Correction

This is wrong - I don't need this stuff - Aquinas does his own things with intensio in the prima and secunda secundae - I'm working within the logic of the text primarily - and without making too specific or conclusionary claims - I can point at the flexibility of the concept and the contexts in which it is used.



Original title: Intensio stuff i need to get my hands on



ottawa u biblio - check - I'm pretty sure they have viviarium

Oresme on Intension and Remission of Qualities in His Commentary on Aristotle's PhysicsS Kirschner - Vivarium, 2000 - ingentaconnect.com
Source: Vivarium, Volume 38, Number 2, 2000 , pp. 255-274(20)


[CITATION] Intention: Outlines for the History of a Phenomenological ConceptK Hedwig - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1979 - JSTOR
NOT SURE if this includes "intensio"

http://www.jstor.org/pss/2106490
this one mentions it. doesn't seem to accord alot of importance to 'intensio' as I do.

A note on intensio/remissio formarum
http://hdl.handle.net/2042/3418


Abstract
« Intensio caritatis » and William of Auxerre’s geometry about infinity
The influence of mathematics on medieval theology seems to be found first, and most importantly, in England, particularly among fourteenth-century scholars. However, there is an earlier example in the theologian William of Auxerre, who also sought mathematical support for the discussions of the idea of Infinity. His influence can be seen in a recently-discovered manuscript by an anonymous inspired by William’s example. William develops a geometrical reasoning relying upon the disproportion between the acute angle and the right angle which suggests the incommensurability (improportionalitas) of Charity. This concept allows a further step which rejects Peter the Lombard’s theory identifying Charity with the presence of God in the human soul.
http://rhr.revues.org/document6853.html


Lo strano caso dell'intensio e la storia della logica medievale
http://www.francoangeli.it/Riviste/Scheda_Riviste.asp?IDarticolo=11243
Titolo Rivista: RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA
Autori o Curatori: Dino Buzzzetti
Anno di pubblicazione: 1996 Fascicolo: 1

title - salutati and contemporary physics
http://www.jstor.org/pss/2708694

Salutati and Contemporary Physics
Ronald G. Witt
Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Oct. - Dec., 1977), pp. 667-672 (article consists of 6 pages)
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press

FUNDAMENTAL ELEMENTS OF PASSION as seen through "sorrow" treatise

WAIT - working with general passions first.
22.1
reception/reception with loss (intensio et remissio)
art. 2 - more appetitive than apprehensive
art. 3 - sensitive more than intellectual
___
23. 1 - conc. and irasc.
23.2 - not of "good and bad" but "simple and hard"
23.3 - anger has no contrary
23.4 - some passions spec. different but not contrary - 3fold form given to passionate subject - connaturality, movement, rest.
____
24.1 - can be moral good and evil - insofar as subject/somehow partaking in reason
24.2 - passions not evil of themselves - cites apparent dif. betw. Stoics and Peripatetics - claims to be a matter of "words"
24.3 - influence upon morality - both for the bad and for the good - can decrease goodness, mitigate or increase badness, but also pertains to "perfection" of man with regard to their being subject to reason.
24.4 - passions can't be "good" or "bad" in their "natural genus" and yet, of their "moral genus" specific passions - considered as subject to reason and will - and some are good/bad of their species depending on their object - e.g. another's good, another's evil, one's good, one's evil - (he uses "envy" and "shame" here which is interesting because he used "mercy" and "modesty" in the sed contra - the good versions and the bad versions : )
________
25.1 - Conc. precedes irasc because regards good absolutely (interesting in light of discussions about the superiority of irascible passions - prefigured in obj. 1 - the 'difficult good' being more excellent - reply is that the object of the conc. good is not contrary to the arduous good)
25.2 - Love the chief of the conc. passions? Here I found it necessary to include a whole excerpt:
Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution. In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end. Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it. And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure. Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (11, 3, ad 3).
25.3 talks about IRASCIBLE - order of intention (without mentioned explicitly) and execution (specifically) - in which anger is last. Also important:
And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.
25.4 the four chief passions: (ones that will be dealing with the most and as such would require the most correction/honing/therapy inasmuch as this would be necessary depending on their nature)
I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5. Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear. Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
SORROW
art. 1
conjunctio +perceptio conjunctionis
art. 2
interior/exterior apprehension
art. 3/4 - relations/contrarieties w/ pleasure
art. 5 - relations w/ contemplation
art. 6 - whether to be evaded more than pleasures pursued
art. 7 - interior pain greater than outward
art. 8 - only four species - on basis of "something additional"
____
36.1 - caused by presence of evil more than loss of good - from the pov of appetite - the 1st
36.2 - desire cause of sorrow
3 - craving for unity
4 - irresistible power (keeping a thing from pursuing its inclination) - the IMPEDIMENT shows that it is irresistible (question for therapy is that what part is it irresistible to and how to strengthen that part?)
_____
37.1 - deprives/modifies power to learn - or even to remember
2 - "burdens" the soul
3 - weakens all activity except accidentally the kind that would remove sorrow
4 - most harmful of all the passions - other passions derive their harmfulness from being associated with sorrow.
_______
remedies
38.1 - EVERY pleasure
2 - weeping
3 - friends' sympathy (provides and is skeptical of one theory analogous to lifting or distributing burden) more confident about "percipere amorem" for himself.
4 - contemplation of truth (can soothe and even utterly overpower by its redundancy - martyr walking on coals better off than Augustine with his toothache)
5 - Sleep and baths (restoring natural mvmt) (direct approach) - also indirect approach - this disposition is furthermore itself a cause of pleasure (ad 1)
_________________
Damn, can't believe I forgot about the last section!
q. 39
Is all sorrow evil? - yes, but on supposition, it might good "on supposition" and what is good "on some supposition" can be considered as good - note the wary approach - and yet the outcome that yes, it must be good. (also bring in convenient - as it seems to the appetite that one should mourn something that should be mourned).
Can sorrow be a virtuous good? (if it can be good, it can be a virtuous good).
Can it be a useful good? - useful as it induces us to avoid not only evil, but occasions of evil. (also see other articles from ohter questions where it can accidentally improve some kinds of activity and also that in some cases sorrow for something may cause it to be shunned - no this doesn't fall under the 'useful' really but the negative defensive)
Is bodily pain the greatest evil? - can't be as bad as not knowing that evil is evil. Also if the evil isn't evil but good, it would be worse not to be connected to the good.

On unity

My friends were wrong - in view of the overall unity - in view of the very unity by which i do not conceive myself to be separated from God or from contemplation when I am among other activities, so I am not necessarily cut off from others and from God when I take time out to contemplate. See here:

Reply to Objection 2. There is nothing to prevent a thing which in one way is divided, from being another way undivided; as what is divided in number, may be undivided in species; thus it may be that a thing is in one way "one," and in another way "many." Still, if it is absolutely undivided, either because it is so according to what belongs to its essence, though it may be divided as regards what is outside its essence, as what is one in subject may have many accidents; or because it is undivided actually, and divided potentially, as what is "one" in the whole, and is "many" in parts; in such a case a thing will be "one" absolutely and "many" accidentally. On the other hand, if it be undivided accidentally, and divided absolutely, as if it were divided in essence and undivided in idea or in principle or cause, it will be "many" absolutely and "one" accidentally; as what are "many" in number and "one" in species or "one" in principle. Hence in that way, being is divided by "one" and by "many"; as it were by "one" absolutely and by "many" accidentally. For multitude itself would not be contained under "being," unless it were in some way contained under "one." Thus Dionysius says (Div. Nom. cap. ult.) that "there is no kind of multitude that is not in a way one. But what are many in their parts, are one in their whole; and what are many in accidents, are one in subject; and what are many in number, are one in species; and what are many in species, are one in genus; and what are many in processions, are one in principle."

Unity can exist without every kind of accidental materially participation.

On starting

I know now that I have been working too long in metaphysics for my topic. I was fortunately brought back to earth from my increasing metaphysical alienation from passion. The metaphysics is necessary to understand passion - but only so much of it is convenient with an entry into the description, the interpretation, the hermeneutics of passion.

Notes from Dewan's text

Form as something divine..

p. 12
T.A. is not innovating, then, with his teaching that form is something divine in things. ARistotle was there before him. We read in Thomas's paraphrasing commentary:

... form is something divine and best, an object of appetite. It is divine, because every form is something of a participation by likeness of hte divine act of being (divini esse), which (divine act of being) is pure act: for, each thing just to this extent is actually (est in actu), that is, inasmuch as it has form. IT is something best, because act is the perfection of potency and its good; and consequently it follows that it is an object of appetite, because each thing has appetite for its own perfection (ftnt 9).

p. 24
Aristotle carefully distinguishes betw. the level of actuality which we generally call "being," and the level we call "operation".

(...)
The principle fo the living thing as a whole is the soul. It is hwat makes the whole thing unqualifiedly "one". It is the
(p. 25)
principle of being. It is thus a cause in the mode of "form". (ftnt 51) This doctrine is at one with the carefully worked out conception of substantial form in material substances, presented by Aristotle in Metaphysics 7 and 8; the form we encounter there is not the entire esence of the thing, though it is the principle of hte essence. THe essence, signified by the definition, i s a composite of form and matter, taken universally. In other words, the form, though a principle of intelligibility, is here necssarily understood as the perfection of matter. This pertains to the doctrine of the being htat belongs to generable and corruptible things. It is here that Aristotle improves on Plato, the Plato of hte Itimaeus, as we shall see next (...)

Notes - participation in aquinas

p. 66
"In spite of the influential "existentialist" interpreatiion of Thomas, in De ente 'being' signifies that whihc has an essence. Further on in De ente Thoma argues that in all created things the essence differs from their being (esse). But it is striking that, throughout the entire treatise, no word is spoken about participation with respect to the essence-esse distinction. As I said beofre, from the beginning of his career Thomas employs the Dionysian vocabulary of participation, especialy in the Scriptum, but apparently without having integrated it into his own thought. In De ente the composite structure of finite reality is conceived and account for without the idea of participation.

p. 67
In the De veritate 21 an important step is taken when Thomas, in order ot uphold participation fo the essential goodness of things, applies participation to their being (eses). Every creature is good by participation, just as it is a being by participation. That a creature has being by participation imp[lies the disticntion between essence and esse (Cf. qudlbt II. q. 2, a. I "Quandocumque autem aliquid praedicantur de altero per participationem, oportet ibi aliquid esse praeter id quod participatur; est ideo in qualibet creatura est aliud ipsa creatura quae habet esse, et ipsum esse eius."
It is important to observe tha the reverse does not ncesarily hold: the distinction of essence and esse does not necessarily imply that their relation is concevied of in terms of participation.

