never noticed - is pleausre in time - has to do also with "movement" and my analysis of contemplation

(slightly of interest - though less so - is the question whether movement is a source of pleasure.. very backhandedly related)

Article 2. Whether delight is in time?
Objection 1. It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Objection 2. Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.
Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2. Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3. Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.

Articulus 2
[34840] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.
[34841] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.
[34842] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio.
[34843] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem.
[34844] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens. Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.
[34845] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore.
[34846] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod per accidens est in tempore.
[34847] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore.

citation - operations more akin to pleasures b/c conjoined to them

CITATION: - 34.1 - are all pleasures evil? And another reason can be taken form the part of hte operation, of which some are good good, and some bad.For operations are more akin to pleasures, because they are conjoined to them, as concupiscence, which precedes them in time. Whence, since the desires of good operations are good, but evil ones are bad; so much more are the pleasures of good operations good, but of evil ones, evil.

One of the most explanatory passages in the treatise on passions

This has the explanation of the physiology that I need - one of the most united explanations.... I guess it is a peak article structurally, when you think about it - if passion pertains to defect, and sorrow is the most passionate of hte passions - here is the question that asks what does this mean concretely... and the question is even asked from the opposite point of view - sorrow appears in the objections as something spiritual - belonging to the soul - especially possible after the "shift" of 35. 1, 2, and 7.

Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body.
Objection 2. Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above (22, 1,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Proverbs 25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Sirach 38:19): "Of sadness cometh death."

I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species.
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil. (I remember thinking about what is it about present evil earlier... in 1 or 2)


Reply to Objection 1. Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the soul.
Reply to Objection 2. Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3. A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness.

i confuse many things

ok just about charity and ppl - having thought through things very politically and having been attentive to things in the Christian words about the neighbour - Christ's words, readings, Catherine of Siena - the love of neighbour that srpings from and makes the love of God to be something valid... and I also thought makes love of God vivid - leading one to God.
Q. 44.2 - obj and answer 3 - the means are good in relation to hte end - and would derive their malice also from the same thing.. the acedic person may be brought to God through others perhaps more - we do bring God to and with others. Love of neighbour is 'virtually contained' but it had to be made explciit for the less intelligent...
the point is that ppl can be hermits b/c love of neighbour is virtually containe din love of God but it is easy to see my confusion if I was unsure about what I thought of God - if I clung to immanent presences - the "neighbour whom I do see" (James or John, can't remember) - this for me was a link to God, their goodnesses.
and I don't really know how to evaluate this.

zeal and sorrow

i see how zeal is really connected to sorrow and envy - at least the occasional passionate twinge nad even a necessity to actually fight off resenting someone else - inasmuch as one's own good is so beloved and one is that much more zealous about it because suffering of it - and seeing others attain something with ease when one has lost leads one to be unhappy.... this is not the vainglory kind of envy...
aquinas is very careful to distinguish zeal from envy -

Hatred.. and charity?

I am just wondering... as I move onto envy - will it be possible to deal without hatred? I don't htink so. I t has already led me to pleasure, then love. So it seems accordingly I will have to deal with hatred. Don't feel like it right now, however - tomorrow - envy for now.

Physiology of the Heart and Stress

somehow this reminds me of Aquinas....

http://cbs11tv.com/video/?id=35229@ktvt.dayport.com

It's all about that contraction and stuff - tension, no time to relax.

Envy's and mercy's natural genus appearnces

q. 24. 4

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts (18, 5,6; 20, 1)--viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the passions in their natural

Pleasure as the moral rule

not judged by the sensitive appetite - "BECAUSE FOOD" is pleasurable to all, and yet the virtuous man takes pleasure according to reason....

Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum.

(QUestion on the morality of passions in genearl - article 24 - very simple jump... actualy)
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (18, 05). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

Article 4. Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?
Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2. Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3. Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Psalm 7:10 "The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive--tou telous; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above (Question 20, Article 1); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1. Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2. All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Reply to Objection 3. Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (Question 33, Article 4); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

Reading Aquinas.... clinically?

The summa theologiae on passions is a really weird text, or at least I have a really difficult time knowing how to respond to it as a genre. I think I end up taking a really clinical approach - inasmuch as I tried to systematize it to make some kind of sense of it. And there is a mechanics of passion, not with respect to the actual phenomenon, which involves influence and change (or perfection) or when it is a centre of the soul involves life - something self reflexive and engaged - none of which are so uncomplicated as action/reaction or proposition/response.
So what is the mechanics? Well one can see it in the question on pleasures - no-one can live without pleasures - and also in the remedies of sorrow. Part of the reason I became so depressed is that I did not realize the "necessity of pleasure for life" - that relaxing really is a remedy for sorrow. In reading the dynamics between sorrow and pleasure I came to have a map to situate my own sadnesses, which happened from prior loves which I could not see were getting met, but one cannot forget the habits of sadness which arise from not having pleasures to moderate them. Now it is impossible to say that a person lives without pleasures - even the saddest person has pleasures - even sadness has some suitability. But in terms of bigger sorrows superseding lesser pleasures, or in terms of one sadness hindering every pleasure, in terms of the circularity of depression which can be alleviated by the very rest which can also be ruined by anxieties that prevent the soul not only from fleeing what disturbs it, but from resting so that one can face it.
So where does the opening for really healing pleasures come in? Well there are some sorrows that Aquinas seems to recognize are not alleviated by any pleasure whatsoever - and this falls under penitence - which is sorrow proper - that concerns one's own evil - and this is the kind of sorrow that reappears in 57 or 59 - only the contrary pleasure can relieve it. So..

