25.2

Objection 1. It would seem that the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions. For the order of the passions is that of their objects. But the object of the irascible faculty is the difficult good, which seems to be the highest good. Therefore the irascible passions seem to precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 2. Further, the mover precedes that which is moved. But the irascible faculty is compared to the concupiscible, as mover to that which is moved: since it is given to animals, for the purposed of removing the obstacles that hinder the concupiscible faculty from enjoying its object, as stated above (23, 1, ad 1; I, 81, 2). Now "that which removes an obstacle, is a kind of mover" (Phys. viii, 4). Therefore the irascible passions precede the concupiscible passions.
Objection 3. Further, joy and sadness are concupiscible passions. But joy and sadness succeed to the irascible passions: for the Philosopher says (Ethic. iv, 5) that"retaliation causes anger to cease, because it produces pleasure instead of the previous pain." Therefore the concupiscible passions follow the irascible passions.

25.2
I answer that, In the concupiscible passions there is more diversity than in the passions of the irascible faculty. For in the former we find something relating to movement--e.g. desire; and something belonging to repose, e.g. joy and sadness. But in the irascible passions there is nothing pertaining to repose, and only that which belongs to movement. The reason of this is that when we find rest in a thing, we no longer look upon it as something difficult or arduous; whereas such is the object of the irascible faculty.

Okay, so here it is from the perspectives of 'rest' and 'movement" - keeping it well in the categories that remind one of the phenomenon rather than using the metaphysical of good. so concupiscible here appear as wider becuase it is both moving and exerting itself and resting - why it would be broader in this case is that it has more activities that fall under it (for rest can be considered an activity). The concupiscible is thus something "big" and not merely something "easy" and therefore contemptible, as one might assume if one creates the logic that the "difficult" is "better". The "activity" of the irascible and the seemingly better good which motivates them makes it seem this way. But Aquinas reverses it in the respondeo - the concupiscible actually contains more (and we see in the responses that it also contains the difficult good - being "prior" to it - the being "prior" is not in an earlier or impoverished sense, but in a richer sense, in that it contains the irascible - the irascible is the concupiscible going out of its way to be concupiscible, one might say. And we get this sense of endurance and durability and effort and "conatus" (at least in hope) for the irascible, whereas the original motivation comes from the love which transforms the thing from the start to endure and to do whatever is necessary and possible to become united with the thing which transformed it.

Now since rest is the end of movement, it is first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible faculty with those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good, it is evident that in the order of execution, the irascible passions take precedence of such like passions of the concupiscible faculty: thus hope precedes joy, and hence causes it, according to the Apostle (Romans 12:12): "Rejoicing in hope."
Here rest comes in as that which is sought - primary in intention, it 'motivates' the thing as I have suggested. Last in the order of execution, it is something that remains close in the first sense but distant and maintained at a distance in the second sense. And here Aquinas notes that the irascible passions precede and even cause concupiscible passions - noting the experience.


But the concupiscible passion which denotes rest in evil, viz. sadness, comes between two irascible passions: because it follows fear; since we become sad when we are confronted by the evil that we feared: while it precedes the movement of anger; since the movement of self-vindication, that results from sadness, is the movement of anger. And because it is looked upon as a good thing to pay back the evil done to us; when the angry man has achieved this he rejoices.
Sadness is situated between two irsacible passions because it is something that was desired helplessly to be warded off in fear while anger is concerned with "self-vindication" that happens from sadness. Here also the love is reinstated - the love of self appears as another good on the horizon and having achieved the "meting out" which enables the concupiscible to take place again.

Thus it is evident that every passion of the irascible faculty terminates in a concupiscible passion denoting rest, viz. either in joy or in sadness.