It seems very likely that Thomas's motive for using hte expression 'esse participatum' in V 21.5 lies in the parallel with the good. For the sake of the convertibilit of being with the ogod, the esse of a thing, in which the essential goodness has its formal ground, must be located outside the essence and must belong to it by particpation. It can therefore be asked whether the application of participation with respect to the distinction of essence and esse is justified on intrinic grounds in this text. In other words, is this distinction already understood here as a relation of hte particular and the universal, which is, after all, implied by the logic of particiaptoin? In this chapter I will argue that this is not the case. In my opinion, the De veritate text still betrays the influence of Avicenna's essentialism, acc. to which theessence in its logical self-containment is prior to and presupposed by its mode of real existence.

If the Boethian discussion of ht egood drew Thomas's attenito to the participational structure of created being, the development wtowards a more intrinsic grounding of the essential goodness in the esse of things (see the previous chapter) may have influenced the increasing emphasis on esse asuniversal perfection. In the summa text we ahve discussed (1,5) being is expressly conceived of in terms of act and perfeciton. And it may be clear that it is against the background of esse as universal perfection (eprfectio omnium perfectionum) that the idea of participation acquires its true metaphsyical significane in Aquinas.

De raeymaker, among others, showed that a certain develop-
(68)
ment took place in Thomas's conception of being (ftnt - See for instance "Le'tre selon Avicenna et selon S. Thomas d'Aquin" in Avicenna Commemoration Volume, Calcutta 1954, pp. 119-131, and "La profonde originalite de la metaphysique de Saint THomas d'Aqiuin," in : Die Metaphysik in Mittelalter (hrsg. P. Wilpert), Berlin 1963, pp. 14029. For an accotnu of De Raeymaker's interpretaiton, see A. Keller, Sein oder Existenz? pp. 212-220) His claim was that intially, in ihs earlywritings, Thomas was still largely indebted to Avicenna's view of esse as "acidnetal" to the essence. Gradualy he moved away form Avicenna's essentialism towards a true metaphysics of being, in which primacy is assigned to esse as act of the essence. An important step in this direcion, acc. to De Raeymaker, was the application of the notions of act and potency to the relation of esse and essence. This approach is found in Aquinas from the very outset, but gradually gains in significance and eventually leads to a reversal in the relationship of essence and esse. For once the essence is viewed as potency in relation to its esse, the essence can no longer be regarded, with Avicenna, as something absolute contained within its logical limits, which as such is indifferent to its mode of particular existence in relaity. As potency the essence is unthinkable outside its relation to the act of being; although it can be considered according to its ratio speciei without any reference to actual existence, the essence as such is not neutral with respect to the act of being; it is the specific determination of being.

platonic trad in mid ages

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7640176.stm
p. 305 - exitus and reditus
rediens ad essentiam suam reditione completa

p. 323
Louis-B Geiger in his groundbreaking "La participation dans la philosophie de St. Thomas d'Aquin" treats recipere as a synonym of participere. In giving examples, Geiger noted those which make particpation according to the mode of the participant a form of creation. (213) He noted that the Scholastics have in the law "Quidquid recipitur ad modem recipientis recipitur," "la loi fundamentale du devenir cosmique". A crucial reference for such an understanding of creation as the various modes of reception of the one First Principle is Thomas "De in divinis nominibus" the initial lecture of ch. 5, a chapter to which we have referred before. There we find that creation can be treated as "esse receptum et participatum" of the one "ipsum esse subsistens" because "all form received in another is limited and bound according to the capacity of the receiver."

I was wondering how I was going to cite the principle found when he treats of knowledge, of form being "constricted" by matter.

medieval visual images plato beginning p. 399

Biblio info:
The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A Doxographic Approach
By Stephen Gersh, University of Notre Dame Medieval Institute, M. J. F. M. Hoenen
Contributor Stephen Gersh, M. J. F. M. Hoenen
Published by Walter de Gruyter, 2002
ISBN 3110168448, 9783110168440
466 pages

Relevant Pieces from O'Rourke

"From chapter 4 - Aquinas: being, non-being, and the good" start p. 85)

"To Aristotle's well-known prhase, 'the Good is what all things desire', Aquinas adds valuable insight and elaboration. He begins with a remark which is important for the entire treatment, namely, that 'the good' is a notion which is ultimate or primary in itself. It is interesting that even within this context Aquinas allowed this as a reason whyt he Platonists could hold that the good is prior to being; he states summarily, however, that they are more properly convertible. Goodness, along with being, is one of those fundamental characteristics which cannot be analysed in to concepts anterior to itself. It cannot be reduced to elements which are simpler or more ultimate however, it becomes manifest through the things which derive from it, as a cause is revealed by its effects. Since the effect proper to the good is that it moves the appetite or will, this is how it may be desribed. The good is thus defined as that which all things desire. (In ethicorum, 1, 1, 9: considerandum est, quod bonum numeratur inter prima: adeo quod secundum Platonicos, bonum est prius ente. Sed secundum rei veritatem bonum cum ente convertitur. Prima autem non possunt notificari per aliqua priora, sed notificantur per posteriora, sicut causae per proprios effectus. Cum autem bonum proprie sit motivum appetitus, describitur bonum per motum appetitus, sicut solet manifestari vis motiva per motum. Et ideo dicit, quod philosophi bene enunciaverunt, bonum esse id quod omnia appetunt.

Desirability, however, is a consequence or result of goodness. To describe the good as that to which all things tend, Aquinas notes, is to indicate by means of a characteristic the presence of goodness rather than disclose its essence or ground. Aquinas' definition indicates what we may term the 'phenomenological' content of goodness - its (86)
manifestation to the desiring subject - but does not pentrate tot hat which fundamentally constitutes it as such. In Plotinus' phrase: 'The good must be desired; but it is not good because it is desirable, it is desirable because it is good.' (enneads, vi, 7, 25). It is thus necessary to go beyond the ratio boni which allows us to recgonize goodness, to the natura boni, its ontological ground (cit - joseph de finance - connaissance de l'etre pp 161-2) (sounds kinda weird to me). In question 5 of the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas gives suhc a foundation to goodnes by indicating its identity with being, more exactly with being conceived as actuality.

(points out that they differ according to their ratio - goodness signifies somethings relation to the will and denotes being as desirable - adds the charactr of appetitbility)

"Seeking the ground of perfection as such, Aquinas in turn states that anything is perfect only in so far as it is in act (ST 1, 5, 1 "Intantum est perfectum unumquodque inquantum est actu"),(...)
That which is in potency is lacking perfection (same question ad 1)

Another cite - p. 89
"To undersatnd why God is named as good, it should be considered that the Platonists, not distingusiheing matter from privation, placed it in the order of non-being, as Aristotle states in Physics I (i, ix, 192a). Now the causality of being extends only to the things which are (entia). Thus according to the Platonists, the causality of being did not extend to prime matter, to which, on the contrary, the causality of hte good extends. A sign of this is that prime matter most of all seeks the good. It is indeed proper to an effect to turn through desire towards its cause. Thus the Good is a more univesral and supreme cause than Being, since its causality extneds to more things. (III, 226. See In de Causis, IV, 101 - causa autem prima est latior, quia extendit etiam ad non-entia. In de causeis, lect. IV, prop XXI, 724b: Materia non participat ens, sed tamen participat bono."

p. 90
According to the Platonist viewpoint, the more general something is, the more they posited it as separate - as something prior, participated by posterior things, and therefore as cause of the posterior. In the order of those things which are affirmed most generally they placed the one and the good, which are more general even than being, since the good or the one is predicated of that of which being is not predicated, namely prime matter which Plato classed with non-being, not distinguishing between matter and privation, as is stated in Physics I; yet he attributed unity and goodness to matter, insofar as it is ordained to form. The good is spoken not only of hte end, but of htat which is ordered towards end. (25 - In de causis - iv, 98. Secundum positiones platonicas... quanto aliquid est communius, etc.)

Aquinas attributs the Platonist identification of matter with non-being to Plato's failure to distinguish netween matter and privation (see also ST1, 5, 2 ad 1 and In DN, IV, ii, 295). The concept of privation is indispensable for an understanding of hte material world. Plato had already made the distinction between matter and form, thereby correcting, as Aquinas notes, (IV, ii. 295) the ivew of the nacients that matter was the sole princple of movmenet in the corporeal world. He failed, however, to discover the third princple of material being which is necessary to explain the process of becoming, namely, steresis, i.e., the privation of form. Aristotle's concept of privation allows matter to be viewed as potency towards form arather than as simple non-being. Matter never exists without form; form is the co-principle together with which it alone receives existence. Yet, informed by a specific determination, it is not of necessity restricted for once and forever to that particular form. Determined by a single form it excludes nad is deprived of all others; these are, however, not totally beyond the bounds of oits xistence: they are not excluded to the very limits of absolute non-being but reside to a greater or lesser degree within its potential resources.

p. 91
Thus for aristotle too, matter is also associated with privation, but is not identical with privation.
(...)
quote form tomas
'Because everything which is caused turns through desire twoards its cause, prime mater desires the Good; since desire is but the disposition of a being towards the actualisation of what it is deprived of (prviatio et ordo ipsius ad actum') - (IV, ii. 296 - in causis - or maybe its dio?)

