Article 3. Whether there is free-will in the angels?
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no free-will in the angels. For the act of free-will is to choose. But there can be no choice with the angels, because choice is "the desire of something after taking counsel," while counsel is "a kind of inquiry," as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. But the angels' knowledge is not the result of inquiring, for this belongs to the discursiveness of reason. Therefore it appears that there is no free-will in the angels.
Objection 2. Further, free-will implies indifference to alternatives. But in the angels on the part of their intellect there is no such indifference; because, as was observed already (58, 5), their intellect is not deceived as to things which are naturally intelligible to them. Therefore neither on the part of their appetitive faculty can there be free-will.
Objection 3. Further, the natural endowments of the angels belong to them according to degrees of more or less; because in the higher angels the intellectual nature is more perfect than in the lower. But the free-will does not admit of degrees. Therefore there is no free-will in them.
On the contrary, Free-will is part of man's dignity. But the angels' dignity surpasses that of men. Therefore, since free-will is in men, with much more reason is it in the angels.
I answer that, Some things there are which act, not from any previous judgment, but, as it were, moved and made to act by others; just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment; but not from free-will, such as irrational animals; for the sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself: such a judgment is not a free one, but implanted by nature. Only an agent endowed with an intellect can act with a judgment which is free, in so far as it apprehends the common note of goodness; from which it can judge this or the other thing to be good. Consequently, wherever there is intellect, there is free-will. It is therefore manifest that just as there is intellect, so is there free-will in the angels, and in a higher degree of perfection than in man.
Reply to Objection 1. The Philosopher is speaking of choice, as it is in man. As a man's estimate in speculative matters differs from an angel's in this, that the one needs not to inquire, while the other does so need; so is it in practical matters. Hence there is choice in the angels, yet not with the inquisitive deliberation of counsel, but by the sudden acceptance of truth.
Reply to Objection 2. As was observed already (2), knowledge is effected by the presence of the known within the knower. Now it is a mark of imperfection in anything not to have within it what it should naturally have. Consequently an angel would not be perfect in his nature, if his intellect were not determined to every truth which he can know naturally. But the act of the appetitive faculty comes of this, that the affection is directed to something outside. Yet the perfection of a thing does not come from everything to which it is inclined, but only from something which is higher than it. Therefore it does not argue imperfection in an angel if his will be not determined with regard to things beneath him; but it would argue imperfection in him, were he to be indeterminate to what is above him.
Reply to Objection 3. Free-will exists in a nobler manner in the higher angels than it does in the lower, as also does the judgment of the intellect. Yet it is true that liberty, in so far as the removal of compulsion is considered, is not susceptible of greater and less degree; because privations and negations are not lessened nor increased directly of themselves; but only by their cause, or through the addition of some qualification.
art. 4
Article 4. Whether there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels?
Objection 1. It would seem that there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that in the demons there is "unreasonable fury and wild concupiscence." But demons are of the same nature as angels; for sin has not altered their nature. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.
Objection 2. Further, love and joy are in the concupiscible; while anger, hope, and fear are in the irascible appetite. But in the Sacred Scriptures these things are attributed both to the good and to the wicked angels. Therefore there is an irascible and a concupiscible appetite in the angels.
Objection 3. Further, some virtues are said to reside in the irascible appetite and some in the concupiscible: thus charity and temperance appear to be in the concupiscible, while hope and fortitude are in the irascible. But these virtues are in the angels. Therefore there is both a concupiscible and an irascible appetite in the angels.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (De Anima iii, text. 42) that the irascible and concupiscible are in the sensitive part, which does not exist in angels. Consequently there is no irascible or concupiscible appetite in the angels.
I answer that, The intellective appetite is not divided into irascible and concupiscible; only the sensitive appetite is so divided. The reason of this is because, since the faculties are distinguished from one another not according to the material but only by the formal distinction of objects, if to any faculty there respond an object according to some common idea, there will be no distinction of faculties according to the diversity of the particular things contained under that common idea. Just as if the proper object of the power of sight be color as such, then there are not several powers of sight distinguished according to the difference of black and white: whereas if the proper object of any faculty were white, as white, then the faculty of seeing white would be distinguished from the faculty of seeing black.
Now it is quite evident from what has been said (1; 16, 1), that the object of the intellective appetite, otherwise known as the will, is good according to the common aspect of goodness; nor can there be any appetite except of what is good. Hence, in the intellective part, the appetite is not divided according to the distinction of some particular good things, as the sensitive appetite is divided, which does not crave for what is good according to its common aspect, but for some particular good object. Accordingly, since there exists in the angels only an intellective appetite, their appetite is not distinguished into irascible and concupiscible, but remains undivided; and it is called the will.
Reply to Objection 1. Fury and concupiscence are metaphorically said to be in the demons, as anger is sometimes attributed to God;--on account of the resemblance in the effect.
Reply to Objection 2. Love and joy, in so far as they are passions, are in the concupiscible appetite, but in so far as they express a simple act of the will, they are in the intellective part: in this sense to love is to wish well to anyone; and to be glad is for the will to repose in some good possessed. Universally speaking, none of these things is said of the angels, as by way of passions; as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix).
Reply to Objection 3. Charity, as a virtue, is not in the concupiscible appetite, but in the will; because the object of the concupiscible appetite is the good as delectable to the senses. But the Divine goodness, which is the object of charity, is not of any such kind. For the same reason it must be said that hope does not exist in the irascible appetite; because the object of the irascible appetite is something arduous belonging to the sensible order, which the virtue of hope does not regard; since the object of hope is arduous and divine. Temperance, however, considered as a human virtue, deals with the desires of sensible pleasures, which belong to the concupiscible faculty. Similarly, fortitude regulates daring and fear, which reside in the irascible part. Consequently temperance, in so far as it is a human virtue, resides in the concupiscible part, and fortitude in the irascible. But they do not exist in the angels in this manner. For in them there are no passions of concupiscence, nor of fear and daring, to be regulated by temperance and fortitude. But temperance is predicated of them according as in moderation they display their will in conformity with the Divine will. Fortitude is likewise attributed to them, in so far as they firmly carry out the Divine will. All of this is done by their will, and not by the irascible or concupiscible appetite.
Thursday, October 30, 2008
VERY FASCINATING - q. 60 art.2
Prologue:
Deinde considerandum est de actu voluntatis, qui est amor sive dilectio, nam omnis actus appetitivae virtutis ex amore seu dilectione derivatur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum in Angelis sit dilectio naturalis. Secundo, utrum in eis sit dilectio electiva. Tertio, utrum Angelus diligat seipsum dilectione naturali an electiva. Quarto, utrum unus Angelus diligat alium dilectione naturali sicut seipsum. Quinto, utrum Angelus naturali dilectione diligat Deum plus quam seipsum.
whether the angels have "love of choice" - interesting phrase
Article 2. Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.