I am already getting out of the mechanics and into the really tough sorrow which minor things cannot relieve. But... even with the entry of the contrary pleasures of forgiveness, hope, and self esteem that arises from joy, there are still habits to be dealt with. There must be a therapy of pleasures which stretch, expand, open up something's capacity for pleasure that has too long been contracted and tensed. And this is where the mechanics comes in - one pleasure provides that little bit of rest that leaves one capable to do more, and if a greater sinking comes in, it takes only a very little pleasure to open up again because oneself is smaller. But sorrow is not the teacher I thought it was - it hinders teaching and learning, rather. The only way it can speed it up is on the part of compacting one's energy and effort towards expelling the causes of sorrow... but all its usefulness has left it by the time it reaches anxiety and acedia. And looking back over my own life the past couple of years, I had reason to appreciate and even to be happy about my sorrow at first - it was helping me to accomplish something! And the sense of activity was very strong, and activity brought pleasure. But as time went on and sorrow - even the proud sorrow that I had - began to sink further - I don't know why - and whether it is something that I would try to discover in confession or in therapy, of what genus it was, or both, at any rate, I developed an ongoing anxiety which falls along with the clinical definitions of depression - inability to concentrate, guilt complexes about resting, a kind of perpetual but un-focused studying - throwing myself more and more into projects with less and less success at them. And then acedia - the physical kind - I know that too.
But the point is, instead of conceiving a linear or historical or reflexive view alone - which could not provide me with a map of this - if I understand it according to a mechanics whereby it is not just pursuit and rest, but contraction and expansion along with pursuit and rest that does not forget the reflexive appetitive activity and the bodily effects.
So in other words, what is Aquinas doing? How would I describe his approach in a way that combines all these things? The word "organic" comes to mind as it expresses both the self-movement, the changes, and the mechanics that happen in an organism. But he is not a disinterested writer - it takes place in a summa tehologiae - after a prologue that proposes to treat of the human being as "he too is a princple of his actions" and these are the kinds of actions which he shares with the other animals - which are not most properly human (in the sense that other animals are excluded) and yet are most human at the same time.
But it is about ethics then. I should call it the organic entry of passions (organic sounds too much like the vegetative soul, though). He calls it the sensitive appetite.
If one could find a comprehensive way to explain appetite... Now, the field of ethics belongs to the voluntary, and the passions are not quite the voluntary, but the will and the passions sleep together or at least create together - it is a democracy...
it'll come... i'll keep putting things together..

Pleasures and Pains

I am trying to undersatnd what is at stake in Thomas Aquinas writing about pleasures and pains! I am mid-thesis-writing here and too close to the material to understand what is going on. But I think it is also more than that - in working with pleasures and pains in Aquinas, my naivete and lack of psychological wisdom and depth and pastoral experience bumps up with that of a wise person who has had all these things, nourished by grace and reflection. And I am trying to jam it all in a little over a month (well I have been playing with it before but taking it far too much for granted). Pleasures and pains... Aristotle said somewhere (it has been a long time since I have read him!) that this is what morality consists of (in a way). For diagnostic purposes, I think immediately - if someone is pleased in something it means their whole intensio is directed that way. And it is a good thing I said that because it shows the lack of learning which Aquinas can give me. If this is how I thought, it is no wonder that I have had such a difficult time in my youth. It is not an "all or nothing" with Aquinas - all human beings take pleasure in sensible things, and these are not the rule of morality. I placed a study of 3-6 prior to 1, 2, and 7 because I was working best with the idea of the whole that comes out in question 22. In 22, it is not a case of different degrees and powers having different ranges and intensities - having a more democratic common effort than a military common effort, it is absolutist. Oh, there are many degrees along the way - but the thing itself is conceived of as a unity. The subject is sick, or well, or perfect, not only in peak condition but peak operation of all the parts. And I preferred to see this "ontologically" although it isn't really because I was able thereby to set up a barrier between the "me" that I was subonsciously determined to protect. Not that I thought there was a "me" but that something was there that couldn't allow me to understand. I wonder why - it seems so simple! Why should I be miserable when it is possible to be happy? Why do I default on the side of sin? Just sorrow enters into Aquinas, but there is no specific category of guilt. Freud had a tremendous insight - I wonder if he knew how great it was. Was it sexual repression, though? Or is sex the best and "most known" paradigm - insofar as bodily pleasures are known to us? Is it rather that we strain towards perfection and towards pleasure and being happy and that sex is "more knowable" in that sense. Because "repression" doesn't have to be just about sex - that is one symptom or indicator or example or paradigm.