92 - Tom writes FORMA est quoddam divinum et optimum et appetibile. (..) Form is good becuase it is the perfection of potency, and therefore desirable since each thing desires its perfection (In Physic. i. 7).
Later he remarks that natural desire is nothing other than the disposition of beings towards their end in accordance with their nature.
p. 93 ftnt 36
citation concerning de veritate 3, 5, ad 1 - matter and a debile esse. don't know if this is relevant at all.

p. 95 cmmntry on dvn names - opening prgh ch. 5 - aquinas - "quia bonum quodammodo ad plura se extendit, ut platonici dixerunt" - and he adds 'For that also which does not exist in act, but is being in potency, b/c it is ordained towards the good (96) has, from this very fact, the nature of goodness; but it participates in the causality of being only when it becomes actual being (V, i, 616 see also VII, i, 697: Bonum autem, sec. quod prius dictum est, quantum ad causalitatem est prius quam ens, quia bonum etiam ad non entia suam causalitatem extendit.
(...)
"the name of the Good... extens both to things which exist as well ast o things which do not exist, in so far as non-beings have something of hte good acc. as they are in potency to being.' (V, i, 610). Her - "the name Goodness epxresses the complete and univesral providence of God, whereas 'Being' denotes only a determinate effect.' - v, i, 613.
p. 96
Talking about the angels.
"Aquinas claims to discern in Dio. the view that goodness is foud in creatures in wo ways, namely 'according to an actual participation of the good or through a disposition towards the good.' This, suggest, Aquinas, is in acc. with Dio's fundmanetal principle that the Good also extends to what is not actually in being. (V, i, 616 - bonum se extendit etiam ad non-ens actu). Angels thus more perfectly ordered to goodness thru a certain 'appropinquatio' towards it.

p. 97
"Esse igitur actu boni rationem constituit... naturaliter enim bonum uniuscuiusque est actus est perfectio eius. (SCG, I, 37) "esse enim actu in unoquoque est bonum ipsius (SCG 1, 38).

WAIT A MINUTE - it IS APPROPRIATE to be workign with the "one" and the "good" - Aquinas does not ask wehther the "desire for being" or "craving for being" is a cuase of sorrow - nor of joy - it comes in as the good - check if there is a corresponding presence of "unity" in the pleasure

Another citation - p. 98
"Since the essecne of good consists in this, that someting be perfective of another in the manner of an end, everything which has hte character of an end also has the nature of goodness. Now two things belong to the nature of end;: it must be sought or desired by things which have not yet attained the end, and loved by the things which share the end, as something whihc is lovable. For it is essentially the same to tend towards an end and in some way to repose in it (just as it is by one and the same nature that a stone moves towards the centre and rests there) Now these two properties (tendency and rest) are foudn to belong to the very act of being (ipsum esse). For those things which do not yet participate in the act of being tend towards it by a certain natural appetite. In this way matter tends to form, according to hte PHilosopher in Physics I. But all things which already have existence, however, naturally love that existence and preserve it with all their power... The act of existing itself has the nature of a good. Thus, just as it is impossible that there be any being which does not have existence, so too it is necessary that every being be good from the very fact that it has existence, although in certain beings many aspects of goodness are added over and above the act of being whereby they subsist. (DE VERITATE - 21, 2)

'Nor is this prevented by the fact that all things have existence, since whatever has being desires its continuance, and what has beng actually in one way only has it potentially in another... and thus what does not have being in act desires to be actually." (DV 22 1 ad 4)

Omnibus delectabile est esse (DV 22 1 ad 7)

'Every action and movmenet are seen to be ordered in some way toward being (esse), either that it (99) may be preserved in teh species or in the individual, or that it may be newly acquired. Now, the act of being is itself good, and so all things desire to be. Therefore, every action and movement are for the sake of the good.'_ (SCG 3, 3, 1881).

99
'The more that potentiality is achieved and brought closer to act, the more vigorous is the inclination which it causes. THis is why anuy natural motion is intensified near the end when the thing tending to the end is more like that end.' (DV 22, 1, ad 3)

One thing I will have to do is find a real appropriate timeline of Aquinas' works. What I think I 'll end up doing is focusing only on the Summa for my text - staying within Aquinas' pedagogy there - assuming that his thought did not develop from one section to the other - I think the Summa is sufficient in itself for my undertaking. I don't want to make a 'system' of Aquinas -or everything else I read about him I can find the inchoate or more rounded and aged and more friendly presentations in the Summa.

p. 100 - question whether being or good is primary - (ST - 1, 5, 2; also DV 21, 2)

p. 100
"Being is divided by act and potency. Now, act as such is good, for something is perfect acc. as it is in act. Potency too is a good thing, for potency tends towards act, as is clear in every change; potency is proportionate to act and belongs in the same genus wiht act; privation does not belong to it, except accidnetally. So eerything which exists, whatever its mode of existence, is good inasmuch as it is a being. (SCG, 3, 7 1917)

DV 21, 2 - causal priority of goodness.
p. 101
"goodness, on the other hand, while it is not predicated of things hwic do not exist, extends its causality to them inasmuch as through desire they fall under its influnece." Cites DV 21, 2 ad 2.
Aquinas thus concedes that things which do not exist in acutality may participate through desire in the nature of the good. (De Malo 1, 2) (Here acc. to o'rourke Aquinas seems to agree with Platonists that the good has an amplissimam extension than being.

"Every subject, thus, inasmuch as it is in potency with respect to any perfection whatsoever, even prime matter, form the fact that it is in potency, has the nature of goodness. And since the Platonists did not dist. between matte rand privatio, but classed matter together with non-being, the y state dthat the good extends more widely than being (quod bonum ad plura se extendit quam ens). Dio. seems to have followed this way of htinking in his book On the Divine names when he ranked the good as pripor to being. A nd although matter is to be distinguished from privation and is non-being by accidnet only, this view, nevertheless, is to some extent true, since prime matter is only potnetially being and through form acquires being as such; but it has potency thru itself alone; and since potency belongs to the nature of hte good, it follows that goodness belongs ot it per se. (DM 1, 2)

p.102
For 'being' si said absolutely, whereas 'good' also involves a relation (bonum autem etiam in oridne consistit) for something is said to be good not only b/c it is an end or has achieved its end, but just as it is ordered towards an end (ordinatum in finem) which wit has not yet attained, by this very relation itself it is called good. Matter, therefore, cannot simply be called being as such, because it is potential being and is predicated in relation to acutal existence (ordo ad esse); it can, however, b/c of this relation, be called good without qualificatio. It appears thus that the good is, in a way, of wisder schope than being. FOr this reason, Dio in ch. 4 (div nam) states that the 'good extends to existing things nad non exiting things'. For even the non-existent, i.e. matter understood as privation, desires a good, since nothing desires the god except that which is good. (SCG 3, 20, 2013; CF SCG 3, 7, 1917)

Orourke notes what appears to be a 'literal reversal' of this - . "Just as prime atter is being potentially and not actually, so it is potentially perfect and not actually, and good potentially and not actually)DV 21, 2, ad 3.

O rourke wonders a this denial of 'unqualified goodness of matter' b/c it happens immeidately after a response (ad 2) where Aquinas grants a greater univesrity to goodness through causality if not by predication (she suggests looking at who he is responding to).

ST, 1, 5, 3, ad 3
"Dicendum quod materia pirma, sicut non est ens nisi in potentia, ita nec bonum nisi in potentia.

she notes the textual 'of interest' bit that he makes this claim immediately before claiming support from platonism against he objection that not everything in existnece is good, since prime matter as such is not desirable but oly desires - here aqu. - b/c of prime matter's predisposition to the good it 'partkaes something of the good'. She notes there is of course no confloict or contradiction - and I know that.

Notes from her words " ultimately groudned in teh actuality of being, the god as such always has reference to end."
"Aquinas simpoly understands Dionysian non-being as signifying potential being; ens is equivalent to the eixtential perfeciton present formaly and actually in beings, whereas bonum is the final end and total perfection of all things; it comprehends both actual and potential being. Fran thinks this is "inded a refined rearrangmenet and prfound trasnformation of the dionysian universe acc. to a new ontological hierarchy in which Being is transcendent."
(end of p. 103)

p. 104
"Secundum primum actum est aliquid ens simpliciter et secundum ultimum, bonum simpliciter.) ST, 1, 5, 1 ad 1) her trans - "to exist w/out qualification is to achieve an initial actuality; to be good w/out qualificaiton is to achieve complete actuality"

her again bot 104
"the Good is prior from the point of view of causality, b/c finality takes precednece in the order of causes. (aqu. explaining why god best named as good in dion, b/c/ 1st and universally = good - nature of cause - III, 227: Id autem quod habet rationem causae, primo et universaliter est bonum." (p. 105) (same section - more quotes. "bonum habet ratinemen finis; fins autem, primo, habet rationmen causae. and again: Agens agit siubi simile, non inquantum est ens quocumque modo, set inquantum est perfectum. Perfectum enim, ut dic. in IV meteorologicorum est quod potest sibi simile facere. Perfectum autem habet rationem boni.")
her
"in attribut. primaycy to the Good as final cause, Aqu. in no way jeopardises his own position. In agreeing w/ dion that from a causal pov. the notion of gdns is prior to that of being, aq. need not abandon his own view of God as transcendnet Being for a divine transc. beyond being. As Et. Gilson remarks, St THomas merely places the thought of dion within the context where it is fuly true, namely that of finality. Reinterpreted from this perspective it reinforces indeed Aqu' theory of God as the plenitude of being.
106
Quote from Gilson - "precisely b/c it is essentially desirbl, gdns is a final cause. Not only this, but it is both prime and ultmt in the order of prpsvns. Even bng is only b/c it is for the sake of smthgn which is its fnl cause, its end. In the ordr of cslty, then, gdns comes first and it is in this sense that Pltnsm rcvs from Tom Aq. all the crdit to which it is entitled." (teh elements of christn phlsphy p. 169)

cit 74 - De potent. 7, 2, ad 10 - Finis autem licet sit primum in intentione, est tamem postremum in operatione, et est effectus aliarum causarum.

now p. 107
ftnt - "sicut autem influere causae efficietnis est agere, ita influere casuae finalis est appeti et desiderari." (DV 22, 2.)
ftnt - "Finis est prior in causando quam aliqua aliarum causarum. (DV 21, 3 ad 3)

Finis etiam non est causa illius quod est efficiens, sed est causa ut efficiens sit efficens... unde finis est causa causalitatis efficientis, quia facit efficiens esse efficiens. (De principiis naturae, iv, 356)

also cites 1, 5, 4 at bot.

p. 108
"Dic. quod vita et scientia et alia huiusmodi sic appetutnur ut sunt in actu, unde in omnibus appetitiur quoddam esse. Et sic nihil est appetibile nihil ens, et per conseuqens nihil est bonum nisi ens. (ST 1, 5, 2, ad 4)

ST, 1, 5, 2 ad 3 "Illud igitur quod per se est appetibile est esse."

