis/definitions/abject.html
Monday, November 2, 2009
Saturday, October 31, 2009
A new form of intellectual: the dissident
http://books.google.com/books?id=UK4XHweWFuIC&pg=PA292&lpg=PA292&dq=A+New+Type+of+Intellectual:+The+Dissident&source=bl&ots=pgnpZMHYCB&sig=dgBr0AEe5mhez5yRm-6xmzValpM&hl=en&ei=QoDsSr7TF8PelAeCh6CABQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1&ved=0CA0Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=A%20New%20Type%20of%20Intellectual%3A%20The%20Dissident&f=false
p. 294 - communal but particular, addressed to all but carried out by each individaul such is the culture of our age when it is not only an echo chamber of the past. From this point on, another society, another body, another body starts to emerge.
Task of the intellectual who has inherited "unproductive" (..) called humanities - not just to produce right t ospeak and behave in an individual way in our culture but to assert its POLITICAL vlaue. Failing this, the funciton of the intellectual strangely turns out to be one of coercion.
In teh wake of the priest, i ti sthe Marxian and the Freudian who today have become these manufacturers of an all-embracing rationality.
closes gap - magic password reasserting slave dialectic.
relates it to life - unemployment - student iwth no job...
p. 294 - communal but particular, addressed to all but carried out by each individaul such is the culture of our age when it is not only an echo chamber of the past. From this point on, another society, another body, another body starts to emerge.
Task of the intellectual who has inherited "unproductive" (..) called humanities - not just to produce right t ospeak and behave in an individual way in our culture but to assert its POLITICAL vlaue. Failing this, the funciton of the intellectual strangely turns out to be one of coercion.
In teh wake of the priest, i ti sthe Marxian and the Freudian who today have become these manufacturers of an all-embracing rationality.
closes gap - magic password reasserting slave dialectic.
relates it to life - unemployment - student iwth no job...
Kristeva and other postmoderns
Introduction to Julia Kristeva -
explaining chora, etc. stages
http://www.cla.purdue.edu/academic/engl/theory/psychoanalysis/kristevadevelop.html
http://www.engl.niu.edu/wac/kristeva.html
The top one explains a very general overview of her work - including her semiotic, symbolic, etc.
Bibliography - Kristeva: http://ms.cc.sunysb.edu/~hvolat/kristeva/krist02.htm
General page on postmodern people:
http://carbon.ucdenver.edu/~mryder/itc_data/postmodern.html#kristeva
Tuesday, October 27, 2009
Foucault and the Critique of Modernity
http://www.uta.edu/huma/pomo_theory/ch2.html
Chapter 2:
Is it not necessary to draw a line between those who believe that we can continue to situate our present discontinuities within the historical and transcendental tradition of the nineteenth century and those who are making a great effort to liberate themselves, once and for all, from this conceptual framework? (Foucault 1977: p.120)
What's going on just now? What's happening to us? What is this world, this period, this precise moment in which we are living? (Foucault 1982a p.216)
[T]he impression of fulfillment and of end, the muffled feeling that carries and animates our thought, and perhaps lulls it so sleep with the facility of its promises... and makes us believe that something new is about to begin, something that we glimpse only as a thin line of light low on the horizon - that feeling and impression are perhaps not ill founded (Foucault 1973b: p.384)
Foucault's critique of modernity and humanism, along with his proclamation of the death of man' and development of new perspectives on society, knowledge, discourse, and power, has made him a major source of postmodern thought. Foucault draws upon an anti-Enlightenment tradition that rejects the equation of reason, emancipation, and progress, arguing that an interface between modern forms of power and knowledge has served tog create new forms of domination. In a series of historico-philosophical studies, he has attempted to develop and substantiate this theme from various perspectives: psychiatry, medicine, punishment and criminology, the emergence of the human sciences, the formation of various disciplinary apparatuses, and the constitution of the subject. Foucault's project has been to write a critique of our historical era' (1984: p.42) which problematizes modern forms of knowledge, rationality, social institutions, and subjectivity that seem given and natural but in fact are contingent sociohistorical constructs of power and domination.
While Foucault has decisively influenced postmodern theory, he cannot be wholly assimilate to that rubric. He is a complex and eclectic thinker who draws from multiple sources and problematics while aligning himself with no single one. If there are privileged figures in his work, they are critics of reason and Western thought such as Nietzsche and Bataille. Nietzsche provided Foucault, and nearly all French poststructuralists, with the impetus and ideas to transcend Hegelian and Marxist philosophies. In addition to initiating a postmetaphysical, posthumanist mode of thought, Nietzsche taught Foucault that one could write a genealogical' history of unconventional topics such as reason, madness, and the subject which located their emergence within sites of domination. Nietzsche demonstrated that the will to truth and knowledge is indissociable from the will to power, and Foucault developed these claims in his critique of liberal humanism, the human sciences, and in his later work on ethics. While Foucault never wrote aphoristically in the style of Nietzsche, he did accept Nietzsche's claims that systematizing methods produce reductive social and historical analyses, and that knowledge is perspectival in nature, requiring multiple viewpoints to interpret a heterogeneous reality.
