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DEGREES OF “BEING TOWARDS” - INTENSIO
We turn our attention first to the special mode of “being” which is denoted by the words “intensio” and “remissio”. Intensio carries the connotation of participation of a thing in a form. There has been comparatively little research concerning the intensio and remissio of forms as they appear in Thomas Aquinas. This language is seldom seen with respect to commentaries on “passions” in Aquinas, although Aquinas himself uses this language to situate passion in 22. Concerning the use of the words “increase” (augmentum) and decrease with regard to a form (or participation therein), Aquinas does not consider it to be necessarily “quantitative” in nature - rather he states that this manner of speaking with respect to “ increase” and “diminishment” regarding intelligible spiritual things is on account of the familiarity of our intellect with corporeal things.
When speaking about "more and less" with respect to something's participation or tension toward a form, one can distinguish between more and less as concerning the form itself, and "more or less" on the part of the subject's participation therein. While some forms do not admit of “more and less” and these include above all substantial forms; there are forms which receive their specification from a relation to something, such as “dispositions” including health, or movements (motus) which are defined by their termini.
What is of more interest to us, however, are the kind of "qualities" which are "connected with actions and passions". With respect to these kind of “qualities”, (I-II, 52.1 co) it is possible to have more and less concerning the part of the participation of the subject, with the interior “tension” towards “more” or “less” designated as “intensio”. This is the space indicating the room for degree of passion. Thomas Aquinas applies the category of intensio specifically when speaking about “passions” in question 22, but we will return to this later on.
This category of intensio with its roots of “tension” and “tendency” seems to be especially rich from the metaphysical point of view - that is, as underlining the interiority and activity of the subject of change or of participation, and is at the same time surprisingly rich in its phenomenological / experiential / existential (pick which fits) significance. We will use the term as loaded with both/all its significances in the pages to follow.
DERIVATIONS OF “INTENSIO”
“INCLINATIO/APPETITE”
“Intensio” can be understood generally, as regards things that can be open to this or that accidental form. While intensio tends to be used in this context, one could expand intensio to include in a very wide sense the tendency which is bound up with a substantial form (as sourced in the thing’s nature). Such a determinate is called “inclination” or “appetite”. Aquinas discusses “appetite” in the Prima Pars, question 80.1:
It is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul. To make this evident, we must observe that some inclination follows every form: for example, fire, by its form, is inclined to rise, and to generate its like.
In addition to a general “natural appetite” which a thing has for its own perfection - for example, the appetite a rock has to remain a rock and to be close to the earth, Aquinas notes two more perfect modes of appetition which are open to receiving the species of other things as well as its own:
But in those things which have knowledge, each one is determined to its own natural being by its natural form, in such a manner that it is nevertheless receptive of the species of other things: for example, sense receives the species of all things sensible, and the intellect, of all things intelligible, so that the soul of man is, in a way, all things by sense and intellect: and thereby, those things that have knowledge, in a way, approach to a likeness to God, "in Whom all things pre-exist," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. v).
Therefore, as forms exist in those things that have knowledge in a higher manner and above the manner of natural forms; so must there be in them an inclination surpassing the natural inclination, which is called the natural appetite. And this superior inclination belongs to the appetitive power of the soul, through which the animal is able to desire what it apprehends, and not only that to which it is inclined by its natural form. And so it is necessary to assign an appetitive power to the soul.
In the human being, Thomas distinguishes two kinds of appetite - sensitive appetite and intellectual appetite which are discerned here on the basis of their motivating powers - what is apprehended by the intellectual faculty is different from what can be apprehended by the sensitive faculty.
PART II
PRIMA SECUNDAE DISCUSSIONS
INTRODUCTION
The Second Part of the Summa introduces a different tonality than that of the Prima Pars. This change is mentioned in the prologue of the Second Part.
Since, as the Damascene says, the human being is said to be made to the image of God, according to which image is meant intellect and freedom of judgment and power through oneself, after having spoken of the exemplar, namely of God, and of those things which proceeded from the divine power according to his will; it remains that we should consider his image, that is the human being, according as he too is the principle of his works, as having freedom of judgment and power over his works.
In the first part of the Summa, the human being is seen as an effect, namely as a creature constituted in itself towards its own perfection. The human being exists as one entity in a hierarchical order of entities proceeding from the creative power of God. In the second part, we are considering the human being as reflecting God’s image, namely, as being the source of actions in himself. Here the image of the human being is one who has "power through himself" - who is oriented towards actions, as an adequate principle from which many kinds of actions flow. The uniquely human kind of activity is characterized by voluntariety. Our concern, however, is specifically with the "passions" which initially appear as "actions", and as actions shared with other animals.
Because it is necessary to reach beatitude through acts, it is thus essential to consider human acts, so that we may know by which acts beatitude is reached, or the way of beatitude is impeded. But as operations and acts are about singulars, for that reason, every knowledge directed towards operation is perfected by considering particulars. Since, then, a “moral” consideration is of human acts, it is addressed first to the universal; but secondly, to the particular. Concerning a universal consideration of human acts, surely the first thing occurring to consideration is human acts; secondly, their principles. Now some human acts are properly human, but some are common between men and other animals. And because beatitude is properly a human good, those acts which are properly human hold themselves closer (propinquius) to beatitude than those which man shares in common with other animals. Therefore we will first consider those acts which are properly human; secondly, those acts which humans have in common with other animals, which are called passions of the soul.
What is interesting here as that passions are seen as something that participate in the way to beatitude (although it is not immediately clear in which way they would help to reach beatitude or impede it). Aquinas avows that the “properly human acts” are closer to beatitude but does not thereby deny that passions which men “shares in common with other animals” are not included in beatitude.
PASSIONS AND “THE SOUL” AS THEIR SUBJECT
Question 22, article 1
Passion in General
In 22.1, Aquinas discusses whether passions are properly found in the soul. Here the emphasis is laid on the nobility of the soul with the consequence that attributing suffering (even in a generic sense) to the soul appears dubious. The objections successively point out that the soul has no matter (the proper subject of passion); neither can it be moved; nor is it subject to corruption, which is a characteristic of something that is prone to passion.
In answering the question, Aquinas delineates three degrees of what it means to have a “passion” - with the most proper sense being the last. The first and most general sense is simple reception, which may also constitute a kind of perfection. The second consists of reception with loss. The third meaning is the reception of something harmful and the loss of what is appropriate, which event would demonstrate the strength of the agent, as being so strong as to turn the subject aside from its own inclination. The first question we might ask is why Aquinas would find it necessary to distinguish between “reception” and “reception with loss”. For instance, in the case of air “receiving” light, could we not also say that air “loses” darkness? One way of finding significance in this distinction is found in noting its similarity with the discussion on intensio and remissio in Burley (cite ftnt 2 or whatever it is).
Another way of reading this distinction is the growing emphasis of passion being something contrary to a thing. While we will below discuss the intersection of the metaphysical and experiential arenas of “passion” with those of “intensio” - what becomes clear is that passion refers to something losing something that belonged to it. Considered simply, a thing’s loss of something that belonged to it involves a kind of corruption of that thing, or the way it was. It is only by a more subtle articulation that “passio” as a concept can mean something is happening that involves an “appropriate” or “convenient” reception - the “loss” with the “reception” is what distinguishes it from more simply positive words like “intensio” which, taken simply, connotes a thing’s intrinsic push towards perfection of form.
Perfection as Passion?
Aquinas himself distinguishes how the presence of passion in its three articulations is found in the soul. Regarding the first, “In the sense of mere reception, we speak of "feeling and understanding as being a kind of passion" (De Anima i, 5).” These passions which are more like “perfections” are proper to the soul. The other kinds of passion, however do not happen to the soul per se, thus Thomas upholds the rationale of the soul’s nobility put forward by the objections.
PROPER PASSION: BODILY DIMENSION
The more proper passions do find the soul as their subject, however, per accidens, These passions happen on account of the soul’s association with the body, with which it forms one substance. It is because we “have” bodies that we are passionate. don’t like this wording.
With regard to the second and third articulations of passion, he states: “But passion, accompanied by the loss of something, is only in respect of a bodily transmutation; wherefore passion properly so called cannot be in the soul, save accidentally, in so far, to wit, as the "composite" is passive.”