Objection 2. Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated (1; 16, 1). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them.
On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them.
I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.
Happiness enters in as a natural love - at least of the will.
There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will.
Because, as was stated already (59, 2), the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower.
Quia, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio intellectus fit secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente.
It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things.
The act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. (HENCE DILECTION? love of choice? or election? is dilection 'choosing to love' - it is if you don't see God - then what is it? a natural love? or a "consent" rather than an "intent"?) Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice.
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (62).
Reply to Objection 1. Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (59, 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. (SO THIS IS THE CONFUSION - FREE JUDGEMENT FOR US HAPPENS ONLY THROUGH REASON BECAUSE THAT IS THE WAY WE OPERATE - OTHERWISE WE ARE BOUND BY OUR PASSIONS - BECAUSE OF THE LIMITEDNESS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE SO THAT WE DON'T GRASP THE WHOLE OF THINGS BUT CENTER IN ON A PART BECAUSE OF OUR WEAKNESS AND IF THE REASON IS IMPEDED THROUGH SOME WAY - "invincible ignorance" -being the extreme end - then we are less responsible??? "Choice is of the means, not of the end, then what do angels choose? or is it different? Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
Deinde considerandum est de actu voluntatis, qui est amor sive dilectio, nam omnis actus appetitivae virtutis ex amore seu dilectione derivatur. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum in Angelis sit dilectio naturalis. Secundo, utrum in eis sit dilectio electiva. Tertio, utrum Angelus diligat seipsum dilectione naturali an electiva. Quarto, utrum unus Angelus diligat alium dilectione naturali sicut seipsum. Quinto, utrum Angelus naturali dilectione diligat Deum plus quam seipsum.
whether the angels have "love of choice" - interesting phrase
Article 2. Whether there is love of choice in the angels?
Objection 1. It would seem that there is no love of choice in the angels. For love of choice appears to be rational love; since choice follows counsel, which lies in inquiry, as stated in Ethic. iii, 3. Now rational love is contrasted with intellectual, which is proper to angels, as is said (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore there is no love of choice in the angels.
Objection 2. Further, the angels have only natural knowledge besides such as is infused: since they do not proceed from principles to acquire the knowledge of conclusions. Hence they are disposed to everything they can know, as our intellect is disposed towards first principles, which it can know naturally. Now love follows knowledge, as has been already stated (1; 16, 1). Consequently, besides their infused love, there is only natural love in the angels. Therefore there is no love of choice in them.
On the contrary, We neither merit nor demerit by our natural acts. But by their love the angels merit or demerit. Therefore there is love of choice in them.
I answer that, There exists in the angels a natural love, and a love of choice. Their natural love is the principle of their love of choice; because, what belongs to that which precedes, has always the nature of a principle. Wherefore, since nature is first in everything, what belongs to nature must be a principle in everything.
This is clearly evident in man, with respect to both his intellect and his will. For the intellect knows principles naturally; and from such knowledge in man comes the knowledge of conclusions, which are known by him not naturally, but by discovery, or by teaching. In like manner, the end acts in the will in the same way as the principle does in the intellect, as is laid down in Phys. ii, text. 89. Consequently the will tends naturally to its last end; for every man naturally wills happiness: and all other desires are caused by this natural desire; since whatever a man wills he wills on account of the end. Therefore the love of that good, which a man naturally wills as an end, is his natural love; but the love which comes of this, which is of something loved for the end's sake, is the love of choice.
Happiness enters in as a natural love - at least of the will.
There is however a difference on the part of the intellect and on the part of the will.
Because, as was stated already (59, 2), the mind's knowledge is brought about by the inward presence of the known within the knower.
Quia, sicut supra dictum est, cognitio intellectus fit secundum quod res cognitae sunt in cognoscente.
It comes of the imperfection of man's intellectual nature that his mind does not simultaneously possess all things capable of being understood, but only a few things from which he is moved in a measure to grasp other things.
The act of the appetitive faculty, on the contrary, follows the inclination of man towards things; some of which are good in themselves, and consequently are appetible in themselves; others being good only in relation to something else, and being appetible on account of something else.
Consequently it does not argue imperfection in the person desiring, for him to seek one thing naturally as his end, and something else from choice as ordained to such end. (HENCE DILECTION? love of choice? or election? is dilection 'choosing to love' - it is if you don't see God - then what is it? a natural love? or a "consent" rather than an "intent"?) Therefore, since the intellectual nature of the angels is perfect, only natural and not deductive knowledge is to be found in them, but there is to be found in them both natural love and love of choice.
In saying all this, we are passing over all that regards things which are above nature, since nature is not the sufficient principle thereof: but we shall speak of them later on (62).
Reply to Objection 1. Not all love of choice is rational love, according as rational is distinguished from intellectual love. For rational love is so called which follows deductive knowledge: but, as was said above (59, 3, ad 1), when treating of free-will, every choice does not follow a discursive act of the reason; but only human choice. (SO THIS IS THE CONFUSION - FREE JUDGEMENT FOR US HAPPENS ONLY THROUGH REASON BECAUSE THAT IS THE WAY WE OPERATE - OTHERWISE WE ARE BOUND BY OUR PASSIONS - BECAUSE OF THE LIMITEDNESS OF OUR KNOWLEDGE SO THAT WE DON'T GRASP THE WHOLE OF THINGS BUT CENTER IN ON A PART BECAUSE OF OUR WEAKNESS AND IF THE REASON IS IMPEDED THROUGH SOME WAY - "invincible ignorance" -being the extreme end - then we are less responsible??? "Choice is of the means, not of the end, then what do angels choose? or is it different? Consequently the conclusion does not follow.
The reply to the second objection follows from what has been said.
other things to note
Q. 10 art 3
I answer that, As stated above (Question 9, Article 2), the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will.
Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion.
Reply to Objection 1. Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I will not, that I do--i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence.
Reply to Objection 2. Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion.
Reply to Objection 3. The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion.
q. 10 art. 4
I answer that, As Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) "it belongs to Divine providence, not to destroy but to preserve the nature of things." Wherefore it moves all things in accordance with their conditions; so that from necessary causes through the Divine motion, effects follow of necessity; but from contingent causes, effects follow contingently. Since, therefore, the will is an active principle, not determinate to one thing, but having an indifferent relation to many things, God so moves it, that He does not determine it of necessity to one thing, but its movement remains contingent and not necessary, except in those things to which it is moved naturally.
--- reminds me of the thing fr dewan pointed out that nature is moved to one thing and the will to different - b/c it is self moved/can have reason/ hold things inside it?
also makes me think of the origin of passions.... touch as being closest to pleasure, beginning wiht bodily pain - mercy being at "the corruptive or distressing" - passions definitely closer to nature which he shares with animals.
old work on 35.7
The seventh article asks whether interior sorrow is greater than exterior sorrow.
The reasons for supposing that “outward pain” (find latin) (obj.2) would be a cuase of greater sorrow because it is sourced in a real conjunction, that it concerns a greater good - the life of the body is held to be greater than something merely cognized as bad, and the third shows that a man dies sooner from pain than from sorrow.
Aquinas in his reply defines the difference between “exterior” and “interior” sorrow - exterior sorrow is on account of a conjoined evil repugnant to the body, while interior pain results from a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. As such, interior pain would be greater than outward pain inasmuch as the object is opposed to the appetite itself, whereas bodily pain comes through the mediation of being repellent to the body. Furthermore, the kind of apprehension that belongs to the interior is more perfect than the apprehension that is proper to the sense of touch. While the oppression of something harmful to the body seems to be more “objective” and real in a sense, the quality of the interior apprehension, as subsuming the nature of a thing to a higher degree, makes the evil to be better known and consequently, it would appear, more painful. This is one passion at least, where, the more it becomes interior, intelligent, and apprehensive, one might perhaps also say that it is more painful. (I remember 35.1arg.2, “every passion fo the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says that bodily pain is caused by the sense ressting a more powerful body. The reply does not discount the association with the apprehensive - not that this is nec. Significant, but still - he says ‘we speak of pain of the sense, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power, but because the senses are erquired for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.)
We can perhaps look for more light on this by returning to 22.2 - where it is asked whether passions are appetitive or apprehensive, and we are able to question this. First, returning to 22.1 - where passion is stated to be something under the power of the agent, and sorrow (find proper latin term) is declared to be the ‘most passionate of the passions’ because something is found to be ‘more under the power when it is prevented from following its inclination.‘ We have seen in the previous articles the tensions that may arise between the internal appetite inclining strongly towards the good, the infliction of an “object“ which happens with the use of the senses (or sensitive appetite more properly, have to check what he says) and the consequent stronger movement against the object of? sorrow - we saw according to the example that “violent movement is intense at first but fades away” - the resistance of the thing by the very nature that it experiences pain or sorrow is slowly becoming more prominent. And the first sign and means of resistance is apprehension of the thing as evil (We don‘t even have to discuss irascible passions - insistent sorrow is angry at evil in this sense). Sorrow, in this chapter which insists that interior pain is more intense, is greater as it is more perfectly apprehended - intelligence can no longer be left fully out of the equation (in English he brings in ‘reason’ and ‘imagination’) as it contributes to sorrow. The passion does not consist in the apprehension, but in order to understand greater intensities of the experience of pain, one must have more perfect knowledge of the nature of the oppressing thing.
Why the focus on apprehension? Because sorrow essentially concerns something violent - something that goes against what one is. There are many ways something can go against one’s nature, (reply ad 1, 35.8) and accordingly as one grasps how problematic it is more perfectly through interior apprehension, one is more repulsed by it. Indeed, if one were not repulsed by the object and instead became conformed to the object, there would be a greater passion insofar as one’s whole inclination and implied form was changed, but pain would disappear and pleasure would ensue - the dissentire becomes consentire (cite somewhere - he cites Augustine - check in Index). Instead of being drawn toward it irresistibly, it is “slammed up” against one, and the person
To know something is wrong requires for more perfect comprehension knowing how it is wrong, (Aquinas doesn’t quite say that, but a more ‘perfect’? apprehension would include this…) which intensifies the pain. On the other hand, one can also find in the interior appetite - on the basis of its self-interiority which can be gleaned from the fact that the apprehension is an interior one, that the intrinsic move towards the good is the more primary principle than when the passion is more defined by an exterior object as it is to the sensitive appetite, which is more immediately concerned with shaking off (?) the oppressive object than with its original motivation towards the good. So we can synthesize these two reflections perhaps and discern that it is possible for a greater pain to happen which, at the same time, need not be as “passionate” in the literal sense of being drawn against its inclination. A more interior grasp is more painful, but it is also is closer to the seat of one’s own fundamental inclination; thus it might have a stronger “resistance factor” even in being more “painfully” “aware”. It is unclear to me according to the text whether such an interior apprehension can happen purely without sensitive apprehension - in 35.6 ad 2 he states “Accidentally, insofar as the senses are requisiste for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.” So it could be that even in a very perfect comprehension there is going to be a corresponding passionate movement - certainly, in fact, if we read with Aquinas that it the lower appetite follows the higher (24.3 ad1, 59.5 - for the perfection) Now where we would have to be careful is that passion properly consists in the sensitive appetite, because of the bodily change. But there are intensities of bodily changes even within the sensitive appetite - we are approaching more subtle sense appetites - “the outward sense is more material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective” - thus the body undergoes a greater change from movement of sensitive appetite and likewise from outward than inward pain. (By the time we get to mercy as a virtue, the verb for the evil object affecting the appetite is “displicet” - displeases)
And so distinguishing an interior sorrow that extends to the reason and the imagination.
ONE THING I AM MORE CONSICOUS OF NOW WHICH I WILL HAVE TO EXPLORE MORE ARE THESE CONSIDERATIONS:
Aquinas is able to explain the intellectual conjunction NOW after carefully veering from the language of apprehension back in 22.2. What is here is not “containing” or “grasping“ - it is “conjunction” - it a more perfect conjunction than an exterior passion.
Here we must be really careful to read this article in light of the earlier one - number 4
answer that, As stated above (Article 3), a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish."
There can be a passionate union between the intellect and its object. Aquinas does not discuss, in sorrow, whether sorrow is in the intellective appetite - he simply takes it for granted that it can be in both - it is not a major question, because the distinction is between “interior” and “exterior” and the “interior” is intentionally left so broad as to include imagination and intellect - perhaps because the two are never really dissociable for us - and yet with sorrow - Aquinas never makes the same claims which he does for “joy” as being possible to be a simple act of the will - it is beause the nature of sorrow - as being conjoined to evil - as being inextricably united to oneself - present evil is soething so contrary to a thing that if it is not presented through an exterior apprehension and a certain apprehensive bodily change, it will accompany an interior apprehension.
The reasons for supposing that “outward pain” (find latin) (obj.2) would be a cuase of greater sorrow because it is sourced in a real conjunction, that it concerns a greater good - the life of the body is held to be greater than something merely cognized as bad, and the third shows that a man dies sooner from pain than from sorrow.
