Passions in another author

http://www.erudit.org/revue/LTP/1984/v40/n2/400093ar.pdf
from p. 208
Powers
We may say in general that a power describes the capability of suffer some
action of an agent or to cause some effect to occur. As Aquinas explains: «... A
power is nothing but a thing's principle of operation, whether it be an action or a
passion. Indeed, a principle is not the subject acting or undergoing an action, but that
by which an agent acts or a patient undergoes an action... »18 There are three different
types of powers which may be distinguished : passive powers, active powers which are
capacities to act, and powers which are actions.
17. The Soul, 12 ad 7 (p. 157).
18. The Soul, 12 (p. 153).


Less relevant

ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
A passive power is the principle of a thing by which the thing suffers some action
of an agent. Aquinas calls that which is related to a power as the agent acting on that
power the « object » of the power, and describes this agent as a « principle and
moving cause.»19 This agent causes something in the patient which was only
potential to become actual. Thus, as Aquinas explains, « a thing is said to be passive,
from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it
was in potentiality...»20 The potential which is actualized with the exercising of a
passive power can either be potential for changing substantially or accidentally.21
Thus a patient may be moved to take on a substantial form or an accidental form. In
general we may say that the exercising of a passive power involves some change of
state in the patient itself effected by the activity of some agent. We may, then,
characterize passive powers in the following manner : x has passive power PEE given
that certain background conditions are met22 if the appropriate agent acts on x then a
certain effect E occurs such that E involves some substantial or accidental state in x.
We may describe the state in which the patient has a certain passive power as the
possibility for that patient to be effected in the above manner, representing this effect
by a verb in the passive voice. Thus we can alternatively give the following
characterization of passive powers : x has passive power PE o for x to beCPed, where
d> represents any transitive verb.23 Thus a rock has the passive power to be cooled or
heated, a sponge has the power to be depressed, and a body has the power to be
moved.
It is important to interpret carefully the modal operator in the above formulation
of passive powers. The possibility which is referred to is not a logical, but rather an
ontological possibility. The patient has the possibility of being effected in some way
by an agent due to the potential it has to take on certain substantial and accidental
forms. Thus it is in the nature of the patient itself to have a certain passive power. For
instance, it is not merely logically possible that a stone can be heated, but possible
given the type of thing it is ; and it is not simply logically possible that a man can see,
but an ontological possibility given the nature of man.
Sometimes Aquinas refers to active powers as capacities to act in some way, the
action of which can produce an effect. The object of an active power is the end of its
corresponding action. For example, the object of my power to walk is the relocation
of my body. Thus the power is defined in terms of its act, and the act is defined in
terms of its end or result. Aquinas puts it this way :
19. ST, I, 77, 3.
20. ST, I, 79, 2.
21. The Soul, 12 (p. 154).
22. These background conditions include conditions which are necessary for the action of the object or
agent to be effective on the patient. For example, an agent will not be effective in moving a body if
there is some force (e.g. magnetic field) holding it in place.
23. There will be some awkwardness in finding adequate verbs to interpret certain passive powers, in
particular the passive powers of living organisms. For example, what verb do we use in describing the
power of an animal to see? « To be colored» suggests that the eye itself takes on color, although for
Aquinas this is not the case (see ST, I, 78, 3). «Te be sighted» carries similar inappropriate
connotations. However, the adequacy of the analysis of passive powers I offer here does not turn on
the facility of our language to fit the analysis in all cases.
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RICHARD W. FIELD
Act, though subsequent in existence to power, is, nevertheless, prior to it in
intention and logically ; as the end is with regard to the agent. And the object,
although extrinsic, is, nevertheless, the principle or end of the action ; and those
conditions which are intrinsic to a thing, are proportionate to its principle and
end.24
Now Aquinas speaks of active power as « the principle of acting upon something
else,»25 and further he says that, « In creatures, power is the principle not only of
action, but likewise of effect.»26 But we must be cautious in interpreting Aquinas
here, for there is no conceptual difficulty in conceiving of an action which has no
effect. I can move my hand, and in so moving it I have acted in a certain way. But this
action does not necessarily entail an effect which proceeds from it. As Aquinas says,
in sensible things «actions and passions, so far as these imply movement, differ from
the relations which result from action and passion...»27 Thus there is nothing
logically or conceptually problematic with an action which has no effect. What I take
Aquinas' point to be in these texts is that any action which proceeds from the active
