I wrote something earlier that was delightfully over-simplifying. The end, for instance, with the concern about presenting error, I should not have been so worried about, insofar as one "has" an error one "has" a truth, albeit the wrong side of it. The intellect holds contraries (Aquinas says this somewhere) not as suffering them, but one as being the means of knowing the other. I always found this difficult as I considered truth to be a "package" deal - a "unity" - a fundamental intuition about the whole of reality that can be articulated at will at various necessary levels. In fact, I thought of "truth" as a good grasp of metaphysical explanations. This, however, is oversimplifying. First, on the part of process. Truth per se may not be a process, but truth for human beings normally involves process - i.e. learning, and reason - maybe "error" is not a necessary notion in coming to the truth, insofar as error would mean holding to a way of thinking, because knowing two possibilities does not mean that one is "in error" but that one has knowledge of opposites. Or is this applicable to this? it seems a difficult way to learn - and maybe it is, maybe it is faster to shut up and listen - maybe this is the "wisdom" and the "peace" of being little ones, but on the other hand if nothing is articulated who will speak? Who will give glory to God in that way? The Spirit surely teaches us and moves us and tis is the 'better way' surely but to share it is surely better - and to move something according to its mode of moving and to our mode of moving is more of a cooperation - a co-work.
Fundamental intuitions (which I choose not to explore here because I want to include not only the fundamental unteachable things of the intellect but also perceptions of reality). Actually, I don't know what. I am going to risk saying stupid things because I have to say them to figure out whether they are wrong. So I am casting deliberation aside in favor of a more rapid process.
What is truth? What is more fundamental - truth or being? Being IS going to be more fundamental - what is confusing is that truth is an "intermediary" between being and being (my teacher suggested something about intellect being a "middle ground" and not privileged).
__________________________________________________________________
Article 3. Whether the true and being are convertible terms?Objection 1. It seems that the true and being are not convertible terms. For the true resides properly in the intellect, as stated (1); but being is properly in things. Therefore they are not convertible. Objection 2. Further, that which extends to being and not-being is not convertible with being. But the true extends to being and not-being; for it is true that what is, is; and that what is not, is not. Therefore the true and being are not convertible. Objection 3. Further, things which stand to each other in order of priority and posteriority seem not to be convertible. But the true appears to be prior to being; for being is not understood except under the aspect of the true. Therefore it seems they are not convertible. On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Metaph. ii) that there is the same disposition of things in being and in truth. I answer that, As good has the nature of what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in De Anima iii that "the soul is in some manner all things," through the senses and the intellect. And therefore, as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect. Reply to Objection 1. The true resides in things and in the intellect, as said before (1). But the true that is in things is convertible with being as to substance; while the true that is in the intellect is convertible with being, as the manifestation with the manifested; for this belongs to the nature of truth, as has been said already (1). It may, however, be said that being also is in the things and in the intellect, as is the true; although truth is primarily in things; and this is so because truth and being differ in idea. Reply to Objection 2. Not-being has nothing in itself whereby it can be known; yet it is known in so far as the intellect renders it knowable. Hence the true is based on being, inasmuch as not-being is a kind of logical being, apprehended, that is, by reason. Reply to Objection 3. When it is said that being cannot be apprehended except under the notion of the true, this can be understood in two ways. In the one way so as to mean that being is not apprehended, unless the idea of the true follows apprehension of being; and this is true. In the other way, so as to mean that being cannot be apprehended unless the idea of the true be apprehended also; and this is false. But the true cannot be apprehended unless the idea of being be apprehended also; since being is included in the idea of the true. The case is the same if we compare the intelligible object with being. For being cannot be understood, unless being is intelligible. Yet being can be understood while its intelligibility is not understood. Similarly, being when understood is true, yet the true is not understood by understanding being. Article 4. Whether good is logically prior to the true?Objection 1. It seems that good is logically prior to the true. For what is more universal is logically prior, as is evident from Phys. i. But the good is more universal than the true, since the true is a kind of good, namely, of the intellect. Therefore the good is logically prior to the true. Objection 2. Further, good is in things, but the true in the intellect composing and dividing as said above (Article 2). But that which is in things is prior to that which is in the intellect. Therefore good is logically prior to the true. Objection 3. Further, truth is a species of virtue, as is clear from Ethic. iv. But virtue is included under good; since, as Augustine says (De Lib. Arbit. ii, 19), it is a good quality of the mind. Therefore the good is prior to the true. On the contrary, What is in more things is prior logically. But the true is in some things wherein good is not, as, for instance, in mathematics. Therefore the true is prior to good. I answer that, Although the good and the true are convertible with being, as to suppositum, yet they differ logically. And in this manner the true, speaking absolutely, is prior to good, as appears from two reasons. First, because the true is more closely related to being than is good. For the true regards being itself simply and immediately; while the nature of good follows being in so far as being is in some way perfect; for thus it is desirable. Secondly, it is evident from the fact that knowledge naturally precedes appetite. Hence, since the true regards knowledge, but the good regards the appetite, the true must be prior in idea to the good. Reply to Objection 1. The will and the intellect mutually include one another: for the intellect understands the will, and the will wills the intellect to understand. So then, among things directed to the object of the will, are comprised also those that belong to the intellect; and conversely. Whence in the order of things desirable, good stands as the universal, and the true as the particular; whereas in the order of intelligible things the converse of the case. From the fact, then, that the true is a kind of good, it follows that the good is prior in the order of things desirable; but not that it is prior absolutely. Reply to Objection 2. A thing is prior logically in so far as it is prior to the intellect. Now the intellect apprehends primarily being itself; secondly, it apprehends that it understands being; and thirdly, it apprehends that it desires being. Hence the idea of being is first, that of truth second, and the idea of good third, though good is in things. Reply to Objection 3. The virtue which is called "truth" is not truth in general, but a certain kind of truth according to which man shows himself in deed and word as he really is. But truth as applied to "life" is used in a particular sense, inasmuch as a man fulfills in his life that to which he is ordained by the divine intellect, as it has been said that truth exists in other things (1). Whereas the truth of "justice" is found in man as he fulfills his duty to his neighbor, as ordained by law. Hence we cannot argue from these particular truths to truth in general.
Intellectual movmenet being more perfect not in that it can hold contraries but that it can be the means of being united to something bigger - to being? "Being beyond being" - or beyond knowing - this is something interesting - and yet not chosen by Aquinas fr whom God has knowledge and love - the relation etween being and truth - truth IS being - but with the aspect o f being related to the intellec t- the intellect - why was my teacher resisting the priviliged access? Because speaking per se (which is always stronger by the way - the intellect is a better way of knowing than mere snese knowledge, but as we experience - as we are, in fact, for the "big" things - fr the "real" things - not only God but hte world which inclines us towards him -THIS IS THE DISTINCTION WHICH MAKES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MY CONFUSION AND MY TEACHER'S NON-CONFUSION.
I don't know what to do with this world and things. I take Aquinas at his word when he talks about "science" of "creatures" being superir to love of them, whereas "love" of God being superior to knowledge of him. But also what I wasn't sure about then was whether love was a willing or a passion but it doesn't matter at that point because it is CONSIDERED SEPARATELY FROM APPREHENSION/COGNITION - "being well affected" towards divine things can happen without any passion, and yet IT IS NOT A COGNITIVE PROCESS ESSENTIALLY.
Cognition, in a sense, is morally indifferent - it is more noble than a lower mode of being which "has only its own form" but "having the forms of other htings" while a more exciting mode of being does not yet have the notion of "being fulfilled in that". It is a fundamental orientation that happens in a more perfect way because of this more perfect way of being - this is not the telos itself.
Cognition can hold contraries - it can be or not be - one can know what is virtuous and what is not virtuous without thereby being virtuous or not virtuous - it is not like "knowing" heat by becoming it. And this is what I am struggling with - the fact that I see that people who are more careful to know God seem to be more close to him by affection - or if not by affection, at least by likeness of form - than those who merely profess to love God - or who perhaps do not profess it so much as I imagine they would. But I may be projecting their "velleity" from my own or I may not - becuase one dimension of passion is potency - potency to do in the active sense from the fact that it is passive in the first sense - to receive forms.
And so perfection for me meant for a long time knowledge and in this sense Plato was not wrong but did not finish the journey - because he saw that knowledge made better men (and even Aquinas says the "good of man consists in reason) he thought that knowing itself is what makes a man better.
And to say, as Maxime did, that perhaps contra Hegel that religion is the broader sphere of absolute spirit than philosophy seems counter-intuitive especially when we see so many people hurting each other in the name of religion - whether by acts of aggression or even with simple-faith "nice people" NOT BEING MERCIFUL as we would expect them to be in imitation of their heavenly father and we find more mercy in those who have knowledge and they seem to be more like God even if they don't have "charity" in the sense of being connected to God.
"Little children, love one another." "From this all shall know that you are my followers, that yu love one another." "Love one another as I have loved you." "Be perfect, as your heavenly father is perfect." "He ate with the tax collectors and sinners." "There is more rejoicing in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety-nine who have no need of repentance." "Those who say 'Lord, Lord, we cast out devils in your name and spoke in the streets," (actually I'll get the section:
MATTHEW CHAPTER 7
17. In the same way, every good tree bears good fruit, but the bad tree bears bad fruit.
18. A good tree cannot bear bad fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit.
19. Every tree that does not bear good fruit is cut down and thrown into the fire.
20. Thus you will know them by their fruits.
21. "Not everyone who says to me, 'Lord, Lord,' will enter the kingdom of heaven, but only the one who does the will of my Father in heaven.
22. On that day many will say to me, 'Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy in your name, and cast out demons in your name, and do many deeds of power in your name?'
23. Then I will declare to them, 'I never knew you; go away from me, you evildoers.'
24. "Everyone then who hears these words of mine and acts on them will be like a wise man who built his house on rock.
25. The rain fell, the floods came, and the winds blew and beat on that house, but it did not fall, because it had been founded on rock.
26. And everyone who hears these words of mine and does not act on them will be like a foolish man who built his house on sand.
27. The rain fell, and the floods came, and the winds blew and beat against that house, and it fell-- and great was its fall!"
28. Now when Jesus had finished saying these things, the crowds were astounded at his teaching, 29. for he taught them as one having authority, and not as their scribes.
Add to this the whole chapter of Matthew 25:
Matthew 25 [Context] [Commentary]
1. "Then the kingdom of heaven will be like this. Ten bridesmaids took their lamps and went to meet the bridegroom.
2. Five of them were foolish, and five were wise.
3. When the foolish took their lamps, they took no oil with them;
4. but the wise took flasks of oil with their lamps.
5. As the bridegroom was delayed, all of them became drowsy and slept.
6. But at midnight there was a shout, 'Look! Here is the bridegroom! Come out to meet him.'
7. Then all those bridesmaids got up and trimmed their lamps.
8. The foolish said to the wise, 'Give us some of your oil, for our lamps are going out.'
9. But the wise replied, 'No! there will not be enough for you and for us; you had better go to the dealers and buy some for yourselves.'
10. And while they went to buy it, the bridegroom came, and those who were ready went with him into the wedding banquet; and the door was shut.
11. Later the other bridesmaids came also, saying, 'Lord, lord, open to us.'
12. But he replied, 'Truly I tell you, I do not know you.'
13. Keep awake therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour.
14. "For it is as if a man, going on a journey, summoned his slaves and entrusted his property to them;
15. to one he gave five talents, to another two, to another one, to each according to his ability. Then he went away.
16. The one who had received the five talents went off at once and traded with them, and made five more talents.
17. In the same way, the one who had the two talents made two more talents.
18. But the one who had received the one talent went off and dug a hole in the ground and hid his master's money.
19. After a long time the master of those slaves came and settled accounts with them.
20. Then the one who had received the five talents came forward, bringing five more talents, saying, 'Master, you handed over to me five talents; see, I have made five more talents.'
21. His master said to him, 'Well done, good and trustworthy slave; you have been trustworthy in a few things, I will put you in charge of many things; enter into the joy of your master.'
22. And the one with the two talents also came forward, saying, 'Master, you handed over to me two talents; see, I have made two more talents.'
23. His master said to him, 'Well done, good and trustworthy slave; you have been trustworthy in a few things, I will put you in charge of many things; enter into the joy of your master.'
24.Then the one who had received the one talent also came forward, saying, 'Master, I knew that you were a harsh man, reaping where you did not sow, and gathering where you did not scatter seed;
25. so I was afraid, and I went and hid your talent in the ground. Here you have what is yours.'
26. But his master replied, 'You wicked and lazy slave! You knew, did you, that I reap where I did not sow, and gather where I did not scatter?
27. Then you ought to have invested my money with the bankers, and on my return I would have received what was my own with interest.
28. So take the talent from him, and give it to the one with the ten talents.
29. For to all those who have, more will be given, and they will have an abundance; but from those who have nothing, even what they have will be taken away.
30. As for this worthless slave, throw him into the outer darkness, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth.'
31. "When the Son of Man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on the throne of his glory.
32. All the nations will be gathered before him, and he will separate people one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats,
33. and he will put the sheep at his right hand and the goats at the left.
34. Then the king will say to those at his right hand, 'Come, you that are blessed by my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world;
35. for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me something to drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me,
36. I was naked and you gave me clothing, I was sick and you took care of me, I was in prison and you visited me.'
37. Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry and gave you food, or thirsty and gave you something to drink?
38. And when was it that we saw you a stranger and welcomed you, or naked and gave you clothing?
39. And when was it that we saw you sick or in prison and visited you?'
40. And the king will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me.'
41. Then he will say to those at his left hand, 'You that are accursed, depart from me into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels;
42. for I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me nothing to drink,
43. I was a stranger and you did not welcome me, naked and you did not give me clothing, sick and in prison and you did not visit me.'
44. Then they also will answer, 'Lord, when was it that we saw you hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not take care of you?'
45. Then he will answer them, 'Truly I tell you, just as you did not do it to one of the least of these, you did not do it to me.'
46. And these will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life."
____________________________________________
Of course I tend to exaggerate the defects of simple-faith people - I forget all the charity that goes with it and the miscalculations in judgement that make them act in ways that seem to me less than merciful. There is a velleity and a good disposition that meets, however, with blocks. And yet I preferred to gravitate to the more understanding - mercy seemed to me to be real piety, whereas "piety" understood generally - or not understood at all, but merely invoked with all its power - HAS great power, both for good and for harm, and I saw its possibilities.
There is something so attractive about mercy that seems to be connected so much with God. God has the capacity to forgive actually and to give grace - we have the ability to offer this to other people by means of encountering them, identifying with them, which passion should and may fundamentally do but when half-education gets in the way, a whole-education is needed to correct it. And by "mercy" I don't mean abusing justice - I mean facing sorrowful people with unconditional love -with an unconditional good disposition towards them which informs every interaction one has with them - it is not a cognitive process but a love. And maybe Aquinas deconstructs this well but I stand in danger of doing so at this point in my articulations because my articulations tend to become over-cognitive because I do not know, like many philosophers, how to explain what is and experience but get confused in the bridge between reality and language so that the language becomes an inadequate vehicle.
And if more learned people offered this mercy more than uneducated but "pious" people - then I preferred to gravitate towards them, and always towards the more merciful. If the "learned" gravitated away from this I chose to go with the more merciful simple people. But I am presenting this too simply again - I am presenting the more reflexive consciousness of me - the one that I was more deliberate with - I have been in the opposite position of tending towards non-mercy - which is really all that really pious people do - it is an error of judgment based on a misdirected fear based on perhaps misguided knowledge or maybe more appropriately an incomplete affection?
Perfect love casts out fear - and when it does so, it brings a mercy so far as it is possible for a finite being to offer.
And in this sense love/affection/religion IS PRIOR TO PHILOSOPHY - I have confused the relative positions because of the signs of true mercy being more in philosophers than in simple-religionists. And maybe philosophers have charity in addition to this - maybe not necessarily - certainly not theoretically necessarily which is a new jump for me - I was Platonist insofar as I thouhgt that knowledge implied virtue because looking for knowledge was already tending to the reality - the res, if you will - and the disposition towards it which is a willing thing was already something virtuous. But this is a confusion - this is thinking that one's own motivations and motivational cause is an essential - formal and material cause - of the result whereas what impels one towards a result may not be the result itself - the result may have an ever greater potential - but the key word there is potential which can be something greater or not - or the potential to be something rather bad - (and there is a principle that the corruption of the best would be the worst).
And so now the point is not to fear (as I have also tended) that I will corrupt into something worse, but to discover what is new and good - and the first thing to discover is that I really can hold contraries intellectually and that this may have nothing to do with what I am -that freedom goes further than holding other things within myself - that freedom may happen before holding many things in myself - that the middle term is a mediating process that is not the end in itself although it may increase and intensify the good that comes after.
Need tolook at II-IIae question 82. 3=
Objection 1. It would seem that contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion. No cause hinders its effect. But subtle considerations about abstract matters (Wow! He voiced something I was unsure about and had to dive into and dismiss because I coldn't articulate and thought it was a senseless "feeling" or a leftover of misguided approach to God - misguided piety or fear or uncertainty and tried to outweigh by a rational consideration of God's creating us to "be" in his image - he is glorified in our power as much as in our weakness) are often a hindrance to devotion. Therefore contemplation or meditation is not the cause of devotion.
Objection 2. Further, if contemplation were the proper and essential cause of devotion, the higher objects of contemplation would arouse greater devotion. But the contrary is the case: since frequently we are urged to greater devotion by considering Christ's Passion and other mysteries of His humanity (THE REAL WORDS ARE: frequenter enim maior devotio excitatur URGED IS TOO INTELLECTUAL! ex consideratione passionis Christi, et aliis mysteriis humanitatis ipsius, quam ex consideratione divinae magnitudinis.) than by considering the greatness of His Godhead. Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion. (WONDERFUL POINT! I thought it would be more rational to contemplate the mysteries of the Godhead which is why I was surprised when I foudn the rosary so "effective").
Objection 3. Further, if contemplation were the proper cause of devotion, it would follow that those who are most apt for contemplation, are also most apt for devotion. Yet the contrary is to be noticed, for devotion is frequently found in men of simplicity and members of the female sex, who are defective in contemplation. (Leave aside feminist commentaries for now). Therefore contemplation is not the proper cause of devotion.
On the contrary, It is written (Psalm 38:4): "In my meditation a fire shall flame out." But spiritual fire causes devotion. Therefore meditation is the cause of devotion.
I answer that, The extrinsic and chief cause of devotion is God, (THE RES HERE! THE REAL THING - but not only as regards the subject relating to him, but in terms of real causality - of God's being the intersubjective before our subjective happens - of his being intersubjective first )
of Whom Ambrose, commenting on Luke 9:55, says that "God calls whom He deigns to call, and whom He wills He makes religious: the profane Samaritans, had He so willed, He would have made devout." But the intrinsic cause on our part (THE LESSER, necessary, instrumetnal)must needs be meditation or contemplation. For it was stated above (Article 1) that devotion is an act of the will to the effect that man surrenders himself readily to the service of God. Now every act of the will proceeds from some consideration, since the object of the will is a good understood. Wherefore Augustine says (De Trin. ix, 12; xv, 23) that "the will arises from the intelligence." Consequently meditation must needs be the cause of devotion, in so far as through meditation man conceives the thought of surrendering himself to God's service. Ondeed a twofold consideration leads him thereto. The one is the consideration of God's goodness and loving kindness, (I would have liked ot put "philosophY' under this umbrella in view fo my specific agenda here but perhaps it is a problem to impose my agenda in this self-contained section??? depends on context which I haven't sat with enough) according to Psalm 72:28, "It is good for me to adhere to my God, to put my hope in the Lord God": and this consideration wakens love ['Dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. 27] which is the proximate cause of devotion. The other consideration is that of man's own shortcomings, on account of which he needs to lean on God, according to Psalm 120:1-2, "I have lifted up my eyes to the mountains, from whence help shall come to me: my help is from the Lord, Who made heaven and earth"; and this consideration shuts out presumption whereby man is hindered from submitting to God, because he leans on His strength. (In the latin it wouldn't be clear that it was "god's" strength to be leaning on, but one's own? which is the case? )
Reply to Objection 1. The consideration of such things as are of a nature to awaken our love ['Dilectio ,' the interior act of charity; cf. 27] of God, causes devotion; whereas the consideration of foreign matters that distract the mind from such things is a hindrance to devotion.
Reply to Objection 2. Matters concerning the Godhead are, in themselves, the strongest incentive to love ['dilectio,' the interior act of charity; cf. 27] and consequently to devotion, because God is supremely lovable. Yet such is the weakness of the human mind that it needs a guiding hand, not only to the knowledge, but also to the love of Divine things by means of certain sensible objects known to us. Chief among these is the humanity of Christ, according to the words of the Preface [Preface for Christmastide], "that through knowing God visibly, we may be caught up to the love of things invisible." Wherefore matters relating to Christ's humanity are the chief incentive to devotion, leading us thither as a guiding hand, although devotion itself has for its object matters concerning the Godhead.
Reply to Objection 3. Science and anything else conducive to greatness, is to man an occasion of self-confidence, so that he does not wholly surrender himself to God. The result is that such like things sometimes occasion a hindrance to devotion; while in simple souls and women devotion abounds by repressing pride. If, however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is increased.
Okay, I copied way more than I wanted to - all I wanted was the answer to objection three. "If however, a man perfectly submits to God his science or any other perfection, by this very fact his devotion is increased."
This notion of "submission" is, I think, a very crucial one for me because it concerns, in a way, what I am trying to get at with passion, and which I have such difficulty approaching.
Perfection and corruption both have to do with submission with anything that is less than infinite. But submission as we understand it usually involves a negation of perfection - a corruption - a surrendering (not towards the better ) but towards what is not oneself - a relinquishing of autonomy. And, in a way, it can be a relinquishing of resistance - with the intellect which has both possibilities but willingly relinquishes the other theoretical -but also to some extent "real" possibility - intellect not determined to one thing - but one can submit without "the other possibility" when one's nature is already ordained to that thing and this is what makes it complicated for me - I do not know the discussion well - is God our "natural" end? I want to say "yes" and I was about to do so but I do not know if philosophically Aquinas would do something different. Submission as something free - subjection would be the other possibility - it is violent and there is only one other possibility - submission, depending on who is submitting to, can involve many possibilities of submission and exclude many possibilities of non-submission? Which is more multiple, the good or the bad? It is hard for me to understand right off the bat because many things are required for good, but only one thing is required for something to be "off" (see this in the affective order where one sorrow hinders every pleasure) but this is not the same with every case such as us as a whole who are mixed with potentiality which tends us towards perfection but does not leave us wholly actual and thus it is impossible not to have first movements of venial sin for us here - which, however, hardly really partakes of the notion of "the bad" - and I assume there must be degrees even of venial sin and some where there can be not even the hint of sin present perhaps but what some translate as "sin" might actually be a case fo the strongest virtue - becuase being "subject" in this world does require resistance - which is why I was also confused becuase I thought of continence as something that was a "pseudo-virtue" but that there were other real possibilities (again it is all a question of degree) but also of externals! The facts are, as I am beginning to realize -the presence of chance and being material beings subjected to many causes, while our wills and intellects are not necessarily DIRECTLY INFLUENCED and while everything is ESSENTIALLY INCLINING US TOWARD GOD it is impossible that there be no potential first movements in other directions. Impossible. But also like Augustine and Dewan says, for example, a lie (which is not exactly a first movement) but what I would call a laudable lie - telling the proverbial Nazis there are no Jews in your house - "If that's the only lie that you have to worry about, you're pretty near perfect."
Okay. So where was I? Approaching.
No comments:
Post a Comment