Foucault was also deeply influenced by Bataille's assault on Enlightenment reason and the reality principle of Western culture. Bataille (1985, 1988, 1989) championed the realm of heterogeneity, the ecstatic and explosive forces of religious fervor, secularity, and intoxicated experience that subvert and transgress the instrumental rationality and normalcy of bourgeois culture. Against the rationalist outlook of political economy and philosophy, Bataille sought a transcendence of utilitarian production and needs, while celebrating a general economy' of consumption, waste, and expenditure as liberator. Bataille's fervent attach on the sovereign philosophical subject and his embrace of transgressive experiences were influential for Foucault and other postmodern theorists. Through his writings, Foucault valorizes figures such as Holderlin, Artaud, and others for subverting the hegemony of modern reason and its norms and he frequently empathized with the mad, criminals, aesthetes, and marginalized types of all kinds.
Recognizing the problems with attaching labels to Foucault's work, we wish to examine the extent to which he develops certain postmodern positions. We do not read Foucault as a postmodernist tout court, but rather as a theorist who combines premodern, modern, and postmodern perspectives. We see Foucault as a profoundly conflicted thinker whose thought is torn between oppositions such as totalizing/detotalizing impulses and tensions between discursive/extra-discursive theorization, macro/microperspectives, and a dialectic of domination/resistance.
Chapter 2:
Is it not necessary to draw a line between those who believe that we can continue to situate our present discontinuities within the historical and transcendental tradition of the nineteenth century and those who are making a great effort to liberate themselves, once and for all, from this conceptual framework? (Foucault 1977: p.120)
What's going on just now? What's happening to us? What is this world, this period, this precise moment in which we are living? (Foucault 1982a p.216)
[T]he impression of fulfillment and of end, the muffled feeling that carries and animates our thought, and perhaps lulls it so sleep with the facility of its promises... and makes us believe that something new is about to begin, something that we glimpse only as a thin line of light low on the horizon - that feeling and impression are perhaps not ill founded (Foucault 1973b: p.384)
Foucault's critique of modernity and humanism, along with his proclamation of the death of man' and development of new perspectives on society, knowledge, discourse, and power, has made him a major source of postmodern thought. Foucault draws upon an anti-Enlightenment tradition that rejects the equation of reason, emancipation, and progress, arguing that an interface between modern forms of power and knowledge has served tog create new forms of domination. In a series of historico-philosophical studies, he has attempted to develop and substantiate this theme from various perspectives: psychiatry, medicine, punishment and criminology, the emergence of the human sciences, the formation of various disciplinary apparatuses, and the constitution of the subject. Foucault's project has been to write a critique of our historical era' (1984: p.42) which problematizes modern forms of knowledge, rationality, social institutions, and subjectivity that seem given and natural but in fact are contingent sociohistorical constructs of power and domination.
While Foucault has decisively influenced postmodern theory, he cannot be wholly assimilate to that rubric. He is a complex and eclectic thinker who draws from multiple sources and problematics while aligning himself with no single one. If there are privileged figures in his work, they are critics of reason and Western thought such as Nietzsche and Bataille. Nietzsche provided Foucault, and nearly all French poststructuralists, with the impetus and ideas to transcend Hegelian and Marxist philosophies. In addition to initiating a postmetaphysical, posthumanist mode of thought, Nietzsche taught Foucault that one could write a genealogical' history of unconventional topics such as reason, madness, and the subject which located their emergence within sites of domination. Nietzsche demonstrated that the will to truth and knowledge is indissociable from the will to power, and Foucault developed these claims in his critique of liberal humanism, the human sciences, and in his later work on ethics. While Foucault never wrote aphoristically in the style of Nietzsche, he did accept Nietzsche's claims that systematizing methods produce reductive social and historical analyses, and that knowledge is perspectival in nature, requiring multiple viewpoints to interpret a heterogeneous reality.
Foucault was also deeply influenced by Bataille's assault on Enlightenment reason and the reality principle of Western culture. Bataille (1985, 1988, 1989) championed the realm of heterogeneity, the ecstatic and explosive forces of religious fervor, secularity, and intoxicated experience that subvert and transgress the instrumental rationality and normalcy of bourgeois culture. Against the rationalist outlook of political economy and philosophy, Bataille sought a transcendence of utilitarian production and needs, while celebrating a general economy' of consumption, waste, and expenditure as liberator. Bataille's fervent attach on the sovereign philosophical subject and his embrace of transgressive experiences were influential for Foucault and other postmodern theorists. Through his writings, Foucault valorizes figures such as Holderlin, Artaud, and others for subverting the hegemony of modern reason and its norms and he frequently empathized with the mad, criminals, aesthetes, and marginalized types of all kinds.
Recognizing the problems with attaching labels to Foucault's work, we wish to examine the extent to which he develops certain postmodern positions. We do not read Foucault as a postmodernist tout court, but rather as a theorist who combines premodern, modern, and postmodern perspectives. We see Foucault as a profoundly conflicted thinker whose thought is torn between oppositions such as totalizing/detotalizing impulses and tensions between discursive/extra-discursive theorization, macro/microperspectives, and a dialectic of domination/resistance.
over 1000 books with interesting phrase
See http://books.google.ca/books?id=m7USFu5Z0lQC&qtid=cb7e7acd&dq=neuroethics&lr=&source=gbs_quotes_r&cad=7 for the whole list.