power of a subject has to be, in principle, capable of producing an effect. Thus the
movement of my hand would, if certain conditions were met, produce a movement in
a susceptible patient.
We may, then, characterize active powers which are capacities in the following
manner : x has the capacity PEE given that certain background conditions are met,28 x
may perform a certain action A, where A is an action which is capable of producing
an effect. Once again, as we have seen with passive powers, we can interpret an
agent's capacity as a possibility to perform action A, representing A by a verb in the
active voice. Thus we might alternatively characterize active powers which are
capacities in the following manner: x has the capacity PEofor x toO, where 0
represents any verb denoting an action which can have an effect. Once again we must
note that the modal operator does not merely represent a logical possibility, but
rather an ontological possibility due to a potentiality of the agent which can be
actualized.
There is, however, a second type of active power which Aquinas speaks of in
connection with God. In this second sense active power is not taken to mean the
principle or source of an action, but as being an action. Since there is nothing in God
which is potential,29 the power of God cannot result from potentiality. Thus the
power of God must be an action. We speak of this as a power in the sense that, as
with the active powers of created things, the action may be productive of an effect.30
24. ST, I, 77, 3 ad 1.
25. ST 1,25, 1.
26. ST, I, 25, I ad 3.
27. ST, 1,41, 1 ad 2.
28. Again, the background conditions include conditions necessary for the agent to act in accordance with
its capacity. If these conditions are not met it would in no way entail that the agent does not have the
capacity in question. For example, if a certain person had a leg in a cast and could not move the limb
this would not drive us to say that the person lacks the capacity to move the leg, but simply that there
is a temporary restraint on such movement.
29. ST, I, 25, 1 ad 1.
30. ST, I, 25, 1 ad 3.
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ST. THOMAS AQUINAS
We may characterize active powers in this sense as follows: x has active power
P = x performs action A, where A is an action capable of producing an effect ;
or alternatively : x has active power P E x<2>'s, where Orepresents any verb denoting
an action which can have an effect.
Powers of the Soul
For Aquinas the powers of the soul are properties. This allows him to deny that
such powers are either the essence of the soul, a status reserved for the powers of
God,31 or purely accidental to the living organism. Rather the powers of the soul are
necessary accidents which are the principles by which a living organism acts. Aquinas
puts it this way : « It is evident that the essence of the soul is not the immediate
principle of its operations, but that it operates through accidental principles.
Consequently the powers of the soul are not the essence itself of the soul, but are
properties of it.»32
As I have indicated earlier, I believe that in order to make sense of the sensitive
and vegetative powers we must postulate that I have called inclusive properties. This
is clearly the case with the powers of the sensitive soul, for all animals have some
sensation, but not all animals have all five of the senses. The only sense which is
common to all animals, according to Aquinas, is touch.33 Thus it is only touch which
is convertible with the subject « animal » and is, therefore, a simple property.
Consequently the powers of the sensitive soul, which include the five exterior and
four interior senses,34 must be inclusive properties expressible in the propositional
form P3 above. This expression, in the case of the sensitive powers, includes one
power, namely touch, which is also a simple property of animals, but, as we have
seen, this is possible for inclusive properties, while it is not possible for exclusive
properties.
The vegetative powers also must be considered inclusive properties. Aquinas
includes three powers under the genera of the vegetative : nutrition, augmentation or
growth, and generation.35 These powers are active powers,36 and, as we shall see
shortly, they are active powers in the sense of being capacities for action. Now, if
these powers were simple properties then we should be able to infer from the fact that
any body is living that it has the capacity to grow and generate its own kind. But
surely not all animals have the capacity to grow and generate offspring their entire
lives. For instance, there appears to be no meaningful sense in which we can say of an
adult human being that he or she can grow. Furthermore, there are some animals
31. ST, I, 77, 1.
32. The Soul, 12 (p. 155).
33. ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, Commentary on Aristotle's De Anima, in Aristotle's De Anima in the Version of
William of Moerbeke and the Commentary of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Kenelm FOSTER and Sylvester
HUMPHRIES (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1951), ii. 3, 260 (p. 185).
34. ST, I, 78, 3-4.
35. Sr, 1,78,2.
36. ST, I, 79, 2 ad 3.
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RICHARD W. FIELD
which never have a capacity to generate their own kind — in the case of sterilization,
for example, or as is the case with mules. These cases demonstrate that we cannot
consider the augmentative and generative powers to be simple properties.
However, we must consider the nutritive power to be a simple property, for