Probably one of the best parts in Aquinas, speaking from the viewpoint of a humble philosopher, is when he talks about the morality of pleasures. He says something to the effect that people have challenged that pleasures are moral, but he points out that when it comes to doing stuff, in which experience or example are more influential than any doctrine, because pleasures are necessary for human life that when people are caught red-handed taking pleasures it rather embarrases their philosophical position. This is one of the most jolly looking things I've ever seen - although nothing really looks jolly in Latin which is why I get bored and have to squint when I read. Which reminds me I want glasses before I'm not on my dad's plan anymore. But Aquinas was wrong - waht about all us poor stupid little students? What about all of us who read too much without trusting to experience and example? (or HAVE no experience BECAUSE we are reading?) What about the eggheads who form their lives on ideologies, not being in the kind of community - or at least a community that is immediate enough - to translate it into practice? When I look at the lives of all the world around me, so different, I realize how much harder it is for me to artifically make my own way and discover the same things through the painful process of "learning" - too, too slow compared with life. When these things happen, I used to hit myself over the head for my stupidity, but I don't even think it is because I am so particularly slow-witted or acedic. I don't know what to blame for unilateralism - and sometimes I don't know whether to hunt down causes that I may address them or press forward and things get corrected through time - which is the "experience" way. I think the second way is more useful, but experience is also only as good as you learn from it. And there is experience in my life. But this is not to forget things I may have learned along the way. For instance, in Aquinas, it is possible to have sorrow usefully and morally. I shouldn't look to my own life as a model or an affirmation of this, becuase I tend too readily to melancholy backed up by habits which have been created in a concrete history for concrete causes - it is "me" but it is not all "me". But the only way I can get a little objectivity is be as capable of pleasure as I am of sadness. And while some pleasures are "imperfect" in this life still they can be more perefct than many. And I realize that I cut off too many sources of pleasure becuase I really thought that all of me was invested in every pleasure - but this is not the case. One needs to distinguish between pleasure and joy - too. I thought all pleasure was pleasure - even joy I sought to - what I thought was "moderate". Looking back I don't undersatnd how I could have been so deceived. Why I became so suspicious of good feelings at all - I guess it was because I was afraid of being blinded and too secure in myself, but I was blinded in another way. I mistrusted pride and I wanted to keep my mood ready for work, but I had long and ceased to have been capable of working because I was so focused upon it, and this led to disintegration which I refused to recognize but which gnawed at me nonetheless. In prizing all those things which St. Paul recommends, there is room for "drinking, eating," and all "to the glory of God." Even watching Star Wars which I am discovering for the first time (as it is hard to find full-length movies on Youtube). (I am astonished how similar it is to Lord of the Rings). I guess I had a kind of anxiety about art for a while inasmuch as I didn't find it to be enough.
maybe also because I have also been very suggestible to art in the past, as well as to other things. And this suggestibility has worked greatly against me - WHETHER I am multi-valent or whether I am one-sided - either way, I can become completely defragmented and overly docile, or I can become rigid and enclosed to protect. I have had both.
And when the intellectual cores were challenged, when the stories I had spun to keep going on the inside - some became tested and thrown away, but I thought that I would have to keep on continuing. I knew nothing of "wheat" - all became "chaff" until there was nothing left.

So what of all this and passions and pleasures?

But this is the kind of thing that leads a person to reject any sensory or imaginative indulgence - becuase it is too much, and one sees the need to develop another part of oneself. And this can accidentally be good - LIKE SO MANY OTHER PATHS! perhaps this is where the individuality really comes in - when something has worked for me because of my peculiar constitution - and other things work for other people with theirs - which is why we really are different - disparate - the degrees of better and better do not really have room to come in until something like that comes in - but we are so much in the world of change that it really is impossible to judge ourselves or others- perfection for us happens in moments which is why we can be critical of others, or of ourselves, or of ourselves in light of others, because we are at different moments because it is becoming virtuous and harmonious.



but it can be extremely painful living without allowing yourself really to take rest in anything.


And extremely counter-productive in another senes, as one has an anxiety that cannot rest.


But what of theology in all this?



Theology does not come in until the second part - where charity is the friendship of God and man, by which God shares the "divine beatitude" with the human being. And I cannot think this abstracted entirely from charity. I can think it independently from charity which leads me to ask about charity. And this is philosophy. And that's why I wouldn't mind finishing up a doctorate.



So what does it mean to take pleasures in a virtuous manner? It is no longer a question of meaning, but of living nad learning and grace and nature. In a way, one cannot look for answers like this, not because it is hopeless or indefinable in the sense of being unknowable, but that they are more lived than said - the saying is infinitely behind, infinitely slower, infinitely piece-by-piece. And yet it is only in the thinking and the articulating that the reflexivity can happen - that life can be conscious. And sure one can reflect immediately in one's head but then it is only one of a gazillion reflections - this is why "intention" (while not being something absolute, being about a "more" of a person in the midst of the infinities of trivia and important things that cross the mind) signifies something that seems really humble in that it is isolated, but really is not humble absolutely speaking, because the "absolute" for us is being a human being - what we have access to, and Christ has made it possible that this no longer means that being ourselves also means that we are left to ourselves, but it is through being human in the body of Christ that glory happens.

26.2 - i would call love the first perfection of the subject.
I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient. Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient: for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator gives the generated body both weight and the movement resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began. Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.

