melancholia in aquinas?

[34949] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod id in quo delectatur tristatus, etsi non sit simile tristitiae, est tamen simile homini contristato. Quia tristitiae contrariantur proprio bono eius qui tristatur. Et ideo appetitur delectatio ab his qui in tristitia sunt, ut conferens ad proprium bonum, inquantum est medicativa contrarii. Et ista est causa quare delectationes corporales, quibus sunt contrariae quaedam tristitiae, magis appetuntur, quam delectationes intellectuales, quae non habent contrarietatem tristitiae, ut infra dicetur. Exinde etiam est quod omnia animalia naturaliter appetunt delectationem, quia semper animal laborat per sensum et motum. Et propter hoc etiam iuvenes maxime delectationes appetunt; propter multas transmutationes in eis existentes, dum sunt in statu augmenti. Et etiam melancholici vehementer appetunt delectationes, ad expellendum tristitiam, quia corpus eorum quasi pravo humore corroditur, ut dicitur in VII Ethic.

[34950] Iª-IIae q. 32 a. 7 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod bona corporalia in quadam mensura consistunt, et ideo superexcessus similium corrumpit proprium bonum. Et propter hoc efficitur fastidiosum et contristans, inquantum contrariatur bono proprio hominis.

THIS LATTER PART I CAN INCLUDE IN MY "ARS VIVENDI" PART OF THE MORALITY OF PLEASURE AT THE END - what i wanted to call "objective".

In a way, sorrow creates a subject in a way that pleasure does not - pleasure is more focused upon objects, sorrow is more rooted in subjects. (sounds weird because in pleasure consists in a good/perfection of the subject, but in sorrow, the absence of the material makes us fall back on the subject)

Don't forget to look at this stuff!

Reply to Objection 3. The object of the will is the end and the good in universal. Consequently there can be no will in those things that lack reason and intellect, since they cannot apprehend the universal; but they have a natural appetite or a sensitive appetite, determinate to some particular good. Now it is clear that particular causes are moved by a universal cause: thus the governor of a city, who intends the common good, moves, by his command, all the particular departments of the city. Consequently all things that lack reason are, of necessity, moved to their particular ends by some rational will which extends to the universal good, namely by the Divine will.

From I-IIae qu. 1 art. 2)

(From art. 3 of same question..)
I answer that Each thing receives its species in respect of an act and not in respect of potentiality; wherefore things composed of matter and form are established in their respective species by their own forms. (I wonder if this can be applied to thinking passions...?) And this is also to be observed in proper movements. For since movements are, in a way, divided into action and passion, (Each movmenT also perhaps? acc. to my theory of 22.1) each of these receives its species from an act; action indeed from the act which is the principle of acting, and passion from the act which is the terminus of the movement. Wherefore heating, as an action, is nothing else than a certain movement proceeding from heat, while heating as a passion is nothing else than a movement towards heat: and it is the definition that shows the specific nature. And either way, human acts, whether they be considered as actions, or as passions, receive their species from the end. For human acts (both called acts)can be considered in both ways, since man moves himself, and is moved by himself.
This is verrrrrrrry interesting!!!!
Now it has been stated above (Article 1) that acts are called human, inasmuch as they proceed from a deliberate will. Now the object of the will is the good and the end. And hence it is clear that the principle of human acts, in so far as they are human, is the end. In like manner it is their terminus: for the human act terminates at that which the will intends as the end; thus in natural agents the form of the thing generated is conformed to the form of the generator. And since, as Ambrose says (Prolog. super Luc.) "morality is said properly of man," moral acts properly speaking receive their species from the end, for moral acts are the same as human acts.

there is other important moral stuff in here - about everything being guided to the last end - place also of jest - also not thinking every moment, but by virtue of the first intention - just like walking on a road don't have to think of the destination every step (but powerful image of walking)

the last article is also interesting - just for animals

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Phys. ii, 2), the end is twofold--the end "for which" and the end "by which"; viz. the thing itself in which is found the aspect of good, and the use or acquisition of that thing. Thus we say that the end of the movement of a weighty body is either a lower place as "thing," or to be in a lower place, as "use"; and the end of the miser is money as "thing," orpossession of money as "use."

If, therefore, we speak of man's last end as of the thing which is the end, thus all other things concur in man's last end, since God is the last end of man and of all other things. If, however, we speak of man's last end, as of the acquisition of the end, then irrational creatures do not concur with man in this end. For man and other rational creatures attain to their last end by knowing and loving God: this is not possible to other creatures, which acquire their last end, in so far as they share in the Divine likeness, inasmuch as they are, orlive, or even know.

am homo et aliae rationales creaturae consequuntur ultimum finem cognoscendo et amando Deum, quod non competit aliis creaturis, quae adipiscuntur ultimum finem inquantum participant aliquam similitudinem Dei, secundum quod sunt, vel vivunt, vel etiam cognoscunt.

Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure? This is very interesting and very important....

Article 6. Whether man's happiness consists in pleasure?

Objection 1. It would seem that man's happiness consists in pleasure. For since happiness is the last end, it is not desired for something else, but other things for it. But this answers to pleasure more than to anything else: "for it is absurd to ask anyone what is his motive in wishing to be pleased" (Ethic. x, 2). Therefore happiness consists principally in pleasure and delight.

