Notes

I never read the section on will in Aquinas which is rather astonishing in light of how wonderful it is. I stop for a moment to meditate on something approaching to "ideology". What I mean by "ideology" in this sense is an disinclination to look outside narrowly-defined borders for the truth. What impels ideology must be a much more complicated story - defensiveness against incmplete presentations, aggressions to complete said presentations - but along the way it may come to be seen as replacing even the other discourses which might be necessary in which case it would not be a case of ideology but truth, but if not necessary - if there is in fact room or even need to understand more, then it is a problem. But I wasn't even wholly ideological - because to be really single-minded when you don't have the whole truth seems to be madness to me - more often you search around for different parts, emphasizing one over the other falsely, mis-combining them, misunderstanding them even if enunciating some things correctly. In short I am describing the process of truth - if it is a process - because if it is a process, it is not so much of an ideology but a search - I think we tend to use "ideology" in perhaps a stronger sense than I am using it now, and yet these are the elements at work in it - the problem with an ideology is that it stops midway. Anyway all this is to say that I was wondering why I never read Aquinas on the will before - it wasn't because I didn't need to - it was because I was tired of "voluntarism" when we seemed much more complicated than that. But. We are more complicated than passion alone, we are not our sensitive appetites alone - we do have something which I frequently confused with sensitive appetite which may say something either about me or about human beings in general, or maybe a little something about both. Because Aquinas seems to be more intelligent about the intersections and inter-relations of intellectual and sensitive appetites. Here's a section I was reading a little earlier: q. 10 art. 3 I-IIae On the contrary, It is written (Genesis 4:7): "Thy lust [Vulg. 'The lust thereof'] shall be under thee, and thou shalt have dominion over it." Therefore man's will is moved of necessity by the lower appetite. I answer that, As stated above (Question 9, Article 2), the passion of the sensitive appetite moves the will, in so far as the will is moved by its object: inasmuch as, to wit, man through being disposed in such and such a way by a passion, judges something to be fitting and good, which he would not judge thus were it not for the passion. (BUT THIS DOES NOT EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE WOULD JUDGE IT TO BE FITTING AND GOOD ALSO WERE IT NOT FOR THE PASSION? IS PASSION ALWAYS COMPLETELY CONFUSED? AND WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO HAVE ONE POWER "SUBJECT" TO ANOTHER... AS A POWER, IS IT NOT GIVEN ITS OWN CAPACITY, INCREASED? "SUBJECT" TO GOD MEANS THIS. IT ALSO HAS THE CONNOTATION OF OBEDIENCE - OF KEEPING IT WITHIN BOUNDS THAT IT WOULD NOT NECESSARILY DO ON ITS OWN - BUT IT IS ALSO GIVEN MORE POWER - can actually accomplish more - it is rather directed or oriented than silenced! - DEMOCRATIC RATHER THAN DESPOTIC - ALSO DEMOCRATIC RATHER THAN MILITARY) Now this influence of a passion on man occurs in two ways. First, so that his reason is wholly bound, so that he has not the use of reason: as happens in those who through a violent access of anger or concupiscence become furious or insane, just as they may from some other bodily disorder; since such like passions do not take place without some change in the body. And of such the same is to be said as of irrational animals, which follow, of necessity, the impulse of their passions: for in them there is neither movement of reason, nor, consequently, of will. Sometimes, however, the reason is not entirely engrossed by the passion, so that the judgment of reason retains, to a certain extent, its freedom: and thus the movement of the will remains in a certain degree. Accordingly in so far as the reason remains free, and not subject to the passion, (DISTINGUISH BETWEEN "PRESENCE" OF PASSION AND "SUBJECTION TO PASSION" AND "SUBJECTION OF PASSION") the will's movement, which also remains, does not tend of necessity to that whereto the passion inclines it. Consequently, either there is no movement of the will in that man, and the passion alone holds its sway: or if there be a movement of the will, it does not necessarily follow the passion. Reply to Objection 1. Although the