Sorrow

Is all sorrow evil?
Can sorrow be a virtuous good? ('honest' - no appearance of 'virtuous' in text)
Can it be a useful good?
Is bodily pain the greatest evil?
1. is every sorrow bad (mala)

[35204] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid esse bonum vel malum, potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se. Et sic omnis tristitia est quoddam malum, hoc enim ipsum quod est appetitum hominis anxiari de malo praesenti, rationem mali habet; impeditur enim per hoc quies appetitus in bono.
That something is good or bad can be said in two ways. One way, simply and according to itself. And so every sadness is in a way bad, for this that the appetite of man is uneasy concerning a present evil, has the ratio of the bad; for it impedes through this the rest of appetite in the good (BAD B/C IMPEDES PLEAUSRE - WHICH IS HERE DEPICTED AS OPERATION "REST IN THE GOOD" IS AN OPERATION FOR AQUINAS AS APPEARS IN 34 either 1 or 2)

Alio modo dicitur aliquid bonum vel malum, ex suppositione alterius, sicut verecundia dicitur esse bonum, ex suppositione alicuius turpis commissi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sic igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat.
Another way something can be called good or bad, from another supposition, as shame is called good, on the supposition that something disgraceful has been done, (4 eth). So therefore, supposing there is something saddening or painful, it pertains to goodness (bonitatem) that something evil being present should sadden or cause pain.
Quod enim non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque istorum est malum manifeste. Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor.
For that something should not be saddened or pained, could not happen unless he would not be sensing, or that he would not regard it as repugnant to himself, and either one of these is clearly a bad thing (est malum). And therefore it pertains to goodness that, supposing the presence of something bad, sadness or pain should follow.
Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., adhuc est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum, nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena. Sed quia sermones morales sunt in singularibus, quorum sunt operationes, illud quod est ex suppositione bonum, debet bonum iudicari, sicut quod est ex suppositione voluntarium, iudicatur voluntarium, ut dicitur in III Ethic., et supra habitum est.
And this is what Augustine says - so far as it is good that one mourns lost good, for unless something good had not remained in nature, there would not be pain at lost good in punishment.
But because moral discussions (sermones) are about singulars, which operations are, that which is good on some supposition, ought to be judged good, just as that which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged voluntary, as is said in Ethics III (voluntary on some supposition.... IT IS ON "SOME SUPPOSITION" THAT CONSTITUTES MORAL DISCUSSIONS - very important distinction is 'what is good acc. to complexion and what is good acc. to appearing - talks about leper - there are many individual constitutions)
it seems also to me that sadness cannot be a measure of virtue b/c one can be sad due to impediments, incompletions, etc. for example i may have been very sad about 'the divine good' for a long time but i was sad that i was 'not getting it' - morally, what is at issue is that i was not really sad concerning it itself... b/c acedia is not about laziness - b/c then it would be the opposite of carefulness, and it is not about dulness due to excessive pampering, which would be carnal excesses - but it is opposed to joy.

CAN SORROW BE An HONEST GOOD? (trnsltd as 'virtuous' - no justificaiton in text)

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, potest esse bonum honestum.
According to that whereby sorrow is good, it can be an honest good
Dictum est enim quod tristitia est bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali. Quae quidem duo in dolore corporali, attestantur bonitati naturae, ex qua provenit quod sensus sentit, et natura refugit laesivum, quod causat dolorem.
For it has been said that sadness is good according to the knowledge and refusal of good. Indeed these two in bodily pain attest to the goodness of nature, from which the it happens that the sense senses, and nature flees the hurtful, which causes pain.
In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere rationem boni honesti.
Now interior sadness, when it is a certain knowledge of something bad is throug the judgment of reason (HERE IS WHEN REASON APPEARS IN SADNESS - BEFORE IT WAS INDIFFERENTLY THE INTELLECT/SIVE IMAGINATION); and the refusal of evil is through the will that is well disposed in hating the evil. For every honest good proceeds from these two things, namely that it is from rectitude of reason and the will. Whence it is clear that sadness can have the character (rationem) of the honest good.

3. IS PLEASURE A USEFUL GOOD?

[35219] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus. Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est praesens, non potest non esse praesens.
A twofold appetitive movmeent arises from present evil. ONe is certainly that the appetite is contraried by the present evil. And from this part sadness doesn't have usefulness, because that which is present, cannot not be present. (No use - helpless)
Secundus motus consurgit in appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter.
Secondly a motion consurging from the appetite to flee or repel the saddening evil. (HERE IS WHERE I WAS CONFUSED - SADNESS TO BE DESCRIBED CONCEPTUALLY AS A 'REST' DID NOT SIT WELL WITH MY EXPERIENCE - AND NEITHER IS AQUINAS ABLE TO REMAIN WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS - BUT I SEE THE DISTINCTION NOW - IF HOPE REMAINS OF REPELLING IT IN THE FUTRE - FIND - further down - and would this repelling be anger, then, or daring, or hope?)
And inasmuch as directed to this, sadness has utiltiy, if it is be concernning that which is to be fled. For something must be fled in two ways.
Uno modo, propter seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad poenitentiam. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus.
One way, on its own account, from the contrariety which it has to the good; as sin. ANd therefore sadness concerning sin is useful for this that man flees sin, as the apostle says, "I rejoice, not becuase you are saddened, but becuase you are saddened towards penance." Another way is something to be fled, not because it is bad according to itself, but becuase it is an occasion of bad; (WHICH IS SOMETHING I NEVER REALLY UNDERSTOOD BEFORE, NOR THAT EVERY ONE HAS HIS OWN HABITUDE...); provided that either the man indeed clings to it excessively through love, or also through this that he is precipated into something evil, as is clear in temporal goods.
Et secundum hoc, tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum.
And according to this, sadness for temporal goods, as Eccl. says, it is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of "good times" (convivi); for by that the end of all men is reminded.
Ideo autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut malum vehementius fugiatur.
Therefore sadness in every fleeing is useful, because it doubles the cause of fleeing. For the bad according to itself is to be fled, while that sadness according to itself all flee, so alsoall desire the good, and pleasure concerning the good. Just as therefore pleasure concerning the good makes one seek the good more avidly, so sadness concerning the bad makes one flee the bad more vehemently.


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CAN BODILY PAIN BE THE WORST EVIL (prologue)
CAN SORROW BE THE WORST EVIL??? (1st 2 objections)
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quae est de vere malo, non potest esse summum malum, est enim aliquid eo peius, scilicet vel non iudicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia peius esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum.
It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be the worst evil of man. For every sorrow or pain is either concerning this that something is truly bad, or concerning something appearing bad, which is really good. But pain or sorrow which are about bad truly,c annot be the worst bad thing, for it is oemthign worse that one should not judge to be bad what is truly bad, or also not to refuse it. But sorrow or pain which concerns the apparent bad, which is truly good, cannot be the worst evil, because it would be worse to be totally alienated from the true good. Whence it is impossible that any sorrow or pain should be the worst evil of the human being.