Aquinas distinguishes still further degrees of passion within the passionate sense of the composite: “But here again we find a difference; because when this transmutation is for the worse, it has more of the nature of a passion, than when it is for the better: hence sorrow is more properly a passion than joy.” The “most proper” passions here are the ones which are contrary to the nature of the composite - the ones that happen “for the worse”.
Another interesting point that is developed in article 2 is the explicit opening of the bodily dimension (or essence) of passion as set forth by Aquinas. This is, in fact, the chief characteristic of passion as an object of the sensitive appetite (the approach in Prima pars is different in the context of distinguishing the difference between sensitive and intellectual appetites - the movements of each appetite are discerned on the basis of their different “active and motive principles.” He doesn’t distinguish there precisely what the “active and motive” principles are (unless he does in the objections/ answers - but I think I will exclude the idea that it is sens/objects and intellect/ objects because of the intersections that can happn -but I would like to suggest the “movement f the heart” - open this up and close it again to show why it is not sufficient? At least in the footnote… because he doesn’t talk about the moving of the heart per se but the blood - which is related to the heart after all)
What kind of bodily transmutatio is happening?
Objection 3 refers to it “Passion in the soul occurs, properly speaking, in respect of a bodily transmutation.” (The argument is that sensitive apprehension requires a bodily transmutation as well as sensitive appetition). This objection requires Aquinas to negotiate more explicitly what sort of bodily changes occur in passion - as opposed to an apprehensive change which is “accidental” , such as an eye becoming “dissolved” through gazing intently at a bright object, the bodily change is essential to the act of the sensitive appetite - it is the “natural change of the organ”. The single example given is the material definition of anger as “a kindling of blood around the heart”.
(footnote - de motu cordis) - linking to other texts.
SOMETHING RECEIVED AND SOMETHING TAKEN - “intensio” and passion
What is interesting here is the “two-sidedness” of one apparent action or passion - emphasizing both taking and receiving on the part of the subject. It recalls to mind the hermeneutic of “intensio” and “remissio” - both ways of speaking emphasize the internal dynamics of the subject of passion, rather than focusing on the agent of passion (although “passio” as a concept implicitly denotes an agent of whom one is “under the power“ -badphrasing) and it provides a space for a hermeneutic of the tensions and even, as we progress, for the participations and interactions of the subject of passion.
Aquinas himself uses the category of “intensio” to describe what happens in passion.
It must be said that the case is contrary with those things that pertain to perfection, and those pertaining to defect. For in the things pertaining to perfection, the intensio is stretched towards accessing to one chief principle, to which, so far as it is nearer, it is so much more intense (as) brightness (lucidi) tends toward gaining the highest degree of brightness, to which as it draws closer, it is brighter.
But in things pertaining to defect, the intensio does not tend toward accessing something best (aliquod summum), but towards regression from perfection, because this is what the notion of privation and defect consist. And therefore so far as something recedes little from the first, so is it less intense, and because of this, in the beginning, there is always found a little defect, which as it progresses, is increased to a greater extent. Now passion pertains to defect, because it is of something that is in potency. Whence in those things which draw near to the prime perfection, namely God, little is found of the ratio of potency and passion, in those things which follow, more. And so in the prior powers of the soul, that is the apprehensive, there is found less of the ratio of passion."
This is a very rich passage which takes place in the context of explaining why there is less “passion” in nobler creatures who are closer to the first perfection of all, God, but it is valuable for us also in the more compact context of its general application to understanding a kind of phenomenology (?)of passion. Passion can consist of perfection - and an intensio or straining, towards approaching/ the onset (accessum) has both meanings of perfection, as something that, in tending toward perfection, becomes more perfect itself, as brightness which tends toward greater brightness is brighter (?). There can also be an intensity of defect, which begins as something “small” but increases with further recession.
DEFECT
One point of interest is the phrasing “intensity of defect” - while it is an undeniable possibility of language to speak of "an intensity of defect", this phrase departs significantly from common ways of speaking about defect - falling short is not usually described in terms of "intensity," in metaphysical language, but rather intensity is spoken of more in terms of "approach" to some perfection. The notion of “defect” can be something “intense” however - this is important from the point of view of reflexive awareness under a strong negative passion. Ii) Why defect?
