The effects of pleasure

Question 33. The effects of pleasure
Is expansion an effect of pleasure?
Does pleasure cause thirst or desire for itself?
Does pleasure hinder the use of reason?
Does pleasure perfect operation?
a) Ex hac autem apprehensione apprehendit se homo perfectionem quandam adeptum, quae est spiritualis magnitudo, et secundum hoc, animus hominis dicitur per delectationem magnificari, seu dilatari. Aliud autem est ex parte appetitivae virtutis, quae assentit rei delectabili, et in ea quiescit, quodammodo se praebens ei ad eam interius capiendam.
From this apprehension the human being apprehends a certain achieved perfection, which is a spiritual magnitude, and according to this, the soul of man is said to be magnifed through pleasure, or expanded. On another way on the part of the appetitive power, which assents to the pleasurable thing, and rests in it, in a certain way making availble to it that it may take it more within.
Made bigger in itself - also the appetitive movement (which is the heart of passion) comes secondly - inasmuch as it it assents and rests - making itself available to it so that it may take more within.

How does it do this?
does it cause thirst or desire for itself?
( two ways pleasure, present actually or in memory - two ways thirst - appetite for something not had - or as excluding distaste. Per se - no cause desire b/c concerns present. But two ways - on the part of the had thing - not had all at once, but received successively - or on the part of the having thing - as something existing perfectly in itself but the haver doesn't have perefctly but acquires by little bits)
Sicut in mundo isto, percipientes aliquid imperfecte de divina cognitione, delectamur; et ipsa delectatio excitat sitim vel desiderium perfectae cognitionis; secundum quod potest intelligi quod habetur Eccli. XXIV, qui bibunt me, adhuc sitient. Si vero per sitim vel desiderium intelligatur sola intensio affectus tollens fastidium, sic delectationes spirituales maxime faciunt sitim vel desiderium sui ipsarum.
But corporal pleasures, if they extend/ continue, exceed the natural habit - they cause distaste - as is clear with pleasures of the table... - when they come to repletion (perfectum) cause disgust and one wants something different
but spiritual delights do not exceed a natural habitud,e but perfect nature, whence, when they come through to their completion, are more delectable (unless perchance, accidentally inasmuch ast he contemplative power is joined to some corporeal pleasures, which through the continuation of working they cause lassitude. ANd in this way we can understand (cites Eccl. xxiv AGAIN)
for, even of the angels, who know God perfectly, and delight in Him, it is written (1 Peter 1:12) that they "desire to look at Him."
Lastly, if we consider pleasure, not as existing in reality, but as existing in the memory, thus it has of itself a natural tendency to cause thirst and desire for itself: when, to wit, man returns to that disposition, in which he was when he experienced the pleasure that is past. But if he be changed from that disposition, the memory of that pleasure does not give him pleasure, but distaste: for instance, the memory of food in respect of a man who has eaten to repletion.

3. does it hinder the use of reason
proper delights increase operations, extraneous ones impede. Ergo a certain delight had in the act of reason - as one delights in contemplating or reasoning. and such delight doesn't hinder the use of reason but helps it more, because we work more attentively in that which we delight, for attention helps operation. But corporeal delights hinder the use of reason three ways.
a) distraction - those in which we delight, we attend greatly b) if bodily pleasure was great, either it totally impedes the use of reason, by drawing it toward itself or impedes it greatly.
Secondly by reason of contrariety. For when delights most superexceed, they are contrary to the order of reason. And in this way ARist. says that bodily pleasures corrupt the estimation of prudence, but not speculative judgements, like there are three sides to a triangle, for example. According to the first way, either impedes. In the third way, according to a certain binding or tie, certainly inasmuch as a corporeal transmutation follows pleasure, more than in the other passions, inasmuch as the appetite is more vehemently affected to the present thing than the absent thing. OKAY - THIS IS REALLY INTERESTING - BECAUSE IT WAS PRESENT ALSO IN 35.6, AND IN THE OHTER ONE WITH THE HEAVIER). I thought that sorrow was more of a bodily affect... but now it is not appearing to be so much... inasmuch as it is present, inasmcuh as it is bodily, yes. yes. but in a way, it can be more intellectual than pleasure inasmuch as it is frustrated passion which turns to something else... e.g. irascible... not that real pleasures are not more intellectual and understanding - okay - not necessarily more intellectual but more apprehensive than appetitive - more "in suspension".
pleasure encourages operation... but in terms of pleasure "drawing the attention"; "being contrary to reason"; or being "binding" by corporeal trasnmutation - sorrow preserves from that. (sorrow is more circumspect in that sense).