But if we compare the irascible passions to those concupiscible passions that denote movement, then it is clear that the latter take precedence: because the passions of the irascible faculty add something to those of the concupiscible faculty; just as the object of the irascible adds the aspect of arduousness or difficulty to the object of the concupiscible faculty. Thus hope adds to desire a certain effort, and a certain raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good. In like manner fear adds to aversion or detestation a certain lowness of spirits, on account of difficulty in shunning the evil.
Comparing simply the ones htat are concerned with movmeent (having looked at hte irascible's relation to rest, both with the positive passion of hope and the vulnerable passion of fear and the anti-vulnerable passion of anger) he notes that the concupiscible still "take precedence" here because htey are concerned with simple objects while the irascible adds something else. Hope is desire with "raising of the spirits to the realization of the arduous good" something more than determination - a kind of confident or expansive determination, expansive at least in the minimal degree of pulling the subject in its wake.
Fear appears here as a 'certain lowness of spirits' which if correct sounds sipmly like sadnss - i guess it is the same as sadness except that the sadness regards difficulty whereas real sadness regards impossibility - in this sense there would be a tiny difference.
Accordingly the passions of the irascible faculty stand between those concupiscible passions that denote movement towards good or evil, and those concupiscible passions that denote rest in good or evil. And it is therefore evident that the irascible passions both arise from and terminate in the passions of the concupiscible faculty.
So this does not come out simply with "love" is the chief of all, (THIS IS NOT ABOUT LOVE, IT'S ABOUT CONCUPISCIBLE) it is concerned with their interactions and how the irascible passions are deployed by and reintroduce the concupiscible passions upon the scene.

I think it is ipmortant to remember the asnwers to the objections, particularly the second one, wihch gives insight into hte thought-processes involved in this article.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument would prove, if the formal object of the concupiscible faculty were something contrary to the arduous, just as the formal object of the irascible faculty is that which is arduous. But because the object of the concupiscible faculty is good absolutely, it naturally precedes the object of the irascible, as the common precedes the proper.

Reply to Objection 2. The remover of an obstacle is not a direct but an accidental mover: and here we are speaking of passions as directly related to one another. Moreover, the irascible passion removes the obstacle that hinders the concupiscible from resting in its object. Wherefore it only follows that the irascible passions precede those concupiscible passions that connote rest. so it would be the moving concupiscible that deploys.... (what about love?) The third object leads to the same conclusion.

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Objection 1. It would seem that love is not the first of the concupiscible passions. For the concupiscible faculty is so called from concupiscence, which is the same passion as desire. But "things are named from their chief characteristic" (De Anima ii, 4). Therefore desire takes precedence of love.
Objection 2. Further, love implies a certain union; since it is a "uniting and binding force," as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv). But concupiscence or desire is a movement towards union with the thing coveted or desired. Therefore desire precedes love.
Objection 3. Further, the cause precedes its effect. But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love: since some love on account of pleasure (Ethic. viii, 3,4). Therefore pleasure precedes love; and consequently love is not the first of the concupiscible passions.
Here it is interesting because the first two objections focus on "desire" which seems to be considerably more "active" than love. Conc. being named from desire supports this (1) and so does the fact that love itself is concerned with uniting - it seems desire does the better job (relaly hard to resist these!2)
the third takes the point of view of pleasure preceding love (convincing in view of hte lsat article where we have seen "rest is primary" in intention) but here he takes it from the pov of pleasure being sometimes the cause of love (it seems not intentionally, but "causally" here.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7,9) that all the passions are caused by love: since "love yearning for the beloved object, is desire; and, having and enjoying it, is joy." Therefore love is the first of the concupiscible passions.
The Sed Contra throws both kinds of objection into relief in which love appears as the cause of both - desire and joy have their existence only from the love which is the condition of their possibility/appearance.
Love is seen as that which is in different circumstances - in the one circumstance having, in the other not. love is the subject - this sed contra clarifies by re-unifying the vision - it is love which can give a unity of action here.