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased ; Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow ; Raze out the written troubles of the brain ; And, with some sweet, oblivious antidote, Cleanse the stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff, Which weighs upon the heart ?... 
Neuroethics: defining the issues in theory, practice, and policy - Page 247
by Judy Illes - 2006 - 329 pages
Limited preview -About this book
THe phrase FROM MACBETH
Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased ; Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow ; Raze out the written troubles of the brain ; And, with some sweet, oblivious antidote, Cleanse the stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff, Which weighs upon the heart ?... Neuroethics: defining the issues in theory, practice, and policy - Page 247
by Judy Illes - 2006 - 329 pages
Limited preview -
 | The Port folio - Page 396Joseph Dennie, Asbury Dickins - History - 1810...that keep her "From her rest;" — With what feeling does he exclaim ! —"Cure her of that! " Canstthou not minister to a mind diseased ; " Pluck from...stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff, " Which weighs upon the heart." And being answered ; — " Therein the patient " Must minister to himself:" He exclaims... |
Melancholy: as it proceeds from the disposition and habit, the passion of ... - Page iRobert Burton - Psychology - 1801 - 420 pages...ENGLISH MALADY " - are traced from within '* Its inmost centre to its outmost skin." i .J Cari'stthounot minister to a mind diseased, Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow, Raze out the written troubles of the brain, And, with some sweet oblivious antidote, Cleanse the foul... |
Bellgrove castle; or, The horrid spectre! - Page 27T H. White - History - 1803...attempts tempts of this nature seemed to operate as provocatives to their melancholy. •" Say, who can minister to a mind diseased — " Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow — " Raze out the written troubles of the brain-.. " And, with some sweet oblivious antidote, •"... |
Letters on literature, taste, and composition, addressed to his son - Page 100George Gregory - Language Arts & Disciplines - 1809 - 363 pages...I believe, ever found the following fine passage of Shakspeare too redundant in metaphor : ' Can'stthou not minister to a mind diseased ? Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow ? ' Base out the living tablets of the brain ; And, with some sweet oblivious antidote, Cleanse the... |
| An apology for the life of James Fennell - Page 424James Fennell - Biography & Autobiography - 1814 - 510 pages...just parted with a real friend, who recommended fortitude. Let us analyze this medicine, that is to "Minister to a mind diseased, Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow, Raze out the written troubles of the brain, And with some sweet oblivious antidote Cleanse the foul... ______________________________ notes from that woman - neuroethics in that neuroethics book which is cited at the top here in which appears (though I didn't find that phrase on the suggested page) practical undersatndings of social world can likewise evovle (just as theoretical knowledge (PM Churchland 89, 2000). role of brain's reward system in social learning normally fosters respect, or even reverence, for whatever human social institutions happen to exist (therefore change in those institutions may neither be fast nor linear and may be vigorulsy resisted even by those who stand to beenfit from the change. (..) despite - changes, etc. even revolutions do occur and some can reasonably be reckoned as moral progress (Churchland 89) that individuals are to be held responsible for their actions is a common human pracitce, and typically involves punishment in some manner when actions violate the estabilished standards. BY its very nature, punishent inflicts pain (or more generally, dis-utilities) on the punished - (complexities of deciding - advances - renewed reflections on fundamentals of responsibility and punishment - at most hbasic levels questions on reltaions betwl free choice, punishment, responsibility. |
Diagnostic bracket creep
Prozac on the couch: prescribing gender in the era of wonder drugs - Google Books Result
by Jonathan Metzl - 2003 - Medical - 275 pages
For example, see the discussion of "diagnostic bracket creep" in Zita, Body Talk, 61-84. 46 For example, scientific knowledge is assumed to be refigured and ...
books.google.ca/books?isbn=082233061X... -
For example, see the discussion of "diagnostic bracket creep" in Zita, Body Talk
books.google.ca/books?isbn=082233061X... -
- [PDF]
Assessing the impact of SSRI antidepressants on popular notions of ...
File Format: PDF/Adobe Acrobat - View as HTML
dynamic that plays out with the advent of new psychotropic medications. Philosopher JaquelinZita writes about a ''diagnostic bracket creep,'' in which ...
www.psych.med.umich.edu/faculty/metzl/ImpactofSSRI.pdf - Similar -
by JM Metzl - 2004 - Cited by 18 - Related articles bioethics.net :: Propranolol and the Prevention of Post-Traumatic ...
The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, ..... may be positioned as another catalyst of "diagnostic bracket creep" (Kramer 1993, 15), ...
bioethics.net/journal/j_articles.php?aid=1338 - Cached - Similar -KRAMER 1993
Neuroethics: sources
doi:10.1016/j.tics.2004.12.001 
Copyright © 2004 Elsevier Ltd All rights reserved.
Neuroethics: the practical and the philosophical
Martha J. Farah
Available online 13 December 2004.
In comparison with the ethical issues surrounding molecular genetics, there has been little public awareness of the ethical implications of neuroscience. Yet recent progress in cognitive neuroscience raises a host of ethical issues of at least comparable importance. Some are of a practical nature, concerning the applications of neurotechnology and their likely implications for individuals and society. Others are more philosophical, concerning the way we think about ourselves as persons, moral agents and spiritual beings. This article reviews key examples of each type of issue, including the relevant advances in science and technology and their accompanying social and philosophical problems.
