love as matrix

Question 25 (skipped 24)
The order of the passions among themselves
1. Are the irascible prior to the concupiscible or “e converso”?
a) The order of the passions is according to the order of objects. But the object of the irascible (appetite) is the arduous good, which seems to be supreme among other goods. Therefore the irascible passions seems to “pre-be” praeesse the concupiscible passions.
2. A mover is prior to the movd - but the irascible passions are compared to the concupiscible as moving to moved, for this is given to animals, s that they might bremove impediments which prohibit the concupiscible from enjoying its object, as was said above; now removing something prohibiting has the ratio of something moving, as was said in 8 Physics. Therefore the irascible passions are prior to the concupiscible passions.
3. Joy and sadness are concupscible passion. But joy and sadness follow upon the irascible passions - Ethi- “punishment quiets the impetus of wrath, making delight in the place of sadness. Therefore the concupsicible passions are posterior to the irascible passions.
Sed contra- the concupiscible passions regard good absolutely; but the irascible passions regard a contracted good (I.e. the difficult) Now since the good simply is prior to the contracted one, it seems the concupiscible passions hold themselves to more than the irascible ones.
Resp. - The concupiscible passions hold themselves to more things than the irascible ones. For in the concupsicible passions there is found something pertaining to motion, as desire, and something pertaining to rest, as joy (gaudium) and sadness (tristitia). But in the irascible passions there is not found anything pertaining to rest, but only to motion. Now of this ratio is because that in which something already rests, does not have the ratio of the difficult or arduous, which is the object of the irascible.
Now since rest is the ned of motion, it is prior in intention, but posterior in execution. If therefore the irascible passions are compared to the concupisicble passions which signify rest in good, manifestly the irascible passions precede the concupsicible passions in order of execustion, as hope precedes joy, whence it causes it, accrding to the Apostle “rejoicing by means of hope” But the concupisicble passion imports some rest in evil, as tristitia, is the medium between two irascible passions. For it folows fear; for since what occurs what something was feared, causes sadness. Now it precedes the motion of wrath, because since out of tristita something precedes which rises up in vengenace, this pertains to the motion of wrath. And because to weigh out the exchange of evil, is apprehended as something good, with the angered having followed, one rejoices. And so it is clear that every irascible passion terminates in a concupsiible passion pertaining to rest, whether to joy or to sadness. But if the irascible passions are compared to the concupiscible passions which importat motion, so manifestly the concupsicible passions prior, because the irascible passions add something beyond the concupiscible passions; as the object of the irascible adds to the concupiscible object arduousness or difficulty. For hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain lifting up of the soul towards folowing the arduous good. And similarly fear adds beyond flight or abomination a ceratin depression of the soul on account of the difficulty of the evil (REMINDS ME OF ANXIETY).
So therefore the irascible passions are mediate between the concupiscible passions which import motion towards good or evil, and among the concupiscible passions which import rest in good or in evil. And so it is clear that the passion of the irascible have their principle from the passions of the concupiscible, and are terminated in the concupiscible passions.
1) That reason would work if the ratio of the concupisicble object were something opposed ot the arduous, as from the ratio of the irascible object is that which is hard. But because the object of the conc. Is good absolutely, it is naturally prior to the irascible object, as common to the proper.
2) Removing the prohibiting is not moving per se but per acciens.





2. IS LOVE THE FIRST OF THE CONCUPISCIBLE PASSIONS?Seems that it is not -
a) concupsicible power is named from concupiscence, which is the same as desire. But the name is from the most powerful, as said in De anima.
b) Love imports a certain union; for it is a “unitive and conrecrete power” as Dionysius says. But concupiscence or desire is a motion towards union with the concuped or desired thing. Ergo conc. Is preior to amore.
c) Cause is prior to the efect. But delight is sometimes the cause of love; for some love because of delight. Ergo delectatio est prior
Sed cotnra - Augustine - all the passions are caused by love; for “love” is to have coveting for what is loved is cupidity, but having it and enjoying it, is rejoicing. Ergo love is the first passion fo the concupiscile.
Respondeo:
The obejct of the concupiscible are good and bad. Naturally good is prior to bad; because bad is the privaiton of good. Whence and eveyr passion of which the object is good, is naturally prior to the passions of which the object is evil, one together with the opposed passion; for because good is sought, thereore the opposed evil is refuted/refused?
Now the good has the ratio of an end, which certainly I prior in intention, but posterior in execution. Therefore the order of the concupiscible passions can be stretched according to intention, or according to consecution. According to consequetion, what is prior because it is first in that it tends to the end. Now it is clear that everything that tends to some end, first has an aptitude or proportion to the end, for nothing tends to the unproportioned end; secondly it is moved to the end; thirdly, it rests in the end after its consectuion.
Now that aptitude or proportion of the appetitie to good is love, which is nothing other than complacency in the good; for motion to the good is desire or concupiscence; but rest in the good is joy or delight. And therefore according to this order love precedes desire, and desire precedes dleight. But according to the order of intention it is the convverse; for delight tended ccauses desire and lve. For delight is fruition, which in some way is the end as itself good, as was said above.
Reply to Objection 1. We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
Reply to Objection 2. The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.

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III - HOPESince then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end; it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation. And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly; whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were. In like manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring: because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming. Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.
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Article 4. Whether these are the four principal passions: joy, sadness, hope and fear?
Objection 1. It would seem that joy, sadness, hope and fear are not the four principal passions. For Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 3,[7 sqq.) omits hope and puts desire in its place.
Objection 2. Further, there is a twofold order in the passions of the soul: the order of intention, and the order of execution or generation. The principal passions should therefore be taken, either in the order of intention; and thus joy and sadness, which are the final passions, will be the principal passions; or in the order of execution or generation, and thus love will be the principal passion. Therefore joy and sadness, hope and fear should in no way be called the four principal passions.
Objection 3. Further, just as daring is caused by hope, so fear is caused by despair. Either, therefore, hope and despair should be reckoned as principal passions, since they cause others: or hope and daring, from being akin to one another.
On the contrary, Boethius (De Consol. i) in enumerating the four principal passions, says: "Banish joys: banish fears: Away with hope: away with tears."
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Reply to Objection 1. Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.
Reply to Objection 2. These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion. And though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future. Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger: yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply to Objection 3).
Reply to Objection 3. Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental: and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental. Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal. And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring.