ratio of good or ratio of evil as presented to teh appetite? heavily loaded word. I thought, to make a case for it being something uniting apprehensive elements to the good, that he could have used "aspect" instead for example, but found only one example of "aspect" in the whole section. but I don't need an elaborate argument.
Case 28. Place 27. Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 27 a. 1 ad 3. Ad tertium dicendum quod pulchrum est idem bono, sola ratione differens. Cum enim bonum sit quod omnia appetunt, de ratione boni est quod in eo quietetur appetitus, sed ad rationem pulchri pertinet quod in eius aspectu seu cognitione quietetur appetitus. Unde et illi sensus praecipue respiciunt pulchrum, qui maxime cognoscitivi sunt, scilicet visus et auditus rationi deservientes, dicimus enim pulchra visibilia et pulchros sonos. [...]-2
I don't even have to stress baout this 22.2
does talk about "magis" of appetitive
Magis autem trahitur anima ad rem per vim appetitivam quam per vim apprehensivam.
and also in the ad 3
Unde patet quod ratio passionis magis invenitur in actu sensitivae virtutis appetitivae, quam in actu sensitivae virtutis apprehensivae, licet utraque sit actus organi corporalis.
I keep on forgetting this...
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In my experience /ratio/ is one of the richest words Aquinas uses. It is usually translated by term like: 'notion' or 'meaning' or 'idea,' but it's much richer than that. I've never tried to write down my take on /ratio/ before. My thoughts might be all jumbled. Feel free to ignore them. Here goes:
Since intellection separates /in mente/ what /in re/ is only found together, and joins /in mente/ what /in re/ is only found apart, for an intellection to be a true intellection, it must have a proximate similitude with the thing being understood such that the thing can be understood under the appearance in which the intellect is understanding it. I think that the /ratio/ is the manner in which an intellection is similar to a thing.
Thus: It belongs to the 'ratio boni' that an appetite is quieted by the good. The good differs from /esse absolute/ and from any particular /ens/ in that it is being viewed according to its relation to an appetite. So it is not being as it is in itself, but it is being according to something, namely its appetible qualities. So the 'ratio boni,' namely the reason why any given thing can be understood sub specie boni, is the desirability of things, namely the complacency of the appetite in the thing.
So, trying to bring together that whole jumble, the /ratio/ is not merely what is contained within the mind (the intellection), nor what is in the thing (reality), but it is in the way that the idea corresponds to reality by viewing reality, not as it is, but according to true divisions and combinations.
You might say that it is the 'concept' and the 'meaning' and the 'idea,' but it is all these things viewed in relation to the thing itself, not merely viewed abstractly.
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