will cannot prevent the movement of concupiscence from arising, of which the Apostle says: "The evil which I will not, that I do--i.e. I desire"; yet it is in the power of the will not to will to desire or not to consent to concupiscence. And thus it does not necessarily follow the movement of concupiscence. Reply to Objection 2. Since there is in man a twofold nature, intellectual and sensitive; sometimes SOMETIMES (but not in the snese i mena it perhaps - it seems to be 'some men' rather than 'sometimes in some men') man is such and such uniformly in respect of his whole soul: either because the sensitive part is wholly subject to this reason, as in the virtuous; or because reason is entirely engrossed by passion, as in a madman. But sometimes, although reason is clouded by passion, yet something of this reason remains free. And in respect of this, man can either repel the passion entirely, or at least hold himself in check so as not to be led away by the passion. For when thus disposed, since man is variously disposed according to the various parts of the soul, a thing appears to him otherwise according to his reason, than it does according to a passion. LATIN MUCH BETTER.Ad secundum dicendum quod, cum in homine duae sint naturae, intellectualis scilicet et sensitiva, quandoque quidem est homo aliqualis uniformiter secundum totam animam, quia scilicet vel pars sensitiva totaliter subiicitur rationi, sicut contingit in virtuosis; vel e converso ratio totaliter absorbetur a passione sicut accidit in amentibus. Sed aliquando, etsi ratio obnubiletur a passione, remanet tamen aliquid rationis liberum. Et secundum hoc potest aliquis vel totaliter passionem repellere; vel saltem se tenere ne passionem sequatur. In tali enim dispositione, quia homo secundum diversas partes animae diversimode disponitur, aliud ei videtur secundum rationem, et aliud secundum passionem. Reply to Objection 3. The will is moved not only by the universal good apprehended by the reason, but also by good apprehended by sense. Wherefore he can be moved to some particular good independently of a passion of the sensitive appetite. For we will and do many things without passion, and through choice alone; as is most evident in those cases wherein reason resists passion. This one also came as a surprise - "we will and do many things without passion". This says either that I confuse sensitive with intellective appetites, or that I never resist passion. But this would be dumb to say the second one, because I change my passions - e.g. from fear to confidence, from sadness to hope, from dislike to fellow-feeling or even to admiration, from sensual affinities with other people - "sexual desire" sounds a little too dramatic and harlequin sounding, and moreover I am passionately moved with other people than men, such as finding a child "charming" or a granny or senior to be "wise" and "admirable" or another girl to be "considerate" "competent" "graceful" and none of these are wholly intellectual or wholly sensible, although generally I do mean attraction to men - at any rate, from those things to gratitude and quiet and attentiveness to them, from shame to humility to hope, from shame to humility to compassion. And this would be the work of reason - NO ACTUALLY - in re-reading, this would be the work of WILL which marshals the other powers (like a general directing subordinates towards their actions for the common cause) - although the degrees in which reason and passion predominate would be interesting - and sometimes there is room for more or less dispassionate judgment and maybe I am mistaking a kind of earnestness which is a kind of sobriety with passion - and maybe such a mistake is unavoidable inasmuch as perhaps intellective nad sensitive collide at some point. And there are many passions that I do not change, obviously, either because I do not have time to work them out, or I do not recognize in that moment that they need to be worked out - because passion is quintessentially "now" although it also concerns more - and thus I do not notice til later - and sometimes never do because we do not know ourselves so well - sometimes I confide myself to God instead - or I change them by repentance and hope - and in a way so far as it is impossible to know ourselves fully, although I think there must be degrees, confiding our whole selves to God repairs our inadequacies, and indeed confiding ourselves to God must be the end of knowing ourselves, so if we get stuck at the means instead of progressing through them it would be counter-productive.