Article Outline
NEUROETHICS - EXCELLENT BOOK!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
p. 3 - philosophers contending with new - brain modelled theories of morality- "naturalized" ethics - new approached may be signified as "naturalized ethics" or simply "neuroethics" (churchland - the same one who wirtes this review. interface of philosophy, jurisprudence and many sciences - neuroscience, evolutionary biology, molecular biology, political science, anthropology, psychology, ethology
focuses on one aspect motivating change in view
p. 4 decisions and decision making
talks about Aristotle 384-322 - first to articulate that the substance of morality matter of practial wisdom rather than exceptionless rules received from
practical undersatndings of social world can likewise evovle (just as theoretical knowledge (PM Churchland 89, 2000).
role of brain's reward system in social learning normally fosters respect, or even reverence, for whatever human social institutions happen to exist (therefore change in those institutions may neither be fast nor linear and may be vigorulsy resisted even by those who stand to beenfit from the change. (..) despite - changes, etc. even revolutions do occur and some can reasonably be reckoned as moral progress (Churchland 89)
that individuals are to be held responsible for their actions is a common human pracitce, and typically involves punishment in some manner when actions violate the estabilished standards. BY its very nature, punishent inflicts pain (or more generally, dis-utilities) on the punished - (complexities of deciding - advances - renewed reflections on fundamentals of responsibility and punishment - at most hbasic levels questions on reltaions betwl free choice, punishment, responsibility.
Chao-Footnotes to Kristevan Semiotics
PREVIEW - see whole thing here:http://www.blueberry-brain.org/chaosophy/semiotics/kristeva2.htm
Julia Kristeva has an approach to social theory that is her own unique blend of linguistic and psychoanalytic theory. Let's start with her basic psychoanalytic distinction: that between pre-Oedipal and Oedipal aspects of personality development that lies at the foundation of her theorizing. Narcissistic identification and maternal dependency, anarchic component drives, polymorphic erotogenicism, and primary processes characterize the pre-Oedipal. (3) Paternal competition and identification, specific drives, phallic erotogenicism, and secondary processes characterize Oedipal aspects.
Kristeva also characterizes the pre-Oedipal feminine phase by a type of space for which she borrows Plato's term, chora (4), an enveloping, amorphous, nonmetric space that both nourishes and threatens. It also defines and limits self-identity. She characterizes the Oedipal male phase by a metric space, for which one could correspondingly use Aristotle's term, topos (5). The self and the self-to-space are more precise and well defined intopos.
Kristeva attributes to each of these spaces, a differing view of time. Pre-Oedipal time is a more phenomenological, subjective time, which Kristeva calls 'monumental' time, and is somewhat akin to Gorgias's Kairos, Bergson's durée, Loye's timeless and spatial times. (6) Oedipal time, Kristeva's 'cursive' time, is a linear time akin to Hesiod's Kronos, Bergson's chronological time, and Loye's serial time.
Kristeva relates linguistics to these basic distinctions. Semiotics is associated with the pre-Oedipal realm. The speaking subject is divided, decentered, and process-oriented. The semiotic approach is needed because structuralism (7) is authoritarian, not process oriented. Semiotic process is rooted in feminine libidinal, pre-Oedipal energy which needs channeling for social cohesion. Infantile drives are indeterminate and multifaceted. A phallically perceived mother (male maternity fantasy) dominates a feminine phase.
"If the semiotic is pre-Oedipal, based on primary processes and is maternally oriented, by contrast the symbolic is an Oedipalized system, regulated by the secondary processes and the Law of the Father. The symbolic is the domain of positions and proposition. The symbolic is an order superimposed on the semiotic. The symbolic control of the various semiotic processes is, however, tenuous and libel to break down or lapse at certain historically, linguistically and psychically significant moments. It results in an upheaval in the norms of the smooth understandable text. The semiotic overflows its boundaries in those privileged 'moments' Kristeva specifies in her triad of subversive forces: madness, holiness and poetry." (8)
Kristeva is Lacanian. Lacan's mirror-image metaphor emphasized not only that we are not possessed of fixed characteristics and that we never get a stable image of self from either internal or external (the mirror) sources.(9) Kristeva's fluid semiotic feminine overflow can thus be seen to have its roots in the Lacanian mirror. Systems theory provides models for stability, instability, and change. A potential control parameter, for example, in Kristevan dynamics, could be the relative strengths of pre-Oedipal and Oedipal forces.