Aquinas in his reply defines the difference between “exterior” and “interior” sorrow - exterior sorrow is on account of a conjoined evil repugnant to the body, while interior pain results from a conjoined evil repugnant to the appetite. As such, interior pain would be greater than outward pain inasmuch as the object is opposed to the appetite itself, whereas bodily pain comes through the mediation of being repellent to the body. Furthermore, the kind of apprehension that belongs to the interior is more perfect than the apprehension that is proper to the sense of touch. While the oppression of something harmful to the body seems to be more “objective” and real in a sense, the quality of the interior apprehension, as subsuming the nature of a thing to a higher degree, makes the evil to be better known and consequently, it would appear, more painful. This is one passion at least, where, the more it becomes interior, intelligent, and apprehensive, one might perhaps also say that it is more painful. (I remember 35.1arg.2, “every passion fo the soul belongs to the appetitive faculty. But pain does not belong to the appetitive, but rather to the apprehensive part: for Augustine says that bodily pain is caused by the sense ressting a more powerful body. The reply does not discount the association with the apprehensive - not that this is nec. Significant, but still - he says ‘we speak of pain of the sense, not as though it were an act of the sensitive power, but because the senses are erquired for bodily pain, in the same way as for bodily pleasure.)
We can perhaps look for more light on this by returning to 22.2 - where it is asked whether passions are appetitive or apprehensive, and we are able to question this. First, returning to 22.1 - where passion is stated to be something under the power of the agent, and sorrow (find proper latin term) is declared to be the ‘most passionate of the passions’ because something is found to be ‘more under the power when it is prevented from following its inclination.‘ We have seen in the previous articles the tensions that may arise between the internal appetite inclining strongly towards the good, the infliction of an “object“ which happens with the use of the senses (or sensitive appetite more properly, have to check what he says) and the consequent stronger movement against the object of? sorrow - we saw according to the example that “violent movement is intense at first but fades away” - the resistance of the thing by the very nature that it experiences pain or sorrow is slowly becoming more prominent. And the first sign and means of resistance is apprehension of the thing as evil (We don‘t even have to discuss irascible passions - insistent sorrow is angry at evil in this sense). Sorrow, in this chapter which insists that interior pain is more intense, is greater as it is more perfectly apprehended - intelligence can no longer be left fully out of the equation (in English he brings in ‘reason’ and ‘imagination’) as it contributes to sorrow. The passion does not consist in the apprehension, but in order to understand greater intensities of the experience of pain, one must have more perfect knowledge of the nature of the oppressing thing.
Why the focus on apprehension? Because sorrow essentially concerns something violent - something that goes against what one is. There are many ways something can go against one’s nature, (reply ad 1, 35.8) and accordingly as one grasps how problematic it is more perfectly through interior apprehension, one is more repulsed by it. Indeed, if one were not repulsed by the object and instead became conformed to the object, there would be a greater passion insofar as one’s whole inclination and implied form was changed, but pain would disappear and pleasure would ensue - the dissentire becomes consentire (cite somewhere - he cites Augustine - check in Index). Instead of being drawn toward it irresistibly, it is “slammed up” against one, and the person
To know something is wrong requires for more perfect comprehension knowing how it is wrong, (Aquinas doesn’t quite say that, but a more ‘perfect’? apprehension would include this…) which intensifies the pain. On the other hand, one can also find in the interior appetite - on the basis of its self-interiority which can be gleaned from the fact that the apprehension is an interior one, that the intrinsic move towards the good is the more primary principle than when the passion is more defined by an exterior object as it is to the sensitive appetite, which is more immediately concerned with shaking off (?) the oppressive object than with its original motivation towards the good. So we can synthesize these two reflections perhaps and discern that it is possible for a greater pain to happen which, at the same time, need not be as “passionate” in the literal sense of being drawn against its inclination. A more interior grasp is more painful, but it is also is closer to the seat of one’s own fundamental inclination; thus it might have a stronger “resistance factor” even in being more “painfully” “aware”. It is unclear to me according to the text whether such an interior apprehension can happen purely without sensitive apprehension - in 35.6 ad 2 he states “Accidentally, insofar as the senses are requisiste for pleasure and pain, pain is shunned more than pleasure is sought.” So it could be that even in a very perfect comprehension there is going to be a corresponding passionate movement - certainly, in fact, if we read with Aquinas that it the lower appetite follows the higher (24.3 ad1, 59.5 - for the perfection) Now where we would have to be careful is that passion properly consists in the sensitive appetite, because of the bodily change. But there are intensities of bodily changes even within the sensitive appetite - we are approaching more subtle sense appetites - “the outward sense is more material than the inward sense, just as the sensitive appetite is more material than the intellective” - thus the body undergoes a greater change from movement of sensitive appetite and likewise from outward than inward pain. (By the time we get to mercy as a virtue, the verb for the evil object affecting the appetite is “displicet” - displeases)
And so distinguishing an interior sorrow that extends to the reason and the imagination.
ONE THING I AM MORE CONSICOUS OF NOW WHICH I WILL HAVE TO EXPLORE MORE ARE THESE CONSIDERATIONS:
Aquinas is able to explain the intellectual conjunction NOW after carefully veering from the language of apprehension back in 22.2. What is here is not “containing” or “grasping“ - it is “conjunction” - it a more perfect conjunction than an exterior passion.
Here we must be really careful to read this article in light of the earlier one - number 4
answer that, As stated above (Article 3), a certain delight arises from the apprehension of the reason. Now on the reason apprehending something, not only the sensitive appetite is moved, as regards its application to some particular thing, but also the intellectual appetite, which is called the will. And accordingly in the intellectual appetite or will there is that delight which is called joy, but not bodily delight.
However, there is this difference of delight in either power, that delight of the sensitive appetite is accompanied by a bodily transmutation, whereas delight of the intellectual appetite is nothing but the mere movement of the will. Hence Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 6) that "desire and joy are nothing else but a volition of consent to the things we wish."
There can be a passionate union between the intellect and its object. Aquinas does not discuss, in sorrow, whether sorrow is in the intellective appetite - he simply takes it for granted that it can be in both - it is not a major question, because the distinction is between “interior” and “exterior” and the “interior” is intentionally left so broad as to include imagination and intellect - perhaps because the two are never really dissociable for us - and yet with sorrow - Aquinas never makes the same claims which he does for “joy” as being possible to be a simple act of the will - it is beause the nature of sorrow - as being conjoined to evil - as being inextricably united to oneself - present evil is soething so contrary to a thing that if it is not presented through an exterior apprehension and a certain apprehensive bodily change, it will accompany an interior apprehension.
Old work on 35.6
The sixth article asks whether sorrow is to be avoided more than pleasure shunned. The principle here is that the desire for good is essentially stronger than the avoidance of evil, for several reasons - that pleasure can be perfect, whereas some sorrow is always “suitable in some way” (a very insightful principle, which is based on at least two causes - the goodness of perceiving something to be bad that is actually bad, and the reflexive judgment of the appetite upon itself which can follow). Aquinas applies a parallel from nature - we see that the “movement” of things becoming “more intense” as they approach their goal.
Accidentally however sorrow can be shunned more inasmuch as love is more keenly felt through sorrow. (But this would also be presupposing that a consciousness of self and self-love prevails - see my reflection on mantellatablog)
Love, which persists throughout sorrow, is simultaneously a cause of pleasure. Inasmuch as the love is the more keenly felt when there is an accompanying sorrow (as pleasure taken in such a love will be the greater and more intense by juxtaposition with the sorrow which hinders it) one strives all the harder to rid oneself of the clinging sorrow. This is a considerable modification, a per accidens counter movement, a thrust against hindrances, in the intense progress towards love’s object or terminus (or at least the clinging to the love itself inasmuch as that incidentally is the best way of ultimately realizing one’s end) through the active intermediary of loving one’s love and the object thereof together, which force causes one to repel the object of one‘s sorrow that much more vehemently.
Secondly, sorrow may be shunned more than pleasure sought on the part of the kind of good which is at stake in the sorrow and what is at stake in the pleasure. If the good to which sorrow is accidentally attached is greater than that which is concerned in the pleasure, then the sorrow will be stronger motivation in the first case than love of that particular pleasure would be in the second case. (For instance etc. - given below)
Finally, sorrow does not hinder only one pleasure but every pleasure. Here all the combined powers of pleasure do not suffice to cloud out or outweigh the experience of sorrow, rather, sorrow makes its presence felt in every kind of pleasure. Signals t(maybe there is some sort of exception - ecstasy, love, whatever?) (Shows that the appetite is not “rational” in the sense that it can measure pleasures out over sorrows, but the logic of the appetite itself is that when it is not satisfied, it is not satisfied - because it is one, when something appears as wrong to it, it becomes impossible to enjoy fully - this does not mean there is no room for therapy, but rather therapy can happen as to extent of sorrow and kind of sorrow, but still the fundamental picture is that the appetite wants a happy ending.)
Got to linger here, because this forms the basis of much of our experience - explains our actions…..
Psychologically, this is very telling. We are always fundamentally oriented, attracted, given disposition towards and movement towards what enters our appetitive horizons as “good”. And yet, when we face serious obstructions towards the gaining or enjoyment of much-loved goods, the tendency of being oriented towards our beloved objects can be accordingly deflected to fit the twists and turns of our daily fates - according to which there are restrictions or denials of access to yearned-for goods. Inasmuch as a much-loved or more primary good is hindered, the attraction towards lesser kinds of goods will fade as the attention and intention of the soul becomes focused on trying to rid itself of what hinders its enjoyment of the more valuable good. The example Aquinas gives is that of eating while subject to bodily blows - our love for the well-being of our body takes precedence in such a case over the secondary pleasure of eating. This will be important to keep in mind when faced with persons who do not seem to take much pleasure in minor things - they might be oriented towards a dearer good which in reality or in perception is threatened for them, and to be preoccupied with the removal of obstacles to such a good (which would already be moving towards the irascible - but the “shunning“ of sorrow is about the irascible, if not angry, at least determined - but anger is the metaphor for determination).
(SYSTEMATIZE AS HE DOES - apprehension - felt more keenly (reflexive) - cause - greater good (priorities) - effect - one sorrow hinders all pleasure (unity of appetite).
Also response to 2nd objection helpful insofar as it shows that on the INTERIOR side tends to good more, but insofar as senses required (and here it seems to be applying to interior things, so much as the thing derives the character of “object” and “external” does one strive to shake it off. What would this mean for effective remedies of sorrow? Keep focused on the good rather than on the evil - “keeping one’s head”.?)
Accidentally however sorrow can be shunned more inasmuch as love is more keenly felt through sorrow. (But this would also be presupposing that a consciousness of self and self-love prevails - see my reflection on mantellatablog)
Love, which persists throughout sorrow, is simultaneously a cause of pleasure. Inasmuch as the love is the more keenly felt when there is an accompanying sorrow (as pleasure taken in such a love will be the greater and more intense by juxtaposition with the sorrow which hinders it) one strives all the harder to rid oneself of the clinging sorrow. This is a considerable modification, a per accidens counter movement, a thrust against hindrances, in the intense progress towards love’s object or terminus (or at least the clinging to the love itself inasmuch as that incidentally is the best way of ultimately realizing one’s end) through the active intermediary of loving one’s love and the object thereof together, which force causes one to repel the object of one‘s sorrow that much more vehemently.
Secondly, sorrow may be shunned more than pleasure sought on the part of the kind of good which is at stake in the sorrow and what is at stake in the pleasure. If the good to which sorrow is accidentally attached is greater than that which is concerned in the pleasure, then the sorrow will be stronger motivation in the first case than love of that particular pleasure would be in the second case. (For instance etc. - given below)
Finally, sorrow does not hinder only one pleasure but every pleasure. Here all the combined powers of pleasure do not suffice to cloud out or outweigh the experience of sorrow, rather, sorrow makes its presence felt in every kind of pleasure. Signals t(maybe there is some sort of exception - ecstasy, love, whatever?) (Shows that the appetite is not “rational” in the sense that it can measure pleasures out over sorrows, but the logic of the appetite itself is that when it is not satisfied, it is not satisfied - because it is one, when something appears as wrong to it, it becomes impossible to enjoy fully - this does not mean there is no room for therapy, but rather therapy can happen as to extent of sorrow and kind of sorrow, but still the fundamental picture is that the appetite wants a happy ending.)
Got to linger here, because this forms the basis of much of our experience - explains our actions…..
Psychologically, this is very telling. We are always fundamentally oriented, attracted, given disposition towards and movement towards what enters our appetitive horizons as “good”. And yet, when we face serious obstructions towards the gaining or enjoyment of much-loved goods, the tendency of being oriented towards our beloved objects can be accordingly deflected to fit the twists and turns of our daily fates - according to which there are restrictions or denials of access to yearned-for goods. Inasmuch as a much-loved or more primary good is hindered, the attraction towards lesser kinds of goods will fade as the attention and intention of the soul becomes focused on trying to rid itself of what hinders its enjoyment of the more valuable good. The example Aquinas gives is that of eating while subject to bodily blows - our love for the well-being of our body takes precedence in such a case over the secondary pleasure of eating. This will be important to keep in mind when faced with persons who do not seem to take much pleasure in minor things - they might be oriented towards a dearer good which in reality or in perception is threatened for them, and to be preoccupied with the removal of obstacles to such a good (which would already be moving towards the irascible - but the “shunning“ of sorrow is about the irascible, if not angry, at least determined - but anger is the metaphor for determination).
