"man alone takes pleasure"

man alone takes pleasure in the source of other things for their own sake.

Consequently man alone, who is a perfectly cognizant animal, takes pleasure in the objects of the other senses for their own sake; whereas other animals take no pleasure in them save as referable to the sensibles of touch, as stated in Ethic. iii, 10. Accordingly, in referring to the objects of the other senses, we do not speak of pain in so far as it is contrary to natural pleasure: but rather of sorrow, which is contrary to joy. So then if pain be taken as denoting bodily pain, which is its more usual meaning, then it is contrasted with sorrow, according to the distinction of interior and exterior apprehension; although, on the part of the objects, pleasure extends further than does bodily pain. But if pain be taken in a wide sense, then it is the genus of sorrow, as stated above.

Pleasure extends further than does bodily pain... is it a bodily pleasure here?


OKAY - "natural" "connatural" nature, etc. appear in question 32 - 28 times.
The causes of pleausre are more than the causes of pain. They are connatural operation, movement (change) in general and then passions in particualr, hope (which enters with memory and what is primary in it there is the facutly or capacity for acheiving - certainty comes in ad3) and sorrow; actions (of others, of oneself) then likeness (unity) then wonder (desire).

Operation - efficiently and object-ly, movement (changeable nature of us as subject; change of object so it doesn't exceed its effect like fire drying up; on the part of knowing (it) wants to know wholly and perfectly, but some things can't - so delight in the change and succeeding to another hope and memory (hp 2nd best conjunction - knowing and power to reach) memory - (3rd best - conjunction of apprhension only) sorrow (actually calling to mind loved - in past - inlight of deliverance) actions of others (pleasant to be benefited; makes us know/ appreciate our own good; reckon their good as our good) action of ourselves doing good for others (effect united to others by love - their benefit is ours; hope of future good from man or God; as principle - a) imagines abundant good which can share CHILDREN AND WORKS b) habitual inclination to do good - connaturality c) moved by love to do) likeness (unity - refers also to sim. art. on love - 27.3 - if increases our good, pleasurable simply, if accidentally hurts it - b/comes disgust or sadness inasmuch as hurts something more one with us i) by surfeit as with food, ii) by removing sufficiency - not enough profits to go round). wonder (getting what one desires cause of pleasure - the greater the desire, the greater the pleasure - increase of desire increases pleasure inasmuch as gives rise to hope since deisre arising from hope that causes pleasure. Scarcity. ALso representation -
Also, representations of things, even of those which are not pleasant in themselves, give rise to pleasure; for the soul rejoices in comparing one thing with another, because comparison of one thing with another is the proper and connatural act of the reason, as the Philosopher says (Poet. iv). This again is why "it is more delightful to be delivered from great danger, because it is something wonderful," as stated in Rhetor. i, 11. (THIS IS MOST INTERESTING - which could be another cause of pleasure in sorrow - inasmuch as there is hope - the comparisons...? I know sometimes I take pleasure in learning from my own experience even if it was painful... I can go back with a different eye).

So - operation, change, passion, action, likeness, and wonder (nowhere here are sensible pleasures mentioned particuarly - although that was done more in 31.)

Reminds me of reading the Metaphysics -
operation first - how it is achieved, and proper operation is itself the congenial good. 2nd act of being, change b/c our nature is changeable is the 1st reason - which involves our own way of being - "suitability" changes for us. The good which changes us is also good to be changed so it doesn't go beyond our habitude. 3 - knowing a good - parts must be known at a time - whole is desired to know but can't be all at once - so passing god. passion (hope and memory) inasmuch as it concerns the conjunction one way or another, passion (sorrow) inasmuch as calls to mind thought of loved, or concerns current deliverance, action (of others) our receiving from them is good; cause us to know/appreciate our own good (WHAT DOES THIS SAY OF PRIMACY OF POLITICS FOR RECEIVING/ACTION AND CLOSENESS TO SELF - AND HOW POLITICS IS NECESSARY FOR SELF-ESTEEM EVEN? we are more closely connected than all the ones worried about "self-interest" would think = this comes before our own actions!!!) their good is our good (friendship) action (of ourselves) i) object: love - take pleasure in their good as ours; hope to get some further good; ii) principle a) imagines good in ourselves to be abundant as to share b) connatural - thru habit c) being moved by love
likeness - unity wonder - relation to everything else - think opening sentence of the Metaphysics.

BTW don't know if I mentioned cognates of nature, natural and connatural appear 28 times in 32 - not too shabby for 8 articles

NOW WHAT DOES THIS HAVE TO SAY ABOUT SORROW?

Sorrow has only four causes.

Question 36. The causes of sorrow or pain
Is sorrow caused by the loss of a good or rather by the presence of an evil?
Is desire a cause of sorrow?
Is the craving for unity a cause of sorrow?
Is an irresistible power a cause of sorrow?

Loss of good/presence of evil (in there he talks about privation which is nothing less than the contrary habit - so it has to do with something already had)
1st question says if we were talking of reality - would be no import - it is according to the nature of hte apprehension that we are dealing. Why? Movement in consequence of apprehension - inasmuch as "apprehended" is a being - even speaking in this way - it is the more towards the place then away from a place that happens. But sorrow (as a category of movement) regards the flight part - the "away from" so it will be more concerned with the "present evil".

DESIRE - really love
has been said that the object is the source of the momvent but also the principle is the inward inclination of the appetite - first regards good, 2nd rejection of evil. the first principle of the mvmt is love, which is the 1st inclination of appetite towards psssn of good, 2nd is hatred - but since concupiscence is the 1st effect of love (which gives rise to greatest pleasure - 32.6) Augustine sometimes speaks of it in this way (as we said (30, 2, ad 2) and thus says desire cause of sorrow in this way. Desire proper - (and not understood as "love") can cause sorrow but not universally.
SO THIS IS REALLY MORE ABOUT LOVE BEING THE CAUSE OF HTE APPETITE - although desire is granted a less common place. ad 3 desire causes pleasure when there is hope

UNITY

IRRESISTIBLE POWER
because against its inclination (violent - in my words) it has to be stronger but not that much stronger because it notes that if it transforms - there is no logner repugnacne or violence. Sets the tone for a tension - sorrow is a maintenance - it is a kind of holding of the thing at bay, even if minimal exercise of power - it is a defence.

loss of good/presence of evil
apprehensive - he spoke a lot in categories of reception/loss before although here it becomes less important in context - 'makes no difference' in reality - but to the apprehension (there is a "contrary habit" - already making space for why it should be "something")

love - inclination - primary (also desire - mvmt twds - in a way but not for every sorrow) important b/c
But it cannot be a universal cause of sorrow: since we sorrow more for the loss of present good, in which we have already taken pleasure, than for the withdrawal of future good which we desire to have. (Hence the "loss" of good rather than absence of good of 1)

irresistible power
influential power which sets the whole thing going - the first three were from the subject's pov. 1) how the object appears on the scene to it 2) what is its relation to the good that defines its disposition when in the bad 3) having all the elements for its own perfection - the reason why it should love anything in the first place - instead of random goods - unity would be prior to love in this sense inasmuch as unity would be a reason for love LOOK UP 27.3 I think it was!
4) the irresistible power - in view of everything that is going on - something appears, adn the inclination and the motivatin for the subject is not enough to deal with the situation - well there is something else afoot. - a power clearly, but an irresistible - (irresistible is different from "stronger" because as long as something is still sorrowful it is strong - e.g. a man lifting a heavyweight can only hold it up for so long bcause it doesn't cease its resistance).