ST. 1, 5, 2 ad 2 - respective causalities of being nad good.

DV 21.1 ad 4 more in the same line of hte causality of goodness and a thing pursuing its end acc. to its total being actually really important but I am geting rather wearied.

She concludes good is more universal not in teh extent of its predication in which it agrees w/ being but in the manner of its causlaity - cites "In I sent., 8, 1, 3, ad 2)
i am not inclined to disagree with her but only to be cautious of conclusionary remarks part. as she ends w/ the sentences.

GREAT history of acedia!!!!

Source: whole chapter is there!
http://books.google.ca/books?hl=en&lr=&id=YVDXCatGGssC&oi=fnd&pg=PA43&dq=aquinas+tristitia&ots=bTQpagtagE&sig=yiDuG-p1y6u7g2klW03tC5zKFOU#PPA60,M1
CHAPTER - ACEDIA THE SIN AND ITS RELATION TO SORROW AND MELANCHOLIA - great! p. 43 in book "CULTURE AND DEPRESSION" - chapter by Stanley W. Jackson
VERY helpful - mentions the ancients and a lot of cassian and christian stuff. bewares of simplifying by calling modern depression.
Best quick version of Aquinas I have ever seen - regarding sorrow/tristitia/
EXCELLENT KNOWLEDGE OF HISTORY - explains the evolving of acedia, the loss of influence of church as source of integrative/interpretation human/ renaissancizing - etc.
55. healing outlook - diff. between judgmental and healing approach - .
loss of tristitia -
protestantization- from acedia to neglect/idleness/indolence - (despite a "busy" person could be acedic for Aquinas)
p. 56 - renaissance rehabilitation of melancholia - character corrleate of genius/giftedness. (even aquinas has something i think sort of acc. to eleanor stump - but be careful in both attributions - check it out)
melancholy as similar to our use of "depression" today
56 - again protestant changes - also leaders faced with fear of problem of increasing mass of able-bodied poor
57 - western preoccupation as a whole - whether of sympathy or concern, or of impatience
58 - relative emphasis on psychological factors in Western tradition, relative emph. on somatic factors in Eastern (cit there)
GREAT biblio - esp. p.60 and 61 two or three titles in particular
wenzel - the sin of sloth: acedia in medieval thought and literature
journal of the history of behavioral science - melancholy and partial insanity 19: 173-84
He's also awesome (both himself) and his sources on the pastoral caring/medicinal/doctoral approaches in the middle ages.

Dif. Betwe. Phil. and Theo.

Gee, this is what makes it more complex. I can't just "wade into" the part on the passions without any previous introduction as to their theological placement - because the way he treats of them, while of course it is ordered - because they exist within various levels of interpretations, he doesn't have to explain everything when he gets into them. But I have to give enough context for the "the passions" to make sense in the disconnected way in which I treat of them - and sorrow in particular.

Chapter 4
THAT THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE THEOLOGIAN CONSIDER CREATURES IN DIFFERENT WAYS
[1] Now, from what has been said it is evident that the teaching of the Christian faith deals with creatures so far as they reflect a certain likeness of God, (very present in the Summa, especially on the part on man) and so far as error concerning them leads to error about God. And so they are viewed in a different light by that doctrine and by human philosophy. For human philosophy considers them as they are, so that the different parts of philosophy are found to correspond to the different genera of things. The Christian faith, however, does not consider them as such; thus, it regards fire not as fire, but as representing the sublimity of God, and as being directed to Him in any way at all. For as it is said: “Full of the glory of the Lord is His work. Did the Lord not make the saints declare all His wonderful works?” (Sirach 42: 16-17)

[2] For this reason, also, the philosopher and the believer consider different matters about creatures. The philosopher considers such things as belong to them by nature-the upward tendency of fire, for example; the believer, only such things as belong to them according as they are related to God—the fact, for instance, that they are created by God, are subject to Him, and so on (this "so on" is where sorrow comes in).

[3] Hence, imperfection is not to be imputed to the teaching of the faith if it omits many properties of things, such as the figure of the heaven and the quality of its motion. For neither does the natural philosopher consider the same characters of a line as the geometrician, but only those that accrue to it as terminus of a natural body. (He does not have to treat of "intensio" when dealing with passion, but I want to!)

[4] But any things concerning creatures that are considered in common by the philosopher and the believer are conveyed through different principles in each case. For the philosopher takes his argument from the proper causes of things; the believer, from the first cause—for such reasons as that a thing has been handed down in this manner by God, or that this conduces to God’s glory, or that God’s power is infinite. Hence, also, [the doctrine of the faith] ought to be called the highest wisdom, since it treats of the highest Cause; as we read in Deuteronomy (4:6): “For this is your wisdom and understanding in the sight of nations.” And, therefore, human philosophy serves her as the first wisdom. Accordingly, divine wisdom sometimes argues from principles of human philosophy. For among philosophers, too, the first philosophy utilizes the teachings of all the sciences in order to realize its objectives.
[5] Hence again, the two kinds of teaching do not follow the same order. For in the teaching of philosophy, which considers creatures in themselves and leads us from them to the knowledge of God, (THIS IS SOMETHING THAT I AM ACCUSTOMED TO, SO ALSO IS AQUINAS, he defends very vigorously somewhere the thing that "the invisible things of God are seen from the things that are, or however it goes) the first consideration is about creatures; the last, of God. But in the teaching of faith, which considers creatures only in their relation to God, the consideration of God comes first, that of creatures afterwards. And thus the doctrine of faith is more perfect, as being more like the knowledge possessed by God, who, in knowing Himself, immediately knows other things.
[6] And so, following this order, after what has been said in Book I about God in Himself, it remains for us to treat of the things which derive from Him.

SO HERE IS MY SOURCE FOR THE STRUCTURE OF THE SUMMA - I WAS GOING TO INTERPRET IT MYSELF AND WENT TO PLATONISM AND NEO-PLATONICS IN ORDER TO DO SO AND it's here.

Goodness in the SCG

Source: http://www.diafrica.org/kenny/CDtexts/ContraGentiles1.htm

THAT GOD IS GOOD
[1] From the divine perfection, which we have shown, we can conclude to the goodness of God.
[2] For that by which each thing is called good is the virtue that belongs to it; for “the virtue of each thing is what makes its possessor and his work good.” Now, virtue “is a certain perfection, for each thing is then called perfect when it reaches the virtue belonging to it,” as may be seen in Physics VII [3]. Hence, each thing is good from the fact that it is perfect. That is why each thing seeks its perfection as the good belonging to it. But we have shown that God is perfect. Therefore, He is good.
[3] Again, it was shown above that there is a certain first unmoved mover, namely, God’s This mover moves as a completely unmoved mover, which is as something desired. Therefore, since God is the first unmoved mover, He is the first desired. But something is desired in two ways, namely, either because it is good or because it appears to be good. The first desired is what is good, since the apparent good does not move through itself but according as it has a certain appearance of the good, whereas the good moves through itself. The first desired, therefore, God, is truly good.
[4] Furthermore, “the good is that which all things desire.” The Philosopher introduces this remark as a “felicitous saying” in Ethics I [1]. But all things, each according to its mode, desire to be in act; this is clear from the fact that each thing according to its nature resists corruption. To be in act, therefore, constitutes the nature of the good. Hence it is that evil, which is opposed to the good, follows when potency is deprived of act, as is clear from the Philosopher in Metaphysics IX [9]. But, as we have shown, God is being in act without potency. Therefore, He is truly good.
[5] Moreover,.the communication of being and goodness arises from goodness. This is evident from the very nature and definition of the good. By nature, the good of each thing is its act and perfection. Now, each thing acts in so far as it is in act, and in acting it diffuses being and goodness to other things. Hence, it is a sign of a being’s perfection that it “can produce its like,” as may be seen from the Philosopher in Meteorologica IV [3]. Now, the nature of the good comes from its being something appetible. This is the end, which also moves the agent to act. That is why it is said that the good is diffusive of itself and of being. But this diffusion befits God because, as we have shown above, being through Himself the necessary being, God is the cause of being for other things. God is, therefore, truly good.
[6] That is why it is written in a Psalm (72:1): “How good is God to Israel, to those who are of a right heart!” And again: “The Lord is good to those who hope in Him, to the soul that seeks Him” (Lam. 3:25).


Chapter 38
THAT GOD IS GOODNESS ITSELF
[1] From this we can conclude that God is His goodness.
[2] To be in act is for each being its good. But God is not only a being in act; He is His very act of being, as we have shown. God is, therefore, goodness itself, and not only good.
[3] Again, as we have shown, the perfection of each thing is its goodness. But the perfection of the divine being is not affirmed on the basis of something added to it, but because the divine being, as was shown above, is perfect in itself. The goodness of God, therefore, is not something added to His substance; His substance is His goodness.
[4] Moreover, each good thing that is not its goodness is called good by participation. But that which is named by participation has something prior to it from which it receives the character of goodness. This cannot proceed to infinity, since among final causes there is no regress to infinity, since the infinite is opposed to the end [finis]. But the good has the nature of an end. We must, therefore, reach some first good, that is not by participation good through an order toward some other good, but is good through its own essence. This is God. God is, therefore, His own goodness.
[5] Again, that which is can participate in something, but the act of being can participate in nothing. For that which participates is in potency, and being is an act. But God is being itself, as we have proved. He is not, therefore, by participation good; He is good essentially.
[6] Furthermore, in a simple being, being and that which is are the same. For, if one is not the other, the simplicity is then removed. But, as we have shown, God is absolutely simple. Therefore, for God to be good is identical with God. He is, therefore, His goodness.
[7] It is thereby likewise evident that no other good is its goodness. Hence it is said in Matthew (19:17): “One is good, God.”