(SYSTEMATIZE AS HE DOES - apprehension - felt more keenly (reflexive) - cause - greater good (priorities) - effect - one sorrow hinders all pleasure (unity of appetite).
Also response to 2nd objection helpful insofar as it shows that on the INTERIOR side tends to good more, but insofar as senses required (and here it seems to be applying to interior things, so much as the thing derives the character of “object” and “external” does one strive to shake it off. What would this mean for effective remedies of sorrow? Keep focused on the good rather than on the evil - “keeping one’s head”.?)
Here contemplation, according to Aquinas, offers something that every other pleasure cannot. Bodily pleasures are inextricably 0connected with sorrows (needs?) inasmuch as the pleasure of drinking arises through thirsting, which pleasure ceases when the thirst is fully quenched. (Another possible source - II-Iiae, 35.1 ad 2 - in English translations says every bodily effect tends towards sorrow - in the online Latin edition, it says defectum, however: Now all bodily effects, of themselves, dispose one to sorrow; and thus it is that those who fast are harassed by sloth towards mid-day, when they begin to feel the want of food, and to be parched by the sun's heat. What would also be interesting here is the weariness or whatever the word would be from intense physical pleasures, like sex - I know someone talks about this, but whether it is rationalists or Aquinas I am not sure)
passions
in my struggles to find passion as preceding and perfecting intellective movements, how do I regard the unthinkingness of the passions - that the suggestibility which is so rich also means that one can be pulled away towards unfitting things, becuase the slightest hint of the good which is present is enough to draw one in without considering the elements that make other goods more desirable?
This is where the "antecedent" and "consequent" to reason come in - While I resisted this passionately at the intellectual level becuase I thought that it meant a long rational process came in before we ever loved anyone/anything - I guess I thought it meant that every love had to be a dilection. But it is more simple than that. Much of the time we are rightly oriented in our passions - in our love for other people, in our care for our body. In coming to reflect upon these things, we don't necessarily change them into willing these things nstead of loving, but we become willingly passionate - the will simply gives a little reflective assent to everything that is already going on as opposed to being causally at the root of everything that is going on (and this is already thinking habituated people - becuase morality is about pleasures as Aristotle and as Aquinas - whether pleasure is the measure and rule of human acts) No unreasonable passions or poorly trained habits are so strong that good habits cannot replace them - unless we need God's help for this, which I think we do, even to be natural.
So reason in this case would be the reflective - the second moment - the check, the query, the question which may end us up on the other side or bring us to a third term or back to wehre we were with the differance.
And will.... how come he said reason and not will? Because it is about being consequent to reason. How do the passions partkae "somewaht" in voluntariety? Voluntariety, I have to remember, is not just about the passivity of the will towards the good which I remembered from working on charity. We have free judgment - and something is moral insofar as it is free - otherwise there is no or diminished responsibility (It is not that something is free insofar as it can do otherwise, it is that something is moral insofar as it can do otherwise??? becuase it concerns opposites, reason. but angels are moral but opposites still happen to them - they can oppose the will) - this is why Aquinas speaks not only of rewards but of punishments and exhortations - it is free judgment (which would be different in us than in angels).
This is where the "antecedent" and "consequent" to reason come in - While I resisted this passionately at the intellectual level becuase I thought that it meant a long rational process came in before we ever loved anyone/anything - I guess I thought it meant that every love had to be a dilection. But it is more simple than that. Much of the time we are rightly oriented in our passions - in our love for other people, in our care for our body. In coming to reflect upon these things, we don't necessarily change them into willing these things nstead of loving, but we become willingly passionate - the will simply gives a little reflective assent to everything that is already going on as opposed to being causally at the root of everything that is going on (and this is already thinking habituated people - becuase morality is about pleasures as Aristotle and as Aquinas - whether pleasure is the measure and rule of human acts) No unreasonable passions or poorly trained habits are so strong that good habits cannot replace them - unless we need God's help for this, which I think we do, even to be natural.
So reason in this case would be the reflective - the second moment - the check, the query, the question which may end us up on the other side or bring us to a third term or back to wehre we were with the differance.
And will.... how come he said reason and not will? Because it is about being consequent to reason. How do the passions partkae "somewaht" in voluntariety? Voluntariety, I have to remember, is not just about the passivity of the will towards the good which I remembered from working on charity. We have free judgment - and something is moral insofar as it is free - otherwise there is no or diminished responsibility (It is not that something is free insofar as it can do otherwise, it is that something is moral insofar as it can do otherwise??? becuase it concerns opposites, reason. but angels are moral but opposites still happen to them - they can oppose the will) - this is why Aquinas speaks not only of rewards but of punishments and exhortations - it is free judgment (which would be different in us than in angels).
this is the one where I can bring in fear and anger into sorrow
Sadness, however, appears interestingly as mediating between irascible passions - because sadness cannot remain in itself - the "rest" is spoken of in a different way than "rest" in something pleasant. A rest towards springing - following upon fear, preceding wrath. And wrath can lead one back into joy if one "weighs out the exchange of evil".
Wednesday, October 29, 2008
I-II 41.1
Reply to Objection 1. Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appetitive faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that passion is a virtue by way of habit.
i. 80. 2
answer that, We must needs say that the intellectual appetite is a distinct power from the sensitive appetite. For the appetitive power is a passive power, which is naturally moved by the thing apprehended: wherefore the apprehended appetible is a mover which is not moved, while the appetite is a mover moved, as the Philosopher says in De Anima iii, 10 and Metaph. xii (Did. xi, 7). Now things passive and movable are differentiated according to the distinction of the corresponding active and motive principles; because the motive must be proportionate to the movable, and the active to the passive: indeed, the passive power itself has its very nature from its relation to its active principle. Therefore, since what is apprehended by the intellect and what is apprehended by sense are generically different; consequently, the intellectual appetite is distinct from the sensitive.
Tuesday, October 28, 2008
I.47.1
Hence we must say that the distinction and multitude of things come from the intention of the first agent, who is God. For He brought things into being in order that His goodness might be communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse creatures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might be supplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures is manifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodness more perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever.
q. 25
Article 2. Whether love is the first of the concupiscible passions?
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2. Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3. Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (11, 3, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1. We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2. The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.
Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2. Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3. Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (11, 3, ad 3).
Reply to Objection 1. We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2. The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.
keep in mind when I come to jealousy
Article 4. Whether zeal is an effect of love?
Objection 1. It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Objection 2. Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Objection 3. Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (Psalm 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things."
I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it.
But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Psalm 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity."
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 1 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of John 2:17: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it."
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
Reply to Objection 2. Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
Objection 1. It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal [Douay: 'envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Objection 2. Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.