Sorrow

Is all sorrow evil?
Can sorrow be a virtuous good? ('honest' - no appearance of 'virtuous' in text)
Can it be a useful good?
Is bodily pain the greatest evil?
1. is every sorrow bad (mala)

[35204] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid esse bonum vel malum, potest dici dupliciter. Uno modo, simpliciter et secundum se. Et sic omnis tristitia est quoddam malum, hoc enim ipsum quod est appetitum hominis anxiari de malo praesenti, rationem mali habet; impeditur enim per hoc quies appetitus in bono.
That something is good or bad can be said in two ways. One way, simply and according to itself. And so every sadness is in a way bad, for this that the appetite of man is uneasy concerning a present evil, has the ratio of the bad; for it impedes through this the rest of appetite in the good (BAD B/C IMPEDES PLEAUSRE - WHICH IS HERE DEPICTED AS OPERATION "REST IN THE GOOD" IS AN OPERATION FOR AQUINAS AS APPEARS IN 34 either 1 or 2)

Alio modo dicitur aliquid bonum vel malum, ex suppositione alterius, sicut verecundia dicitur esse bonum, ex suppositione alicuius turpis commissi, ut dicitur in IV Ethic. Sic igitur, supposito aliquo contristabili vel doloroso, ad bonitatem pertinet quod aliquis de malo praesenti tristetur vel doleat.
Another way something can be called good or bad, from another supposition, as shame is called good, on the supposition that something disgraceful has been done, (4 eth). So therefore, supposing there is something saddening or painful, it pertains to goodness (bonitatem) that something evil being present should sadden or cause pain.
Quod enim non tristaretur vel non doleret, non posset esse nisi quia vel non sentiret, vel quia non reputaret sibi repugnans, et utrumque istorum est malum manifeste. Et ideo ad bonitatem pertinet ut, supposita praesentia mali, sequatur tristitia vel dolor.
For that something should not be saddened or pained, could not happen unless he would not be sensing, or that he would not regard it as repugnant to himself, and either one of these is clearly a bad thing (est malum). And therefore it pertains to goodness that, supposing the presence of something bad, sadness or pain should follow.
Et hoc est quod Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., adhuc est bonum quod dolet amissum bonum, nam nisi aliquod bonum remansisset in natura, nullius boni amissi dolor esset in poena. Sed quia sermones morales sunt in singularibus, quorum sunt operationes, illud quod est ex suppositione bonum, debet bonum iudicari, sicut quod est ex suppositione voluntarium, iudicatur voluntarium, ut dicitur in III Ethic., et supra habitum est.
And this is what Augustine says - so far as it is good that one mourns lost good, for unless something good had not remained in nature, there would not be pain at lost good in punishment.
But because moral discussions (sermones) are about singulars, which operations are, that which is good on some supposition, ought to be judged good, just as that which is voluntary on some supposition, is judged voluntary, as is said in Ethics III (voluntary on some supposition.... IT IS ON "SOME SUPPOSITION" THAT CONSTITUTES MORAL DISCUSSIONS - very important distinction is 'what is good acc. to complexion and what is good acc. to appearing - talks about leper - there are many individual constitutions)
it seems also to me that sadness cannot be a measure of virtue b/c one can be sad due to impediments, incompletions, etc. for example i may have been very sad about 'the divine good' for a long time but i was sad that i was 'not getting it' - morally, what is at issue is that i was not really sad concerning it itself... b/c acedia is not about laziness - b/c then it would be the opposite of carefulness, and it is not about dulness due to excessive pampering, which would be carnal excesses - but it is opposed to joy.

CAN SORROW BE An HONEST GOOD? (trnsltd as 'virtuous' - no justificaiton in text)

Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum illam rationem qua tristitia est bonum, potest esse bonum honestum.
According to that whereby sorrow is good, it can be an honest good
Dictum est enim quod tristitia est bonum secundum cognitionem et recusationem mali. Quae quidem duo in dolore corporali, attestantur bonitati naturae, ex qua provenit quod sensus sentit, et natura refugit laesivum, quod causat dolorem.
For it has been said that sadness is good according to the knowledge and refusal of good. Indeed these two in bodily pain attest to the goodness of nature, from which the it happens that the sense senses, and nature flees the hurtful, which causes pain.
In interiori vero tristitia, cognitio mali quandoque quidem est per rectum iudicium rationis; et recusatio mali est per voluntatem bene dispositam detestantem malum. Omne autem bonum honestum ex his duobus procedit, scilicet ex rectitudine rationis et voluntatis. Unde manifestum est quod tristitia potest habere rationem boni honesti.
Now interior sadness, when it is a certain knowledge of something bad is throug the judgment of reason (HERE IS WHEN REASON APPEARS IN SADNESS - BEFORE IT WAS INDIFFERENTLY THE INTELLECT/SIVE IMAGINATION); and the refusal of evil is through the will that is well disposed in hating the evil. For every honest good proceeds from these two things, namely that it is from rectitude of reason and the will. Whence it is clear that sadness can have the character (rationem) of the honest good.

