Aha!

This is something I need not to lose. Intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and (...) it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. I-II. 31.5 I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects. If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. (One's relation to the other is more present inasmuch as it is more known - the conjunction is not only more profound, but more "real") But in this case it would seem that intellect is not the summum bonum per se but insofar as it approximates closer to a"real" conjunction? Maybe "being" and "being united" IS more primary...
Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14). If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. THE GOOD which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined (the power), and the conjunction itself. (interesting because in sorrow - he doesn't explicitly mention the "that to which it is conjoined" although it of course comes through - the consciousness of self, however, seems to be minimalized in sorrow which seems to be apprehensive not so much of oneself or "that to which it is conjoined" but the "malum" and the "conjunction" - insofar as it is an "irresistible" thing which makes it sorrowful, because one is not self-sufficient to ward it from affecting oneself in this strong manner - conjunctio is strong - oneself becomes less and less prominent, while "that thing" becomes more and more prominent. We speak of people who "lack a sense of self" who have been abused, mistreated, neglected from early childhood or who are overly oppressed by afflictions. Pleasure, on the other hand, promotes a self-consciousness, which however is not understood as self-sufficient, that is, restricted to oneself, circumscribed in oneself but as a self-reflection that occurs upon the relation - or more properly - the conjunction of oneself with the "other" beloved object). For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." Quia intellectualis cognitio et perfectior est, et etiam magis cognoscitur, quia intellectus magis reflectitur supra actum suum quam sensus. Est etiam cognitio intellectiva magis dilecta, nullus enim est qui non magis vellet carere visu corporali quam visu intellectuali, eo modo quo bestiae vel stulti carent, sicut Augustinus dicit, in libro de Civ. Dei. Sed si comparentur delectationes intelligibiles spirituales delectationibus sensibilibus corporalibus, sic, secundum se et simpliciter loquendo, delectationes spirituales sunt maiores. Et hoc apparet secundum tria quae requiruntur ad delectationem, scilicet bonum coniunctum, et id cui coniungitur, et ipsa coniunctio. Nam ipsum bonum spirituale et est maius quam corporale bonum; et est magis dilectum. Cuius signum est quod homines etiam a maximis corporalibus voluptatibus abstinent, ut non perdant honorem, qui est bonum intelligibile. More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. (And yet.... this is speaking of intellection proper - but reasoning is something a little different and can be more painful insofar as one is from the point of veiw of "impediments to knowledge" of which it seems ignorance would be chief - not merely an absence but impediment because contemplation is more essentially an action than a habit although habits may arise from it and dispose to it) - More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible. On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. (in which case, presumably - if there is a habitual connection between the lower and the superior appetites which is secured by an intent habit of the will, e.g. increased charity, then a greater cementing of one's affections toward this will presumably continue) Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on (35, 5). *(except insofar as one was contemplating sad things, which can lead to a bodily change, in which case, contemplating the opposite happy things should also have the aspect of 'remedy' to oneself, insofar as the bodily change is effected by following the inclinations of the sensitive apprehension accopmanying the intellectual apprehension - no? E.g. devotion - through realizing one's defects - causing one to tend more readily to the thought of God's help e.g. - II-II,82.4, ad 2. The spirit which on the one hand is afflicted on account of the defects of the present life, on the other hand is rejoiced, by the consideration of God's goodness, and by the hope of the Divine help. - ex alia parte condelectatur ex consideratione divinae bonitatis et ex spe divini auxilii.) Reply to Objection 1. The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body. Reply to Objection 2. Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite. Reply to Objection 3. Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate. (And rejoicing concerning them, insofar as an overflow into the sensitive appetite would constitute a hindrance by its excess, is also moderated through time by the growing preponderance of quieter joys and different infusions, because the reaction is also moderated through time from the desire to know more - gaudium concerns all three elements of object, conjunction, and that-to-which-is-conjoined, but if the sensitive powers are conjoined