Logics of pleausre and pain

On the other hand, in relation to us, bodily pleasures are more vehement, for three reasons. First, because sensible things are more known to us, than intelligible things. Secondly, because sensible pleasures, through being passions of the sensitive appetite, are accompanied by some alteration in the body: whereas this does not occur in spiritual pleasures, save by reason of a certain reaction of the superior appetite on the lower. Thirdly, because bodily pleasures are sought as remedies for bodily defects or troubles, whence various griefs arise. Wherefore bodily pleasures, by reason of their succeeding griefs of this kind, are felt the more, and consequently are welcomed more than spiritual pleasures, which have no contrary griefs, as we shall state farther on (35, 5).
Note the order - sensible pleasures are more vehement first of all because more known - more familiar to us!
Second, because of alteration in the body
third, because remedy for (contrary) griefs - more clear in 35.5 than in here)

The one he seems to pick up on more is the third.... inasmuch as he has a whole question on contemplation as maybe having a contrary grief?
quesiton: does he pick up the others.
sorrow seems to bring in more of the relations between pleasure and sorrow than the question on pleasure does - I don't even know if it is becuase hte logic of sorrow relies more primarioly on the logic of pleasure (which is where I was first going) or if it is simply a matter of the second half of the discussion being able to complete the first half)


35.4 distinguishes several ways in which pleasure and sorrow can interact. Generically, taken from the point of view of their movement, they are contrary. That being said, concerning the movements themselves, it is possible to take them as specifically as contrary movements with regard to the same object (e.g. approach and withdrawal from the same thing); it may be taken as regarding different kinds of objects, and thus be disparate and not-comparable, or they may be taken in respect of contrary objects (which is the usual case, to be joyful for X and sad at non-X or vice versa). And thus they have a "mutual affinity".
This article precedes contemplation as being able to explain it.

Now why does 35.3 precede 35.4?
35. is rather short - the respondeo, at least - what is in the respondeo is taken up and made more complex in 35.4. The objections seem to have more meat telling what is at stake - the fundamental love - the good - the conceiving to have love. It is only after this more fundamental ties between sorrow and pleasure are made clear that it is possible to speak concerning which ways they are "contrary".