Causes of pleasure

Hypothesis (35.2 -
Reply to Objection 3. The sensibles of touch are painful, not only in so far as they are disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but also in so far as they are contrary to nature: whereas the objects of the other senses can indeed be disproportionate to the apprehensive power, but they are not contrary to nature, save as they are subordinate to the sensibles of touch. Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; (OKAY - SO MAN’S NATURAL PLEASURES ARE BROADER THAN ANIMALS - AND THIS IS EVEN BEFORE REASONED PLEASURES, WHICH ARE JOY. THE STRUCTURE OF PLEASURE IS THAT IT IS HAPPENING A LOT AND HAPPENING IN RESPECT OF HUMAN NATURE THAT IS HABITUALLY TOWARDS KNOWING AS WELL AS TOWARDS PRESERVING NATURE (USE) HENCE, ALL THE EIGHT ARTICLES OF PLEASURE ARE ABOUT PLEASURE - CHECK - AND NOT EVEN ABOUT JOY YET. JOY (INTELLECTUAL PLEASURE) REQUIRES A LOT MORE THAN SORROW (INTELLECTUAL PAIN) - inasmuch as pleasure itself is already kind of oriented towards midway perfection - the highest form of the passion of pleasure will be accordingly of a different kind. so man naturally takes pleasure in a lot of things
but joy is "reasoned" - read 31.3 again

now it seems at first that everything that falls under pain also falls under "interior apprehension" - it doesn't have to be intellect necessarily, but certainly under imagination. Now this is also a broader distinction "interior and exterior" between "sensitive and rational". - Follows reason "consequuntur rationem" (Q. 30 ARt. 3 -

[34819] Iª-IIae q. 30 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, concupiscentia est appetitus boni delectabilis. Dupliciter autem aliquid est delectabile. Uno modo, quia est conveniens naturae animalis, sicut cibus, potus, et alia huiusmodi. Et huiusmodi concupiscentia delectabilis dicitur naturalis. Alio modo aliquid est delectabile, quia est conveniens animali secundum apprehensionem, sicut cum aliquis apprehendit aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, et per consequens delectatur in ipso. Et huiusmodi delectabilis concupiscentia dicitur non naturalis, et solet magis dici cupiditas. Primae ergo concupiscentiae, naturales, communes sunt et hominibus et aliis animalibus, quia utrisque est aliquid conveniens et delectabile secundum naturam. Et in his etiam omnes homines conveniunt, unde et philosophus, in III Ethic., vocat eas communes et necessarias. Sed secundae concupiscentiae sunt propriae hominum, quorum proprium est excogitare aliquid ut bonum et conveniens, praeter id quod natura requirit. Unde et in I Rhetoric., philosophus dicit primas concupiscentias esse irrationales, secundas vero cum ratione. Et quia diversi diversimode ratiocinantur, ideo etiam secundae dicuntur, in III Ethic., propriae et appositae, scilicet supra naturales.

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1), concupiscence is the craving for pleasurable good. Now a thing is pleasurable in two ways. First, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal; for example, food, drink, and the like: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be natural. Secondly, a thing is pleasurable because it is apprehended as suitable to the animal: as when one apprehends something as good and suitable, and consequently takes pleasure in it: and concupiscence of such pleasurable things is said to be not natural, and is more wont to be called "cupidity."
Accordingly concupiscences of the first kind, or natural concupiscences, are common to men and other animals: because to both is there something suitable and pleasurable according to nature: and in these all men agree; wherefore the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 11) calls them "common" and "necessary." But concupiscences of the second kind are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and suitable, beyond that which nature requires. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11) that the former concupiscences are "irrational," but the latter, "rational." And because different men reason differently, therefore the latter are also called (Ethic. iii, 11) "peculiar and acquired," i.e. in addition to those that are natural.

. whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.

q. 32

Is operation the proper cause of pleasure?
Is movement a cause of pleasure?
Do hope and memory cause pleasure?
Does sadness cause pleasure?
Are the actions of others a cause of pleasure to us?
Is doing good to another a cause of pleasure?
Is likeness a cause of pleasure?
Is wonder a cause of pleasure?

a) operation - achieves, act of appetite is - also operation itself is connatural
b) (3 objects - they translated - Three things are requisite for pleasure; two, i.e. the one that is pleased (I think I took it as the "delighted in" object but maybe they make more sense) and the pleasurable object conjoined to him; and a third, which is knowledge of this conjunction) - regarding all 3 mvmt is pleasant a) change pleasnat to us b/c of our nature is changeable, b) continued action of an agent increases its effect exceeding natural habitude c) on the part of knwledge inasmuch as the whole can't be perceived at once).
c) two passions cause pleasure - presence of the suitable good is first, second is hope, which has pleasurable conjunction in X - and 3rd, memory - only ocnjunction of apprehension
d) sadness a) brings to mind love b) calls to mind present deliverance
e) others 1) obtain some good "since it is pleasant to be benefited by another" 2) make us know or appreciate our own good 3) another's actions if good reckoned to be one's own
f) doing good 1) thru love look on their benefit as our own 2) consideration of end - hope from God or man - hope is cause of pleasure 3) principle (a) doing good arouses imagination of abundant good in oneself - can share b) in a way connatural - e.g. liberal one c) motive - to do for someone we love.
g) likeness - kind of unity - one with us (can accientally not be)
h) wonder - pleanst to get what one deisres - wonder a kind of desire for knowledge