I think the trouble here is also looking at the person as MECHANIZED - when I say "I change my passion" this is already a rationalist way of seeing it. And neither can I say that the two "collide" that is just giving up if you're thinking in terms of Aquinas - for Aquinas, they are distinct, that's the whole point of talking about them in the first place. Dialectic can be closing as much as opening - it's point shows you that there is something more, but what it seems to do in some cases is effectively silence what you can and should make distinct. Maybe not for Hegel but for people who are not Hegel, at least for me - he can do it because he's german and he does not forget all the distinctions. Anyway. that's dumb. The point is that we are not "overseers" of ourselves in the sense of standing apart, distant, operating on ourselves, adjusting variables so that we get this effect rather than that effect - this is essentially what "changing" or "modifying" passion would be. "Self-creation" and "self-modification" comes with a different understanding of nature and man's capacity to uncover and modify. There is something about the metaphysics of nature that I have to intuit - or not even - just to say that we are fundamentally moving in the middle voice - we are already on the way, moving and moved, and what "activity" is of this is already the movement - what we can "change" is the orientation -it is not that "reason is the slave of the passions' it is that "BECAUSE THE HUMAN BEING IS ONE THING" - He does say in the ad 2 above that cum in homine duae sint naturae, (TWO PRINCIPLES OF MOVMENET - thus) intellectualis scilicet et sensitiva, quandoque quidem est homo aliqualis uniformiter secundum totam animam, (Sometimes it is that some man (Note the double particularization - not just "sometimes" or "some men") is uniform with respect to the whole soul) quia scilicet vel pars sensitiva totaliter subiicitur rationi, sicut contingit in virtuosis; vel e converso ratio totaliter absorbetur a passione sicut accidit in amentibus ("Madmen" a precipitate translation - literally - "out of mind - ab mente" - can refer to temporary excitement, madness, franticness, distraction, foolish).
Hm. Two natures. Two principles of movement. "Quandoque" uniform, either badly or goodly - but "happens sometimes" with the virtuous that "uniform" in respect of whole soul - happens sometimes with temporary passionate-take-over.
But even if there are "two natures" there is still "one thing" even if it has one power more in potential and one more in act - still, the two powers are in the same thing, and there must be some kind of unity holding it together - it may be a "political" unity; it may be a "rational" unity; it may be a "passionate" unity. BUt one is always fundamentally moved. Reading "the will" showed me that - I guess I thought of the will as something that was more like intellect - more like "Hm. Something good" - in short, something that doesn't do much - just the intellect saying what's good. But when I see how active it is then I see how I confuse it with passion.
Take a look.
9.1 MOST INTERESTING _ the intellect is not absolutely the cause of the willl... but as formal principle.... - the good of other powers?
I answer that, A thing requires to be moved by something in so far as it is in potentiality to several things; for that which is in potentiality needs to be reduced to act by something actual; and to do this is to move. Now a power of the soul is seen to be in potentiality to different things in two ways: first, with regard to acting and not acting; secondly, with regard to this or that action. Thus the sight sometimes sees actually, and sometimes sees not: and sometimes it sees white, and sometimes black. It needs therefore a mover in two respects, viz. as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act. The first of these is on the part of the subject, which is sometimes acting, sometimes not acting: while the other is on the part of the object, by reason of which the act is specified. THIS IS PRECISELY WHAT I NEEDED - maybe he is only talking about sleep, but it must be possible for the will to be indifferent sometimes for some people - - and it depends what you mean by "active" will - - - how much is required.
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Question 1, Article 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end. And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will. For the end and perfection of every other power, is included under the object of the will as some particular good: and always the art or power to which the universal end belongs, moves to their acts the arts or powers to which belong the particular ends included in the universal end. Thus the leader of an army, who intends the common good--i.e. the order of the whole army--by his command moves one of the captains, who intends the order of one company.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
Objection 2. Further, the intellect in presenting the appetible object to the will, stands in relation to the will, as the imagination in representing the appetible will to the sensitive appetite. But the imagination, does not remove the sensitive appetite: indeed sometimes our imagination affects us no more than what is set before us in a picture, and moves us not at all (De Anima ii, 3). Therefore neither does the intellect move the will. Reply to Objection 2. Just as the imagination of a form without estimation of fitness or harmfulness, does not move the sensitive appetite; so neither does the apprehension of the true without the aspect of goodness and desirability. Hence it is not the speculative intellect that moves, but the practical intellect (De Anima iii, 9). (MAYBE THE ACTIVITY WOULD BE IN THE PRACTICAL INTELLECT THEN - ESTIMATING THIS TO BE A GOOD BECAUSE ONE HAS DONE THE NECESSARY MEDITATION/ REFLECTION)>Reply to Objection 3. The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act; since even the true itself which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good, as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; since the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true. It is therefore evident that the same is not mover and moved in the same respect.