Objection 2. Further, "the first cause goes more deeply into the effect than the second cause" (De Causis i). Now the causality of the end consists in its attracting the appetite. Therefore, seemingly that which moves most the appetite, answers to the notion of the last end. Now this is pleasure: and a sign of this is that delight so far absorbs man's will and reason, that it causes him to despise other goods. Therefore it seems that man's last end, which is happiness, consists principally in pleasure.

Objection 3. Further, since desire is for good, it seems that what all desire is best. But all desire delight; both wise and foolish, and even irrational creatures. Therefore delight is the best of all. Therefore happiness, which is the supreme good, consists in pleasure.

On the contrary, Boethius says (De Consol. iii): "Any one that chooses to look back on his past excesses, will perceive that pleasures had a sad ending: and if they can render a man happy, there is no reason why we should not say that the very beasts are happy too."

I answer that, Because bodily delights are more generally known, "the name of pleasure has been appropriated to them" (Ethic. vii, 13), although other delights excel them: and yet happiness does not consist in them. Because in every thing, that which pertains to its essence is distinct from its proper accident: thus in man it is one thing that he is a mortal rational animal, and another that he is a risible animal. We must therefore consider that every delight is a proper accident resulting from happiness, or from some part of happiness; since the reason that a man is delighted is that he has some fitting good, either in reality, or in hope, or at least in memory. Now a fitting good, if indeed it be the perfect good, is precisely man's happiness: and if it is imperfect, it is a share of happiness, either proximate, or remote, or at least apparent. Therefore it is evident that neither is delight, which results from the perfect good, the very essence of happiness, but something resulting therefrom as its proper accident.

But bodily pleasure cannot result from the perfect good even in that way. For it results from a good apprehended by sense, which is a power of the soul, which power makes use of the body. Now good pertaining to the body, and apprehended by sense, cannot be man's perfect good. For since the rational soul excels the capacity of corporeal matter, that part of the soul which is independent of a corporeal organ, has a certain infinity in regard to the body and those parts of the soul which are tied down to the body: just as immaterial things are in a way infinite as compared to material things, since a form is, after a fashion, contracted and bounded by matter, so that a form which is independent of matter is, in a way, infinite. Therefore sense, which is a power of the body, knows the singular, which is determinate through matter: whereas the intellect, which is a power independent of matter, knows the universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains an infinite number of singulars. Consequently it is evident that good which is fitting to the body, and which causes bodily delight through being apprehended by sense, is not man's perfect good, but is quite a trifle as compared with the good of the soul. Hence it is written (Wisdom 7:9) that "all gold in comparison of her, is as a little sand." And therefore bodily pleasure is neither happiness itself, nor a proper accident of happiness.

Reply to Objection 1. It comes to the same whether we desire good, or desire delight, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in good: thus it is owing to the same natural force that a weighty body is borne downwards and that it rests there. Consequently just as good is desired for itself, so delight is desired for itself and not for anything else, if the preposition "for" denote the final cause. But if it denote the formal or rather the motive cause, thus delight is desirable for something else, i.e. for the good, which is the object of that delight, and consequently is its principle, and gives it its form: for the reason that delight is desired is that it is rest in the thing desired.

Reply to Objection 2. The vehemence of desire for sensible delight arises from the fact that operations of the senses, through being the principles of our knowledge, are more perceptible. And so it is that sensible pleasures are desired by the majority.

Reply to Objection 3. All desire delight in the same way as they desire good: and yet they desire delight by reason of the good and not conversely, as stated above (ad 1). Consequently it does not follow that delight is the supreme and essential good, but that every delight results from some good, and that some delight results from that which is the essential and supreme good.

interesting also earlier is whether the good of the body or something like that is beatitude - analogy of ship and navigation.

Article 7. Whether some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness?

Objection 1. It would seem that some good of the soul constitutes man's happiness. For happiness is man's good. Now this is threefold: external goods, goods of the body, and goods of the soul. But happiness does not consist in external goods, nor in goods of the body, as shown above (4,5). Therefore it consists in goods of the soul.

Objection 2. Further, we love that for which we desire good, more than the good that we desire for it: thus we love a friend for whom we desire money, more than we love money. But whatever good a man desires, he desires it for himself. Therefore he loves himself more than all other goods. Now happiness is what is loved above all: which is evident from the fact that for its sake all else is loved and desired. Therefore happiness consists in some good of man himself: not, however, in goods of the body; therefore, in goods of the soul.

Objection 3. Further, perfection is something belonging to that which is perfected. But happiness is a perfection of man. Therefore happiness is something belonging to man. But it is not something belonging to the body, as shown above (Article 5). Therefore it is something belonging to the soul; and thus it consists in goods of the soul.

On the contrary, As Augustine says (De Doctr. Christ. i, 22), "that which constitutes the life of happiness is to be loved for its own sake." But man is not to be loved for his own sake, but whatever is in man is to be loved for God's sake. Therefore happiness consists in no good of the soul.