Objection 3. Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (Psalm 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.
On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things."
I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it.
But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Psalm 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity."
On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 1 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have been zealous for the Lord of hosts." Again on the words of John 2:17: "The zeal of Thy house hath eaten me up," a gloss says that "a man is eaten up with a good zeal, who strives to remedy whatever evil he perceives; and if he cannot, bears with it and laments it."
Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.
Reply to Objection 2. Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.
Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.
Causes of sorrow - thinking love
36.1
Respondeo dicendum quod, si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione animae, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quaestio nullius momenti esse videretur. Malum enim, ut in primo libro habitum est, est privatio boni, privatio autem, in rerum natura, nihil est aliud quam carentia oppositi habitus, secundum hoc ergo, idem esset tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis. In apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis. Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum.
Et quia motus appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animae, sicut motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus; ex consideratione naturalium motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod est conveniens naturae; recessus autem per se respicit id quod est contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius inclinat ad locum deorsum, quam retrahat a loco sursum, a quo recedit ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum. Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.
ARTICLE 2 - how love plays into sorrow............................
I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above (Article 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.
("CONNATURAL" appears 9 times in question 32 - the causes of pleasure)
32.6
The third principle is the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure.
36.2
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (Article 1) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Question 32, Article 6); hence it is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (30, 2, ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Q. 26
[34648] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor est virtus unitiva, et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris.
[34642] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus passio est. Sed omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio.
[34643] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Trin. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo amor non est passio.
[34644] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod passio est motus quidam. Amor autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed principium huiusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.
[34645] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.
[34646] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.
So he asks first whether love is in the concupiscible and then whether love is a passion at all.
__________________________
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius enim, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et dilectio, sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas lineas. Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio significant idem.
[34651] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, appetitivi motus secundum obiecta differunt. Sed idem est obiectum dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem.
[34652] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre videntur, quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sed hoc modo non differunt, quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit, in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem concludit quod non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem dicere.
[34653] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod quibusdam sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen dilectionis.
[34654] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
[34655] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione, secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est quod dilectio.
[34656] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut dictum est.
[34657] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva idem est amor et dilectio. Et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus de amore, unde parum post subdit quod recta voluntas est bonus amor, et perversa voluntas est malus amor. Quia tamen amor, qui est passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt occasionem qui praedictam differentiam assignaverunt.
BY THE WAY, MY FAVOURITE RESPONSE IN THE SUMMA HAS NO OBJECTION WHICH IT CORRESPONDS WITH!
[34658] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.___________________________
last question - divides love into concupiscence and friendship.
Respondeo dicendum quod, si hoc modo se haberent privationes in apprehensione animae, sicut se habent in ipsis rebus, ista quaestio nullius momenti esse videretur. Malum enim, ut in primo libro habitum est, est privatio boni, privatio autem, in rerum natura, nihil est aliud quam carentia oppositi habitus, secundum hoc ergo, idem esset tristari de bono amisso, et de malo habito. Sed tristitia est motus appetitus apprehensionem sequentis. In apprehensione autem ipsa privatio habet rationem cuiusdam entis, unde dicitur ens rationis. Et sic malum, cum sit privatio, se habet per modum contrarii. Et ideo, quantum ad motum appetitivum, differt utrum respiciat principalius malum coniunctum, vel bonum amissum.
Et quia motus appetitus animalis hoc modo se habet in operibus animae, sicut motus naturalis in rebus naturalibus; ex consideratione naturalium motuum veritas accipi potest. Si enim accipiamus in motibus naturalibus accessum et recessum, accessus per se respicit id quod est conveniens naturae; recessus autem per se respicit id quod est contrarium; sicut grave per se recedit a loco superiori, accedit autem naturaliter ad locum inferiorem. Sed si accipiamus causam utriusque motus, scilicet gravitatem, ipsa gravitas per prius inclinat ad locum deorsum, quam retrahat a loco sursum, a quo recedit ut deorsum tendat. Sic igitur, cum tristitia in motibus appetitivis se habeat per modum fugae vel recessus, delectatio autem per modum prosecutionis vel accessus; sicut delectatio per prius respicit bonum adeptum, quasi proprium obiectum, ita tristitia respicit malum coniunctum. Sed causa delectationis et tristitiae, scilicet amor, per prius respicit bonum quam malum. Sic ergo eo modo quo obiectum est causa passionis, magis proprie est causa tristitiae vel doloris malum coniunctum, quam bonum amissum.
ARTICLE 2 - how love plays into sorrow............................
I answer that, Sorrow is a movement of the animal appetite. Now, as stated above (Article 1), the appetitive movement is likened to the natural appetite; a likeness, that may be assigned to a twofold cause; one, on the part of the end, the other, on the part of the principle of movement. Thus, on the part of the end, the cause of a heavy body's downward movement is the lower place; while the principle of that movement is a natural inclination resulting from gravity.
("CONNATURAL" appears 9 times in question 32 - the causes of pleasure)
32.6
The third principle is the motive: for instance when a man is moved by one whom he loves, to do good to someone: for whatever we do or suffer for a friend is pleasant, because love is the principal cause of pleasure.
36.2
Now the cause of the appetitive movement, on the part of the end, is the object of that movement. And thus, it has been said above (Article 1) that the cause of pain or sorrow is a present evil. On the other hand, the cause, by way or principle, of that movement, is the inward inclination of the appetite; which inclination regards, first of all, the good, and in consequence, the rejection of a contrary evil. Hence the first principle of this appetitive movement is love, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the possession of good: while the second principle is hatred, which is the first inclination of the appetite towards the avoidance of evil. But since concupiscence or desire is the first effect of love, which gives rise to the greatest pleasure, as stated above (Question 32, Article 6); hence it is that Augustine often speaks of desire or concupiscence in the sense of love, as was also stated (30, 2, ad 2): and in this sense he says that desire is the universal cause of sorrow. Sometimes, however, desire taken in its proper sense, is the cause of sorrow. Because whatever hinders a movement from reaching its end is contrary to that movement. Now that which is contrary to the movement of the appetite, is a cause of sorrow. Consequently, desire becomes a cause of sorrow, in so far as we sorrow for the delay of a desired good, or for its entire removal. But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have.
Q. 26
[34648] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor est virtus unitiva, et philosophus dicit, in II Polit., quod unio est opus amoris.
[34642] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus passio est. Sed omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio.
[34643] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor est unio quaedam vel nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Trin. Sed unio vel nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo amor non est passio.
[34644] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in II libro, quod passio est motus quidam. Amor autem non importat motum appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed principium huiusmodi motus. Ergo amor non est passio.
[34645] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.
[34646] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passio est effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem effectum inducit in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam, secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem propter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitui, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium. Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.