Chapter 39
THAT THERE CANNOT BE EVIL IN GOD
[1] From this it is quite evident that there cannot be evil in God.
[2] For being and goodness, and all names that are predicated essentially, have nothing extraneous mixed with them, although that which is or good can have something besides being and goodness. For nothing prevents the subject of one perfection from being the subject of another, just as that which is a body can be white and sweet. Now, each nature is enclosed within the limits of its notion, so that it cannot include anything extraneous within itself. But, as we have proved, God is goodness, and not simply good. There cannot, therefore, be any non-goodness in Him. Thus, there cannot possibly be evil in God.
[3] Moreover, what is opposed to the essence of a given thing cannot befit that thing so long as its essence remains. Thus, irrationality or insensibility cannot befit man unless he ceases to be a man. But the divine essence is goodness itself, as we have shown. Therefore, evil, which is the opposite of good, could have no place in God—unless He ceased to be God, which is impossible, since He is eternal, as we have shown.
[4] Furthermore, since God is His own being, nothing can be said of Him by participation, as is evident from the above argument. If, then, evil is said of God, it will not be said by participation, but essentially. But evil cannot be so said of anything as to be its essence, for it would lose its being, which is a good, as we have shown. In evil, however, there can be nothing extraneous mixed with it, as neither in goodness. Evil, therefore, cannot be said of God.
[5] Again, evil is the opposite of good. But the nature of the good consists in perfection, which means that the nature of evil consists in imperfection. Now, in God, Who is universally perfect, as we have shown above, there cannot be defect or imperfection. Therefore, evil cannot be in God.
[6] Then, too, a thing is perfect according as it is in act. A thing will therefore be imperfect according as it falls short of act. Hence, evil (MALUM I SUPPOSE) is either a privation or includes privation. But the subject of privation is potency, which cannot be in God. Neither, therefore, can evil.
[7] If, moreover, the good is “that which is sought by all,” it follows that every nature flees evil as such. Now, what is in a thing contrary to the motion of its natural appetite is violent and unnatural. Evil in each thing, consequently, is violent and unnatural, so far as it is an evil for that thing; although, among composite things, evil may he natural to a thing according to something within it. But God is not composite, nor, as we have shown, can there be anything violent or unnatural in Him. Evil, therefore, cannot be in God.
[8] Scripture likewise confirms this. For it is said in the canonic Epistle of John (I, 1:5): “God is light and in Him there is no darkness”; and in Job (34:10) it is written: “Far from God be wickedness; and iniquity from the Almighty.”


Chapter 40
THAT GOD IS THE GOOD OF EVERY GOOD
[1] From the foregoing it is also shown that God is “the good of every good.”’
[2] For the goodness of each thing is its perfection, as we have said. But, since God is absolutely perfect, in His perfection He comprehends the perfections of all things, as has been shown. His goodness, therefore, comprehends every goodness. Thus, He is the good of every good.
[3] Moreover, that which is said to be of a certain sort by participation is said to be such only so far as it has a certain likeness to that which is said to be such by essence. Thus iron is said to be on fire in so far as it participates in a certain likeness of fire. But God is good through His essence, whereas all other things are good by participation, as has been shown. Nothing, then, will be called good except in so far as it has a certain likeness of the divine goodness. Hence, God is the good of every good.
[4] Since, furthermore, each thing is appetible because of the end, and since the nature of the good consists in its being appetible, each thing must be called good either because it is the end or because it is ordered to the end. It is the last end, then, from which all things receive the nature of good. As will be proved later on, this is God. God is, therefore, the good of every good.
[5] Hence it is that God, promising to Moses a vision of Himself, says: “I will show you all good” (Exod. 33:19). And in Wisdom (7:11), it is said of the divine wisdom: “All good things come to me together with her.”


Chapter 41
THAT GOD IS THE HIGHEST GOOD
[1] From this conclusion we prove that God is the highest good.
[2] For the universal good stands higher tlpn any particular good, just as “the good of the people is better than the good of an individual,” since the goodness and perfection of the whole stand higher than the goodness and perfection of the part. But the divine goodness is compared to all others as the universal good to a particular good, being, as we have shown, the good of every good. God is, therefore, the highest good.
[3] Furthermore, what is said essentially is said more truly than what is said by participation. But God is good essentially, while other things are good by participation, as we have shown. God is, therefore, the highest good.
[4] Again, “what is greatest in any genus is the cause of the rest in that genus,” for a cause ranks higher than an effect. But, as we have shown, it is from God that all things have the nature of good. God is, therefore, the highest good.
[5] Moreover, just as what is not mixed with black is more white, so what is not mixed with evil is more good. But Cod is most unmixed with evil, because evil can be in God neither in act nor in potency; and this belongs to God according to His nature, as we have shown. God is, therefore, the highest good.
[6] Hence what is written in 1 Samuel (2:2): “There is none holy as the Lord is.”

Notes from Commentary on Job

translation by Brian Mullady, OP
http://www.opwest.org/Archive/2002/Book_of_Job/tajob.html

really amazing breakdown - this one is relevant:

Now when divine worship is rare, men usually celebrate it more devoutly; but when it is frequent, it annoys them. This is the sin of acedia18, namely when someone is saddened about spiritual work. Job was not indeed subject to this sin, for the text adds, "Job did this every day," maintaining an almost steadfast devotion in divine worship.

_______
The fact that worldly men are designated by "earth" is shown clearly enough by the fact that the Lord seems to separate Job from the earth, although he is living on earth. For when Satan had said, "I have prowled about the earth and I have run through it," the text adds, "And the Lord said to him: Have you considered my servant Job, there is none like him on the earth?" For it would seem groundless to ask whether he who asserted he had prowled about and run through the earth had considered Job, unless he understood Job his servant to be outside the earth. God clearly shows in what respect Job is separated from the earth saying,"my servant Job." Man has been created as it were like a mean between God and earthly things, for with the mind he clings to God but with the flesh he is joined to earthly things. Besides, as every mean recedes more from one extreme the closer it approaches to the other one. So, the more man clings to God, the more removed he is from earth. To be a servant of God means to cling to God with the mind, for it is characteristic of a servant to not be his own cause.31 The one who clings to God in his mind, orders himself to God as a servant of love and not of fear.
________
Satan wants to show that Job had served God because of the earthly prosperity he had attained using an argument based on opposition. For if after earthly prosperity comes to an end Job ceased fearing God, it would become clear that he feared God because of the earthly prosperity he was enjoying. So he adds, "Put forth your hand just a little and touch all that he has," by taking it away, "If he does not bless(benedixerit) you to your face," i.e. curse you openly (literally,"may misfortune come upon me.") Note that even the hearts of truly just men are sometimes badly shaken by great adversity, but the deceitfully just are disturbed by a slight adversity like men having no root in their virtue. So Satan wants to insinuate that Job was not truly just but only pretending to be. Thus he says that if he should be touched by even a very small adversity, he would murmur against God, that is blaspheme him. He distinctly says, "If he does not you to your face," to indicate that even in prosperity he was blaspheming God in a certain sense in his heart when he preferred temporal things to love of him. But when his prosperity is taken away, he would blaspheme God even to his face, i.e. openly. The expression, "If he does not bless (benedixerit) you to your face," can be understood in another way, so that may be taken as a blessing properly speaking and the sense would be this: If you should touch him even a little by taking away his earthly prosperity, may these things befall me if it does not become clear that before he blessed you not in his true heart, but to your face, that is keeping up appearances before men.
Because, as I have said, God wills the virtue of the saints to be known to all, both the just and the wicked, it pleased him that as all saw Job’s good deeds of Job that his right intention sh ould also be clearly shown to all. So he willed to deprive Job of his earthly prosperity, so that when he perservered in the fear of God, it would become clear that he feared God from a right intention and not on account of temporal things. Note that God punishes wicked men through both the good and the wicked angels, but he never sends adversity on good men except through wicked angels. So he did not will that adversity be brought on blessed Job except through Satan, and because of this the text continues, "And the Lord said to Satan: Behold, all that he has is in your power," that is, I surrender it to your power, "only do not extend your hand to him." From this text we are clearly given to understand that Satan cannot harm just men as much as he wants, but only as much as he is permitted to do so. Consider also that the Lord did not command Satan to strike Job, but only gave him the power to do so, because, "The will to do harm is in each wicked person from himself, but the power of harming comes from God."34
From what has been said already it is clear that the cause of the adversity of blessed Job was that his virtue should be made clear to all. So Scripture says of Tobias, "Thus the Lord permitted him to be tempted so that an example might be given to posterity of his patience, like blessed Job."(Tob. 2:12) Be careful not to believe that the Lord had been persuaded by the words of Satan to permit Job to be afflicted, but he ordered this from his eternal disposition to make clear Job’s virtue against the false accusations of the impious. Therefore, false accusations are placed first and the divine permission follows.
_____________________________

After the cause of the blessed Job’s adversity has been considered, the text shows as a consequence how such adversity came upon him. Because all the adversity was produced by Satan, the text therefore speaks about him first saying, "So Satan went forth from the face of the Lord," as if to use the power permitted to him. It is expressly stated,"He went forth from the face of the Lord," for Satan is in the presence of the face of the Lord in that the power of harming someone is permitted him because this happens according to the reasonable will of God but when he uses this power permitted to him, he goes forth from the face of the Lord, because he turns away from the intention of the one giving him permission. This is apparent in the case in question: for he was permitted by God to harm Job to make Job's virtue clearly known. However, Satan did not inflict him for this reason, but to provoke him to impatience and blasphemy.


At the same time, what we said above appears clearly true in this text.35 Satan came to present himself among the sons of God assisting in his presence in the sense that some are said to assist in the presence of God who are subject to divine judgement and examination, not in the sense that they assist in the presence of God who see God. So here the text does not say Satan cast God away from his face, but that," he went forth from the presence of God," as though he turned away from the intention of his providence, although he was not strong enough to escape the order of providence.
Reflect that the order in which the adversities are about to be explained is just the opposite of the order in which the prosperity was explained. For the prosperity which was explained proceeded from the more important to the less important beginning from the person of Job himself. After him came his offspring and then his animals, first the sheep and then the rest. This was done reasonably because the duration which cannot be preserved in the person is sought in the offspring for whose sustenance one needs possessions. In the adversity however, the opposite order is proposed. First, the loss of possessions is related, then the destruction of the children and third the affliction of his own person. This is to increase the adversity. For one who has been oppressed by a greater adversity does not feel a lesser one. But after a lesser adversity, one feels a greater one. Therefore, so Job would feel his own individual affliction from each adversity and so be disturbed to become more impatience, Satan began to afflict Job with a small adversity and gradually proceeded to greater ones.