I answer that, As stated above (Question 1, Article 8), the end is twofold: namely, the thing itself, which we desire to attain, and the use, namely, the attainment or possession of that thing. If, then, we speak of man's last end, it is impossible for man's last end to be the soul itself or something belonging to it. Because the soul, considered in itself, is as something existing in potentiality: for it becomes knowing actually, from being potentially knowing; and actually virtuous, from being potentially virtuous. Now since potentiality is for the sake of act as for its fulfilment, that which in itself is in potentiality cannot be the last end. Therefore the soul itself cannot be its own last end.

In like manner neither can anything belonging to it, whether power, habit, or act. For that good which is the last end, is the perfect good fulfilling the desire. Now man's appetite, otherwise the will, is for the universal good. And any good inherent to the soul is a participated good, and consequently a portioned good. Therefore none of them can be man's last end.

But if we speak of man's last end, as to the attainment or possession thereof, or as to any use whatever of the thing itself desired as an end, thus does something of man, in respect of his soul, belong to his last end: since man attains happiness through his soul. Therefore the thing itself which is desired as end, is that which constitutes happiness, and makes man happy; but the attainment of this thing is called happiness. Consequently we must say that happiness is something belonging to the soul; but that which constitutes happiness is something outside the soul.

Reply to Objection 1. Inasmuch as this division includes all goods that man can desire, thus the good of the soul is not only power, habit, or act, but also the object of these, which is something outside. And in this way nothing hinders us from saying that what constitutes happiness is a good of the soul.

Reply to Objection 2. As far as the proposed objection is concerned, happiness is loved above all, as the good desired; whereas a friend is loved as that for which good is desired; and thus, too, man loves himself. Consequently it is not the same kind of love in both cases. As to whether man loves anything more than himself with the love of friendship there will be occasion to inquire when we treat of Charity.

Reply to Objection 3. Happiness, itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is an inherent good of the soul; but that which constitutes happiness, viz. which makes man happy, is something outside his soul, as stated above.

Article 8. Whether any created good constitutes man's happiness?

Objection 1. It would seem that some created good constitutes man's happiness. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. vii) that Divine wisdom "unites the ends of first things to the beginnings of second things," from which we may gather that the summit of a lower nature touches the base of the higher nature. But man's highest good is happiness. Since then the angel is above man in the order of nature, as stated in I, 111, 1, it seems that man's happiness consists in man somehow reaching the angel.

Objection 2. Further, the last end of each thing is that which, in relation to it, is perfect: hence the part is for the whole, as for its end. But the universe of creatures which is called the macrocosm, is compared to man who is called the microcosm (Phys. viii, 2), as perfect to imperfect. Therefore man's happiness consists in the whole universe of creatures.

Objection 3. Further, man is made happy by that which lulls his natural desire. But man's natural desire does not reach out to a good surpassing his capacity. Since then man's capacity does not include that good which surpasses the limits of all creation, it seems that man can be made happy by some created good. Consequently some created good constitutes man's happiness.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xix, 26): "As the soul is the life of the body, so God is man's life of happiness: of Whom it is written: 'Happy is that people whose God is the Lord' (Psalm 143:15)."

I answer that, It is impossible for any created good to constitute man's happiness. For happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether; else it would not be the last end, if something yet remained to be desired. Now the object of the will, i.e. of man's appetite, is the universal good; just as the object of the intellect is the universal true. Hence it is evident that naught can lull man's will, save the universal good. This is to be found, not in any creature, but in God alone; because every creature has goodness by participation. Wherefore God alone can satisfy the will of man, according to the words of Psalm 102:5: "Who satisfieth thy desire with good things." Therefore God alone constitutes man's happiness.

Reply to Objection 1. The summit of man does indeed touch the base of the angelic nature, by a kind of likeness; but man does not rest there as in his last end, but reaches out to the universal fount itself of good, which is the common object of happiness of all the blessed, as being the infinite and perfect good.

Reply to Objection 2. If a whole be not the last end, but ordained to a further end, then the last end of a part thereof is not the whole itself, but something else. Now the universe of creatures, to which man is compared as part to whole, is not the last end, but is ordained to God, as to its last end. Therefore the last end of man is not the good of the universe, but God himself.

Reply to Objection 3. Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him: but it is less than the good of which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinite. And the participated good which is in an angel, and in the whole universe, is a finite and restricted good.

power - wikipedia
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Power_(philosophy)

good essay on foucault

http://www.mun.ca/phil/codgito/vol3/v3doc2.html

never noticed - is pleausre in time - has to do also with "movement" and my analysis of contemplation

(slightly of interest - though less so - is the question whether movement is a source of pleasure.. very backhandedly related)