Because more potentiality. Potentially can signify the space taken as an increasingly smaller interim between being and its perfection. Or it can signify a growing space or longer division between these two things. Potentiality can achieve its perfection or it might not - it is not something “evil” in itself but a manner of being that is not complete - some human potentialities can scarcely be understood as “defects” proper, because they are time-appropriate and are naturally realized through a process of maturation, such as the biological and intellectual potentialities of the infant, the child, the teenager - some potentialities through human neglect or attention to other directions. The point is that potentiality perceived as a “defect” is that something is lacking a kind of perfection that is proper or fitting (convenient?) to it.

PASSION AS DISTINCT AND RELATED TO APPREHENSION
- VERY CONFUSED - JUST WORK WITHIN THE PRIMA! Do sense apprehension and intellectual apprehension - (make intellectual complete even if citing - also probably should cross-reference sense apprehension - but don’t get to complex yet - that can be after)
The second article addresses the question whether passion is something more apprehensive (explain what I mean by apprehensive or it should be plain by now) or appetitive. Thomas decides in favor of appetitive because it is through the “appetitive power that the soul has an order to things in themselves,” and passion involves being drawn by some thing, whereas the object of the intellect is not something in itself, but only a thing as it exists within a mind - that is, by its intention. Here what is interesting is the active status which is accorded to passion: in the second objection the appetite is seen to be more active than the apprehensive faculty, because (according to the response) it is more a principle of exterior action. Aquinas notes that the (sense? appetitive faculty) is more active precisely because it is more passive - it is the power that which relates to things in themselves. This is interesting because it seems to place the intellect in an “inferior” position. For the intellect is not concerned with things not as they are in themselves, but only according to their form, their ratio, or their intention. Passions are more “real”.
CONCUPISCIBLE AND IRASCIBLE
Article 2 (prima pars) insists upon the need for a distinction between sensitive appetitive movements, one kind is directed simply towards good and away from evil (this is called the concupiscible faculty - taken from “desire“ - concupiscentia); the other kind concerns a higher level of effort or resistance for less simple goods and evils (this is called the irascible faculty - taken from ira - anger). Aquinas uses as an example purely natural things which not only pursue their being and avoid the harmful but to deal with whatever poses hindrances in their way of achieving good or averting some evil. He uses the example of fire, which pursues its own good by “rising” from a lower place, but it also resists whatever gets in its way - it is a powerful image of something which continues when interfered with - fire often consumes what gets in its way, or even when something “irresistible” is put over it, like a pot, it continues to burn under or even around the pot. Aquinas insists that the concupisicible and irascible appetites cannot be reduced to one appetite, because one may act contrarily to the tendency of the concupiscible appetite when the mandate of the irascible appetite demands it (quia interdum anima tristibus se ingerit - “the soul sometimes casts itself towards sorrowful things“ cf also I-II.23.1 ad 3).
An intriguing account ensues regarding the interactions between the concupiscible and the irascible in light of the primacy which one passionate faculty may assume, depending on the situation. Thus when there are powerful objects preventing one’s resting in one’s desired good, the current intensity of desire or aversion will fade as the irascible passions become more influential in their concern for what is necessary for the concupiscible passions to be realized. The concupiscible faculty (regarding love, desire, rest, hatred, aversion, sorrow) remains primacy; for not only does it motivate the irascible passions, but it also concludes them. The irascible appetite serves as the “fighter” and “defender” (propugnatrix et defensatrix) of the concupiscible appetite. (DOES HE USE THE WORD “passio” here - if not - explain that I use it because of the treatise later on - although note why he wouldn’t use it here)
Kinds of Passion
3 degrees - connaturality, movement, and rest.
FOOTNOTE Somewhere!- Prima ParsThe objections insist upon an cognitive or apprehensive dimension to appetite - the reason why Aquinas rejects this is because of the different ways in which apprehension and appetite stand toward their objects. Where “apprehension” is concerned, the action is complete by having the species of the thing present in the one who apprehends, whence Aquinas identifies a similarity between it and a kind of “rest”. On the other hand, appetition implies that the one who desires is “borne towards” the thing which is desired - thus while appetition necessarily implies some kind of apprehension of that towards which it attracted, the movement is more complex than appetition - its completion is “likened” to a movement.