Kristeva's psycholinguistic research "Detected in the first mimetic utterances of infants as 'rhythms and intonations anterior to the first phonemes, morphemes, lexemes, and sentences' (10) this semiotic chora. . . While syntactical language with its rules and boundaries ruptures this amorphous anteriority to constitute a separate subject—the 'I' who speaks—the semiotic continues to function as a primary process of language . . . This modality, moreover, is privileged by avant garde writers and feminists alike since its phonemic and rhythmic evocations undermine the rigidities of symbolic codes and logical syntax." (11)
Kristeva has a theory of marginality, dissidence, and subversion. She observes that semiotic forms of signification don't fit in the rational symbolic order and thus threaten their sovereignty and so have been relegated to the margins of discourse (Sarup). "Repression of the nonlinear, i.e., an alternative consciousness and perception of the world, is the result of the ascendancy of patriarchy and logocentrism that privileges male rationality, . . . Repression of arationality suppresses both the female and human unconsciousness. . . It [pre-Oedipal semiotics] is a way to challenge the domination of the androcentric construction of the mind as rational ego . . ." to move on to a post-post-Oedipal stage (the post-Oedipal stage is a "capitulation to patriarchy"). (12)
Anthropological, historical, ecofeminist analyses of major dominator-egalitarian social bifurcation in human culture based on nonlinear dynamical systems metaphors have been made by Ralph Abraham (1994) and Riane Eisler (1987), which bear striking similarities to Kristevan dynamics, albeit without such heavy recourse to the psychoanalytical dynamics of postmodern theorists. Another difference between them and Kristeva is that they focus on major Western cultural events, such as the bifurcation from a feminist, cooperative cuture to patriarchal dominator culture about 6,000 years ago and look for a new general idealistic global bifurcation to a gylanic-cooperative culture, whereas Kristeva focuses more on contemporary, realistic, and specific strategies.
Revolutionary "practice is determined by the pulverization of the unity of consciousness by a nonsymbolic outside, on the basis of objective contradictions and, as such, it is the place where the signifying process is carried out . . . In this moment of heterogeneous contradiction, the subject breaks through h[er] unifying enclosure and, through a leap (laughter? Fiction?), passes into the process of social change that moves through h[er]." (13)
"Current attempts to put an end to human subjecthood (to the extent that it involves subjection to meaning) by proposing to replace it with space (Borromean knots, morphology of catastrophies) (14) , of which the speaker would be merely a phenomenal actualization, may seem appealing." (15) This comment is actually a caution. If language and language acquisition can impose limitations (subjugations) on an individual, the use of sytems theory (catastrophe theory), may not entirely liberate the subject (individual). This caution is implied in Lacan (16) (concerning mathematical formalism), and is explicit in Mosca (17) (concerning chaos theory).
"A true catastrophe in the sense this word has taken on in morphological theories of catastrophes: going over from one enunciative space into another. . . The child lodges itself within a language, French, that has gathered such modalities of spatialization into one category—'catastrophe.' . . . the archeology of spatial naming accompanies the development of autonomy of the subjective unit. (18)
"The epistemology underlying linguistics and the ensuing cognitive processes (structuralism, for example), even though constituting a bulwark against irrational destruction and sociologizing dogmatism, seem helplessly anachronistic when faced with the contemporary mutations of self and society.
"Determining truth was reduced to a seeking out of the object-utterance's internal coherence, which was predetermined by the coherence of the particular metalinguistic theory within which the search was conducted.
" . . . What is implied is that language, and thus sociability, are defined by boundaries admitting of upheaval, dissolution, and transformation. Situating our discourse near such boundaries might enable us to endow it with a current ethical impact." (19)
"Systems, in order to bifurcate, must first approach the bifurcation point. Individuals who can enjoy being near the abyss and face it with the eagle's courage and strength of grasp of talons, the existential challenge of ayin, are more likely to have a life process that gives them meaning. They create themselves." (20)
These last two paragraphs contain the essence of creativity, both personal and cultural, and one of the most meaningful metaphoric uses of dynamical systems theory for social theory. An intentional system that seeks change and desires freedom of choice must place itself in an unstable condition, that of being near bifurcation points, of beiang within that part of the parameter space that best empowers transformation.
It could be claimed that most of Kristeva's discourse, as presented herein, is anthropological, descriptive, operational in a sense, and devoid of ethical impact. But it is clear that being concerned with the locus of social change, can imply, as Artigiani suggests (21), placing a value on social change, and social changes, in her case, for humanitarian purposes. This concern for ethical social bifurcation thus reflects her own semiotic agenda that drives her psycho-semantic-social theoretical program.
Go To References1 This paper is a rather modest, not so fluent, beginner's exploration of some of Kristeva's ideas. It was born from the invitation to participate in the Washington Evolutionary Systems Society's' 6th Annual Conference, May 8-10, 1998. I was in total ignorance of semiotics, the topic of the conference. My direction was entirely dictated by Kristeva being the only semiotic author available to me during my sabbatical teaching at Silliman University in the Philippines prior to the conference. Fortuitously, her ideas proved not only very exciting, but also provided an extension of my project on existentialist/systems' aspects of creativity (Abraham, 1986) into the social theoretical realm, which is the reason why I had taken some postmodern, hermeneutic, and rhetorical reading with me. Return
2 Blueberry Brain Institute & Chaos Cooperative, Waterbury Center VT 05677, frederick.d.abraham@gmail.com, blueberry-brain.org Return
3 Alan Stein, a psychoanalytic expert and friend informs me (email 4/23/98) that primary process is a label which Freud gave to the process of the unconscious working without aid of the ego (which is learned from experience). Secondary process is the rational process practiced by the ego that has learned the actual ways of the world. Return
4 Plato, principally in Timaeus, but also in Parmenides, Theaetetus, and Sophistes. Return
5 My extrapolation from an account of Aristotle's extension of Plato's concept of chora, to which he added the concept of topos (Bochner, 1966, pp. 152-156). Aristotle, Meteorologica, De Caelo, Physica IV, andCategories. Kristeva was more concerned with chora, and did not venture extensively into topos. Return
6 I also consider this space-time within a loose dynamical-metaphoric aspect of cognitive navigation of parameter space (Abraham, 1994, pp. 89-91). Loye (1984, pp. 57-59, 61, 67-69). Return
7 Structuralism was a prevailing linguistic theory of the time, as developed by Bloomfield, Levi-Straus, Saussure and others. There was a synergy between Barthes and Kristeva in evolving semiotics contra structuralism (see Roudiez' introduction in Desire, and Kristeva, #4 in Desire). Return
8 From Sarup (1993). Much of the précis of Kristeva's ideas herein as well as this quote are from Sarup (pp. 122-126). Return
9 Lacan, (1977, pp. 1-7). In addition to his psychoanalytic orientation, Lacan combined structuralism (for its system's approach, becoming a leading post-structuralist in the process), phenomenology, and hermeneutics. Return
10 Kristeva, From One Identity to Another (1977/1980, #5 in Desire, p. 133). Return
11 Kahane (1993, p. 286). These ideas and research are similar to those of Winnecott. The research also places language development earlier than did conventional psychological research of the time. Return
12 Murphy (1995, p. 75). The discussion follows DeKoven using Derrida and Kristeva, and also follows Lacan. Return
13 Kristeva, Revolution in Poetic Language (1984), quoted in Murphy (p. 78). Return
Go To References Return15 Kristeva, Place Names (1976, 1977, 1980, #10 in Desire, p. 280).