Article 2. Whether delight is in time?
Objection 1. It would seem that delight is in time. For "delight is a kind of movement," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. i, 11). But all movement is in time. Therefore delight is in time.
Objection 2. Further, a thing is said to last long and to be morose in respect of time. But some pleasures are called morose. Therefore pleasure is in time.
Objection 3. Further, the passions of the soul are of one same genus. But some passions of the soul are in time. Therefore delight is too.
On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. x, 4) that "no one takes pleasure according to time."
I answer that, A thing may be in time in two ways: first, by itself; secondly, by reason of something else, and accidentally as it were. For since time is the measure of successive things, those things are of themselves said to be in time, to which succession or something pertaining to succession is essential: such are movement, repose, speech and such like. On the other hand, those things are said to be in time, by reason of something else and not of themselves, to which succession is not essential, but which are subject to something successive. Thus the fact of being a man is not essentially something successive; since it is not a movement, but the term of a movement or change, viz. of this being begotten: yet, because human being is subject to changeable causes, in this respect, to be a man is in time.
Accordingly, we must say that delight, of itself indeed, is not in time: for it regards good already gained, which is, as it were, the term of the movement. But if this good gained be subject to change, the delight therein will be in time accidentally: whereas if it be altogether unchangeable, the delight therein will not be in time, either by reason of itself or accidentally.
Reply to Objection 1. As stated in De Anima iii, 7, movement is twofold. One is "the act of something imperfect, i.e. of something existing in potentiality, as such": this movement is successive and is in time. Another movement is "the act of something perfect, i.e. of something existing in act," e.g. to understand, to feel, and to will and such like, also to have delight. This movement is not successive, nor is it of itself in time.
Reply to Objection 2. Delight is said to be long lasting or morose, according as it is accidentally in time.
Reply to Objection 3. Other passions have not for their object a good obtained, as delight has. Wherefore there is more of the movement of the imperfect in them than in delight. And consequently it belongs more to delight not to be in time.

Articulus 2
[34840] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod delectatio sit in tempore. Delectatio enim est motus quidam, ut in I Rhetoric. philosophus dicit. Sed motus omnis est in tempore. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.
[34841] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, diuturnum, vel morosum, dicitur aliquid secundum tempus. Sed aliquae delectationes dicuntur morosae. Ergo delectatio est in tempore.
[34842] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, passiones animae sunt unius generis. Sed aliquae passiones animae sunt in tempore. Ergo et delectatio.
[34843] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in X Ethic., quod secundum nullum tempus accipiet quis delectationem.
[34844] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod aliquid contingit esse in tempore dupliciter, uno modo, secundum se; alio modo, per aliud, et quasi per accidens. Quia enim tempus est numerus successivorum, illa secundum se dicuntur esse in tempore, de quorum ratione est successio, vel aliquid ad successionem pertinens, sicut motus, quies, locutio, et alia huiusmodi. Secundum aliud vero, et non per se, dicuntur esse in tempore illa de quorum ratione non est aliqua successio, sed tamen alicui successivo subiacent. Sicut esse hominem de sui ratione non habet successionem, non enim est motus, sed terminus motus vel mutationis, scilicet generationis ipsius, sed quia humanum esse subiacet causis transmutabilibus, secundum hoc esse hominem est in tempore. Sic igitur dicendum est quod delectatio secundum se quidem non est in tempore, est enim delectatio in bono iam adepto, quod est quasi terminus motus. Sed si illud bonum adeptum transmutationi subiaceat, erit delectatio per accidens in tempore. Si autem sit omnino intransmutabile, delectatio non erit in tempore nec per se, nec per accidens.
[34845] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicitur in III de anima, motus dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, qui est actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, inquantum huiusmodi, et talis motus est successivus, et in tempore. Alius autem motus est actus perfecti, idest existentis in actu; sicut intelligere, sentire et velle et huiusmodi, et etiam delectari. Et huiusmodi motus non est successivus, nec per se in tempore.
[34846] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectatio dicitur diuturna vel morosa, secundum quod per accidens est in tempore.
[34847] Iª-IIae q. 31 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod aliae passiones non habent pro obiecto bonum adeptum, sicut delectatio. Unde plus habent de ratione motus imperfecti, quam delectatio. Et per consequens magis delectationi convenit non esse in tempore.

citation - operations more akin to pleasures b/c conjoined to them

CITATION: - 34.1 - are all pleasures evil? And another reason can be taken form the part of hte operation, of which some are good good, and some bad.For operations are more akin to pleasures, because they are conjoined to them, as concupiscence, which precedes them in time. Whence, since the desires of good operations are good, but evil ones are bad; so much more are the pleasures of good operations good, but of evil ones, evil.

One of the most explanatory passages in the treatise on passions

This has the explanation of the physiology that I need - one of the most united explanations.... I guess it is a peak article structurally, when you think about it - if passion pertains to defect, and sorrow is the most passionate of hte passions - here is the question that asks what does this mean concretely... and the question is even asked from the opposite point of view - sorrow appears in the objections as something spiritual - belonging to the soul - especially possible after the "shift" of 35. 1, 2, and 7.

Objection 1. It would seem that sorrow is not most harmful to the body. For sorrow has a spiritual existence in the soul. But those things which have only a spiritual existence do not cause a transmutation in the body: as is evident with regard to the images of colors, which images are in the air and do not give color to bodies. Therefore sorrow is not harmful to the body.
Objection 2. Further if it be harmful to the body, this can only be due to its having a bodily transmutation in conjunction with it. But bodily transmutation takes place in all the passions of the soul, as stated above (22, 1,3). Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
Objection 3. Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 3) that "anger and desire drive some to madness": which seems to be a very great harm, since reason is the most excellent thing in man. Moreover, despair seems to be more harmful than sorrow; for it is the cause of sorrow. Therefore sorrow is not more harmful to the body than the other passions of the soul.
On the contrary, It is written (Proverbs 17:22): "A joyful mind maketh age flourishing: a sorrowful spirit drieth up the bones": and (Proverbs 25:20): "As a moth doth by a garment, and a worm by the wood: so the sadness of a man consumeth the heart": and (Sirach 38:19): "Of sadness cometh death."

I answer that, Of all the soul's passions, sorrow is most harmful to the body. The reason of this is because sorrow is repugnant to man's life in respect of the species of its movement, and not merely in respect of its measure or quantity, as is the case with the other passions of the soul. For man's life consists in a certain movement, which flows from the heart to the other parts of the body: and this movement is befitting to human nature according to a certain fixed measure. Consequently if this movement goes beyond the right measure, it will be repugnant to man's life in respect of the measure of quantity; but not in respect of its specific character: whereas if this movement be hindered in its progress, it will be repugnant to life in respect of its species.
Now it must be noted that, in all the passions of the soul, the bodily transmutation which is their material element, is in conformity with and in proportion to the appetitive movement, which is the formal element: just as in everything matter is proportionate to form. Consequently those passions that imply a movement of the appetite in pursuit of something, are not repugnant to the vital movement as regards its species, but they may be repugnant thereto as regards its measure: such are love, joy, desire and the like; wherefore these passions conduce to the well-being of the body; though, if they be excessive, they may be harmful to it. On the other hand, those passions which denote in the appetite a movement of flight or contraction, are repugnant to the vital movement, not only as regards its measure, but also as regards its species; wherefore they are simply harmful: such are fear and despair, and above all sorrow which depresses the soul by reason of a present evil, which makes a stronger impression than future evil. (I remember thinking about what is it about present evil earlier... in 1 or 2)


Reply to Objection 1. Since the soul naturally moves the body, the spiritual movement of the soul is naturally the cause of bodily transmutation. Nor is there any parallel with spiritual images, because they are not naturally ordained to move such other bodies as are not naturally moved by the soul.
Reply to Objection 2. Other passions imply a bodily transmutation which is specifically in conformity with the vital movement: whereas sorrow implies a transmutation that is repugnant thereto, as stated above.
Reply to Objection 3. A lesser cause suffices to hinder the use of reason, than to destroy life: since we observe that many ailments deprive one of the use of reason, before depriving one of life. Nevertheless fear and anger cause very great harm to the body, by reason of the sorrow which they imply, and which arises from the absence of the thing desired. Moreover sorrow too sometimes deprives man of the use of reason: as may be seen in those who through sorrow become a prey to melancholy or madness.

i confuse many things

ok just about charity and ppl - having thought through things very politically and having been attentive to things in the Christian words about the neighbour - Christ's words, readings, Catherine of Siena - the love of neighbour that srpings from and makes the love of God to be something valid... and I also thought makes love of God vivid - leading one to God.
Q. 44.2 - obj and answer 3 - the means are good in relation to hte end - and would derive their malice also from the same thing.. the acedic person may be brought to God through others perhaps more - we do bring God to and with others. Love of neighbour is 'virtually contained' but it had to be made explciit for the less intelligent...
the point is that ppl can be hermits b/c love of neighbour is virtually containe din love of God but it is easy to see my confusion if I was unsure about what I thought of God - if I clung to immanent presences - the "neighbour whom I do see" (James or John, can't remember) - this for me was a link to God, their goodnesses.
and I don't really know how to evaluate this.

zeal and sorrow

i see how zeal is really connected to sorrow and envy - at least the occasional passionate twinge nad even a necessity to actually fight off resenting someone else - inasmuch as one's own good is so beloved and one is that much more zealous about it because suffering of it - and seeing others attain something with ease when one has lost leads one to be unhappy.... this is not the vainglory kind of envy...
aquinas is very careful to distinguish zeal from envy -

Hatred.. and charity?

I am just wondering... as I move onto envy - will it be possible to deal without hatred? I don't htink so. I t has already led me to pleasure, then love. So it seems accordingly I will have to deal with hatred. Don't feel like it right now, however - tomorrow - envy for now.

Physiology of the Heart and Stress

somehow this reminds me of Aquinas....

http://cbs11tv.com/video/?id=35229@ktvt.dayport.com

It's all about that contraction and stuff - tension, no time to relax.

Envy's and mercy's natural genus appearnces

q. 24. 4

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ. Dei ix, 5) that "pity is a kind of virtue." Moreover, the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 7) that modesty is a praiseworthy passion. Therefore some passions are good or evil according to their species.
I answer that, We ought, seemingly, to apply to passions what has been said in regard to acts (18, 5,6; 20, 1)--viz. that the species of a passion, as the species of an act, can be considered from two points of view. First, according to its natural genus; and thus moral good and evil have no connection with the species of an act or passion. Secondly, according to its moral genus, inasmuch as it is voluntary and controlled by reason. In this way moral good and evil can belong to the species of a passion, in so far as the object to which a passion tends, is, of itself, in harmony or in discord with reason: as is clear in the case of "shame" which is base fear; and of "envy" which is sorrow for another's good: for thus passions belong to the same species as the external act.
Reply to Objection 1. This argument considers the passions in their natural

Pleasure as the moral rule

not judged by the sensitive appetite - "BECAUSE FOOD" is pleasurable to all, and yet the virtuous man takes pleasure according to reason....