DOES PLEASURE PERFECT OPERATION???

Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. First, as an end: not indeed according as an end is that on "account of which a thing is"; but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it, can be called its end.
NOT AS FINAL END, but as COMPLETING END - finishing touches! "finished" end not "final" end.
And in this sense the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation . . . as some end added to it": that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, denoting the repose of the appetite in a good that is presupposed.
Secondly, as agent; not indeed directly, for the Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "pleasure perfects operation, MAKES IT SOMETHING BETTER, LIKE HEALTH - DISPOSITON TOWARDS not as a physician makes a man healthy, but as health does": but it does so indirectly; inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care. And in this sense it is said in Ethic. x, 5 that "pleasures increase their appropriate activities, and hinder those that are not appropriate."
THUS PLEASURES INCREASE THEIR OWN PROPER OPERATIONS and hinder the extraneous ones : )



Question 37 the effects of pain
Does pain deprive one of the power to learn?
Is the effect of sorrow or pain to burden the soul?
Does sorrow or pain weaken all activity?
Is sorrow more harmful to the body than all the other passions of the soul?

1.
Respondeo dicendum quod, quia omnes potentiae animae in una essentia animae radicantur, necesse est quod, quando intentio animae vehementer trahitur ad operationem unius potentiae, retrahatur ab operatione alterius, unius enim animae non potest esse nisi una intentio.

Because all the powers of the soul are rooted in one essence, it is necessary that, when the inteniton of the soul is vehemently drawn to the operation of one power, it withdraws from other operation, for the singular (unius) soul cannot be unless by one intention. (abl.)

Et propter hoc, si aliquid ad se trahat totam intentionem animae, vel magnam partem ipsius, non compatitur secum aliquid aliud quod magnam attentionem requirat.
And b/c of this, when something draws to itself the whole intention of the soul, or even a great part of it, it cannot itself be sympathetic (be passive) with something other than that which requires great attention.

Manifestum est autem quod dolor sensibilis maxime trahit ad se intentionem animae, quia naturaliter unumquodque tota intentione tendit ad repellendum contrarium, sicut etiam in rebus naturalibus apparet.
Now it's clear that sensible pain most of all draws the intention of hte soul to itself, becuase naturally each one with the whole intention tends to repel (its) contrary, just as it appears in natural things.

imiliter etiam manifestum est quod ad addiscendum aliquid de novo, requiritur studium et conatus cum magna intentione, ut patet per illud quod dicitur Prov. II, si quaesieris sapientiam quasi pecuniam, et sicut thesauros effoderis eam, tunc intelliges disciplinam.
Similarly it is clear that to learn something new requires study and force with great intention, as is clear from Prov 'if you seek wisdom as though money, and as a treasure dig her out then you will understand discipline)

Et ideo si sit dolor intensus, impeditur homo ne tunc aliquid addiscere possit. Et tantum potest intendi, quod nec etiam, instante dolore, potest homo aliquid considerare etiam quod prius scivit.
And so if pain be intense, it impedes man then from being able to learn smething. And even though he can intend, because he might not even, (if pursued /hard-pressed by sorrow) be able to consider what he already knew before.

hoc tamen attenditur diversitas secundum diversitatem amoris quem homo habet ad addiscendum vel considerandum, qui quanto maior fuerit, magis retinet intentionem animi, ne omnino feratur ad dolorem.
In this nevertheless diversity is applied according to the diversity of love which a man has for learning or considering, which when it is that much greater, he retains the intention of his soul more, nor is he in totally borne over to pain.

____
Is effect - to burden?
(met. like fever to love, widening to pleasure, burdening to pain)

sorrow - b/c prsnt evil, rpgnt to will, impedes it from enjoying, is like burderning.

And if it is not impeded so much as to take away any hope of evading it, although it is impeded in this, that it cannot become master of what it wills at present, there nevertheless remains some motion for repelling the saddening harmful thing. If however the power of evil goes beyond limits (superexcrescat), then it simply impedes the interior motion of the will in anguish, so that it is not strong to divert this or that.
And so whenever the exterior motion of the body is impeded, so it remains that man is stupid (stunned) in himself.

Wow - this describes anxiety and acedia well... i can't wait to work on it!

Does sorrow impede every operation?