Return16 Lacan (1977, p. 12).
Return17 Mosca (1995, p. 181).
Return18 Kristeva, Place Names (1976, 1977, 1980, #10 in Desire, p. 288).
Return19 Kristeva, Ethics of Linguistics (1974, 1980, #1 in Desire).
Return20 Abraham (1996, p. 394).
Return21 Discussion during WESS 6th Annual Conference, 1998.
Return (return choices at end of references)Abraham, F. D. (1994). Chaos and Dynamical Navigation of the Cognitive Map. In S. I. Macey (ed.), Encyclopedia of Time. New York: Garland.
Abraham, F. D. (1996). The Dynamics of Creativity and the Courage to Be. In W. Sulis & A. Combs (eds.), Nonlinear Dynamics in Human Behavior. Singapore: World Scientific.
Abraham, R. H. (1994). Chaos, Gaia, Eros. San Francisco: Harper.
Bochner, S. (1966). The Role of Mathematics in the Rise of Science. Princeton: Princeton.
Eisler, R. (1987). The Chalice and the Blade. San Francisco: Harper & Row.
Kahane, C. (1993). Gender and Voice in Transitional Phenomena. In P. L. Rudnytsky (ed.), Transitional Objects and Transitional Spaces: Literary Uses of D. W. Winnicott. New York: Columbia.
Kristeva, J. (1980). Desire in Language. (L. S. Roudiez, ed.; T. Gora, A. Jardine, & L. S. Roudiez, trans.) New York: Columbia. A collection of ten papers spanning from 1966 to 1976, with an excellent introduction by Roudiez, including a guide and discussion of terminology. Kristeva, J. (1984). Revolution in Poetic Language. M. Waller (trans.). New York: Columbia.
Lacan, J. (1977). Écrits: A Selection. London: Tavistock; New York: Norton
Loye, D. (1984). The Sphinx and the Rainbow. New York: Bantam.
Mosca, F. (1995). Freedom in Chaos Theory: A Case for Choice in a Universe without a Bottom Line. In F. D. Abraham & A. R. Gilgen (eds.), Chaos Theory in Psychology. Wesport: Greenwood/Praeger.
Murphy, P. D. (1995). Literature, Nature, and Other Ecofeminist Critiques. Albany: State University of New York.
Sarup, M. (1993). An Introductory Guide to Post-structuralism and Postmodernism (2nd ed.). Athens: Georgia.
Thom, R. (1972/1975). Stabilité Structurelle et Morphogenèse. Strucural Stability and Morphogenesis (H. Fowler, trans.). Reading: Benjamin.
Monday, October 26, 2009
[BOOK] Passion and action: the emotions in seventeenth-century philosophy
S James, 1997 - books.google.com
... worked out within the Scholastic Aristotelian tradition, particularly with that
of Thomas Aquinas, who identified no fewer than eleven basic passions. ...
p. 48 - aqu. faithfully retains load-bearing planks of arist's meatphysics - preserves most of conceptions of activity and passivity 9...) also introduces far-reacing modifcicaitons (god created world in fashion of OT; hierarchy of naturla things culm. in God - need to accomd. Arist' mtphcs to christian tents - desire to improve by tidying up.
p. 51 - general and proper sense of passion - Aquinas takes issue w/ Aristotle who remarked in de anima 'strange' (..) speak of wise man being altered - she says Aquinas disagrees - claiming and intelligible sense (hmmm)
58 - Aristotle clearly regarded anger as ipmortant to which men are natrually prone - aquinas transforms to a more pervaisve power - not only to defend oneself but to perservere, etc.
ceratin "toughness" from divis. betw. conc and iras - also creates space to deal w/ conflict in the soul (...) as well as modifying passions directed at outward things (...) irasc can deploy its capaciteis to resist and succumb on the soul itself. WHere passions conflict, can sternghten or undermine one at the epxense of another. While not exactly clear hwo the irascible app. performs these tasks, the gen. significance of aquinas' position plain: rather tahn trying to explain all mental strggl in terms of conflict and coopearation betw. snstv and rtnl souls, he follows Aristotle in locating psychological struggle within teh snstv soul itslf. Our passions neither simple nor unified; include inlclinations to resist or succumb which may be more or less powerful.