3. IS PLEASURE A USEFUL GOOD?

[35219] Iª-IIae q. 39 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod ex malo praesenti insurgit duplex appetitivus motus. Unus quidem est quo appetitus contrariatur malo praesenti. Et ex ista parte tristitia non habet utilitatem, quia id quod est praesens, non potest non esse praesens.
A twofold appetitive movmeent arises from present evil. ONe is certainly that the appetite is contraried by the present evil. And from this part sadness doesn't have usefulness, because that which is present, cannot not be present. (No use - helpless)
Secundus motus consurgit in appetitu ad fugiendum vel repellendum malum contristans. Et quantum ad hoc, tristitia habet utilitatem, si sit de aliquo quod est fugiendum. Est enim aliquid fugiendum dupliciter.
Secondly a motion consurging from the appetite to flee or repel the saddening evil. (HERE IS WHERE I WAS CONFUSED - SADNESS TO BE DESCRIBED CONCEPTUALLY AS A 'REST' DID NOT SIT WELL WITH MY EXPERIENCE - AND NEITHER IS AQUINAS ABLE TO REMAIN WITHIN THOSE PARAMETERS - BUT I SEE THE DISTINCTION NOW - IF HOPE REMAINS OF REPELLING IT IN THE FUTRE - FIND - further down - and would this repelling be anger, then, or daring, or hope?)
And inasmuch as directed to this, sadness has utiltiy, if it is be concernning that which is to be fled. For something must be fled in two ways.
Uno modo, propter seipsum, ex contrarietate quam habet ad bonum; sicut peccatum. Et ideo tristitia de peccato utilis est ad hoc quod homo fugiat peccatum, sicut apostolus dicit, II ad Cor. VII, gaudeo, non quia contristati estis, sed quia contristati estis ad poenitentiam. Alio modo est aliquid fugiendum, non quia sit secundum se malum, sed quia est occasio mali; dum vel homo nimis inhaeret ei per amorem, vel etiam ex hoc praecipitatur in aliquod malum, sicut patet in bonis temporalibus.
One way, on its own account, from the contrariety which it has to the good; as sin. ANd therefore sadness concerning sin is useful for this that man flees sin, as the apostle says, "I rejoice, not becuase you are saddened, but becuase you are saddened towards penance." Another way is something to be fled, not because it is bad according to itself, but becuase it is an occasion of bad; (WHICH IS SOMETHING I NEVER REALLY UNDERSTOOD BEFORE, NOR THAT EVERY ONE HAS HIS OWN HABITUDE...); provided that either the man indeed clings to it excessively through love, or also through this that he is precipated into something evil, as is clear in temporal goods.
Et secundum hoc, tristitia de bonis temporalibus potest esse utilis, sicut dicitur Eccle. VII, melius est ire ad domum luctus quam ad domum convivii, in illa enim finis cunctorum admonetur hominum.
And according to this, sadness for temporal goods, as Eccl. says, it is better to go to the house of mourning than to the house of "good times" (convivi); for by that the end of all men is reminded.
Ideo autem tristitia in omni fugiendo est utilis, quia geminatur fugiendi causa. Nam ipsum malum secundum se fugiendum est, ipsam autem tristitiam secundum se omnes fugiunt, sicut etiam bonum omnes appetunt, et delectationem de bono. Sicut ergo delectatio de bono facit ut bonum avidius quaeratur, ita tristitia de malo facit ut malum vehementius fugiatur.
Therefore sadness in every fleeing is useful, because it doubles the cause of fleeing. For the bad according to itself is to be fled, while that sadness according to itself all flee, so alsoall desire the good, and pleasure concerning the good. Just as therefore pleasure concerning the good makes one seek the good more avidly, so sadness concerning the bad makes one flee the bad more vehemently.


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CAN BODILY PAIN BE THE WORST EVIL (prologue)
CAN SORROW BE THE WORST EVIL??? (1st 2 objections)
Respondeo dicendum quod impossibile est aliquam tristitiam seu dolorem esse summum hominis malum. Omnis enim tristitia seu dolor aut est de hoc quod est vere malum, aut est de aliquo apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum. Dolor autem seu tristitia quae est de vere malo, non potest esse summum malum, est enim aliquid eo peius, scilicet vel non iudicare esse malum illud quod vere est malum, vel etiam non refutare illud. Tristitia autem vel dolor qui est de apparenti malo, quod est vere bonum, non potest esse summum malum, quia peius esset omnino alienari a vero bono. Unde impossibile est quod aliqua tristitia vel dolor sit summum hominis malum.
It is impossible for any sorrow or pain to be the worst evil of man. For every sorrow or pain is either concerning this that something is truly bad, or concerning something appearing bad, which is really good. But pain or sorrow which are about bad truly,c annot be the worst bad thing, for it is oemthign worse that one should not judge to be bad what is truly bad, or also not to refuse it. But sorrow or pain which concerns the apparent bad, which is truly good, cannot be the worst evil, because it would be worse to be totally alienated from the true good. Whence it is impossible that any sorrow or pain should be the worst evil of the human being.