At any rate you see that the intellect is only the formal principle of the will - what this means for me is that while it has an indispensable role in the "boring" activity which I assigned to it, that the will is not quite so boring - it regards the aim for which I also feel passionately.
In 9.3 he asks whether the will "moves itself" - or somebody does - whoever wrote the title. But in the body of the article we see that it moves itself as to means like intellect moves itself to conclusions - just like the intellect is something passive in a way - potential - but still requires "light" - what would be the parallel of the will? Truth - intellect what good - will - both are being - the second is what the will sees is good to be united to and sets oneself in motion towards it - this is not just passion- maybe the distinction between will and passion in this sense would be the ordering? Because you can tell what is deliberate by "preparation". Despite all my existentail quandaries, I haven't done much with my life - not much that would require a lot of deliberation - not much bad that is. The most deliberate things I have done with my life have been deciding to get educated and where and sticking to it. I also order my own finances. I haven't done a lot of other deliberative things - of course I am oversimplifying - but there is a difference between "deliberation" in everyday activities and the "deliberatin" that you are looking for in a court of law. We recognize degrees of significance in deliberation - because some things are necessary for all to achieve basic human goods - regardless whether these are further deliberately (or only implicitly) directed or not - that's not something we peer into usually.
At any rate, this deliberateness or ordering would seem to take it out of passion and into the will - and why? Is the reason brought to bear upon the end, or only upon the means? But in order to grasp things as means one must grasp the end - so yes, it would definitely be in the will by reason of being moved by an aim as aim - presented formally as something good.
OKAY here is my answer - where does the will start - or in other words, is it moved by an exterior principle? (Question 9.4)
I answer that, As far as the will is moved by the object, it is evident that it can be moved by something exterior. But in so far as it is moved in the exercise of its act (WHICH IS REALLY KIND OF WHAT I AM ASKING, AS WELL AS WHAT SORT OF OBJECT MAKES IT DISTINCT FROM OBJECT OF SENSITIVE APPETITE????? It must be a difficult distinction outside of words, because Aquinas identifies so many people making that mistake - stoics, platonists...)
, we must again hold it to be moved by some exterior principle. For everything that is at one time an agent actually, and at another time an agent in potentiality, needs to be moved by a mover. Now it is evident that the will begins to will something, whereas previously it did not will it. Therefore it must, of necessity, be moved by something to will it. And, indeed, it moves itself, as stated above (Article 3), in so far as through willing the end it reduces itself to the act of willing the means (only way it moves itself is with regard to means - and again - this is something that I wouldn't have immediately known to distinguish as the will but still assign to practical intellect - knowing is doing in that sense - and I included even passions as a kind of "art" because I looked at what would be most successful - not in general -but with me in particular - not even 'me as human being' because I wasn't sure what virtue would look like - all I knew was I had to work with "me" whether it be something that lasted a long time or that developed into something else - so it "made sense" intellectually to allow for other non-intellectual goods - which is why I couldn't undersatnd when someone said, "You know when you know you shouldn't do something but you do it anyway?" because I justified these things - even if not fully when I would feel guilty for being lazy or buying something unnecessary - the guilt was a remnant not only to humility but to improvement, but only insofar as I relaxed about the guilt and turned it into an openness to the possibility of being better on the one hand and a cause for confiding myself more readily to God in the other hand - which second option I am more interested in now - since I know help comes from God and that this is more good as an end to turn to God than the defects which prompt turning to God are bad - which draws away fascination and points one in the right direction - to the good - you know it's interesting what Paul says - "You who once were alientated and hostile in mind because of evil deeds he has now reconciled in his fleshly body through his death, to present you holy, without blemish, and irreproachable before him, provided that you persevere in the faith, firmly grounded, stable, and not shifting from the hope of the gospel that you heard, which has been preached to every creature under heaven - Cor. 1:21-23). Now it cannot do this without the aid of counsel: for when a man wills to be healed, he begins to reflect how this can be attained, and through this reflection he comes to the conclusion that he can be healed by a physician: and this he wills. But since he did not always actually will to have health, he must, of necessity, have begun, through something moving him, to will to be healed. And if the will moved itself to will this, it must, of necessity, have done this with the aid of counsel following some previous volition. But this process could not go on to infinity. Wherefore we must, of necessity, suppose that the will advanced to its first movement in virtue of the instigation of some exterior mover, as Aristotle concludes in a chapter of the Eudemian Ethics (vii, 14).