So he asks first whether love is in the concupiscible and then whether love is a passion at all.
__________________________
Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor sit idem quod dilectio. Dionysius enim, IV cap. de Div. Nom., dicit quod hoc modo se habent amor et dilectio, sicut quatuor et bis duo, rectilineum et habens rectas lineas. Sed ista significant idem. Ergo amor et dilectio significant idem.
[34651] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, appetitivi motus secundum obiecta differunt. Sed idem est obiectum dilectionis et amoris. Ergo sunt idem.
[34652] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, si dilectio et amor in aliquo differunt, maxime in hoc differre videntur, quod dilectio sit in bono accipienda, amor autem in malo, ut quidam dixerunt, secundum quod Augustinus narrat, in XIV de Civ. Dei. Sed hoc modo non differunt, quia, ut ibidem Augustinus dicit, in sacris Scripturis utrumque accipitur in bono et in malo. Ergo amor et dilectio non differunt; sicut ipse Augustinus ibidem concludit quod non est aliud amorem dicere, et aliud dilectionem dicere.
[34653] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod quibusdam sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen dilectionis.
[34654] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi potest. Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.
[34655] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione, secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est quod dilectio.
[34656] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod obiectum amoris est communius quam obiectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut dictum est.
[34657] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva idem est amor et dilectio. Et sic loquitur ibi Augustinus de amore, unde parum post subdit quod recta voluntas est bonus amor, et perversa voluntas est malus amor. Quia tamen amor, qui est passio concupiscibilis, plurimos inclinat ad malum, inde habuerunt occasionem qui praedictam differentiam assignaverunt.
BY THE WAY, MY FAVOURITE RESPONSE IN THE SUMMA HAS NO OBJECTION WHICH IT CORRESPONDS WITH!
[34658] Iª-IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod ideo aliqui posuerunt, etiam in ipsa voluntate, nomen amoris esse divinius nomine dilectionis, quia amor importat quandam passionem, praecipue secundum quod est in appetitu sensitivo; dilectio autem praesupponit iudicium rationis. Magis autem homo in Deum tendere potest per amorem, passive quodammodo ab ipso Deo attractus, quam ad hoc eum propria ratio ducere possit, quod pertinet ad rationem dilectionis, ut dictum est. Et propter hoc, divinius est amor quam dilectio.___________________________
last question - divides love into concupiscence and friendship.
28.5
And let this be understood as applying to love in respect of its formal element, i.e. in regard to the appetite. But in respect of the material element in the passion of love, i.e. a certain bodily change, it happens that love is hurtful, by reason of this change being excessive: just as it happens in the senses, and in every act of a power of the soul that is exercised through the change of some bodily organ.
footnote on dif. betw. intllctv and snsbl plsr
31.5
Article 5. Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?
Objection 1. It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 2. Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 3. Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on (35, 5).
Reply to Objection 1. The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.
Reply to Objection 2. Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate.
Article 5. Whether bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intellectual pleasures?
Objection 1. It would seem that bodily and sensible pleasures are greater than spiritual and intelligible pleasures. For all men seek some pleasure, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. x, 2,4). But more seek sensible pleasures, than intelligible spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 2. Further, the greatness of a cause is known by its effect. But bodily pleasures have greater effects; since "they alter the state of the body, and in some they cause madness" (Ethic. vii, 3). Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
Objection 3. Further, bodily pleasures need to be tempered and checked, by reason of their vehemence: whereas there is no need to check spiritual pleasures. Therefore bodily pleasures are greater.
On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 118:103): "How sweet are Thy words to my palate; more than honey to my mouth!" And the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 7) that "the greatest pleasure is derived from the operation of wisdom."
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), pleasure arises from union with a suitable object perceived or known. Now, in the operations of the soul, especially of the sensitive and intellectual soul, it must be noted that, since they do not pass into outward matter, they are acts or perfections of the agent, e.g. to understand, to feel, to will and the like: because actions which pass into outward matter, are actions and perfections rather of the matter transformed; for "movement is the act produced by the mover in the thing moved" (Phys. iii, 3). Accordingly the aforesaid actions of the sensitive and intellectual soul, are themselves a certain good of the agent, and are known by sense and intellect. Wherefore from them also does pleasure arise, and not only from their objects.
If therefore we compare intellectual pleasures with sensible pleasures, according as we delight in the very actions, for instance in sensitive and in intellectual knowledge; without doubt intellectual pleasures are much greater than sensible pleasures. For man takes much more delight in knowing something, by understanding it, than in knowing something by perceiving it with his sense. Because intellectual knowledge is more perfect; and because it is better known, since the intellect reflects on its own act more than sense does. Moreover intellectual knowledge is more beloved: for there is no one who would not forfeit his bodily sight rather than his intellectual vision, as beasts or fools are deprived thereof, as Augustine says in De Civ. Dei (De Trin. xiv, 14).
If, however, intellectual spiritual pleasures be compared with sensible bodily pleasures, then, in themselves and absolutely speaking, spiritual pleasures are greater. And this appears from the consideration of the three things needed for pleasure, viz. the good which is brought into conjunction, that to which it is conjoined, and the conjunction itself. For spiritual good is both greater and more beloved than bodily good: a sign whereof is that men abstain from even the greatest bodily pleasures, rather than suffer loss of honor which is an intellectual good. Likewise the intellectual faculty is much more noble and more knowing than the sensitive faculty. Also the conjunction is more intimate, more perfect and more firm. More intimate, because the senses stop at the outward accidents of a thing, whereas the intellect penetrates to the essence; for the object of the intellect is "what a thing is." More perfect, because the conjunction of the sensible to the sense implies movement, which is an imperfect act: wherefore sensible pleasures are not perceived all at once, but some part of them is passing away, while some other part is looked forward to as yet to be realized, as is manifest in pleasures of the table and in sexual pleasures: whereas intelligible things are without movement: hence pleasures of this kind are realized all at once. More firm; because the objects of bodily pleasure are corruptible, and soon pass away; whereas spiritual goods are incorruptible.
On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on (35, 5).
Reply to Objection 1. The reason why more seek bodily pleasures is because sensible goods are known better and more generally: and, again, because men need pleasures as remedies for many kinds of sorrow and sadness: and since the majority cannot attain spiritual pleasures, which are proper to the virtuous, hence it is that they turn aside to seek those of the body.
Reply to Objection 2. Bodily transmutation arises more from bodily pleasures, inasmuch as they are passions of the sensitive appetite.
Reply to Objection 3. Bodily pleasures are realized in the sensitive faculty which is governed by reason: wherefore they need to be tempered and checked by reason. But spiritual pleasures are in the mind, which is itself the rule: wherefore they are in themselves both sober and moderate.
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