Consider also that the soul of man is more disturbed by those things which come on the scene suddenly for adversities which are foreseen are more easily tolerated. Therefore to make Job more disturbed, Satan brought adversity on him at a time of the greatest rejoicing, when he could at least think about adversity, so that the adversity might seem more severe from the very presence of the rejoicing. For "when things which are contraries are placed beside each other, they become clearer in their contrast."36 Therefore, the text says, "on a certain day when his sons and daughters were eating and drinking wine," which is especially put here to indicate rejoicing because according to Sirach, "Wine was created from the beginning for rejoicing, not for drunkeness." (31:35) "They were in their eldest brother's house," which is placed to show greater solemnity. For it is probable that a more solemn banquet would be celebrated in the home of the first born. "A messenger came to Job and said: The oxen were plowing," which would remind him of profit, and so the damage would seem more unbearable. "And the asses feeding beside them," which is also put in to increase pain when he considered that the enemy fell upon them at a time in which they could steal more things at once. "And the Sabeans fell upon them," namely an enemy who came from far away from whom the things which they stole could not easily be retrieved. "And took everything", lest if they left s omething it would at least be sufficient for necessary use or breeding. "They slew the servants with the sword," which was more grave for the just man. "I alone escaped to tell you," as if to say: the fact that I alone escaped happened by divine disposition so that you could have an account of such a great loss as though God meant to afflict you with pain.

Immediately after the announcement of this adversity, another one is announced, lest it some interval happened meanwhile, Job would recover his composure and prepare himself in patience to sustain what followed more easily. Because of this, the text adds, "While he was still speaking, another messenger came and said: The fire of God," that is, send by God, "fell from heaven," as if to impress on his mind that he was suffering persecution not only from men, but also from God, and thus he might more easily be provoked against God. "And burned up the sheep and the servants, consuming them," as if to say: this was divinely caused so that everything was immediately consumed at the touch of the fire. This is beyond the natural power of fire. "And I alone escaped to tell you." The text continues,"While he was still speaking, another messenger came and said: The Chaldeans" (who were fierce and powerful) "formed three companies" to emphasize how strong they were, so that he cannot hope for revenge or recovery of his lost goods. The next text shows what he lost saying,"and made a raid upon the camels and took them and slew the servants with the sword. I alone escaped to tell you." The destruction of his children follows. "While he was still speaking, another messenger entered and said: Your sons and daughters were eating and drinking wine in their brother's house," so that because of this, their death would be more sad for Job, since he would be uncertain whether they were in a state of sin preceding their death. For he used to sanctify them and offer holocausts for each one for this reason because he was afraid that they had incurred some sin during their banquets. Lest he could perhaps think that they had repented or provided for their souls, the text adds, "a violent wind suddenly rushed in from the desert and struck the four corners of the house." This is said to show the force of the wind which unusually destroyed the whole house at once, which shows the wind proceded by divine will and so Job would be moved more easily against God when he was afflicted by one whom he had served with a devout mind. To compound his sorrow more greatly, the damage of the destruction of his children is added, when the text says, "It fell and crushed the young people and they are dead," namely, all of them so that no hope of posterity would remain in the escape of even one of his children. This was believed to be more sorrowful because although all the children were destroyed, one of the servants escaped to increase his pain, for there follows, "and I alone escaped to tell you."
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After the adversity of blessed Job has been narrated, the text treats the patience Job showed in adversity. As evidence of what is said here know that there was a difference of opinion among the ancients philosophers39 as to corporeal goods and the passions of the soul. For the Stoics said that exterior goods were not goods of man and that there could be no sorrow for their loss in the soul of the wise man. But, the opinion of the Peripatetics was that some of the goods of man are truly exterior goods, though these are certainly not the principal ones. Nevertheless, they are like instruments ordered to the principal good of man which is the good of the mind. Because of this, they conceded that the wise man is moderately sad in the losses of exterior goods, namely his reason is not so absorbed by sadness that he leaves righteousness. This opinion is the more true of the two and is in accord with the teaching of the Church as is clear from St. Augustine in his book, The City of God.40
So Job followed this opinion and truly showed sorrow in adversity; yet this sadness was so moderated that it was subject to reason. The text therefore continues, "Then Job arose, and rent his robe," which is usually an indication of sadness among men.41 Note however that the text says, "Then", namely after he heard about the death of his children, so that he might seem more sad over their loss than the loss of his possessions. For it is characteristic of a hard and insensible heart to not grieve over dead friends, but it is characteristic of virtuous men to not have this grief in an immoderate way as St. Paul says in I Thessalonians, "But we would not have you ignorant, brethren, concerning those who are asleep, that you may not grieve as others do who have no hope." (4:13) This was true in the case of blessed Job and so the state of his mind appears in his exterior act. Since his reason stood upright, the text fittingly says that "Job arose" although men in grief usually prostrate themselves. For though he suffered grief, but not a grief which penetrated as far as disturbing the his interior reason, he showed a sign of his sadness in exterior actions in two ways: namely as to what is outside the nature of the body, and so the text says, "he rent his robe"; and as to those things which procede from the nature of the body, "he shaved his head," which among those who care for their hair, usually indicates grief.42 These two signs then fittingly correspond to the adversities mentioned, for the tearing of the robe corresponds to the loss of his possessions, and the cutting of the hair corresponds to the loss of his sons. Then the mind stands upright when it humbly is submitted to God. For each thing exists in a higher and more noble state to the extent that it stands firm in what perfects it more, like air when it is subject to light, and matter when it is subject to form. Therefore the fact that the mind of blessed Job was not dejected by sadness, but persisted in its righteousness, clearly shows that he humbly subjected himself to God. So the text continues, ,"and he fell on the ground, and worshipped," to show evidence for his devotion and humility.

Job revealed the state of his mind not only by deeds, but also by words. For he rationally demonstrated that although he suffered sadness, he did not have to yield to sadness. First, he demonstrated from the condition of nature so the text said, "He said: Naked I came forth from my mother's womb," namely, from the earth which is the common mother of everything,43 "and naked shall I return there," i.e., to the earth. Sirach speaks in the same vein saying, "Great hardship has been created for man, and a heavy yoke lies on the sons of Adam from the day they come forth from their mother's womb until the day they return to their burial in the mother of them all." (40:1) This can also be interpreted in another way. The expression,"from my mother's womb" can be literally taken as the womb of the mother who bore him. When he says next "naked I shall return there," the term "there" establishes a simple relation. For a man cannot return a second time to the womb of his own mother, but he can return to the state which he had in the womb of his mother in a certain respect, namely in that he is removed from the company of men. In saying this he reasonably shows that a man should not be absorbed with sadness because of the loss of exterior goods, since exterior goods are not connatural to him, but come to him accidentally. This is evident since a man comes into this world without them and leaves this world without them. So when these accidental goods are taken away if the substantial ones remain man ought not to be overcome by sadness although sadness may touch him.
Second, he shows the same thing from divine action saying, "The Lord gave; the Lord has taken away." Here his true opinion about divine providence in relation to human affairs must first be considered. When he says, "The Lord gave," he confessed that earthly prosperity does not come to men accidentally either according to fate or the stars, or as a result of human exertion alone, but by divine direction. When he says, however, "The Lord has taken away," he confesses also that earthly adversities also arise among men by the judgement of divine providence. This leads to the conclusion that man does not have a just complaint with God if he should be despoiled of his temporal goods, because he who gave freely could bestow them either until the end of his life or temporarily. So when he takes temporal goods away from man before the end of life, man cannot complain.
Third, he shows the same thing from the good pleasure of the divine will saying, "As God pleased, so it has been done." For friends will and do not will the same thing.44 Thus if it is the good pleasure of God that someone should be despoiled of temporal goods, if he loves God, he ought to comform his will to the divine will, so that he is not absorbed by sadness in this consideration.
These three arguments are put in the proper order. For in the first argument it is posited that temporal goods are exterior to man. In the second, it is posited that they are a gift given to a man and taken away by God. In the third that this happens according to the good pleasure of the divine will. So one can conclude from the first argument that man should not be absorbed by sorrow because of the loss of temporal goods; from the second that he cannot even complain and from the third that he ought even to rejoice. For it would not please God that someone should suffer from adversity unless he wished some good to come to him from it. So though adversity is bitter in itself and generates sadness, nevertheless it should be the cause of rejoicing when one considers the use because of which it pleases God, as is said about the apostles, "The apostles went rejoicing because they had suffered contempt for Christ." (Acts 5:41) and so on. For when taking a bitter medicine, one can rejoice with reason because of the hope for health, although he suffers sensibly. So since joy is the matter of the action of thanksgiving, therefore Job concludes this third argument with an act of thanksgiving saying,"Blessed be the name of the Lord." The name of the Lord is truly blessed by men inasmuch as they have knowledge of his goodness, namely that he distributes all things well and does nothing unjustly.