Bonitas et malitia delectationum

Is every pleasure evil?
If not, is every pleasure good?
Is any pleasure the greatest good?
Is pleasure the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good and evil?
Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in X Ethic., aliqui posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas. Cuius ratio videtur fuisse, quia intentionem suam referebant ad solas delectationes sensibiles et corporales, quae sunt magis manifestae, nam et in ceteris intelligibilia a sensibilibus antiqui philosophi non distinguebant, nec intellectum a sensu, ut dicitur in libro de anima. Delectationes autem corporales ut dicitur in libro de anima.
Some have said that all pleasures are bad. The reason seems to be they referred their intention to sensible and corporeal pleasures alone, which are more manifest, for as with other intelligible things the old philosophers did not distinguish from the sensible, nor intellect from sense, as is said in the De Anima. Now bodily pleasures are articulated in the de anima.
Delectationes autem corporales arbitrabantur dicendum omnes esse malas, ut sic homines, qui ad delectationes immoderatas sunt proni, a delectationibus se retrahentes, ad medium virtutis perveniant. Sed haec existimatio non fuit conveniens.
Now it must be said that bodily pleasures to be all bad, so that human beings, who are prone to immoderate pleasures, drawing back from from the pleasures can come to the medium of virtue. But this estimation doesn't seem right (conveniens).
Cum enim nullus possit vivere sine aliqua sensibili et corporali delectatione, si illi qui docent omnes delectationes esse malas, deprehendantur aliquas delectationes suscipere; magis homines ad delectationes erunt proclives exemplo operum, verborum doctrina praetermissa. In operationibus enim et passionibus humanis, in quibus experientia plurimum valet, magis movent exempla quam verba.
For since no one can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure, so if those who teach that all pleasures are bad, are caught taking some pleasures; men will be more likely headed towards pleasures by the example of works, than by the overlooked doctrine of words. For in human operatinos and passions, in which experience is the most influential, examples move more than words.
Dicendum est ergo aliquas delectationes esse bonas, et aliquas esse malas. Est enim delectatio quies appetitivae virtutis in aliquo bono amato, et consequens aliquam operationem.
Therefore it must be said that some pleasures are good, and some bad. For pleasure is a rest of the appetitive power in some beloved good, and consequently (is) some operation.
Unde huius ratio duplex accipi potest. Una quidem ex parte boni in quo aliquis quiescens delectatur.
Whence a twofold can be taken. One is on the part of the good in which the one resting takes delight.
Bonum enim et malum in moralibus dicitur secundum quod convenit rationi vel discordat ab ea, ut supra dictum est, sicut in rebus naturalibus aliquid dicitur naturale ex eo quod naturae convenit, innaturale vero ex eo quod est a natura discordans. Sicut igitur in naturalibus est quaedam quies naturalis, quae scilicet est in eo quod convenit naturae, ut cum grave quiescit deorsum; et quaedam innaturalis, quae est in eo quod repugnat naturae, sicut cum grave quiescit sursum, ita et in moralibus est quaedam delectatio bona, secundum quod appetitus superior aut inferior requiescit in eo quod convenit rationi; et quaedam mala, ex eo quod quiescit in eo quod a ratione discordat, et a lege Dei. Alia ratio accipi potest ex parte operationum, quarum quaedam sunt bonae, et quaedam malae.
For good and evil are said in moral things according as it goes along with (is "convenient") to reason or is at variance with it, just as in natural things something is called natural in that it goes along with nature or is unnatural as it is at variance with nature.
So therefore in natural things there is a certain natural rest, which is in that which is convenient to nature, as when something hevay rests lower; and a certain unnaturalness, when something is repugnant to nature, as when the heavy body rests above, so in moral things there is a certain pleausre in good, according to which the higher appetite or the lower rests in that which goes along with reason, and a certain 'bad' from that it rests in that which is at variance with reason or the law of God.

Operationibus autem magis sunt affines delectationes, quae sunt eis coniunctae, quam concupiscentiae, quae tempore eas praecedunt. Unde, cum concupiscentiae bonarum operationum sint bonae, malarum vero malae; multo magis delectationes bonarum operationum sunt bonae, malarum vero malae.
And another reason can be taken form the part of hte operation, of which some are good good, and some bad.
For operations are more akin to pleasures, that they are conjoined to them, as concupiscence, which precedes them in time. Whence, since the desires of good operations are good, but evil ones are bad; so much more are the pleasures of good operations good, but of evil ones, evil.

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ARTICLE 2
Whether all pleasures are good?

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut aliqui Stoicorum posuerunt omnes delectationes esse malas, ita Epicurei posuerunt delectationem secundum se esse bonum, et per consequens delectationes omnes esse bonas.
Just as some of the Stoics put all pleasures as bad, so the Epicureans held delight of itself to be good, and consequently all delights to be good.
Qui ex hoc decepti esse videntur, quod non distinguebant inter id quod est bonum simpliciter, et id quod est bonum quoad hunc. Simpliciter quidem bonum est quod secundum se bonum est. Contingit autem quod non est secundum se bonum, esse huic bonum, dupliciter.
BUt these seem to be deceived, because they did not distinguish between that which is good simply, and that which is good with respect to something. Now something is simply good because it is good according to itself. But it happens that something is not good according to itself, to be good to this (one), in two ways.
Uno modo, quia est ei conveniens secundum dispositionem in qua nunc est, quae tamen non est naturalis, sicut leproso bonum est quandoque comedere aliqua venenosa, quae non sunt simpliciter convenientia complexioni humanae. Alio modo, quia id quod non est conveniens, aestimatur ut conveniens.
One way, becuase what is convenient according to the disposition in which it is now, which is nevertheless not natural, as it is good to the leper when he eats something poisonous, which are not genearlly (simpliciter) suitable (conveniens) for the human constitution (complexioni). Another way, because that which is not suitable, is ESTIMATED to be suitable.
Et quia delectatio est quies appetitus in bono, si sit bonum simpliciter illud in quo quiescit appetitus, erit simpliciter delectatio, et simpliciter bona. Si autem non sit bonum simpliciter, sed quoad hunc, tunc nec delectatio est simpliciter, sed huic, nec simpliciter est bona, sed bona secundum quid, vel apparens bona.
And because delihgt is the rest of the appetite in good, if it is good it is that in which the appetite rests, it will be delight simply, and simply good. But if it is not good simply, but unto (until - quoad) this one, then it will not be pleausre simply, but to this one, nor is it simply good, but good according to such a thing, or that it appears good.
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IS ANY PLEASURE THE BEST GOOD
We had first of all the entry of "some of the Stoics" (or at least it was some of them in art. 2); then "some of hte Stoics and the Epicureans" in art. 2, now we have Plato and the Stoics and Epicureans.