In practice, he tells us they occur in sequences (NOT SURE ABOUT THAT)
60 - his analysis far more thorough and meticulous than those of his predecessors - worked out with a fervent tatention to detail to which none of them aspired (...) not simply listing, each examined and anatomized in best Scholastic style (Summa thus set a standard for later discussions and established a format that endured into the seventeenth century) - still pasisons in general - follwed by elaborate chapters on indivdual passions (intrp - assmsts various auth's, summries other writers, instrctv anecdontes)
p. 60 unlike God human intellct has a potentiality to undersatnd which is not always actual
61 As powers of the soul alone, volitions have no bodily effects and are in this respect quite diffeent - nonthless similarites
62 - intllctl love FEELS dif from pssnt - but becuase 1st often accomp by 2nd, phenomenological difference may easily evade us.
One of most puzzling features - depicting states of hte soul as motions. chcrctzn of volitions and some of ht epssns as mvmts draws these phenomena into an explanatory scheme designed to cover both soul and material world - in wihch two sets of metaphors are used to blend the physical and psychological. On one hand - applies ideas now consrdrd physcoholcal to physcal things - on the other hand - reverse strategies.
(...)
63 A's profoundly influential account of the passions conceives them, as we have seen in Aristo. terms as effects, isntances of being acted on, powers that may or may not be exercised, rooted in matter. Pssns consequenlty those staes of mind that are understood as the effects of snsbl objects - also closely connected to human body. HOwever, notion fo a pssn or pssv power also has much broader
64 connotations - can be properly applied to other states (prtclry perceptions) and to purely material bodies
in all these contexts presente as counterpart of action, actuality and form.
WOrks of Arist and Aquin dispaly, better than any, the philosophical subtletly and dialectical ingenuity with which this set of interconnected ideas can be woven together to a point where it becomes difficult to think about potentiality without actuality or actuality without motion. NEvertheles, the web o fScholiastic Aristotelianism was not so fine that it defied alteration. While some scholars have claimd that hte most innjovative of hte arly-modern philoosophers rejected Aristotelianism, (Ftnt 87) a study of hte passions suggests (so I shall argue) that this is an exaggeration.
Writing about philos. phsychology, even the great revolutionarie sof the New Philos. did not reject htier Scholastic heritage outright. While abandoned some aspects of it, retained many others, creating theroies at once citical of th eanalyses so far discussed and continuous with them.
Balancing act - achieved in mor ethan one way: e.g. Dsecates retains aspects of Scholatsic framework that Hobbes rejects. Neither is it completely lacking in uniifromtiy- some Shcol. doctirnes and assumpteions are generall agreed to be obsolete while others survive largely unscathed.
Among the features of Aristotelianism that endure: centrality and scope of opposition between action and passion, which, in most cases, continues to underpin phys. and psych. explanations, and to span the working of the body, sense and intellect. It is within this framework, as I shall show in teh following parts of this book, that hte New Philosophy fo the 17th century adreses the passions.
Ch. 3
ch. 4 Post-Aristotelian Passion and Action
The soft underbelly of reason: the passions in the seventeenth centuryby Stephen GaukrogerLimited preview - 19 Aquinas on our Responsibility for our EmotionsCE Murphy - Medieval Philosophy and Theology, 2001 - Cambridge Univ Press ... As I argue below, Aquinas's 'passions' are not equivalent to our 'emo- tions'. ... 13 So Aquinas's passions don't, on their own, constitute emotions. ... Cited by 6 - Related articles RODUCTION Philosophical investigations of the concept of responsibility, mirroring its most common function in ordinary language and thought, have been geared for the most part to clarifying intuitions concerning moral and legal accountability for actions. But the resurgence of interest in ethical theories concerned with human virtues has resurrected old questions about our responsibility for our character, attitudes, and emotions. The philosophical tradition that takes virtues as a central moral category has taught us to think of virtues not only as involving dispositions to actions, but also dispositions to desires and emotions. It has also taught us to think of actions as only one of the proper objects of moral evaluation, alongside, for example, motives, intentions, beliefs, desires, and emotions. So it is natural that interest in ethical theories concerned with the virtues would yield interest in responsibility for our attitudes and emotions. 