Respondeo dicendum quod bonitas vel malitia moralis principaliter in voluntate consistit, ut supra dictum est. Utrum autem voluntas sit bona vel mala, praecipue ex fine cognoscitur. Id autem habetur pro fine, in quo voluntas quiescit. Quies autem voluntatis, et cuiuslibet appetitus, in bono, est delectatio. Et ideo secundum delectationem voluntatis humanae, praecipue iudicatur homo bonus vel malus; est enim bonus et virtuosus qui gaudet in operibus virtutum; malus autem qui in operibus malis. Delectationes autem appetitus sensitivi non sunt regula bonitatis vel malitiae moralis, nam cibus communiter delectabilis est secundum appetitum sensitivum, bonis et malis. Sed voluntas bonorum delectatur in eis secundum convenientiam rationis, quam non curat voluntas malorum.

(QUestion on the morality of passions in genearl - article 24 - very simple jump... actualy)
I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways: first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will. If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (18, 05). If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them. Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary. Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil. And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

Article 4. Whether pleasure is the measure or rule by which to judge of moral good or evil?
Objection 1. It would seem that pleasure is not the measure or rule of moral good and evil. Because "that which is first in a genus is the measure of all the rest" (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasure is not the first thing in the moral genus, for it is preceded by love and desire. Therefore it is not the rule of goodness and malice in moral matters.
Objection 2. Further, a measure or rule should be uniform; hence that movement which is the most uniform, is the measure and rule of all movements (Metaph. x, 1). But pleasures are various and multiform: since some of them are good, and some evil. Therefore pleasure is not the measure and rule of morals.
Objection 3. Further, judgment of the effect from its cause is more certain than judgment of cause from effect. Now goodness or malice of operation is the cause of goodness or malice of pleasure: because "those pleasures are good which result from good operations, and those are evil which arise from evil operations," as stated in Ethic. x, 5. Therefore pleasures are not the rule and measure of moral goodness and malice.
On the contrary, Augustine, commenting on Psalm 7:10 "The searcher of hearts and reins is God," says: "The end of care and thought is the pleasure which each one aims at achieving." And the Philosopher says (Ethic. vii, 11) that "pleasure is the architect," i.e. the principal, "end [St. Thomas took "finis" as being the nominative, whereas it is the genitive--tou telous; and the Greek reads "He" (i.e. the political philosopher), "is the architect of the end."], in regard to which, we say absolutely that this is evil, and that, good."
I answer that, Moral goodness or malice depends chiefly on the will, as stated above (Question 20, Article 1); and it is chiefly from the end that we discern whether the will is good or evil. Now the end is taken to be that in which the will reposes: and the repose of the will and of every appetite in the good is pleasure. And therefore man is reckoned to be good or bad chiefly according to the pleasure of the human will; since that man is good and virtuous, who takes pleasure in the works of virtue; and that man evil, who takes pleasure in evil works.
On the other hand, pleasures of the sensitive appetite are not the rule of moral goodness and malice; since food is universally pleasurable to the sensitive appetite both of good and of evil men. But the will of the good man takes pleasure in them in accordance with reason, to which the will of the evil man gives no heed.
Reply to Objection 1. Love and desire precede pleasure in the order of generation. But pleasure precedes them in the order of the end, which serves a principle in actions; and it is by the principle, which is the rule and measure of such matters, that we form our judgment.
Reply to Objection 2. All pleasures are uniform in the point of their being the repose of the appetite in something good: and in this respect pleasure can be a rule or measure. Because that man is good, whose will rests in the true good: and that man evil, whose will rests in evil.
Reply to Objection 3. Since pleasure perfects operation as its end, as stated above (Question 33, Article 4); an operation cannot be perfectly good, unless there be also pleasure in good: because the goodness of a thing depends on its end. And thus, in a way, the goodness of the pleasure is the cause of goodness in the operation.

Reading Aquinas.... clinically?

The summa theologiae on passions is a really weird text, or at least I have a really difficult time knowing how to respond to it as a genre. I think I end up taking a really clinical approach - inasmuch as I tried to systematize it to make some kind of sense of it. And there is a mechanics of passion, not with respect to the actual phenomenon, which involves influence and change (or perfection) or when it is a centre of the soul involves life - something self reflexive and engaged - none of which are so uncomplicated as action/reaction or proposition/response.
So what is the mechanics? Well one can see it in the question on pleasures - no-one can live without pleasures - and also in the remedies of sorrow. Part of the reason I became so depressed is that I did not realize the "necessity of pleasure for life" - that relaxing really is a remedy for sorrow. In reading the dynamics between sorrow and pleasure I came to have a map to situate my own sadnesses, which happened from prior loves which I could not see were getting met, but one cannot forget the habits of sadness which arise from not having pleasures to moderate them. Now it is impossible to say that a person lives without pleasures - even the saddest person has pleasures - even sadness has some suitability. But in terms of bigger sorrows superseding lesser pleasures, or in terms of one sadness hindering every pleasure, in terms of the circularity of depression which can be alleviated by the very rest which can also be ruined by anxieties that prevent the soul not only from fleeing what disturbs it, but from resting so that one can face it.
So where does the opening for really healing pleasures come in? Well there are some sorrows that Aquinas seems to recognize are not alleviated by any pleasure whatsoever - and this falls under penitence - which is sorrow proper - that concerns one's own evil - and this is the kind of sorrow that reappears in 57 or 59 - only the contrary pleasure can relieve it. So..