Without getting into the question of whether "violent" movement is possible to the will, Aquinas simply notes in the last article of this question that God alone could be the exterior mover of the willl insofar as the ensuing movement would be natural. This is interesting:
First, because the will is a power of the rational soul, which is caused by God alone, by creation, as was stated in the I, 90, 2. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that the will is ordained to the universal good. Wherefore nothing else can be the cause of the will, except God Himself, Who is the universal good: while every other good is good by participation, and is some particular good, and a particular cause does not give a universal inclination. Hence neither can primary matter, which is potentiality to all forms, be created by some particular agent.
Need to remind myself of the first article - which asks whether the intellect moves the will:
The motion of the subject itself is due to some agent. And since every agent acts for an end, as was shown above (Question 1, Article 2), the principle of this motion lies in the end. (...)
And hence it is that the art which is concerned with the end, by its command moves the art which is concerned with the means; just as the "art of sailing commands the art of shipbuilding" (Phys. ii, 2). AHA SO IT IS SIMILAR TO ARTS DIRECTED TO ENDS!!! Now good in general, which has the nature of an end, is the object of the will. Consequently, in this respect, the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts, for we make use of the other powers when we will.
On the other hand, the object moves, by determining the act, after the manner of a formal principle, whereby in natural things actions are specified, as heating by heat. Now the first formal principle is universal "being" and "truth," which is the object of the intellect. And therefore by this kind of motion the intellect moves the will, as presenting its object to it.
AND HERE IS HOW THE INTELLECT IS CAUSE - BY PRESENTING OBJECT - seems to be at the service of the will as much as the guidance of it - can't say one is absolutely nobler than the other although intellect is prior it seems, but not necessarily nobler on that account because of what will makes possible.
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back to ch. 9 art. 2 - whether the sensitive appetite moves?
Objection 3. Further, as is proved in Phys. viii, 5, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, in such a way that there be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, inasmuch as the sensitive appetite obeys the reason. Therefore the sensitive appetite does not move the will.
I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), that which is apprehended as good and fitting, moves the will by way of object. Now, that a thing appear to be good and fitting, happens from two causes: namely, from the condition, either of the thing proposed, or of the one to whom it is proposed. For fitness is spoken of by way of relation; hence it depends on both extremes. And hence it is that taste, according as it is variously disposed, takes to a thing in various ways, as being fitting or unfitting. Wherefore as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 5): "According as a man is, such does the end seem to him." Now it is evident that according to a passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to a certain disposition. Wherefore according as man is affected by a passion, something seems to him fitting, which does not seem so when he is not so affected: thus that seems good to a man when angered, which does not seem good when he is calm. And in this way, the sensitive appetite moves the will, on the part of the object.