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut iam dictum est, tristitia quandoque non ita aggravat vel absorbet animum, ut omnem motum interiorem et exteriorem excludat; sed aliqui motus quandoque ex ipsa tristitia causantur.
As was said, when sorrow does not so weigh down or absorb the soul, that every interior and exterior motion is excluded; but some motion can then be caused by the sadness itself.
Sic ergo operatio ad tristitiam dupliciter potest comparari. Uno modo, sicut ad id de quo est tristitia.
So operation can be compared to sadness in two ways. One, as to that about which one is sad. And so sadness impedes operation (a little if you please?) for we never do that with sadness so well as that what we do with delight, or without sadness -notice the comparison that must be made - there is a degree of delight, and a degree of apathy - or atristitia - both of which are easier.
Et sic tristitia quamlibet operationem impedit, nunquam enim illud quod cum tristitia facimus, ita bene facimus sicut illud quod facimus cum delectatione, vel sine tristitia. Cuius ratio est, quia voluntas est causa operationis humanae, unde quando operatio est de qua aliquis contristatur, necesse est quod actio debilitetur.
Of which the reason is, that because the will is the cuase of human works, whence when operation is concerning that which saddens, it is necessary that act be debilitated.
Alio modo comparatur operatio ad tristitiam sicut ad principium et causam. Et sic necesse est quod operatio talis ex tristitia augeatur, sicut quanto aliquis magis tristatur de re aliqua, tanto magis conatur ad expellendam tristitiam, dummodo remaneat spes expellendi, alioquin nullus motus vel operatio ex tristitia causaretur.
Another way operation is compared to sadness as principle and cause. And so it is neessary that such an operation will be enhanced by sadness, because inasmuch as something is more sadened by something, so does it seem more compelled to expel sadness, provided that hope remains to expel, otherwise no motion or operation would be caused by sadness.

4. Is sadness the most harmful

Respondeo dicendum quod tristitia, inter omnes animae passiones, magis corpori nocet.
Among all the passions of the soul, does more harm TO THE BODY (even then excessive pleasures?)
Cuius ratio est, quia tristitia repugnat humanae vitae quantum ad speciem sui motus; et non solum quantum ad mensuram seu quantitatem, sicut aliae animae passiones.
Because sadnss is repugnant to human life with respect to the species of its motion, and not only according to the measure or quantity, as of the other passions... (it is always disproportionate - pain is always worse than a surfiet of pleasure)
Consistit enim humana vita in quadam motione, quae a corde in cetera membra diffunditur, quae quidem motio convenit naturae humanae secundum aliquam determinatam mensuram.
For human life consists in a certain motion, which from the heart is diffused to the other members, which certain motion comes naturally (convenit) to human nature according to a determinate measure.
Si ergo ista motio procedat ultra mensuram debitam, repugnabit humanae vitae secundum quantitatis mensuram; non autem secundum similitudinem speciei.
If therefore this motion progresses beyond the proper measure, it will be repugnant to human life according to the measure of quantitiy, but not according to the likeness of its species.
Si autem impediatur processus huius motionis, repugnabit vitae secundum suam speciem. Est autem attendendum in omnibus animae passionibus, quod transmutatio corporalis, quae est in eis materialis, est conformis et proportionata motui appetitus, qui est formalis, sicut in omnibus materia proportionatur formae.
But if the process of htis motion is impeded (cut short - think of people when their sad - we speak of 'blood freezing') it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species. And this is applied to all the passions of the soul, because the bodily change, which is in its materiality, is conformed and proportioned to the motion of the appetite, which is formal, as in all matter is proportioned to form. (metaphysical /substantial rather than physiological, really)
Illae ergo animae passiones quae important motum appetitus ad prosequendum aliquid, non repugnant vitali motioni secundum speciem, sed possunt repugnare secundum quantitatem, ut amor, gaudium, desiderium, et huiusmodi.
Therefore those passions of the soul which import a motion of the appetite towards pursuing something, are not repugnant to the vital motion according to species, but can be repugnant to it according to qunatity, as love, joy, desire, and things fo this kind.

Et ideo ista secundum speciem suam iuvant naturam corporis, sed propter excessum possunt nocere. Passiones autem quae important motum appetitus cum fuga vel retractione quadam, repugnant vitali motioni non solum secundum quantitatem, sed etiam secundum speciem motus, et ideo simpliciter nocent, sicut timor et desperatio, et prae omnibus tristitia, quae aggravat animum ex malo praesenti, cuius est fortior impressio quam futuri.
And so therefore according to species they help/assist/serve the nature of the body, but because of excess can harm. But hte passions which import the motion fo the appetite with flight or a certain withdrawal, are repugnant to the vital motion not only according to qunatity, but also according to the species of motion, and therefore they are harmful simply, as fear and despair, and above all sadness, which burdens the soul from present evil, which is more strongly impressed than future.