I answer that, Good and evil are the object of the concupiscible faculty. Now good naturally precedes evil; since evil is privation of good. Wherefore all the passions, the object of which is good, are naturally before those, the object of which is evil--that is to say, each precedes its contrary passion: because the quest of a good is the reason for shunning the opposite evil.
Rather broad beginning. Doesn't exclude either 1st or 2nd kind of objection but contextualizes his discussion. Good precedes evil, b/c evil is a privation of good. Shunning evil here is in light of the "quest of a good" (which sounds like desire here)

Now good has the aspect of an end, and the end is indeed first in the order of intention, but last in the order of execution. Consequently the order of the concupiscible passions can be considered either in the order of intention or in the order of execution
A distinction we are familiar with from the last article, except that "good" appears rather than "rest" which is significant because the last article was concerned with what was moving what, and here we are concerned with what kind of what is moving what. The order of "execution" we have already seen is possible for the concupiscible to appear before, after, or as mediating irascible passions (like sadness - b/c so foreign to the nature of the composite that it must be a mediator for a healthy organism).

In the order of execution, the first place belongs to that which takes place first in the thing that tends to the end.
Okay, so zeroing in on execution first instead of intention like he did in the last article. Not a causal stream, but simply what "takes place first" "has first place".

Now it is evident that whatever tends to an end, has, in the first place, an aptitude or proportion to that end, for nothing tends to a disproportionate end; secondly, it is moved to that end; thirdly, it rests in the end, after having attained it.
Because we are here speaking of a natural movement or of something that has a close parallel with a natural movement while being more complex (in that it is self-moved, reflexive) such natural moments would apply - 1) aptitude or proportion - assimilation - tendency - is given. "It is moved" secondly - conceptually it is possible to split the two - becuase it being moved is different from it having a similarity - a progression towards the thing which changed it has begun, and 3) rest in "having attained" (in a unity as he phrases elsewhere).

And this very aptitude or proportion of the appetite to good is love, which is complacency in good; while movement towards good is desire or concupiscence; and rest in good is joy or pleasure.
He gives the names accordingly to each step of the way of love, desire, and delight.

Accordingly in this order, love precedes desire, and desire precedes pleasure. But in the order of intention, it is the reverse: because the pleasure intended causes desire and love. For pleasure is the enjoyment of the good, which enjoyment is, in a way, the end, just as the good itself is, as stated above (11, 3, ad 3).
It is thus in the order of "things happening" that love will always be first. If one looks at what is internal to the thing's self-explication or reflexive awareness of the affair, (WRONG BECAUS SOMETIMES WE Don't know what it is!) the "good" causes both, and here the good can be seen as enjoyment as well as the objective thing (the subjective way of describing unity with real good without / without being able to describe the good itself).

Reply to Objection 1. We name a thing as we understand it, for "words are signs of thoughts," as the Philosopher states (Peri Herm. i, 1). Now in most cases we know a cause by its effect. But the effect of love, when the beloved object is possessed, is pleasure: when it is not possessed, it is desire or concupiscence: and, as Augustine says (De Trin. x, 12), "we are more sensible to love, when we lack that which we love." Consequently of all the concupiscible passions, concupiscence is felt most; and for this reason the power is named after it.
The intensity of the expeirence of absence of the loved thing causes the faculty to be named for desire.

Reply to Objection 2. The union of lover and beloved is twofold. There is real union, consisting in the conjunction of one with the other. This union belongs to joy or pleasure, which follows desire. There is also an affective union, consisting in an aptitude or proportion, in so far as one thing, from the very fact of its having an aptitude for and an inclination to another, partakes of it: and love betokens such a union. This union precedes the movement of desire.
"Aptitude or proportion" anticipates real union and causes it.

Reply to Objection 3. Pleasure causes love, in so far as it precedes love in the order of intention.

In all three of these (I am thinking also of the next question) the order of execution is treated primarily than the order of intention. This is because the nature of passion itself is that it is a change, so that the order of execution remains the essential and constitutive of its description. Love will be the first in this sense - it originates the change - it is a change itself insofar as the object is said to have influence on the subject, which influence is maintained throughout and in fact causes the other passions although he cannot get rid of hte primacy of the end which is real union - one kind of union towards real union.