Reply to Objection 3. As the Philosopher says (Polit. i, 2), the reason, in which resides the will, moves, by its command, the irascible and concupiscible powers, not, indeed, "by a despotic sovereignty," as a slave is moved by his master, but by a "royal and politic sovereignty," as free men are ruled by their governor, and can nevertheless act counter to his commands. Hence both irascible and concupiscible can move counter to the will: and accordingly nothing hinders the will from being moved by them at times.Here's my question. Does the distinction between "antecedent" and "consequent" passion suffice? Because passion can be the result of will - as being so intent that it affects one's whole being and disposition - shows the completeness of the willing in that sense. And passion that is the result of willing something is also a kind of disposition. Would the point be that then the disposition would be moderated by the real object? Ideally and quite possibly. But there is also the per accidens possibility that along the way the disposition of the passion would incline one to unwise things? Only if the willing was replaced instead of buttressed by passion - perhaps - if passion increases because of a representation or aggravation so that it takes more weight rather than less - and still increased passion in and of itself need not be entirely out of the purview of reason - in this way continence is understood to be a virtue - intense passion does not leave us wholly victims - reason is still at work in resistance (this is also where I was formerly confused because I thought so many times that the "virtuous" person had a sensitive appetite that was perfectly "well-behaved" - that he/she didn't have to be "continent" - this is a confusion - virtue is about less need for continence, irascibility, resistance, maintenance perhaps, but not about no need for the said thing - particularly because as one's capacities increase, so also can one's field of activity and objects which are accordingly equal to challenge him/her? Or vicissitudes of life - these kinds of htings can wear and tear away at you - I keep on forgetting that I am not a child - that the unbounded carefreeness gives way to something different in adulthood - it is neither so existential and neither so light as I have made it out to be on varying occasions). "Anyhoo", as my friend says. The whole point of this is to find out whether love is the cause of everything that the lover does, whether love is the cause of sorrow, and yet Aquinas goes for things in this order as being the cause of sorrow: "present evil, desire for good, craving for unity, irresistible power". "Desire" as opposed to "love" would be something more intense - it is already concerned with the movement - and why? Because of the particular nature of sorrow, which concerns an obstruction (and not a difficult obstruction - just "an obstruction" - not even an "easy" one because sorrow doesn't know whether it is easy or hard - just that it is there - and because it is there already it does have the notion of irresistible - and aquinas does say the irascible ends in the concupiscible - there is something of "rest" in sadness which I revolted against because it sounds so counter-intuitive - sorrow is about misery which is separated - distinct with respect to itself - opposed to itself - to its desire becuase of something beyond its control - it is the last thing approaching "rest" I would ever dream of - but it is a "rest" - it is the "rest" of someone laying down to die - becuase it is "rest" there is something of that attractive thing like "laying down to die" - yielding - you do not hurt if you do not resist. But at the same time sorrow is not yielding - it is fatigue because if it were really yielding it would be pleasure, like the person laying down to die probably before disappearing feels some relief in non-resistance. But there is a way of it being impossible to yield as long as you are still there - pain will always be pain - you are corrupted otherwise - whether changed for the better (and not really corrupted but perfected which Aristotle finds so hard to consider as being "changed" but Aquinas doesn't) or changed for the worst. And if sorrow is a fatigue but not a yielding - as it appears to be in Aquinas - as he explicitly says that it is resistance because if it were yielding it would be pleasure, then my analogy doesn't apply - I am still thinking of "rest" as "pleasure" which is a good and rational thing - but why 'rest' in something when you are not at rest? You can slump to the ground which is different from "laying down" to die. Look at 300- the movie. At the end, Xerxes or whatever his name is demands from Leonidas (offering great terms - except for the submission to him) - Leonidas falls to the ground - I think the narrator talks about him being "weary" - his shield was heavy, he was tired, it's all very dramatic. And you think, "gee, whiz, Leonidas - not now!" although you kind of want him to be saved at the same time but don't want him to submit. And then he yells for a guy behind him to kill the guy in front and you see that all his shedding of excess armor and stuff was simply to enable him to make the final dash against Xerxes - it was the rest enabling him to get up with the last defiance. This would be the "resistance" aspect of sorrow - which in resting still maintains itself - and even maintains itself possibly with a conscious, latent readiness for another spring. Where sorrow comes in as something harmful is not as a fundamental posture of the appetite (it can be not only a useful good but a bonum honestum for Aquinas) is in its implications and effects. It's implication is that something is not good. Its effects (per se, of course) are a weighing down of the soul, fatigue - because it is more central to sorrow that one is resting than that one is resting in readiness for the spring - it of itself does not have that intelligibility attached to it for Aquinas. It is reduced to resistance, fuga, weighting. The fuga is the useful - sometimes the impossibility of flight with the existence of the weight - the irresistble makes it something perverse and twisted - not on the part of the one suffering but on the part of the unfortunate situation he or she is in. It is in this volatile situation of goodness and bad situations that we must work. This is why it was hard for me to see love as the fundmental motivation. I have been disposed to sorrow for a signifcant portion of my life (it is not hard to be anything for a significant portion of my life at my age) - for a number of reasons. And after a while, the love which is fundamentally moving you loses its significance or primacy of place to that which is afflicting you or that distant thing you are hoping for - desire is certainly more present than love. But that order - of present evil, desire, craving for unity, irresistible power - most interesting. But I'll return to this.