Respondeo dicendum quod Plato non posuit omnes delectationes esse malas, sicut Stoici; neque omnes esse bonas, sicut Epicurei; sed quasdam esse bonas, et quasdam esse malas; ita tamen quod nulla sit summum bonum, vel optimum. Sed quantum ex eius rationibus datur intelligi, in duobus deficit.
Plato did not hold all pleasures to be bad, as the Stoics; neither for all to be good, as the Epicureans; but some to be good, and some to be bad; so that, nevertheless, none is the 'summum bonum' or the best. But inasmuch as from his reasons it is given to be understood, they fail in two things.
In uno quidem quia, cum videret delectationes sensibiles et corporales in quodam motu et generatione consistere, sicut patet in repletione ciborum et huiusmodi; aestimavit omnes delectationes consequi generationem et motum. Unde, cum generatio et motus sint actus imperfecti, sequeretur quod delectatio non haberet rationem ultimae perfectionis.
In the first certain thing because, when one should see sensible nad corporeal pleasures to consist of a certain motion and generation, as is clear in repletin of food and similar things; he judged (aestimavit) all pleasure to follow generation and motion. Whence, since generation and change (motus) are imperfect acts, it would follow that pleasure would not have the ratio of the ultimate perfection.
Sed hoc manifeste apparet falsum in delectationibus intellectualibus. Aliquis enim non solum delectatur in generatione scientiae, puta cum addiscit aut miratur, sicut supra dictum est; sed etiam in contemplando secundum scientiam iam acquisitam. Alio vero modo, quia dicebat optimum illud quod est simpliciter summum bonum, quod scilicet est ipsum bonum quasi abstractum et non participatum, sicut ipse Deus est summum bonum.
But this clearly appears false in intellectual pleasures. For one does not only take pleausre in the generation of knowledge, for example when he learns or wonders, just as was said above; but also in contemplating according to knowledge already acquired. Truly in a way, because he says the best is that which is simply the summum bonum, that certainly is itself good as though removed and not particpated, as God himself is the summum bonum.
Nos autem loquimur de optimo in rebus humanis. Optimum autem in unaquaque re est ultimus finis. Finis autem, ut supra dictum est, dupliciter dicitur, scilicet ipsa res, et usus rei; sicut finis avari est vel pecunia, vel possessio pecuniae.
BUt we speak about the best in human things. Now the best in one thing is the ultimate end. NOw the end, as was said above, can be taken in two ways, namely the thing itself, and the use of the thing; just as the end is to covet or money, or the possession of money. (?)
Et secundum hoc, ultimus finis hominis dici potest vel ipse Deus, qui est summum bonum simpliciter; vel fruitio ipsius, quae importat delectationem quandam in ultimo fine. Et per hunc modum aliqua delectatio hominis potest dici optimum inter bona humana.
And according to this, the ultimate end of man can be said to be God himself, who is the summum bonum simpliciter, or his enjoyment (fruition) which imports a certain delight in the ultimate end (AHA - DEFINITION FRUITION!) and in this way some delight of man can be said to be the best among human goods.

Quarto, utrum delectatio sit mensura vel regula secundum quam iudicetur bonum vel malum in moralibus.
[35021] Iª-IIae q. 34 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum.
Moral goodness or malice principally consists in the will, as was said above. Now whether the will is good or bad is chiefly known by its goal (ex fine). Now something is had for an end, because the will rests in it. Now the rest of the will, (and of any appetite) in good is delight. And therefore according to the delight of the human will, the human being is chiefly (praceipue) judged good or bad; for one is good and virtuous who rejoices (gaudet) in works of virtue; but he is bad in bad works. But delights of the sensitive apetite are not the rule of moral goodness or badness, for sustenance (food - cibus) is commonly pleasurable according to the sensitive appetite, for the good and the bad. But the will of good things takes pleasure in them according as they go along with reason (secundum convenientiam rationis) which a bad will does not care about.

The remedies of sorrow

question 38

Deinde considerandum est de remediis doloris seu tristitiae. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quinque. Primo, utrum dolor vel tristitia mitigetur per quamlibet delectationem. Secundo, utrum mitigetur per fletum. Tertio, utrum per compassionem amicorum. Quarto, utrum per contemplationem veritatis. Quinto, utrum per somnum et balnea.
Is pain or sorrow assuaged by every pleasure?
Is it assuaged by weeping?
Is it assuaged by the sympathy of friends?
Is it assuaged by contemplating the truth?
Is it assuaged by sleep and baths?

1. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex praedictis patet, delectatio est quaedam quies appetitus in bono convenienti; tristitia autem est ex eo quod repugnat appetitui. Unde sic se habet delectatio ad tristitiam in motibus appetitivis, sicut se habet in corporibus quies ad fatigationem, quae accidit ex aliqua transmutatione innaturali, nam et ipsa tristitia fatigationem quandam, seu aegritudinem appetitivae virtutis importat. Sicut igitur quaelibet quies corporis remedium affert contra quamlibet fatigationem, ex quacumque causa innaturali provenientem; ita quaelibet delectatio remedium affert ad mitigandam quamlibet tristitiam, ex quocumque procedat.

As is clear from the above, pleasure is a certain rest of the appetite in a convenient good; but sadness comes from something being repugnant to the appetite. Whence pleasure so holds itself to sadness among the appetitive motions, as rest to fatigue in bodies, which happens from some unnatural change, for sadness itself is a certain fatigue or imports a sickness of the appetitive power. As therefore any rest of the body bears a remedy for any fatigue, from whatever cause the unnatural is coming from so any pleasure brings a remedy to mitigate any sadness, which proceeds from anything.