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ARTICLE THREE

I answer that, As stated above (Article 1) all irascible passions imply movement towards something. Now this movement of the irascible faculty towards something may be due to two causes: one is the mere aptitude or proportion to the end; and this pertains to love or hatred, those whose object is good, or evil; and this belongs to sadness or joy. As a matter of fact, the presence of good produces no passion in the irascible, as stated above (23, 3,4); but the presence of evil gives rise to the passion of anger.
Since then in order of generation or execution, proportion or aptitude to the end precedes the achievement of the end;
it follows that, of all the irascible passions, anger is the last in the order of generation.
And among the other passions of the irascible faculty, which imply a movement arising from love of good or hatred of evil, those whose object is good, viz. hope and despair, must naturally precede those whose object is evil, viz. daring and fear: yet so that hope precedes despair; since hope is a movement towards good as such, which is essentially attractive, so that hope tends to good directly;
Also I believed he mentioned the "per se" somewhere, was it above? What is through itself is stronger than what is through something else

whereas despair is a movement away from good, a movement which is consistent with good, not as such, but in respect of something else, wherefore its tendency from good is accidental, as it were.

In like manner fear, through being a movement from evil, precedes daring. And that hope and despair naturally precede fear and daring is evident from this--that as the desire of good is the reason for avoiding evil, so hope and despair are the reason for fear and daring:
because daring arises from the hope of victory, and fear arises from the despair of overcoming

Lastly, anger arises from daring: for no one is angry while seeking vengeance, unless he dare to avenge himself, as Avicenna observes in the sixth book of his Physics. Accordingly, it is evident that hope is the first of all the irascible passions.

And if we wish to know the order of all the passions in the way of generation, love and hatred are first; desire and aversion, second; hope and despair, third; fear and daring, fourth; anger, fifth; sixth and last, joy and sadness, which follow from all the passions, as stated in Ethic. ii, 5: yet so that love precedes hatred; desire precedes aversion; hope precedes despair; fear precedes daring; and joy precedes sadness, as may be gathered from what has been stated above.

Wow. it's true we can garner from what has been stated above.

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ARTICLE FOUR
he seems to move away from his tradition in looking primarily at the order of generation - love does not appear as a primary passion here! Objection two notes this - that there should be love and hatred and joy and sadness. objection one replaces the irascible ohpe with the concupiscible desire. The third considers more likely conjunctions of the irascible, giving up - syaing it should be hope and despair or at least hope and daring from their simliarty.

I answer that, These four are commonly called the principal passions. Two of them, viz. joy and sadness, are said to be principal because in them all the other passions have their completion and end; wherefore they arise from all the other passions, as is stated in Ethic. ii, 5.
Here the intention is not considered, but hte omvement is turned the other way around -t hey have their perfection here and not their beginning strictly speaking. (i am reminded a little of art. 2 though)

Fear and hope are principal passions, not because they complete the others simply, but because they complete them as regards the movement of the appetite towards something: for in respect of good, movement begins in love, goes forward to desire, and ends in hope; while in respect of evil, it begins in hatred, goes on to aversion, and ends in fear.
Completing the movement of hte appetite towards something pays tribute to the experience of being-in-movement - of being impassioned - what it means to be passionate without perfect joy to which nothing more can be added - now.

Hence it is customary to distinguish these four passions in relation to the present and the future: for movement regards the future, while rest is in something present: so that joy relates to present good, sadness relates to present evil; hope regards future good, and fear, future evil.
Then he looks at them in terms of time saying it is "customary" - hope and fear regards the future (maintaining our dynamism of the "now") while joy and sadness refer to the present.

As to the other passions that regard good or evil, present or future, they all culminate in these four. For this reason some have said that these four are the principal passions, because they are general passions; and this is true, provided that by hope and fear we understand the appetite's common tendency to desire or shun something.
Then he kind of takes it back - or no - he doesn't - he says that those who say they are general are right insofar as we understand fear and hope to be general - so he is content to leave availbility for desire and aversion - for a more 'general' tendency like ohpe and fear.