I am already getting out of the mechanics and into the really tough sorrow which minor things cannot relieve. But... even with the entry of the contrary pleasures of forgiveness, hope, and self esteem that arises from joy, there are still habits to be dealt with. There must be a therapy of pleasures which stretch, expand, open up something's capacity for pleasure that has too long been contracted and tensed. And this is where the mechanics comes in - one pleasure provides that little bit of rest that leaves one capable to do more, and if a greater sinking comes in, it takes only a very little pleasure to open up again because oneself is smaller. But sorrow is not the teacher I thought it was - it hinders teaching and learning, rather. The only way it can speed it up is on the part of compacting one's energy and effort towards expelling the causes of sorrow... but all its usefulness has left it by the time it reaches anxiety and acedia. And looking back over my own life the past couple of years, I had reason to appreciate and even to be happy about my sorrow at first - it was helping me to accomplish something! And the sense of activity was very strong, and activity brought pleasure. But as time went on and sorrow - even the proud sorrow that I had - began to sink further - I don't know why - and whether it is something that I would try to discover in confession or in therapy, of what genus it was, or both, at any rate, I developed an ongoing anxiety which falls along with the clinical definitions of depression - inability to concentrate, guilt complexes about resting, a kind of perpetual but un-focused studying - throwing myself more and more into projects with less and less success at them. And then acedia - the physical kind - I know that too.
But the point is, instead of conceiving a linear or historical or reflexive view alone - which could not provide me with a map of this - if I understand it according to a mechanics whereby it is not just pursuit and rest, but contraction and expansion along with pursuit and rest that does not forget the reflexive appetitive activity and the bodily effects.
So in other words, what is Aquinas doing? How would I describe his approach in a way that combines all these things? The word "organic" comes to mind as it expresses both the self-movement, the changes, and the mechanics that happen in an organism. But he is not a disinterested writer - it takes place in a summa tehologiae - after a prologue that proposes to treat of the human being as "he too is a princple of his actions" and these are the kinds of actions which he shares with the other animals - which are not most properly human (in the sense that other animals are excluded) and yet are most human at the same time.
But it is about ethics then. I should call it the organic entry of passions (organic sounds too much like the vegetative soul, though). He calls it the sensitive appetite.
If one could find a comprehensive way to explain appetite... Now, the field of ethics belongs to the voluntary, and the passions are not quite the voluntary, but the will and the passions sleep together or at least create together - it is a democracy...
it'll come... i'll keep putting things together..

Pleasures and Pains

I am trying to undersatnd what is at stake in Thomas Aquinas writing about pleasures and pains! I am mid-thesis-writing here and too close to the material to understand what is going on. But I think it is also more than that - in working with pleasures and pains in Aquinas, my naivete and lack of psychological wisdom and depth and pastoral experience bumps up with that of a wise person who has had all these things, nourished by grace and reflection. And I am trying to jam it all in a little over a month (well I have been playing with it before but taking it far too much for granted). Pleasures and pains... Aristotle said somewhere (it has been a long time since I have read him!) that this is what morality consists of (in a way). For diagnostic purposes, I think immediately - if someone is pleased in something it means their whole intensio is directed that way. And it is a good thing I said that because it shows the lack of learning which Aquinas can give me. If this is how I thought, it is no wonder that I have had such a difficult time in my youth. It is not an "all or nothing" with Aquinas - all human beings take pleasure in sensible things, and these are not the rule of morality. I placed a study of 3-6 prior to 1, 2, and 7 because I was working best with the idea of the whole that comes out in question 22. In 22, it is not a case of different degrees and powers having different ranges and intensities - having a more democratic common effort than a military common effort, it is absolutist. Oh, there are many degrees along the way - but the thing itself is conceived of as a unity. The subject is sick, or well, or perfect, not only in peak condition but peak operation of all the parts. And I preferred to see this "ontologically" although it isn't really because I was able thereby to set up a barrier between the "me" that I was subonsciously determined to protect. Not that I thought there was a "me" but that something was there that couldn't allow me to understand. I wonder why - it seems so simple! Why should I be miserable when it is possible to be happy? Why do I default on the side of sin? Just sorrow enters into Aquinas, but there is no specific category of guilt. Freud had a tremendous insight - I wonder if he knew how great it was. Was it sexual repression, though? Or is sex the best and "most known" paradigm - insofar as bodily pleasures are known to us? Is it rather that we strain towards perfection and towards pleasure and being happy and that sex is "more knowable" in that sense. Because "repression" doesn't have to be just about sex - that is one symptom or indicator or example or paradigm.