2)
Respondeo dicendum quod lacrimae et gemitus naturaliter mitigant tristitiam. Et hoc duplici ratione. Primo quidem, quia omne nocivum interius clausum magis affligit, quia magis multiplicatur intentio animae circa ipsum, sed quando ad exteriora diffunditur, tunc animae intentio ad exteriora quodammodo disgregatur, et sic interior dolor minuitur. Et propter hoc, quando homines qui sunt in tristitiis, exterius suam tristitiam manifestant vel fletu aut gemitu, vel etiam verbo, mitigatur tristitia. Secundo, quia semper operatio conveniens homini secundum dispositionem in qua est, sibi est delectabilis. Fletus autem et gemitus sunt quaedam operationes convenientes tristato vel dolenti. Et ideo efficiuntur ei delectabiles. Cum igitur omnis delectatio aliqualiter mitiget tristitiam vel dolorem, ut dictum est, sequitur quod per planctum et gemitum tristitia mitigetur.
Tears and sighing naturally mitigate sadness. And this for two reasons. The first, becuase every harmful thing afflicts more as it is closed up more inside, because the intention of the soul is greatly increased concerning it, but when it is diffused outward, the the intention of the soul is in a way dispersed outward, and so interior pain is diminished. ANd because of this, when men who are in sadnesses, manifest their sadness more outwardly by weeping or sighing, or even by words, sadness is mitigated (I prefer sighs to groans, becuase then he goes even to "words").
SEcondly, because every operation convenient to man according to the disposition in which he is, is pleasurable to him. Now weeping and sighing are certain congenial/convenient/connatural to being saddened or grieving. And so they become pleasurable to oneself. Since therefore every pleasure somehow mitigates sadness or pain, as was said, it follows that through lamenting and sighing sadness is mitigated.


ARTICLE 3 - the love of friends (prologue - compassionum amicorum - 1st obj - compatientis)

Respondeo dicendum quod naturaliter amicus condolens in tristitiis, est consolativus. Cuius duplicem rationem tangit philosophus in IX Ethic. Quarum prima est quia, cum ad tristitiam pertineat aggravare, habet rationem cuiusdam oneris, a quo aliquis aggravatus alleviari conatur. Cum ergo aliquis videt de sua tristitia alios contristatos, fit ei quasi quaedam imaginatio quod illud onus alii cum ipso ferant, quasi conantes ad ipsum ab onere alleviandum et ideo levius fert tristitiae onus, sicut etiam in portandis oneribus corporalibus contingit. Secunda ratio, et melior, est quia per hoc quod amici contristantur ei, percipit se ab eis amari; quod est delectabile, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus condolens tristitiam mitiget.
Naturally a friend grieving together in sadness is consoling. Aristotle touches upon two reasons in 9 Ethics. One of which si because, when sadness pertains to weighing down, it has the character (ratio) of some kind of load, from which emburdenment one is constrained (conatur) to be alleviated.
Now when someone sees others saddened concerning one's sorrow, it seems to him by a certain imagination that his others bear his load with him, as though constrained to alleviate him form the burden and therefore he bears the burden of his sorrow more lightly, also as it happens in carrying bodily burdens.
The second reason, and better, is because one perceives himself to be loved by his friends through their being saddened with him; which is pleasurable, as was said above. Hence, since every pleasure mitigates sadness, as was said above, so it follows that a friend grieving with one mitigates sadness. (Why is it better? because it actually causes pleasure - through being loved by his friends).

Article 4
DOES CONTEMPLATION OF THE TRUTH mitigate sorrow?

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in contemplatione veritatis maxima delectatio consistit.
Maximal delight consists in this.
Omnis autem delectatio dolorem mitigat, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo contemplatio veritatis mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius aliquis est amator sapientiae. Et ideo homines ex contemplatione divina et futurae beatitudinis, in tribulationibus gaudent; secundum illud Iacobi I, omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in tentationes varias incideritis.
Now every pleasure mitigates pain, as was said above. And therefore the contemplation of turth mitigates sorrow or pain, and much more, the more perfectly is someone a lover of wisdom. And therefore men rejoice in tribulations from the contemplation of divine things and future beatitude; acc. to James I - Think everything joy, my brothers, when you fall into various temptations.
Et quod est amplius, etiam inter corporis cruciatus huiusmodi gaudium invenitur, sicut Tiburtius martyr, cum nudatis plantis super ardentes prunas incederet, dixit, videtur mihi quod super roseos flores incedam, in nomine Iesu Christi.
And this is more, also when joy is found in a tortured body, as the martyr Tiburtius, when he walked barefoot on burning coals, said, "It seems to me that I walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ."

5. Do sleep and baths mitigate?

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tristitia secundum suam speciem repugnat vitali motioni corporis. Et ideo illa quae reformant naturam corporalem in debitum statum vitalis motionis, repugnant tristitiae, et ipsam mitigant. Per hoc etiam quod huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex his delectatio, hoc enim est quod delectationem facit, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.
Sandess is according to its species repugnant to the vital motion. ANd therefore those things which reform the bodily nature to its proper state of vital movement, is repugnant to sadness, and mitigate it. Go from within the body itself - counteract the movement. Through this also because remedies of this kind reduce nature to its proper state, pleasure is caused, for this is what makes delight, as was said above. Nature in its proper state also causes pleasure. Whence, since every pleasure mitigates sadness, through bodily remedies such as these sadness is mitigated.