(slightly of interest - though less so - is the question whether movement is a source of pleasure.. very backhandedly related)
Article 2. Whether delight is in time?
Objection 1. It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Objection 2. Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.
Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2. Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3. Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.
Articulus 2
[34840] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.
[34841] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.
[34842] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio.
[34843] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem.
[34844] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens. Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.
[34845] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore.
[34846] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod per accidens est in tempore.
[34847] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore.
No comments:
Post a Comment