Then the text therefore concludes to the innocence of Job when it says, "In all these things, Job did not sin with his lips," namely, he did not express a movement of impatience in word, "nor did he say something stupid against God," i.e., blasphemy, so that he did not blaspheme concerning divine providence. For stupidity is opposed to wisdom which properly is knowledge of divine things.45
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The next verse expresses the fact that these friends just mentioned came to console Job saying, "They agreed to come to visit him together and console him." In this they showed themselves to be true friends in not deserting him in a time of tribulation, for Sirach says, "A man’s friend is recognized in sorrow and evil." (12:9) At first the visit itself was certainly consoling, for to see a friend and to associate with him is most delightful. 50 They also console him by their actions, showing him signs of their compassion. What provoked these signs of compassion is now introduced. "When they saw him from afar, they did not recognize him," for his face was changed by sores, his clothing and his refinement gone because of the loss of his possessions. The term "from afar" should be understood to mean that measure by which a man can be recognized from a distance. This change in their friend stirred them to sadness and compassion which they showed by external signs, for there follows, "and raising their voices," out of the great depth of their sorrow, "they wept, and they rent their robes and sprinkled dust on their heads," as a sign of humility and dejection, as though they felt themselves to be cast down by the casting down of their friend. The text adds, "heavenward" as though they might provoke the mercy of heaven by this humiliation. Consider that the compassion of friends is a consolation,51 either because adversity like a burden in more lightly born when it is carried by many, or even more because all sorrow is alleviated when mixed with pleasure. To have the experience of someone's friendship is very pleasurable, which especially derives from their compassion in adversity and so offers consolation.
They consoled him not only by showing compassion to him, but also by showing their fellowship with him; for there follows, "they sat with him on the ground seven days and seven nights." Nevertheless one must not understand this to mean a continuous period, but at suitable timez, for great sorrow needed consolation for a long time. But they did not show him the third form which is especially consoling i.e. in words, for there follows, "and no one said a word to him." The cause of their silence is shown when the text continues, "for they saw that his suffering was very great." This cause is more an idea the consolers have than the state of the one afflicted. For when the mind of someone has been absorbed with pain, he does not listen to words of consolation, and so Ovid remarks, "Who but someone who has no good sense, would forbid a mother to weep at the funeral of her child?"52 Job however had not been so disposed that he could not accept consolation because of great sorrow. Rather, he consoled him self very much according to reason as is apparent from the words quoted above.
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In Chapter II I explained that there were two opinions held by ancient philosophers about the passions. The Stoics said that there was no place in the wise man for sorrow. The Peripatetics said that the wise man is indeed sad, but in sad things he conducts himself with a moderation in accord with reason. This opinion accords with the truth. For reason does not take away the condition of nature. It is natural to sensible nature to rejoice and be pleased about fitting things and grieve and feel pain about harmful things. So reason does not take away this natural disposition, but so moderates it that reason is not deflected from its right course because of sorrow. This opinion also accords with Holy Scripture which places sorrow in Christ, in whom there is every fullness of virtue and wisdom.

So, Job then indeed feels sad as a result of those adversities which he suffered described above, otherwise the virtue of patience would have no place in him. But his reason did not desert the right path because of sorrow but rather ruled the sorrow. This is proved when the text says,"After this, Job opened his mouth." "After this" means after he had passed seven days in silence. This clearly shows that what he is going to say is said in accord with a reason which is not confused by sorrow. In fact, if they had been spoken from a mind confused by sorrow, he would have said them sooner, when the force of sorrow was more acute. For every sorrow is mitigated with the passage of time53and one feels it more in the beginning. He seems to have kept silent for a long time for this reason, so that he would not be judged to have spoken from a confused mind. This is shown by the text," He opened his mouth." In fact, when someone speaks because of a fit of passion, he does not open his mouth himself, but he is compelled to speak by the passion. For we are not the masters of our acts done through passion, but only of those done through reason. In speaking he showed the sorrow which he suffered, he showed patience. Wise men usually express the motion of the passions which they feel in a reasonable way. So Christ said,"My soul is sorrowful unto death,"(Matt. 26:38) and St. Paul in Romans, "I do not do the good I want, but the very evil that I hate, I do." (7:15) Also, Boethius at the beginning of the Consolation of Philosophy opens with the expression of his sadness, but he shows how to mitigate it by reason.54 So Job expresses his sorrow verbally.
The text continues,"and he cursed his day." This seems to contradict what St. Paul says in Romans,"Bless and do not curse." (12:14) Note that cursing can mean several things. For since "to curse" (maledicere) is to speak evil [malum dicere], every time one speaks evil, he is said to curse. One speaks evil of someone by speech which causes evil, as God causes evil to something in his very speech and the judge causes the punishment on another in speaking the sentence of condemnation. This is the way the Lord spoke evil or cursed in Genesis, "Cursed is the ground because of you,"(3:17) and "Cursed be Canaan, a slave of slaves shall he be to his brothers." (9:25) Joshua also cursed Achor who suffered from the condemnation.(Jos. 7:25) In another way, one may understand cursing another as invoking or desiring evil to him. For example, in I Kings, "The Philistine cursed David in his ways." (17:43) In a third way, one may simply speak evil by disclosing it either in the present, the past, the future, truly or falsely. Paul prohibits cursing in this way when someone deprecates someone or defames his character falsely. However he does not prohibit it when a judge condemns a defendant who is guilty or when someone expresses in an ordered way the real evil of someone, either by demonstrating an act to occur in the present, or by relating something past or by predicting something in the future. So, one should understand that Job cursed his day, because he denounced it as evil, not only because of its nature, which was created by God, but according to the common usage of Holy Scripture where time is called good or evil because of what happens in that time. The Apostle Paul speaks in this way when he says, " […] making the most of the time, because the days are evil." (Eph. 5:16) So Job cursed his day in remembering the evils which had happened to him on that day.

The next verse explains the manner of his cursing and continues,"And Job said: Let the day perish on which I was born, and the night which said, `A man chiild is conceived.'" Note that although to exist and to live are desirable in themselves, yet to exist and to live in misery like this should be avoided, although one may freely sustain being miserable for some purpose.55 So a wretched life which is not ordered to some good end should not be chosen for any reason. The Lord speaks in this way in Matthew,"It would have been better for that man if he had never been born." (26:24) Reason alone apprehends what good can be expected in some misery. The sensitive power does not perceive it. For example, the sense of taste perceives the bitterness of the medicine, but reason alone enjoys the purpose of health. If someone wanted to express the feeling of his sense of taste then he would denounce the medicine as evil, although reason would judge it to be good because of its purpose. So the blessed Job was able by his reason to perceive the misery which he suffered as certainly useful for some end. But the lower part of the soul influenced by sorrow would completely repudiate this adversity. Thus, life itself under such adversity was hateful to him. When something is hateful to us, we abhor everything by which we come to that thing. So in the inferior part of his soul, whose passion Job now intended to express, he hated both the birth and the conception by which he came into life and consequently both the day of his birth and the night of his conception according to the usage of attributing to time the good or evil which happens in that time. So therefore because Job repudiated life in adversity from the point of view of the senses, he wished that he had never been born or conceived. He expresses this saying, "Let the day perish on which I was born," saying in effect, "Would that I had never been born!" and "the night on which it was said," i.e. it could truly be said, "a man-child is conceived," [that is,"Would that I had never been conceived!"] He uses a fitting order here, for if birth does not take place, this does not preclude conception, but lack of conception precludes birth. He also fittingly ascribes the conception to night and birth to day, because according to the astrologers,56 a birth during the day is more praiseworthy since the principal star, the sun, shines over the land at that time; but a conception at night is more frequent. Jeremiah uses a similar way of speaking saying, "Cursed be the day I was born, may the night on which my mother bore me not be blessed." (20:14)

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After Job has detested his own life in many ways, he now detests the life of the whole human race taken collectively, both of those in prosperity and those in adversity. He begins to treat first of those who are more renowned. Note that there are two things which belong especially to living beings: to live and to know. Although knowing in itself is very delightful and very noble, yet to know those things which cause affliction is painful. So he says, "Why was light given to him that is in misery?," as if to say: For what purpose does a man subject to unhappiness have the light of knowledge, since by it he can consider the evil with which he is afflicted? To live is noble because of the soul, but if the soul should exist in bitterness, living itself is rendered bitter. So he says, "and life to the bitter of soul." (Understand "why is it given?" to be repeated) He shows that life is given to them uselessly because unhappy men desire its contrary. So he says, "Who," living in bitterness, "long for death, which does not come," that is as quickly as they would like. To show that those who are unhappy wait for death not shrinking from it but desiring it he continues, "like those who dig for buried treasure," aroused by their great desire to find the treasure by digging. Because desire, when it is fulfilled causes joy, he adds, "and are glad powerfully when they find the grave," i.e. when they see they have arrived at death which procures a grave for them. Some 62 think this passage refers to the fact that those who dig for treasure rejoice in finding a grave because they often found treasures in ancient tombs. But the first explanation is better.
Someone could object that although life is useless if given to miserable men, yet it is useful if given to those who enjoy prosperity. He removes this possibility saying, "Why are they (i.e. light and life) given to man whose way is hidden?" The way of a man is hidden because he does not know how the state of his present prosperity will end. As Proverbs says, "Laughter will be mixed with pain, and the end of joy is grief,"(Prov. 14:13) and Jeremiah, "Man's road is not in his control." (10:23) and Qoheleth, "What necessity is there for man to seek greater things for himself, when he does not know how to use things profitable for himself in this life? Or who can indicate what will be after him under the sun?"(7:1) He explains how the way of man is hidden on the earth saying, "And God has hedged him in with darkness." This is evident in many ways. First, as to those things which happened in the past or will happen in the future Qoheleth says, "Many are the afflictions of man because he is ignorant of the past and the future or who can tell him how it will be?" (8:6) Second, as to what is near him, namely men. As I Cor. says, "For who knows a man's thoughts but the spirit of the man which is in him."(2:11) As to those things above a man, the last chapter of I Timothy says, "He (God) lives in inaccessible light, whom no man sees or is able to see,"(1 Tim. 6:16) and in the Psalms, "He makes the darkness his hiding place."(17:12) Finally as to those things which are below him, Qoheleth says, "All things are difficult, a man cannot explain them with speech." (1:8) God is said to have hedged a man in with darkness because God bestows the kind of intellect on him which not able to understand these things.