1 Thomas Aquinas, who of course is one of the most important architects of the tradition that takes virtues to be central moral categories, holds a very complex set of views about our responsibility for our emotions. My aim in this essay is to develop and explain Aquinas’s views about whether and when, why, and to what extent we can be responsible for our emotions. I hope to show, in so doing, that his view is plausible, and fits well with some of our own conflicting intuitions about the question. Footnotes1 Robert Adams has already done much to draw our attention to the different concept of responsibility we are forced to define if we focus on our intuitions about moral accountability for emotions, attitudes, and beliefs, rather than for actions. See R. Adams, “The Virtue of Faith,” in Adams, The Virtue of Faith (Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 9–24; and “Involuntary Sins,” Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 3–31. I disagree with his account of responsibility for such states, but I am indebted to his illuminating discussions of the topics. [CITATION] „Aquinas, Hobbes and Descartes on the Passions “EC Sweneey - Meeting of the Minds: The Relations Between Medieval …, 1996 Cited by 4 - Related articles The Passions of the soul and Descartes's machine psychology- ►psu.edu [PDF]G Hatfield - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 2007 - Elsevier ... Subsequent sections compare Descartes's treatment of the passions to Aquinas's influential account (3); sketch the material mechanisms underlying his machine ... Cited by 3 - Related articles - Get at CISTI - All 5 versions Transitory Vice: Thomas Aquinas on Incontinence- ►jhu.edu [PDF]B Kent - The Journal of the History of Philosophy, 1989 - muse.jhu.edu ... Is the incontinent's thinking so twisted by passion that he judges the forbid- den act good? ... Yet the first position is defended by Aquinas. ... Cited by 6 - Related articles - All 6 versions [CITATION] Choosing to feel: virtue, friendship, and compassion for friendsDF Cates, 1996 - Univ of Notre Dame Pr Cited by 23 - Related articles [BOOK] From passions to emotions: The creation of a secular psychological categoryTM Dixon, 2003 - books.google.com ... page viii Note on quotations x 1 Introduction: from passions and affections to emotions I 2 Passions and affections in Augustine and Aquinas 26 3 From ... Cited by 32 - Related articles - All 3 versions Late scholastic theories of the passions: Controversies in the Thomist traditionP KING - Emotions and choice from Boethius to Descartes, 2002 - books.google.com ... For Aquinas, the passions are physiologi- cally-based powers through which the faculty of sensitive appetite engages the world, much as the different kinds of ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - All 2 versions [CITATION] Aquinas and the Passion of GodW Hankey - Allistair Kee, Eugene T. Long, Being and Truth,- …, 1986 Cited by 2 - Related articles [PDF] ►Aquinas on threats and temptationsP Hoffman - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2005 - faculty.ucr.edu ... than involuntary.5 In contrast to the case of fear, Aquinas says that ... this assertion is problematic because he also asserts that antecedent passions, that is ... Cited by 1 - Related articles - View as HTML - All 4 versions 3. Passion and Action in AquinasS James - Passion and Action, 1999 - ingentaconnect.com The Aristotelian analysis discussed in Ch. 2 is taken up by Aquinas, who adapts it to fit a Christian framework. Aquinas modifies and elaborates Aristotle's account of the active and passive aspects of the soul, and produces a novel .. [PDF] ►Thomas Aquinas on the passionsRC Miner - thedivineconspiracy.org 1 Here and elsewhere, I occasionally acquiesce in the practice of referring to 1-2. 22–48 as the “Treatise on the Passions.” I hasten to add that I am using “treatise” under erasure, since Thomas does not, strictly ... View as HTML [PDF] ►Hope: A Silent MusicM Waldock - pesa.org.au ... David Hume agrees with Aquinas in situating hope in the category of passion, but he differs in his representation of hope's opposite; not despair, but fear. ... Related articles - View as HTML [CITATION] … Distinction of Hope as Irascible Passion and as Theological Virtue in St. Thomas Aquinas' …ML Mulloney, 2007 Knowing What is “Natural”- ►jhu.edu [PDF]T Aquinas, LT Johnson - logos, 2009 - muse.jhu.edu ... Aquinas on “Dishonorable Passions” Aquinas then turns to what Paul calls “dishonorable passions”(Rom 1:26), which he understands to be “sins against ... Related articles - All 4 versions [PDF] ►WHAT INSIGHTS FROM CONTEMPORARY WRITING AND AQUINAS HELP TO DEEPEN, …SJ Kenneth Baker - scta.org.au ... integrity and wisdom. Aquinas' teaching on the passions' influence on moral action enriches our view of Jesus' rebuking of the money ... Related articles - View as HTML [CITATION] Paul Gondreau, The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas AquinasLJ Elders - THOMIST, 2003 - DOMINICAN FATHERS BL Direct AQUINAS ON ATTACHMENT, ENVY, AND HATRED IN THE SUMMA THEOLOGICAK Green - Journal of Religious Ethics, 2007 - interscience.wiley.com ... Copyright 2007 Journal of Religious Ethics, Inc. KEYWORDS. attachment • envy • hatred • bigotry • passions • emotion • love • Aquinas. ABSTRACT. ... Related articles - BL Direct - All 2 versions Related articles - View as HTML Martha Nussbaum and Thomas Aquinas on the Emotions.C Leget - Theological Studies, 2003 - questia.com ... (7) For an overview of Aquinas's theory of passiones animae, see Peter King, "Aquinas on the Passions," in Aquinas's Moral Theory, ed. Scott MacDonald and ... BL Direct - All 3 versions ►Instinct and CustomAL White - THOMIST, 2002 - thomist.org ... Page 590. Although he does not mention the perception of intentiones when discussing the passions, Aquinas does on occasion contrast the roles of estimation and ... Cached - BL Direct - All 3 versions [CITATION] Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives Book by Brian Davies; Oxford …T Aquinas - questia.com ... Find in Book: Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives ... Loading... Search Results: Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives ... Related articles - All 2 versions LEFT OFF P. 6 of ggl schlr "passion aquinas" |
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)