Probably one of the best parts in Aquinas, speaking from the viewpoint of a humble philosopher, is when he talks about the morality of pleasures. He says something to the effect that people have challenged that pleasures are moral, but he points out that when it comes to doing stuff, in which experience or example are more influential than any doctrine, because pleasures are necessary for human life that when people are caught red-handed taking pleasures it rather embarrases their philosophical position. This is one of the most jolly looking things I've ever seen - although nothing really looks jolly in Latin which is why I get bored and have to squint when I read. Which reminds me I want glasses before I'm not on my dad's plan anymore. But Aquinas was wrong - waht about all us poor stupid little students? What about all of us who read too much without trusting to experience and example? (or HAVE no experience BECAUSE we are reading?) What about the eggheads who form their lives on ideologies, not being in the kind of community - or at least a community that is immediate enough - to translate it into practice? When I look at the lives of all the world around me, so different, I realize how much harder it is for me to artifically make my own way and discover the same things through the painful process of "learning" - too, too slow compared with life. When these things happen, I used to hit myself over the head for my stupidity, but I don't even think it is because I am so particularly slow-witted or acedic. I don't know what to blame for unilateralism - and sometimes I don't know whether to hunt down causes that I may address them or press forward and things get corrected through time - which is the "experience" way. I think the second way is more useful, but experience is also only as good as you learn from it. And there is experience in my life. But this is not to forget things I may have learned along the way. For instance, in Aquinas, it is possible to have sorrow usefully and morally. I shouldn't look to my own life as a model or an affirmation of this, becuase I tend too readily to melancholy backed up by habits which have been created in a concrete history for concrete causes - it is "me" but it is not all "me". But the only way I can get a little objectivity is be as capable of pleasure as I am of sadness. And while some pleasures are "imperfect" in this life still they can be more perefct than many. And I realize that I cut off too many sources of pleasure becuase I really thought that all of me was invested in every pleasure - but this is not the case. One needs to distinguish between pleasure and joy - too. I thought all pleasure was pleasure - even joy I sought to - what I thought was "moderate". Looking back I don't undersatnd how I could have been so deceived. Why I became so suspicious of good feelings at all - I guess it was because I was afraid of being blinded and too secure in myself, but I was blinded in another way. I mistrusted pride and I wanted to keep my mood ready for work, but I had long and ceased to have been capable of working because I was so focused upon it, and this led to disintegration which I refused to recognize but which gnawed at me nonetheless. In prizing all those things which St. Paul recommends, there is room for "drinking, eating," and all "to the glory of God." Even watching Star Wars which I am discovering for the first time (as it is hard to find full-length movies on Youtube). (I am astonished how similar it is to Lord of the Rings). I guess I had a kind of anxiety about art for a while inasmuch as I didn't find it to be enough.
maybe also because I have also been very suggestible to art in the past, as well as to other things. And this suggestibility has worked greatly against me - WHETHER I am multi-valent or whether I am one-sided - either way, I can become completely defragmented and overly docile, or I can become rigid and enclosed to protect. I have had both.
And when the intellectual cores were challenged, when the stories I had spun to keep going on the inside - some became tested and thrown away, but I thought that I would have to keep on continuing. I knew nothing of "wheat" - all became "chaff" until there was nothing left.

So what of all this and passions and pleasures?

But this is the kind of thing that leads a person to reject any sensory or imaginative indulgence - becuase it is too much, and one sees the need to develop another part of oneself. And this can accidentally be good - LIKE SO MANY OTHER PATHS! perhaps this is where the individuality really comes in - when something has worked for me because of my peculiar constitution - and other things work for other people with theirs - which is why we really are different - disparate - the degrees of better and better do not really have room to come in until something like that comes in - but we are so much in the world of change that it really is impossible to judge ourselves or others- perfection for us happens in moments which is why we can be critical of others, or of ourselves, or of ourselves in light of others, because we are at different moments because it is becoming virtuous and harmonious.



but it can be extremely painful living without allowing yourself really to take rest in anything.


And extremely counter-productive in another senes, as one has an anxiety that cannot rest.


But what of theology in all this?



Theology does not come in until the second part - where charity is the friendship of God and man, by which God shares the "divine beatitude" with the human being. And I cannot think this abstracted entirely from charity. I can think it independently from charity which leads me to ask about charity. And this is philosophy. And that's why I wouldn't mind finishing up a doctorate.



So what does it mean to take pleasures in a virtuous manner? It is no longer a question of meaning, but of living nad learning and grace and nature. In a way, one cannot look for answers like this, not because it is hopeless or indefinable in the sense of being unknowable, but that they are more lived than said - the saying is infinitely behind, infinitely slower, infinitely piece-by-piece. And yet it is only in the thinking and the articulating that the reflexivity can happen - that life can be conscious. And sure one can reflect immediately in one's head but then it is only one of a gazillion reflections - this is why "intention" (while not being something absolute, being about a "more" of a person in the midst of the infinities of trivia and important things that cross the mind) signifies something that seems really humble in that it is isolated, but really is not humble absolutely speaking, because the "absolute" for us is being a human being - what we have access to, and Christ has made it possible that this no longer means that being ourselves also means that we are left to ourselves, but it is through being human in the body of Christ that glory happens.