After he shows that the life of man is difficult because of the unhappiness and bitterness of men, he applies to himself what he said about men in general. In this he expresses his own bitterness when he says, "Before I eat, I sigh," for as laughter is a sign of joy, so sighing is a sign of bitterness of soul. In this he shows the manner of his bitterness from the manner of his sighing. He began his sighing easily, "Before I eat, I sigh." And his sighing was continuous and great. So he adds, "and my wailing is like flood water." For as sighing is a sign of moderate sorrow, so wailing is a sign of vehement sorrow, a sorrow which can hardly be tolerated. This wailing is compared to the roaring of water, for water which moves swiftly makes a murmuring sound. So a man experiencing great affliction is provoked to wailing from a slight recollection of his misery. He continues, "like flood water," to emphasize the continuous character of his bitterness, for flooding water moves continuously and makes a loud noise.
Because bitterness of soul arises from unhappiness, after he speaks of the bitterness of his soul, he next speaks about his unhappiness saying, "For the thing that I fear comes upon me." Note here that the unhappiness of man which provokes bitterness seems to consist in two things. First, in the damage to his things or his person and in dishonor. As to the first two, he says,"For the thing that I fear comes upon me," i.e. those things which I fear happen to me. Here this expression refers to the greatness of loss and pain for the more prudent someone is, the more he recognizes what can happen to him in a time of adversity when he is still in a time of prosperity. So Sirach says, "In the day of prosperity, do not forget evil." (9:27) Job, who was the most prudent of men, suffered great unhappiness when the very evils happened to him which he feared. As for the second, dishonor, he says, "and what I dread befalls me." According to Aristotle, shame is "the fear of dishonor."63 He shows therefore by this that from great glory, he fell into many disgraces and dishonors.
______________FROM NO OTHER REASON THAN FROM BEING AFFLICTED - SHAME HERE, TOO!
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To summarize what Job said in his lamentation, note that three things are contained in it. First, he shows his own life is wearisome ("Cursed be the day of my birth") v. 3; second, the greatness of the unhappiness which he was suffering ("Before I eat, I sigh) v. 24; and third, he shows his innocence (Have I not dissembled) v. 26 and so on.
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THE SECTION I WAS INTERESTED IN - CH 9
- can man be justified/argue before God?

He consequently shows a sign of how he knows this. When a man is just in comparison to another man, he can freely and securely argue with him, because justice and truth are made clear in mutual discussion. However, no man is secure when he argues with God. So he adds, "If anyone will wish to argue with him," i.e. man with God, "he will not be able to answer him "one question for a thousand." Truly we should note that the greatest number which has a proper name is in our usage a thousand,135 for all the higher numbers are named as multiples of the lower numbers, for example, ten thousand, one hundred thousand. This happens reasonably, for according to the ancients,136 the species of numbers extend up to ten and beyond this one repeats the first numbers again (1,2,3,) and this fact is clear according to the names, whatever the truth of the matter. For the cube of ten is one thousand137 for one thousand is ten times ten times ten. Thus Job chooses the number one thousand as the highest of the numbers which designates for us every large determined quantity. When he says that man cannot respond to God, "one question for a thousand," it is the same as if he were to say: no determined measure of number can express how much divine justice exceeds human justice, since the latter is finite but the former is infinite.
He shows as a consequence that man cannot approach God in any proportion in arguing a case when he says, "He (God) is wise in heart and Almighty in power." For there are two types of dispute. There is one in which the dispute is carried on by argument and this is done by wisdom. There is another when the dispute is carried on by force and this is depends on power. In both of these, God exceeds man, because in both his strength and wisdom he exceeds all strength and wisdom. Consequently he shows both of these pre-eminences. First he shows the preeminence of God in power which he certainly begins to show in relation to men when he says, "what man has resisted him and found peace?" as if to say: "No one." Note that man obtains peace in one way from someone who is more powerful and in another way from one who is less powerful or his equal in power. For clearly the more powerful acquires peace from the less powerful by fighting against him, as when a powerful king wages war against a rebellious subject in his kingdom and after he obtains victory, re-establishes the peace of his kingdom. In the same way, a man also sometimes obtains peace from someone who is his equal in power by fighting him. For although he cannot overcome him, he can still wear him out by his persistence in the fight and lead him to sue for peace. But one never obtains peace from someone who is more powerful by resisting and fighting him, but by submitting himself to him humbly. Thus, an evident sign that the strength of God excedes all human strength is the fact that no one can have peace with him by resisting him, but only by obeying him humbly. As Isaiah says, "You will maintain us in peace. Peace surely which comes because we trust in you."(26:3) However, the wicked who resist God cannot have peace, as Isaiah says, "For the wicked, the Lord says there is no peace." (57:21) He means this here when he says, "What man has resisted him and found peace?"

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VERY INTERESTING....
Because Blessed Job wished to affirm that he does not desire to argue with God, he showed the depth of the wisdom of God in natural things using many examples. Now, however, he wishes to show the profundity of the divine wisdom in human affairs. Note here that three things pertain to the governor of human affairs. The first is that he should dispense the precepts of justice and other benefits to those subject to him. The second is that he should examine the acts of his subjects and the third is that he should subject those whom he finds guilty to punishments. In these three things he shows the immense profundity of divine power. First, because he provides his benefits so deeply and with such finesse for his subjects that it cannot be grasped even by those who receive them. He addresses this theme when he continues ,"Should he come near me, I will not see; if he withdraws, I will not know him." (WOW - this is way better than the merely impassioned - anxious - desiring-God version I gave, although nevertheless I think my version was certianly true to my experience) Note that in the Scriptures, God is said to come near to man when he bestows his benefits on him, either by illuminating his intelligence, exciting his love, or bestowing any kind of good on him. So Isaiah says, "Our God Himself will come and save us." (35:4) On the other hand, God is said to withdraw from man when he withdraws his gifts or his protection from him. Psalm 9 says, "Why, O Lord, do you stand afar off? Why do you despise me in opportunities in trial?"(v.22) Now it happens that God sometimes permits trials or even some spiritual defects to happen to some to obtain their salvation, as Romans says, "All things work together for the good of those who love God." (8:28) In this way God comes to man to obtain his salvation, and yet man does not see him because he cannot perceive his kindness. On the other contrary, God does not take away his manifest gifts from many men, and yet they turn them to their own destruction. So God is said to go away from man in the sense that man does not understand that he withdraws from him. Therefore the depth of the divine wisdom appears in the dispensation of his gifts.
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Therefore, after he has shown in many ways the immensity of the divine power and the depth of the divine wisdom, he draws the conclusion to the proposition, namely that his intention is not to argue with God. He explains this when he says, "Am I great enough," as powerful and wise as possible, "to answer him," i.e. to answer the most powerful and most wise God when he interrogates me "and to address him in my own words." This means by examining his deeds and saying, "Why do you do this?"(v.12) as if to say: I am not sufficient to argue with God, for argument consists in answering and making objections. Sometimes although one is not powerful or wise, he is still not afraid to argue with a judge because of the security of his conscience. But Job excludes this reason for disputing with God from his case when he says, "Even if I were somewhat just, I could not answer him at all," with God examining me in defense of my own justice, "but will rather ward off my judge by earnest prayer," not asking for justice, but for mercy. He says clearly, "Even if I were somewhat just," to show the uncertainly of human justice by using the words, "even if I were." As St. Paul says, "I have nothing on my conscience, but I am not justified in this," (I Cor. 4:4) to show that the justice of man is insignificant and imperfect when related to the divine testing of it he says following Isaiah, "All our just deeds", in his sight, "are like polluted cloth."(64:6)

He shows the consequence of his prayer for pardon when he says, "If I appeal to him and he hears my call, I do believe that he would hear my words." For God sometimes does not hear someone’s prayer according to what he wishes, but according to what actually succeeds. Just like a doctor does not heal the plea of the sick man who asks him to take the bitter medicine away, (if the doctor does not remove the remedy he knows to be health inducing, he nevertheless hears the actual advantage of the plea of the patient because he induces the health, which the sick person greatly desires), God does not take away trials from a man set down in the midst of trial, although he prays for mercy, because he knows that trials are useful to final salvation. Thus, although God truly heeds him, nevertheless the man who set down in the midst of miseries does not believe that he is heard. He shows why he does not believe he is heard when he says, "For in the storm, he will wear me away." As is his custom, he now explains what he has said metaphorically saying, "and even multiply wounds without cause." To wear away is to multiply wounds, i.e. trials. This wearing away is in "The storm," in terrifying darkness, which he has said is "without cause," namely, which is not clear and understood by the man who is afflicted. For if an afflicted man should understand the reason why God afflicts him and that the afflictions are useful to his salvation, clearly he would believe that his prayer had been heard. But because he does not understand this, he does not believe that his prayer has been heard. So he not only suffers exteriorly but also interiorly, like an invalid, who does not know that he will achieve health from a bitter cure, would not only suffer from the bad taste (of the medicine), but also in his spirit. He continues, "He will not permit my spirit to rest," for a spirit rests although the flesh is afflicted because of the hope of an end to the affliction, according to what the Lord teaches in Matthew, "Blessed are you when they utter evil against you," and later "Rejoice, for your reward is great in heaven."(5:11, 12) So when I am struck down exteriorly and I do not rest interiorly, "he fills me with bitterness," interiorly and exteriorly.

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Sometimes, however, although a man has no other witnesses to speak in his behalf, he is still confident in his case because he trusts in the testimony of his own conscience. Yet even the witness of conscience cannot prevail for men against the contrary accusation of God. He shows this in several degrees. The testimony of conscience has three levels, the highest of which is when one’s conscience wants to render testimony that he is just, as Romans says, "The spirit himself renders testimony to our spirit that we are sons of God." (8:16) But this witness cannot stand fast against divine censure. He therefore says, "If I should want to justify myself," i.e. if I want to say that I am just, when God instead is objecting that I am junjust," my own mouth will condemn me," for it will render me worthy of condemnation for blasphemy. The second level is when someone, although he does not presume that he is just, still does not find fault with himself in his conscience for some sin, as I Cor. says, "My conscience convicts me of nothing." (4:4) But this witness cannot stand against God either, and so he says, "if I show myself innocent," i.e. if I want to show that I am without sin," he will prove me wicked," in that he will show sins of which I am not conscious to myself and others. For Psalm 18 says, "Who understands his crimes?" (v.13) The third degree is when someone, although he might be interiorly conscious of sin, still takes for granted either he had no evil intention or he did not do it from malice and deceit, but from ignorance and weakness. But this testimony also does not stand for man against God either. So he says, "If I am simple," without the deceit and duplicity of a depraved intention, "my soul will not know this." For man is unable to discern the fluid motion of his affection, both because of its variation and the mingling and impulse of many passions. Because of this, Jeremiah says, "The heart of man is wicked and inscrutable. Who will understand it?" (27:9) It is because of the ignorance of these sorts of things that man knows neither himself nor his state and life is rendered wearisome even to the just. So he says, "and I will be weary of life."